Hawk XX204 Service Inquiry
Have to agree. My experience of PFLs, albeit in a piston engine aircraft, is of picking the field and executing a safe approach with the fear that when the instructor says "that's a goodun" and opens up the throttle....The engine splutters and dies. Result would be one aircraft sans undercart in a field, or worse, for no good reason.
It worked for Sully - commit to landing "out", pick the landing site (preferably a field, not the Hudson) and fly a circuit/approach looking out of the canopy and judging speed and height by the mark one eyeball. A lot safer than the PFLs described above.
If we did always avoid putting ourselves in a position where, if we opened a closed throttle and
The engine splutters and dies.
However, I am sure that few would turn down the opportunity to go gliding but I am not convinced it would really help judgement in higher drag aircraft.
There is a fundamental difference between 'real gliders' and an aeroplane like a Hawk; glide angle (L/D ratio). You are acclimatised to a shallow glide angle plus spoilers to increase the angle on finals if you need to. When you have a much steeper glide angle, and for some types with gear and flaps down it is around 10 degrees, and no spoiler option to increase it if you need to, the required judgement is much different. Yes, you can sideslip some aircraft but it doesn't work in the Hawk. Your TAS is much higher and minimum turn radius much greater in a Hawk so if you realise that your sightline is too low then you have few options for varying ground track to correct it.
However, I am sure that few would turn down the opportunity to go gliding but I am not convinced it would really help judgement in higher drag aircraft.
However, I am sure that few would turn down the opportunity to go gliding but I am not convinced it would really help judgement in higher drag aircraft.
The emphasis during a Forced landing in my day was the final judgement as to whether you would throw it away (PFL), or in the real case, eject in a controlled manner if you were not going to land in a reasonable place on a suitable surface. Although it is nice for a student to ‘get in’ it was this final critical decision that determined whether the student was safe to attempt a PFL/AFL whilst solo. No amount of gliding experience is going to prevent press-on-itis as evidenced by the parameters in this final turn.
In addition to what I said earlier, gliders try to find lift to increase altitude/potential energy. When a high speed aircraft such as a Hawk loses the engine, for real or practise, the only way to increase potential energy is an exchange with kinetic energy. Alternatively, excess kinetic energy (speed) can be used to travel across the ground at constant potential energy. This is another fundamental difference.
With respect to glide angles, most aircraft such as the Hawk will glide gear and flaps up at about 2nm/1000 ft which, as flighthappens has said, is a still air glide ratio of 1:12. Once the gear and flaps are down, this reduces to about 1nm/1000 ft or 1:6.
With respect to glide angles, most aircraft such as the Hawk will glide gear and flaps up at about 2nm/1000 ft which, as flighthappens has said, is a still air glide ratio of 1:12. Once the gear and flaps are down, this reduces to about 1nm/1000 ft or 1:6.
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Axminster Devon
Age: 83
Posts: 166
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As a brand new pilot officer arriving at my Canberra squadron, I happened to have more than 100 hours of gliding under my belt. I had not thought of gliding my bomber – perhaps I had not been near any glider for the last eight months or so. The squadron QFI (Flt Lt Johnny Walker – excellent officer) thought the new pilot on his first check ride would be flummoxed by an unbriefed simulated double-flameout at night.
Sully had more airmanship built into him than many pilots. We universally recognise it. Some of that was an extensive understanding of what we might call one-time critical low speed energy management. The Sully model worked for me. The lessons would be relevant to a Hawk pilot and were essential, however little they actually controlled their falling meteor, to the pilots of Apollo. R3 did not have it in his armoury.
Sully had more airmanship built into him than many pilots. We universally recognise it. Some of that was an extensive understanding of what we might call one-time critical low speed energy management. The Sully model worked for me. The lessons would be relevant to a Hawk pilot and were essential, however little they actually controlled their falling meteor, to the pilots of Apollo. R3 did not have it in his armoury.
Last edited by rlsbutler; 13th Oct 2019 at 21:21.
Join Date: Aug 2018
Location: Down South
Posts: 364
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Does anybody know how Flt Lt Stark is doing in his recovery? Has he returned to work? Is he flying again?
And most importantly, is he receiving psychiatric help? This is going to take a long time to recover from, psychologically. He may never fully recover from it - psychological trauma is tough, as I know all too well, myself. My thoughts are with him and of course the Bayliss family, and all of their friends and colleagues at this difficult time.
And most importantly, is he receiving psychiatric help? This is going to take a long time to recover from, psychologically. He may never fully recover from it - psychological trauma is tough, as I know all too well, myself. My thoughts are with him and of course the Bayliss family, and all of their friends and colleagues at this difficult time.
agree with the above, also highlighting that comparing a (big handful rounded numbers only) 400lb aircraft that will stall at around 40kts with a 1:20+ glide ratio to a 8000lb aircraft, stalling at 145kts with a 1:10 glide ratio is a very different exercise in energy management. Personally I don’t believe they will directly compare!
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: The Alderaan System
Posts: 29
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Last edited by Homelover; 14th Oct 2019 at 21:39.
Another turnback fatality. In the JP environment, ( where I was trained and instructed) back in the late 60s we stopped them after a number of accidents practising for an exceptionally unlikely event, in fact I can’t recall a single efato. .
Time to consign such practice, but not PFL, to the sim. ?
Time to consign such practice, but not PFL, to the sim. ?
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Axminster Devon
Age: 83
Posts: 166
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Another turnback fatality. In the JP environment, ( where I was trained and instructed) back in the late 60s we stopped them after a number of accidents practising for an exceptionally unlikely event, in fact I can’t recall a single efato. .
Time to consign such practice, but not PFL, to the sim. ?
Time to consign such practice, but not PFL, to the sim. ?
Never mind. It is a serious exercise of skill, not as seriously risky as the late, long and expensive habit of practising for the loss of a Meteor or Canberra engine.
Yours is an answer to the existential question for a dedicated military pilot. I felt it was my business to be completely on top of my aircraft. Poking about in the dodgy corners of its performance was part of my job. That is an alternative answer.
I regret my feeling that the modern RAF thinks it can legislate away risk. The Hawk SI seems to be more concerned with its "contract" parameters than with failures of essential airmanship. Do its senior officers believe that its fighting assets will never be at risk ? As a civil transport pilot, do you really think that is a valid military policy ?
I was not speaking as a transport pilot, but as a former RAF standards QFI.
I , too, wanted and tried hard to be, right on top of handling my jet, “just” a JP but CFS decided the risk of turnbacks was not worth the gain.
That may have changed.
.....and yes, as a former Canberra pilot, I had a sound grasp of, and excellent training on, asymmetric ops. such that on my two engine failures, both in b. awkward situations, we survived but long after the Canberra came into service asymmetric training was still being refined and being made safer. Perhaps less risky might be a better description, as the Wyton (IIRC) station commander was killed on an asymmetric accident almost at the end of Canberra service. The Canberra was a big JP on two engines ( except for the PR9) but on one it had to be flown with great care.
.. of course military aircraft will always have a risk factor far greater than in civil aviation, but I believe, even those risks must be measured against gain.
I , too, wanted and tried hard to be, right on top of handling my jet, “just” a JP but CFS decided the risk of turnbacks was not worth the gain.
That may have changed.
.....and yes, as a former Canberra pilot, I had a sound grasp of, and excellent training on, asymmetric ops. such that on my two engine failures, both in b. awkward situations, we survived but long after the Canberra came into service asymmetric training was still being refined and being made safer. Perhaps less risky might be a better description, as the Wyton (IIRC) station commander was killed on an asymmetric accident almost at the end of Canberra service. The Canberra was a big JP on two engines ( except for the PR9) but on one it had to be flown with great care.
.. of course military aircraft will always have a risk factor far greater than in civil aviation, but I believe, even those risks must be measured against gain.
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 14th Oct 2019 at 14:57.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So what happens now ? Is the pilot likely to be court martialled ?
DV
Two questions
...
Q 1. Would a non-aircrew occupant of an ejection seat, whether authorised as 'passenger' or 'supernumerary crew' ever have enough training or experience to be able to identify a developing hazard, sufficient to justify self-ejection, given that the developing hazard had not yet been articulated by the aircraft captain ?
Q 2. If this aircraft had been fitted with command ejection under the control of the aircraft captain, would it have made any difference to the actual outcome of this specific crash ?
LFH
...
Q 1. Would a non-aircrew occupant of an ejection seat, whether authorised as 'passenger' or 'supernumerary crew' ever have enough training or experience to be able to identify a developing hazard, sufficient to justify self-ejection, given that the developing hazard had not yet been articulated by the aircraft captain ?
Q 2. If this aircraft had been fitted with command ejection under the control of the aircraft captain, would it have made any difference to the actual outcome of this specific crash ?
LFH
...
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lordflasheart
In my honest opinion the the answer to Q1 is 'No'. I suspect that in the case of the XX204 accident Cpl Bayliss would not have known there was a problem until he was 'scorched' by the flames from the pilot's seat rocket pack as he left the aircraft. That is why it is important for the rear seat to go first.
Again, in my honest opinion, the answer to Q2 is 'Yes'. Cpl Bayliss would have gone first.
I am sure that the coroner, who will apply the 'balance of probability' test, will come to the same conclusions.
This case has the same sickening theme, regarding risk assessment/management, as the 2012 Tornado accident. In that case the root cause was not the lack of CWS but the fact that the ODH signed off to say the risk was ALARP without it. Now we have a ODH signing off to say ALL risks are ALARP, even though the emergency egress system was connected 'arse about face' for the task in hand. At lease the command ejection system in the Tornado had Front/Rear/Both options.
DV
In my honest opinion the the answer to Q1 is 'No'. I suspect that in the case of the XX204 accident Cpl Bayliss would not have known there was a problem until he was 'scorched' by the flames from the pilot's seat rocket pack as he left the aircraft. That is why it is important for the rear seat to go first.
Again, in my honest opinion, the answer to Q2 is 'Yes'. Cpl Bayliss would have gone first.
I am sure that the coroner, who will apply the 'balance of probability' test, will come to the same conclusions.
This case has the same sickening theme, regarding risk assessment/management, as the 2012 Tornado accident. In that case the root cause was not the lack of CWS but the fact that the ODH signed off to say the risk was ALARP without it. Now we have a ODH signing off to say ALL risks are ALARP, even though the emergency egress system was connected 'arse about face' for the task in hand. At lease the command ejection system in the Tornado had Front/Rear/Both options.
DV
...
Q 1. Would a non-aircrew occupant of an ejection seat, whether authorised as 'passenger' or 'supernumerary crew' ever have enough training or experience to be able to identify a developing hazard, sufficient to justify self-ejection, given that the developing hazard had not yet been articulated by the aircraft captain ?
Possibly a Hawk experienced pax with some civvy flying experience might have put a hand onto the seat pan handle once full flap was selected and the AOB was approaching 70deg with the a/c overshooting the rwy centre line and with the ROD increasing - when I was young and switched on I would like to think I might have.However if the backseater did 'bang out' uncommanded - would they then take at least part of the blame for the ensuing crash ?
Q 2. If this aircraft had been fitted with command ejection under the control of the aircraft captain, would it have made any difference to the actual outcome of this specific crash ?
Possibly but in this case it would have been a very close call due to the ultra late/low ejection decision.
LFH
...
Q 1. Would a non-aircrew occupant of an ejection seat, whether authorised as 'passenger' or 'supernumerary crew' ever have enough training or experience to be able to identify a developing hazard, sufficient to justify self-ejection, given that the developing hazard had not yet been articulated by the aircraft captain ?
Possibly a Hawk experienced pax with some civvy flying experience might have put a hand onto the seat pan handle once full flap was selected and the AOB was approaching 70deg with the a/c overshooting the rwy centre line and with the ROD increasing - when I was young and switched on I would like to think I might have.However if the backseater did 'bang out' uncommanded - would they then take at least part of the blame for the ensuing crash ?
Q 2. If this aircraft had been fitted with command ejection under the control of the aircraft captain, would it have made any difference to the actual outcome of this specific crash ?
Possibly but in this case it would have been a very close call due to the ultra late/low ejection decision.
LFH
...
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Dark Side of West Wales
Age: 85
Posts: 161
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Was Cpl Bayliss ordered to eject? I could see no mention of this in the report and this leaves me somewhat puzzled. Way back in the 1950's when things were far more relaxed, groundcrew and other lucky people who got to have a ride in a Vampire or Hunter T7 got a thorough briefing on what to expect and what to do/not do. Paramount was on the command "eject, eject" immediately pull legs back against the seat and reach up and pull red handle. If you say "what" you will get not reply because I would have already gone. I cannot help wondering if this is what happened in this case as the pilot got out awfully late.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DODGYOLDFART
1.4.352. Verbal Warning. The command to a passenger to initiate an ejection is "eject, eject, eject". The engineer had been briefed that if a hazardous situation occurred from which it was required to abandon the aircraft, he would be given the command to eject. R3 recalled stating a short warning, but not 'eject' x 3, and instinctively pulled the ejection handle; he was uncertain if he said it prior to or as he pulled the handle. The Panel considered that if R3's warning was made during the ejection sequence there was a possibility that the engineer did not hear it as the pilot's intercom may have been separated from the main aircraft. Furthermore, and in the Panel's opinion, even if the engineer had heard the warning there was insufficient time for him to react before the aircraft hit the ground. Having heard it he would have been required to recognise the meaning and act appropriately.
DV
1.4.352. Verbal Warning. The command to a passenger to initiate an ejection is "eject, eject, eject". The engineer had been briefed that if a hazardous situation occurred from which it was required to abandon the aircraft, he would be given the command to eject. R3 recalled stating a short warning, but not 'eject' x 3, and instinctively pulled the ejection handle; he was uncertain if he said it prior to or as he pulled the handle. The Panel considered that if R3's warning was made during the ejection sequence there was a possibility that the engineer did not hear it as the pilot's intercom may have been separated from the main aircraft. Furthermore, and in the Panel's opinion, even if the engineer had heard the warning there was insufficient time for him to react before the aircraft hit the ground. Having heard it he would have been required to recognise the meaning and act appropriately.
DV