F-35 lost
Can anyone confirm what should have happened to BK 18, the report begins, continues and ends in the same convoluted and unclear manner
Red Gear employment policies
1.4.58. To bring conformity to the see-off procedures at RAF Marham a see- off Air Engineering Standing Order (AESO) was created with more detail than the Joint-Service Technical Documentation (JTD) section for 'Aircraft Dispatch Actions (ADA) —Inspections'. The JTD instructions directed that the intake and exhaust should be inspected for FOD but did not explicitly state how to do this. In the REDACTED and the REDACTED who operated the F- 35B and F-35C respectively, the see-off team conducted a check immediately prior to the pilot getting into the aircraft. An engineer climbed into the common duct to check for FOD, a process known as 'diving the duct' which, when completed, was reported to the pilot on their arrival at the aircraft. The JTD did not explicitly instruct the engineer to 'dive the duct,' but the text did include instructions for entering the duct safely and matched those required for the engine intake inspection.
1.4.59. This action of 'diving the duct' was not stipulated in the AESO see- off procedure. In the UK, engineers inspected inside the common duct during a POS/BOS, but this servicing was valid for up to 24 hours. There was no further check in the intervening period before the aircraft went flying. Fitment of Red Gear should have subsequently protected against FOD entering the intake, but as Red Gear was not routinely fitted whilst aircraft were on the flight deck, continuity of protection was lost.
1.4.60. The AESO stated that the see off team should report to the pilot:
'... this is BK-** (as appropriate) all Red Gear has been removed and accounted for and the 3 groundlock safety pins have been removed, placed in the Pin Bag and stowed within the MIP Panel'.