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Vulcans Falkland Raid
The Vulcan raid on the Falklands runway was screened this evening
- in which was shown the skill of the numerous Victors and Vulcan crew . It was always understood that the purpose of the mission was to bomb the runway so as to deny its use to enemy fighters - However the film of the bombed runway showed that of the stradle of bombs dropped only one bomb landed on the runway and at that appeared to be at its far end and well to one side - in that the length of the runway was barely affected. All aircrew involved were superb but could it honestly be claimed that the runway had been 'put out of action' and of no further use to enemy jet fighters ? .. |
As I understand it, the straddle was planned. If the bombs were dropped along the length of the runway and were off by more than a few metres the whole thing would have been wasted; there would have been a nice line of holes parallel to the runway. As it was, the one was sufficient in that it prevented the use of the jets.
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i've always thought that 'breaking the runway' was a 'nice to have' - the big points of doing the job was to get the Argentines to concentrate more on defending the homeland than worrying about the FI, and to get a load of conscripts and politically reliable officers to reconsider the wisdom of going to war with a nation that can put a strategic nuclear bomber over their heads a mere 8,000 miles from home...
i'm sure the effect on morale of watching a stick of 21 1000lb bombs going off across your newly captured airfield must have been something to behold as well. |
Hi
No it was not out of action, it was a great peace of flying though. As far as I remember Stanley was not used by Argentinian Fighters as it was unsuitable until fitted with arrestor gear after the surrender. Deepsixteen |
Ah, it must have been at least six months since we had the usual long thread on this...
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...ring-raid.html being the most recent I can think of. The one hole in the runway (contrary to various myths, blogs and letters to the Daily Telegraph) meant that the Argentines couldn't operate fast jets from the runway even if they extended it with the PSP that was there (there were other complications too) because of the limited resources available to fill it in. This is discussed in no little depth in two different articles in the Journal of the Royal Engineers in 1983/84, one written by the Sapper officer who led the team who had to fill it in to a standard which'd permit the operation of FJ. There are an array of myths about the raid and a reasonable amount of public domain information which has emerged which disprove many of the myths; the release of the documents about the war (but not all of them - some have redactions, pointing to other documents which are to be retained for another 10 years...) will help as well, since I suspect that some of the confident recollections of senior officers, intelligence types and politicians of the time - notably the details which emerged during the 2002 Staff College seminar for the 20th anniversary - might have been dulled by the passage of time. I've not gone through many yet, but it is worth noting that one of the War Cabinet documents notes with regret that the Sunday Express was going, by 18th Apr 1982, to claim that the Vulcans were being prepped to bomb the mainland, but also notes that this might be quite handy... The documents also point to the concerns over when to deploy the Vulcans to Ascension because the possible diplomatic ramifications. One of the elements to this discussion noted that shutting the airfield (to combat aircraft?) would be an obvious part of this clearly-stated aim of imposing a TEZ, and thus acceptable. There's a clear sense, even from the few bits of paper I've looked at so far, that there was a far bigger picture than just shutting the runway to FJ going on (there were discussions about using the SAS or naval forces as alternative means of attacking the airfield) - but there's still a lot of paper to go through... |
I remember being taught at Chivenor, on my Hunter course, that it was best to attack a straight-line target at a 30 degree angle so as to hit something, at least.
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What I can't figure out is how they got their fuel flow calculations so badly wrong, and according to tonights film, didn't even monitor fuel flow on the mission, so much so that they were surprised at the final fuel transfer.
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Fuel Planning
I recently had a chat with one of the planners. I think there are 2 issues here. The final Vulcan transfer just north of the FI is relatively easy to explain. Bob T had swapped places with the other remaining Victor (which had a broken probe). This had 2 bearings on the situation. The other AC had to keep enough fuel to reach ASI without the planned AAR and the Victor/Victor transfer had taken part further south than planned (delayed by swap around ) which made matters even worse. The part I have difficulty with is understanding why it is that the short slot ac all landed with low fuel states. The supposition that it is anything to do with the Vulcan fuel figures is a red herring since they only transferred fuel to other Victors. It therefore must be that the Victor assumptions were wrong. I can only think that the ISA Deviation was unknown /unfactored.
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I'd agree with the ISA deviation issue, vasco. One other comment I heard was that there was an ASI discrepancy between the Vulcan and the Victors, so that the formation was flying at a higher IAS than planned - but due to RT silence, no-one could give any warning.
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I always thought that the Vulcans had never been flown at that (heavy) load before for any long distances,and that they were 'off the graph' for fuel consumption figures - presumably because the cruise AoA was a little higher than normal (and thus more draggy)
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ISTR It was mentioned in 'Vulcan 607' that the planners didn't have accurate figures for Vulcan fuel consumption.
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goudie / longer ron - as vascodegama stated, Vulcan fuel figures were irrelevant to the early Victor/Victor transfers.
Yes, they were inaccurate. Allegedly because 'Caligula' provided normal peacetime training weight figures, rather than ODM figures, I'm told....:uhoh: |
Posted by 50+Ray some time ago
Fuel Burn It is my understanding that whenever refuelling happened the receiver was topped right up. So for a considerable time the Vulcan was actually above Max AUW, where it was noticeably thirstier. The other factor was that crews were normally operating at between FL410 and FL450. Since AAR was being done in the high twenties/low thirties the engines burnt more and the groundspeed was less. The relevant pages of the ODM were not looked at in my 7 year stretch on Vulcans, as we just did not operate like that. rgds LR |
The other factor was that crews were normally operating at between FL410 and FL450. Since AAR was being done in the high twenties/low thirties the engines burnt more and the groundspeed was less. The relevant pages of the ODM were not looked at in my 7 year stretch on Vulcans, as we just did not operate like that. As 50+Ray stated "AAR was being done in the high twenties/low thirties " which would have been less efficient but in the other sense. The whole issue with fuel planning was that it was too easy in UK, in peacetime, on simple sorties, not to use the ODM. War planning was a good illustration of how it was frequently done incorrectly. It was a task delegated to the co-pilot, often a very junior pilot. Frequently the wrong speed tables, 240 vice 325, were used. The correct AUW was often used to the target but after the target the off-loaded bomb weight was often converted to useable post-target fuel. It was my job to check and spot these errors (once I had been taught a quick reference check system by a senior navigator). I am not suggesting any of the above errors applied but just to confirm that ODM practice was a rarely practised skill. |
It is fully understood the impact the raid must have had upon the enemy however reverting to the OP - Googling will bring up a report
from a senior naval aviation officer involved there - Rear Admiral S Woodward - 801 Air Sqn who is on record for stating in effect that the actual damage to the runway had been greatly overstated and that the runway remained operational to the enemy up to the last day of the conflict. This is not in any way disputing the hazards faced, skills and bravery of all flyers - But simply asking - was the Rear Admiral right ? |
a senior naval aviation officer involved there - Rear Admiral S Woodward - 801 Air Sqn I suspect the bearded one's opinions being quoted here. |
pasir,
The runway continued to be used by C130 and Puma aircraft until the end of the conflict. However, the Vulcan raid prevented the runway from being used by FJ and that was the intention. I recall reading in one of the books on the conflict that the damage from one of the near misses actually did quite a lot of damage to the runway and it was more significant than the bomb that hit. The same book also pointed out that there was some severe infighting between the various branches of the armed services over how the war was prosecuted. For example, there were references to the South African navy due to Woodward's decision to operate the Task Force well to the east of the FI. I suspect that any criticism of one branch by another must be taken with a grain of salt. |
Continued to be used by Puma or Pucara?
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Originally Posted by PLovett
(Post 7613801)
there were references to the South African navy due to Woodward's decision to operate the Task Force well to the east of the FI.
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Falkland Islands Info Portal - History Articles
The Black Buck Bombing Raid on Stanley Airport The most spectacular RAF exploit was the Vulcan bomber raid on Stanley airport on May 1st, which had significant impact on the conduct of the war and on morale on both sides, far beyond the damage inflicted on the runway. It demonstrated the undreamed of reach of RAF retaliation, and caused colossal psychological repercussions in Argentina, with the realisation that mainland targets were within bombing reach. Code-named 'Black Buck', this was an astonishing feat of arms by any standards. It was the longest operational bombing mission ever attempted, a 6,760 miles round-trip from Ascension Island for the ageing delta-winged bomber whose inadequate navigational system and long-abandoned flight-refuelling capability had to be restored. No fewer than 14 aircraft were deployed to get just one Vulcan to its target. With no intelligence on Argentine fighter and missile defence, the operation had to be carried out at night, in radio silence, with no rehearsal. As soon as the bomber/tanker force roared off the runway at Wideawake Airfield, one of the two Vulcans had to abandon the mission when its pressurisation failed, as did one of the 12 Victor refuelling tankers with a defective hose. Catastrophe was averted when four of the refuelling Victors arrived back at Ascension almost simultaneously, desperately short of fuel. Only the skill of the pilots narrowly avoided a disastrous pile-up on the crowded runway which would have destroyed a quarter of the RAF's total South Atlantic tanker force. Another tanker had a fuel leak and one of the last two tankers broke its probe in a violent tropical storm, leaving only one Victor to press on with the Vulcan, both acutely short of fuel, and in danger of ditching. To maintain surprise, no radio SOS was possible. As the Vulcan began its bombing run, it was detected by Argentine gun-control radar. But its twenty-one 1,000 pound bombs straddled the runway. The explosions woke the startled Islanders from their sleep, but it tremendously boosted their morale. Tony Chater recalls: "The whole house shook, as though there had been an earthquake. There was terrific jubilation. From then on, we felt confident the British forces would come to our rescue." The aircraft broke radio silence with the code-word 'Superfuse' indicating the raid had succeeded. Despite more refuelling problems, the Vulcan managed to get back to Ascension and complete its sixteen-hour mission. Its pilot, Martin Withers, was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and Victor pilot, Box Tuxford, the Air Force Cross. The effort expended was out of all proportion to the damage to the runway which the Argentines continued to use. But the psychological impact was enormous. The Argentine Air Force removed its only dedicated fighter interceptor squadron, the Mirage fighters of Gruppo 8, from Rio Gallegos and Falklands operations, to re-deploy further north at Comodoro Rivadavia for mainland defence. The Argentines had conceded defeat in the crucial battle for air superiority over the battered Task Force. Harriers could hunt down and destroy attacking aircraft without interference from enemy fighters. What the British did not know is that, according to the Argentines, President Galtieri had decided on April 30th to withdraw his forces to comply with the United Nations resolution and to seek negotiations on sovereignty. He reportedly changed his mind as a result of the Vulcan and Harrier attacks on Stanley Airport on May 1st. Falklands 25 « Articles « Fast Air Photography |
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