Vulcans Falkland Raid
What did the UK pay for fuel delivered to the Black Buck Ops in those days?
The pump price in Blighty has naught to do with the price of fuel at the Forward Operating Base, costs to provide that inflight fuel to the Tankers and the Attack Aircraft.
Cost to Benefit has never been a real consideration in War.
The point he was making as I recall reading it....was to show how much more effective the use of Tactical Assets in the Falklands was to the Black Buck Raid with all of its complexity.
Seems your point about .92 P a unit is a bit useless.
If you are going to attempt to criticize his views.....do find something better than that can't you?
The pump price in Blighty has naught to do with the price of fuel at the Forward Operating Base, costs to provide that inflight fuel to the Tankers and the Attack Aircraft.
Cost to Benefit has never been a real consideration in War.
The point he was making as I recall reading it....was to show how much more effective the use of Tactical Assets in the Falklands was to the Black Buck Raid with all of its complexity.
Seems your point about .92 P a unit is a bit useless.
If you are going to attempt to criticize his views.....do find something better than that can't you?
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The point he was making as I recall reading it....was to show how much more effective the use of Tactical Assets in the Falklands was to the Black Buck Raid with all of its complexity.
If that was the case, having an entire Annex using numerous tables and calculations based up fuel cost was not necessary, talking about the millions of £ per bomb are a side track to the argument, or was he proving the point that it was an extravagant use of money?
I don't doubt there is a strong element of the later involved
Originally Posted by giblets
...So in true geek style, did a little research, fuel at the time was around $0.92 a gallon (don't get me started on UK/UK gallons), or £0.50p (based on the exchange rate of the time.
Makes the cost of the black buck raids a more manageable £65,000 in fuel (basically divide all the costs by 8), or £188k (based on inflation), compare that to $1.45m for a tacit Tomahawk (yes I appreciate the numerous other incurred costs!).
Makes the cost of the black buck raids a more manageable £65,000 in fuel (basically divide all the costs by 8), or £188k (based on inflation), compare that to $1.45m for a tacit Tomahawk (yes I appreciate the numerous other incurred costs!).
Didn't all other flying (e.g. C.130 re-supplying the Task Force, Nimrod flights, etc.) have to be suspended for a three-day period for each Black Buck raid owing to the exhaustion of aviation fuel at Ascension?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
UK pump price is for petrol with taxes paid. Military fuel is not petrol and is tax free (one of the moans of the trains over planes lobby is the duty-free aspect of Avtur).
Did the bearded one consider the cost of over 30 Harrier sorties, all dedicated to dive bombing Stanley, in daylight, from sufficient height to achieve cratering?
I wonder how many 1000lb bombs the magazines on the carriers carried?
Thirty tons is 'not a lot' but is a significant user of space.
Did the bearded one consider the cost of over 30 Harrier sorties, all dedicated to dive bombing Stanley, in daylight, from sufficient height to achieve cratering?
I wonder how many 1000lb bombs the magazines on the carriers carried?
Thirty tons is 'not a lot' but is a significant user of space.
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Cost of 4* equivalent petrol in 1982 was £1.64 per gallon according to the AA.
Aviation-grade kerosene fuel with icing inhibitor (F-34 FSII), as used in jet turbine aircraft including the Vulcan, Harriers etc, was priced between 0.95 and 0.96 cents a gallon during the Falklands War, which would have been approximately 50p a gallon at 1982 prices.
Last edited by The Helpful Stacker; 7th Jan 2013 at 18:35.
Did the bearded one consider the cost of over 30 Harrier sorties,
If you wish to throw in the second bomb that hit adjacent to the runway....lets double the number of necessary hits to equal that success.
GW1 showed the attrition rate of ground attacking a well defended airfield, and we didn't have many spare Harriers.
Sharkey does have a rather one-eyed view of the conflict - how many mentions of the RAF ground attack aircraft are there in his book?
For an alternative perspective, Jerry Pook's book (ISBN 184884556-1) makes an interesting read, although I suspect he and Sharkey have similar views on task force senior management.
Sharkey does have a rather one-eyed view of the conflict - how many mentions of the RAF ground attack aircraft are there in his book?
For an alternative perspective, Jerry Pook's book (ISBN 184884556-1) makes an interesting read, although I suspect he and Sharkey have similar views on task force senior management.
Last edited by Fitter2; 7th Jan 2013 at 18:59.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Does it really take 30 Harrier sorties to get a single bomb on the runway and thus equal the damage done by the Black Buck Raids that had 63 bombs between them?
We were on a knife edge from start to finish - up to the last day and the surrender of Stanley.
Hindsight is wonderful...........
For the required weapon effects the impact angle is critical. Please remember the capabilities of the Harrier at the time as well as the considerable threat from the airfield itself.
Fitter....when you changed from low level airfield attacks and went to Medium Height as done by other Coalition aircraft....were not the results just as good and losses minimal compared to the early low level attacks?
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ORAC (and others)
I don't have a huge axe to grind on this one. I served down there (on HMS Invincible), alongside Sharkey and many other FAA colleagues. We were grateful for any help down there, and you are quite right that we were on the knife edge right the way through.
Just to set the record straight, the Vulcan raid was one component of a combined effort against Stanley that day. As well as Black Buck, nine SHARs of 800 NAS attacked the airfield, hitting both runway and parked aircraft. (three more SHARs attacked Goose Green). Shortly afterwards, warships closed the coast and bombarded the airfield with 4.5 inch shells, damaging more aircraft. There were no GR3 attacks that day, because they weren't available for ops until 20th May.
The Vulcan was certainly 'the right thing to do' - it was offered, it was available and it added more effort. but it was one part, and eventually a minor part, of the war. It wasn't 'decisive', and it wasn't 'the most daring raid' of the war. But that doesn't take a single thing away from the brave and professional crews who got the aircraft there and back. It was a damn fine effort.
The only thing I ask is that when we post, please take the time to get it right. really right, and make sure that we honour the efforts of all those who fought down there.
Best Regards as ever to all those who did it then and those who are still doing it now,
Engines
I don't have a huge axe to grind on this one. I served down there (on HMS Invincible), alongside Sharkey and many other FAA colleagues. We were grateful for any help down there, and you are quite right that we were on the knife edge right the way through.
Just to set the record straight, the Vulcan raid was one component of a combined effort against Stanley that day. As well as Black Buck, nine SHARs of 800 NAS attacked the airfield, hitting both runway and parked aircraft. (three more SHARs attacked Goose Green). Shortly afterwards, warships closed the coast and bombarded the airfield with 4.5 inch shells, damaging more aircraft. There were no GR3 attacks that day, because they weren't available for ops until 20th May.
The Vulcan was certainly 'the right thing to do' - it was offered, it was available and it added more effort. but it was one part, and eventually a minor part, of the war. It wasn't 'decisive', and it wasn't 'the most daring raid' of the war. But that doesn't take a single thing away from the brave and professional crews who got the aircraft there and back. It was a damn fine effort.
The only thing I ask is that when we post, please take the time to get it right. really right, and make sure that we honour the efforts of all those who fought down there.
Best Regards as ever to all those who did it then and those who are still doing it now,
Engines
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
There is a world of hurt difference between medium altitude night attacks with good ECM coverage and SEAD support and daylight attacks against SAM and radar controlled guns.
Remember the Losses too PN.....that was the point of the question.
I know the USAF and RAF differed on how to tackle the problem and early on the RAF went their way...took losses and in time changed to the other method that had been suggested to be the safer way to go.
That is my reading of Horner anyway....and as he was there I shall have to go with his version until someone can prove otherwise.
It is not about courage and ability....it is all about minimizing risk and still getting the job done is it not?
From the RAF website.....
From a UK Newspaper.....
I know the USAF and RAF differed on how to tackle the problem and early on the RAF went their way...took losses and in time changed to the other method that had been suggested to be the safer way to go.
That is my reading of Horner anyway....and as he was there I shall have to go with his version until someone can prove otherwise.
It is not about courage and ability....it is all about minimizing risk and still getting the job done is it not?
From the RAF website.....
The Tornado GR1s - thanks to their uniquely effective JP233 airfield denial munition - made a particularly distinguished contribution to the counter-air element of the campaign. The offensive counter-air task facing the coalition was daunting. There were only two anti-runway weapons available; the F-111s armed with the French Durandal and the Tornado/JP233 combination. Because of the known limitations of the Durandal, it fell to the Tornados to take on the Iraqi runways.
The Tornados were tasked to attack over a dozen Iraqi main operating bases at low-level supported by F-15 fighters, F-4G 'Wild Weasels' and EF-111A 'Raven' electronic countermeasures aircraft. The F-15s, flying in the fighter sweep and escort roles cleared away Iraqi fighters, the 'Wild Weasels' fired HARM anti-radiation missiles to close down enemy SAM and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) radars, whilst the EF-111s suppressed the Iraqi early warning radars.
Nevertheless, the Tornado crews still had to fly through intense AAA fire to reach their targets, and it was soon realised that simultaneous toss attacks against AAA clusters by other Tornados using 1,000lb bombs would help further to clear the way for the JP233-armed aircraft. After four nights the air opposition had been effectively neutralised, for the loss of four Tornados. Eight Iraqi main operating bases had been closed while the operations of several others had been markedly reduced.
The Tornados were tasked to attack over a dozen Iraqi main operating bases at low-level supported by F-15 fighters, F-4G 'Wild Weasels' and EF-111A 'Raven' electronic countermeasures aircraft. The F-15s, flying in the fighter sweep and escort roles cleared away Iraqi fighters, the 'Wild Weasels' fired HARM anti-radiation missiles to close down enemy SAM and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) radars, whilst the EF-111s suppressed the Iraqi early warning radars.
Nevertheless, the Tornado crews still had to fly through intense AAA fire to reach their targets, and it was soon realised that simultaneous toss attacks against AAA clusters by other Tornados using 1,000lb bombs would help further to clear the way for the JP233-armed aircraft. After four nights the air opposition had been effectively neutralised, for the loss of four Tornados. Eight Iraqi main operating bases had been closed while the operations of several others had been markedly reduced.
Four British airmen and up to four Tornado aircraft may have been lost unnecessarily at the beginning of the Gulf war because of "disgraceful interference" by a senior officer at the Ministry of Defence, the former commander of the British forces says in a forthcoming documentary.
The senior officer is believed to be Marshal of the RAF Sir David Craig, then Chief of Defence Staff. The claim is made by General Sir Peter de la Billiere, now retired, in a BBC1 documentary series, The Gulf War, which begins on 9 January and marks the fifth anniversary of the 1991 conflict. During the war Sir Peter oversaw the operations of British troops, sailors and airmen.
In the film, he says that the loss of some of the Tornados could have been averted if the RAF had switched from low to high-level bombing sooner. It is understood Sir Peter and the RAF commander in Saudi Arabia, Air Vice Marshal Bill Wratten, recommended the switch and that the joint commander of the operation, based in Britain, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, agreed with them. But a "senior officer" in the MoD, who could only have been the Chief of Defence Staff, demurred.
"It was a decision of substantial magnitude," Sir Peter says. "It was going to impact on the whole of the RAF's strategy as developed for Europe and put it into question . . . indeed, I saw a letter from a senior Air Force officer in the MoD [believed to be Sir David] saying in effect that if we changed it, [i.e. switching from low- to high-level bombing] then my air commander wasn't doing his job. I've never seen such a disgraceful letter in my life."
Interviewed for the series, the United States air commander in the Gulf, Lt-Gen "Chuck" Horner, said: "I don't think there's any doubt about it. The Tornado losses were in part due to the low-altitude tactics." Lt-Gen Horner suggests that he was relieved when the British changed their tactics, but said he could not force them to.
The senior officer is believed to be Marshal of the RAF Sir David Craig, then Chief of Defence Staff. The claim is made by General Sir Peter de la Billiere, now retired, in a BBC1 documentary series, The Gulf War, which begins on 9 January and marks the fifth anniversary of the 1991 conflict. During the war Sir Peter oversaw the operations of British troops, sailors and airmen.
In the film, he says that the loss of some of the Tornados could have been averted if the RAF had switched from low to high-level bombing sooner. It is understood Sir Peter and the RAF commander in Saudi Arabia, Air Vice Marshal Bill Wratten, recommended the switch and that the joint commander of the operation, based in Britain, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, agreed with them. But a "senior officer" in the MoD, who could only have been the Chief of Defence Staff, demurred.
"It was a decision of substantial magnitude," Sir Peter says. "It was going to impact on the whole of the RAF's strategy as developed for Europe and put it into question . . . indeed, I saw a letter from a senior Air Force officer in the MoD [believed to be Sir David] saying in effect that if we changed it, [i.e. switching from low- to high-level bombing] then my air commander wasn't doing his job. I've never seen such a disgraceful letter in my life."
Interviewed for the series, the United States air commander in the Gulf, Lt-Gen "Chuck" Horner, said: "I don't think there's any doubt about it. The Tornado losses were in part due to the low-altitude tactics." Lt-Gen Horner suggests that he was relieved when the British changed their tactics, but said he could not force them to.
Last edited by SASless; 7th Jan 2013 at 21:47.
Engines
My comments were about the overall anti runway effort from 1st May - 13 Jun. On the 1st May SHAR attack on Stanley, only one SHAR of the nine was tasked to attack the runway with 1000lbs retarded bombs (flown by Flt Lt Penfold), of the other 8, three lofted VT 1000lbs bombs to airburst over the airfield defences while the rest dropped CBU's to take out soft skinned targets. Only one aircraft was confirmed destroyed, and that was an Islander whose tail was chopped off by a CBU (some other aircraft were damaged but none of them were Military). The Goose Green attack on the other hand did destroy one Pucara and damage a couple of others. The first GR3 low level attack was on the 24 May when 4 aircraft managed to get 9 retarded 1000lbs bombs on to the runway, However the 1 Sqn CO at the time and Sqn Ldr Pook both state that the 40ms delay that was set on the bomb fuzes without their advice minimised the effect of the attack on the runway surface. All other attacks on Stanley Airfield by Harriers (bar one rushed low level 2in rocket attack by 2 GR3's on 30 May to attack suspected swept wing aircraft spotted by a SHAR) were either loft attacks, random 1000lbs dropped by SHAR on their way to CAP stations or the failed attempts to guide LGB's using the GR3 LRMTS as the illuminator (they thought it would work thanks to some duff gen). In all of those cases none of the bombs came as close as those from Black Buck one and two. To be Honest, I agree with a hell of a lot of what Sharkey wrote in 'Sea Harrier in the Falklands', because its not just him that has a go at how the air war was fought, Jerry Pook has equally bad things to say (though not about the FAA) and both are backed up in more diplomatic speak by two other Harrier pilots who have published works (one is on-line only). There is a published bomb plot of what weapons landed where on the airfield in the Book 'Falklands - The Air War' which shows the impact points of 1000lbs bombs and CBU's...plus the Sea Slugs that Glamorgan lobbed at the place.
My comments were about the overall anti runway effort from 1st May - 13 Jun. On the 1st May SHAR attack on Stanley, only one SHAR of the nine was tasked to attack the runway with 1000lbs retarded bombs (flown by Flt Lt Penfold), of the other 8, three lofted VT 1000lbs bombs to airburst over the airfield defences while the rest dropped CBU's to take out soft skinned targets. Only one aircraft was confirmed destroyed, and that was an Islander whose tail was chopped off by a CBU (some other aircraft were damaged but none of them were Military). The Goose Green attack on the other hand did destroy one Pucara and damage a couple of others. The first GR3 low level attack was on the 24 May when 4 aircraft managed to get 9 retarded 1000lbs bombs on to the runway, However the 1 Sqn CO at the time and Sqn Ldr Pook both state that the 40ms delay that was set on the bomb fuzes without their advice minimised the effect of the attack on the runway surface. All other attacks on Stanley Airfield by Harriers (bar one rushed low level 2in rocket attack by 2 GR3's on 30 May to attack suspected swept wing aircraft spotted by a SHAR) were either loft attacks, random 1000lbs dropped by SHAR on their way to CAP stations or the failed attempts to guide LGB's using the GR3 LRMTS as the illuminator (they thought it would work thanks to some duff gen). In all of those cases none of the bombs came as close as those from Black Buck one and two. To be Honest, I agree with a hell of a lot of what Sharkey wrote in 'Sea Harrier in the Falklands', because its not just him that has a go at how the air war was fought, Jerry Pook has equally bad things to say (though not about the FAA) and both are backed up in more diplomatic speak by two other Harrier pilots who have published works (one is on-line only). There is a published bomb plot of what weapons landed where on the airfield in the Book 'Falklands - The Air War' which shows the impact points of 1000lbs bombs and CBU's...plus the Sea Slugs that Glamorgan lobbed at the place.
Last edited by MAINJAFAD; 8th Jan 2013 at 03:10.
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When asking the question about fuel planning on the first page I forgot that my colleague Baz H was involved in the planning and he tells me he was instructed to audit the fuel transfers by comparing what actually happened against the Victor ODM expectation. He says the ISA deviations were correct, and suspects that this snippet migrated from a later ghost trail when the F4 manuals tabled fuel flows against what they said was ISA deviation, but actually turned out to be deviation from JSA.
Baz reckons that, in answer to vascodegama's question, the short Victors were all low on fuel, some disastrously so, because the formation took much longer than expected to form up at night in radio silence, this leading in turn to the early transfers taking place at least ten minutes (he says 10 to 15 minutes) further down track than expected. This meant that all the short Victors were down by at least twenty minutes fuel plus the turn, plus the extra ten to fifteen minutes of fuel transferred. Baz says that the actual fuel burns and transfers matched exactly what the Victor ODM would predict for the modified bracket positions, the only exception being he could not account for 5000lbs missing from one tanker. Out of interest, the Vulcan 607 book records an additional 'off plan' 5000lb transfer to the Vulcan, this may be it.
The inference from this is that there was significantly more fuel in the formation than expected after the early transfers.
Baz reckons that, in answer to vascodegama's question, the short Victors were all low on fuel, some disastrously so, because the formation took much longer than expected to form up at night in radio silence, this leading in turn to the early transfers taking place at least ten minutes (he says 10 to 15 minutes) further down track than expected. This meant that all the short Victors were down by at least twenty minutes fuel plus the turn, plus the extra ten to fifteen minutes of fuel transferred. Baz says that the actual fuel burns and transfers matched exactly what the Victor ODM would predict for the modified bracket positions, the only exception being he could not account for 5000lbs missing from one tanker. Out of interest, the Vulcan 607 book records an additional 'off plan' 5000lb transfer to the Vulcan, this may be it.
The inference from this is that there was significantly more fuel in the formation than expected after the early transfers.
Last edited by Alex Whittingham; 8th Jan 2013 at 13:47.
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Originally Posted by The Helpful Stacker
Aviation-grade kerosene fuel with icing inhibitor (F-34 FSII), as used in jet turbine aircraft including the Vulcan, Harriers etc, was priced between 0.95 and 0.96 cents a gallon
The supply of 1,000 bombs in the carriers was, indeed, finite but a similarly finite number of re-loads were available a RAS away in certain solid support RFAs. Re-supplying the re-suppliers, though, would not have been a piece of cake.
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Engaging pedant mode.......
Engaging pedant mode, the in theatre Harriers/SHARs were burning AVCAT with FSII
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Courtney:
Interesting - why? I don't know anything about AVCAT vs F-34?
Yours in ignorance,
S41
We all used a lot of AVCAT in the South Atlantic that year. That could also account for some of the fuel-burn discrepancy for the Black Buck missions.
Yours in ignorance,
S41