Remember the Losses too PN.....that was the point of the question.
I know the USAF and RAF differed on how to tackle the problem and early on the RAF went their way...took losses and in time changed to the other method that had been suggested to be the safer way to go.
That is my reading of Horner anyway....and as he was there I shall have to go with his version until someone can prove otherwise.
It is not about courage and ability....it is all about minimizing risk and still getting the job done is it not?
From the RAF website.....
The Tornado GR1s - thanks to their uniquely effective JP233 airfield denial munition - made a particularly distinguished contribution to the counter-air element of the campaign. The offensive counter-air task facing the coalition was daunting. There were only two anti-runway weapons available; the F-111s armed with the French Durandal and the Tornado/JP233 combination. Because of the known limitations of the Durandal, it fell to the Tornados to take on the Iraqi runways.
The Tornados were tasked to attack over a dozen Iraqi main operating bases at low-level supported by F-15 fighters, F-4G 'Wild Weasels' and EF-111A 'Raven' electronic countermeasures aircraft. The F-15s, flying in the fighter sweep and escort roles cleared away Iraqi fighters, the 'Wild Weasels' fired HARM anti-radiation missiles to close down enemy SAM and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) radars, whilst the EF-111s suppressed the Iraqi early warning radars.
Nevertheless, the Tornado crews still had to fly through intense AAA fire to reach their targets, and it was soon realised that simultaneous toss attacks against AAA clusters by other Tornados using 1,000lb bombs would help further to clear the way for the JP233-armed aircraft. After four nights the air opposition had been effectively neutralised, for the loss of four Tornados. Eight Iraqi main operating bases had been closed while the operations of several others had been markedly reduced.
From a UK Newspaper.....
Four British airmen and up to four Tornado aircraft may have been lost unnecessarily at the beginning of the Gulf war because of "disgraceful interference" by a senior officer at the Ministry of Defence, the former commander of the British forces says in a forthcoming documentary.
The senior officer is believed to be Marshal of the RAF Sir David Craig, then Chief of Defence Staff. The claim is made by General Sir Peter de la Billiere, now retired, in a BBC1 documentary series, The Gulf War, which begins on 9 January and marks the fifth anniversary of the 1991 conflict. During the war Sir Peter oversaw the operations of British troops, sailors and airmen.
In the film, he says that the loss of some of the Tornados could have been averted if the RAF had switched from low to high-level bombing sooner. It is understood Sir Peter and the RAF commander in Saudi Arabia, Air Vice Marshal Bill Wratten, recommended the switch and that the joint commander of the operation, based in Britain, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, agreed with them. But a "senior officer" in the MoD, who could only have been the Chief of Defence Staff, demurred.
"It was a decision of substantial magnitude," Sir Peter says. "It was going to impact on the whole of the RAF's strategy as developed for Europe and put it into question . . . indeed, I saw a letter from a senior Air Force officer in the MoD [believed to be Sir David] saying in effect that if we changed it, [i.e. switching from low- to high-level bombing] then my air commander wasn't doing his job. I've never seen such a disgraceful letter in my life."
Interviewed for the series, the United States air commander in the Gulf, Lt-Gen "Chuck" Horner, said: "I don't think there's any doubt about it. The Tornado losses were in part due to the low-altitude tactics." Lt-Gen Horner suggests that he was relieved when the British changed their tactics, but said he could not force them to.