Red Arrows - Flt Lt Jon Egging Inquest
Trim Stab,
I doubt you will find anyone on here who disagrees with the public having the right to know. It is how the information is being conveyed that's the problem. Turning the whole thing into 'public entertainment' is indeed unsavoury, indecent and lacking in respect. I would say that about any individual in similar circumstances too and not just because it is a fellow officer.
I doubt you will find anyone on here who disagrees with the public having the right to know. It is how the information is being conveyed that's the problem. Turning the whole thing into 'public entertainment' is indeed unsavoury, indecent and lacking in respect. I would say that about any individual in similar circumstances too and not just because it is a fellow officer.
All inquests reveal a great deal about the individual and the circumstances leading to their death, much of which is uncomfortable reading for family and friends. It is not "public entertainment" as one facile poster put it - it is simply the result of us being lucky enough to live in an open and rigorous society where accidents are properly investigated.
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Reading the BoI report, there are some references to loss of 'corporate knowledge', in other words, things had happened in the past and over time had been forgotten about. This tragic accident shows, I suppose, that just because things haven't happened for years and years, that doesn't mean that they will never happen again.
maybe something to do with the rush to put all our 'learnings' in e-format (where you have to know what you want to read about and where it is)? I know I learnt plenty of old lessons by browsing through hardcopy BOI and UI reports lying around the t-bar. Having a centralised, ordered, fast-access database of knowledge (ASIMS) is great but you don't see people browsing through it....
Last edited by Sandy Parts; 19th Dec 2012 at 09:44. Reason: spooling
The crash mags have made a "welcome" (if I can use that word) reappearance in the last year. They never truly disappeared, but a massive back-log built up - I think it was almost 3 years between issues, which I think can largely be ascribed to the continual churn between DASC / DARS / MAA and the length and complexity of SIs. Whatever blockage did exist has evidently become un-blocked because they are gradually catching up. It still seems to be a few months between SI report and crash mag, though, presumably because whichever SO3 gets the task of distilling the report has got a bazillion other things to do.
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I think it was almost 3 years between issues
Obviously by reading such reports the squadron pilot can add to his store of knowledge and hope to avoid or mitigate whatever the cause was from happening to him/her.
From reading the link to this enquiry, it also seems that the language of the civilian H&S culture has permeated the service - yet there is little priority to disseminate the vital info to the troops?
If a flight safety publication 'disappeared' for 3 years then how were aircrew getting their info in that time?
On the subject of G-LOCI was once G-LOCed by a colleague in a JP, I don't think we ever reported it, it was most disorientating. I was out for 30 seconds, when I came round I firstly had no idea I was in an aeroplane and it took quite a while before I could function again - please take it easy out there guys.
I was using the term 'issue' pejoratively there to match the phrase 'crash mag'. They are still issued as individual publications for each accident, although perhaps a little thinner now than in years gone by.
In the period where the publications were thin on the ground, there was a bit of communication down the flight safety chain with things like 'Feedback' - essentially brief summaries of incident reports. But it was all a mess, which is why (rightly) the decision to rebuild the IFS was eventually taken.
In the period where the publications were thin on the ground, there was a bit of communication down the flight safety chain with things like 'Feedback' - essentially brief summaries of incident reports. But it was all a mess, which is why (rightly) the decision to rebuild the IFS was eventually taken.
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GLOC Recovery
Please note this is 'lower case' lightningmate 
An individual's recovery from GLOC can be very varied, both in characteristics and duration. Most will have seen video of people suffering GLOC whilst riding the Farnborough Centrifuge and will recall the extreme bodily 'twitching and jerking' that some people demonstrate during recovery. However, when pilots experience GLOC the critical factor is time taken after recovery to become fully aware of the situation and capable of responding correctly. This is the area where risk rises exponentially, particularly when close to something solid.
Some time ago, I reviewed a cockpit video that included a GLOC incident affecting the non-handling pilot; a Hawk with 2-up, luckily for the GLOC guy. The aircraft was operated up to +8Gz and the Guy in the front cockpit went to sleep. Some 5-10 secs after the manoeuvre was completed, the GLOC Guy come onto the intercom muttering 'what's happening etc, I nearly ejected!'. In excess of 3 mins later, the Guy confirmed he felt sufficiently recovered for the aircraft to be gently manoeuvred again.
Thankfully, I recover almost immediately and my brain is fully on-line at the same time - were it different, I would have been a charred mess in a German field!
So, 2 extremes of the human recovery duration spectrum following a GLOC.
lm
An individual's recovery from GLOC can be very varied, both in characteristics and duration. Most will have seen video of people suffering GLOC whilst riding the Farnborough Centrifuge and will recall the extreme bodily 'twitching and jerking' that some people demonstrate during recovery. However, when pilots experience GLOC the critical factor is time taken after recovery to become fully aware of the situation and capable of responding correctly. This is the area where risk rises exponentially, particularly when close to something solid.
Some time ago, I reviewed a cockpit video that included a GLOC incident affecting the non-handling pilot; a Hawk with 2-up, luckily for the GLOC guy. The aircraft was operated up to +8Gz and the Guy in the front cockpit went to sleep. Some 5-10 secs after the manoeuvre was completed, the GLOC Guy come onto the intercom muttering 'what's happening etc, I nearly ejected!'. In excess of 3 mins later, the Guy confirmed he felt sufficiently recovered for the aircraft to be gently manoeuvred again.
Thankfully, I recover almost immediately and my brain is fully on-line at the same time - were it different, I would have been a charred mess in a German field!
So, 2 extremes of the human recovery duration spectrum following a GLOC.
lm
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Sad to say but the black/grey out appears to have been fairly short-lived, and it would appear he was in the process of recovering the aircraft at impact.
Anyone know what the 'normal' peak g on a 380kt team break would be and what Red 8 pulled? In my day the break was 'punchy' but not 'extreme' and tailored by later 'breakers' to follow the preceding and maintain spacing.
Anyone know what the 'normal' peak g on a 380kt team break would be and what Red 8 pulled? In my day the break was 'punchy' but not 'extreme' and tailored by later 'breakers' to follow the preceding and maintain spacing.
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BOAC, have a look at the BoI (or whatever its called now) report by following the link in an earlier posting.
All that 'g' info is there, it very lengthy.
I had posted earlier (deleted) about the team not wearing g-suits except the synchro. This info was based on a ride I had with them in about 1996. Sometime after that they changed to wearing them as a result of a near g-loc experience in the break to land. This is mentioned in the report as well.
On my trip, my pilot, whom I knew well, specifically warned me that the most 'g' pulled would be on the break to land, he certainly snatched hard to over 6g. This was a struggle without a g-suit, and I was a current QFI on type at the time.
I suppose no matter what type you fly or in what role, 'corporate' experience can get lost. It helps if everything is written down, but even then things get omitted during revisions to manuals etc.
All that 'g' info is there, it very lengthy.
I had posted earlier (deleted) about the team not wearing g-suits except the synchro. This info was based on a ride I had with them in about 1996. Sometime after that they changed to wearing them as a result of a near g-loc experience in the break to land. This is mentioned in the report as well.
On my trip, my pilot, whom I knew well, specifically warned me that the most 'g' pulled would be on the break to land, he certainly snatched hard to over 6g. This was a struggle without a g-suit, and I was a current QFI on type at the time.
I suppose no matter what type you fly or in what role, 'corporate' experience can get lost. It helps if everything is written down, but even then things get omitted during revisions to manuals etc.
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Ibuprofen...
From the internet so treat with caution.
The report mentions other side-effects of the drug, but not that one...
From the internet so treat with caution.
In general, ibuprofen also acts as a vasoconstrictor, having been shown to constrict coronary arteries and some other blood vessels mainly because it inhibits the vasodilating prostacyclin produced by cyclooxygenase 2 enzymes
I'm no doc but I understand vasoconstriction to help g-tolerance by providing less room for blood to pool in the lower body. Long as these SI reports are, I wouldn't expect them to have listed all ibuprofen side-effects, just those that might have been a factor in this or another scenario.
Have flown several back-seat trips with RAFAT during pre-season training. It is still the case that pax do not wear g-suits, to avoid them inadvertantly fouling the flying controls. This makes for a challenging experience - and it wasn't the 6g display breaks that I found hardest, it was the 6.5g break to land (complete grey-out despite my best AGSM) and the sustained 4g turn that 8+9 pull at crowd rear whilst holding for what seemed like minutes while the synchro pair did their thing. Brutal!
Have flown several back-seat trips with RAFAT during pre-season training. It is still the case that pax do not wear g-suits, to avoid them inadvertantly fouling the flying controls. This makes for a challenging experience - and it wasn't the 6g display breaks that I found hardest, it was the 6.5g break to land (complete grey-out despite my best AGSM) and the sustained 4g turn that 8+9 pull at crowd rear whilst holding for what seemed like minutes while the synchro pair did their thing. Brutal!
Last edited by Easy Street; 19th Dec 2012 at 20:34.
The BBC lust for reporting of this nature predictably results in accuracy. One newsreader 'quoted' the possible cause as A-Lock...
cuefaye, I appreciate it is SOP to blame the media and that your comment was made before the Service Inquiry report was released, but in fact the SI report does discuss A-LOC ('Almost' Loss of Consciousness) and I suspect that the same term would have been used at the inquest reported on.
RIP.
Last edited by baffman; 19th Dec 2012 at 20:45.
For what it's worth I understand why the local media would choose to have someone reporting live. It's a big story for them, which they have reported in a factual way and not sensationalised.
I felt that due respect was made to Mrs Egging and her trust work in Johns name was promoted. As unpalatable as the whole tragedy is to those of you who knew him, I feel they did a decent job.
I felt that due respect was made to Mrs Egging and her trust work in Johns name was promoted. As unpalatable as the whole tragedy is to those of you who knew him, I feel they did a decent job.
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Easy Street
I'm no doc either but I would think that during a display natural vasodilation would be the normal state of affairs. And the wikiextract specifically mentions coronary arteries and "some other blood vessels".. not enough info...
TP
I'm no doc either but I would think that during a display natural vasodilation would be the normal state of affairs. And the wikiextract specifically mentions coronary arteries and "some other blood vessels".. not enough info...
TP
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I have just read the Service Inquiry Report into Jon’s accident. There are a number of issues in the report that I, as a recently retired fighter pilot, find disturbing.
As most of us thought, the main cause was that, for some reason, Jon blacked out. That could have been due to a rapid onset of G. These days we want to call it G-LOC, A-LOC and other things but it is not something new to fighter aviation. Even in an F4 at 650 kts you could achieve a rapid onset and high peak G, ask some F4 navigators. The benefit we had years ago was we flew twice a day and operated our ac to their limits. The present day pilot is limited by rules and micro-management.
Over the past few years aircrew, and engineers, have been over whelmed in paper work. The total restructure of “Flight Safety” has generated an unmanageable amount of work. This has been to the detriment of Flight Safety. As I left the Service I observed double the number of FSOs on a station, non-of who ever left their office. Everywhere people were worrying about Risk Registers, ALARP, New Management System, and so the list goes on. No time to concentrate on the job in hand.
The change to all Order Books being electronic is fundamentally floored. The hierarchy have been told many times but they choose not to listen. Consequently, pilots are not conversant and familiar with extant regulations. Most of us did not deliberately break the rules but at least in the old days there was a book at the Ops Desk or in the Crew Room to refer to.
The majority of the Recommendations from the Inquiry are modern day “Staff Speak”. Operating fast jet aircraft is a risky business. Obviously you reduce the risk as much as possible but it must not reduce your mission effectiveness. If you partake in Extreme Sports you must accept the associated risk. One of the best ways to mitigate risk was to operate close to the limits on a regular basis. The other way is to not partake. I observe that a cash strapped, risk adverse Air Force has got it’s work cut out if it wishes to maintain the credibility built up over the past 90+ years.
As most of us thought, the main cause was that, for some reason, Jon blacked out. That could have been due to a rapid onset of G. These days we want to call it G-LOC, A-LOC and other things but it is not something new to fighter aviation. Even in an F4 at 650 kts you could achieve a rapid onset and high peak G, ask some F4 navigators. The benefit we had years ago was we flew twice a day and operated our ac to their limits. The present day pilot is limited by rules and micro-management.
Over the past few years aircrew, and engineers, have been over whelmed in paper work. The total restructure of “Flight Safety” has generated an unmanageable amount of work. This has been to the detriment of Flight Safety. As I left the Service I observed double the number of FSOs on a station, non-of who ever left their office. Everywhere people were worrying about Risk Registers, ALARP, New Management System, and so the list goes on. No time to concentrate on the job in hand.
The change to all Order Books being electronic is fundamentally floored. The hierarchy have been told many times but they choose not to listen. Consequently, pilots are not conversant and familiar with extant regulations. Most of us did not deliberately break the rules but at least in the old days there was a book at the Ops Desk or in the Crew Room to refer to.
The majority of the Recommendations from the Inquiry are modern day “Staff Speak”. Operating fast jet aircraft is a risky business. Obviously you reduce the risk as much as possible but it must not reduce your mission effectiveness. If you partake in Extreme Sports you must accept the associated risk. One of the best ways to mitigate risk was to operate close to the limits on a regular basis. The other way is to not partake. I observe that a cash strapped, risk adverse Air Force has got it’s work cut out if it wishes to maintain the credibility built up over the past 90+ years.
Dominator2
As a retired fighter pilot, you are much more qualified to comment on the substance of the inquiry than me but you are barking up the wrong tree with some of your comments. You may have flown twice a day in an F4 but each one of RAFAT's pilots was flying three times a day five days a week during winter work-up so I don't think lack of exposure to repeated high-g manoeuvring inflicted by defence cuts and micro-management is to blame (this time).
As a retired fighter pilot, you are much more qualified to comment on the substance of the inquiry than me but you are barking up the wrong tree with some of your comments. You may have flown twice a day in an F4 but each one of RAFAT's pilots was flying three times a day five days a week during winter work-up so I don't think lack of exposure to repeated high-g manoeuvring inflicted by defence cuts and micro-management is to blame (this time).
Dominator,
Things aren't that bad! No-one's said that G-LOC is a new concept, and Ham Phisted's already pointed out that RAFAT fly 3 times a day and operate up to their limits on every sortie. I'm sure even the F4 force had some published limits and you were told to stay inside them?
I haven't been to a station with more than one full time FSO, and the sqn FSOs certainly did leave their offices! The introduction of things like risk registers were due to the issues surrounding XV230 and the subsequent stand-up of the MAA; which I'm sure most people think is a positive step. All my FSOs did a pretty good job of keeping us informed and operating within the rules, and even on a busy front line FJ squadron I didn't have any problems concentrating on the job in hand. I certainly didn't find rules or sticking to them got in the way of our training.
We also had paper copies of the vast majority of our books too. Aircrew manuals were still paper, and syllabi, orders books etc were managed by a sqn pubs officer who made sure any electronic updates were printed out and publicised. Frankly, most aircrew now are perfectly capable of logging on to a PC and finding the electronic copy of the FOB, GASOs, MAA documents, their platform training syllabus etc; we're not all flummoxed by the lack of a book plonked in front of us on the ops desk.
Every aircraft I've ever flown was operated up to and very occasionally beyond its published limits, and in some I even flew 2 or 3 times a day as well, supported by a pretty robust FS system that didn't generate any extra paperwork for me as an operator.
Things aren't that bad! No-one's said that G-LOC is a new concept, and Ham Phisted's already pointed out that RAFAT fly 3 times a day and operate up to their limits on every sortie. I'm sure even the F4 force had some published limits and you were told to stay inside them?
I haven't been to a station with more than one full time FSO, and the sqn FSOs certainly did leave their offices! The introduction of things like risk registers were due to the issues surrounding XV230 and the subsequent stand-up of the MAA; which I'm sure most people think is a positive step. All my FSOs did a pretty good job of keeping us informed and operating within the rules, and even on a busy front line FJ squadron I didn't have any problems concentrating on the job in hand. I certainly didn't find rules or sticking to them got in the way of our training.
We also had paper copies of the vast majority of our books too. Aircrew manuals were still paper, and syllabi, orders books etc were managed by a sqn pubs officer who made sure any electronic updates were printed out and publicised. Frankly, most aircrew now are perfectly capable of logging on to a PC and finding the electronic copy of the FOB, GASOs, MAA documents, their platform training syllabus etc; we're not all flummoxed by the lack of a book plonked in front of us on the ops desk.
Every aircraft I've ever flown was operated up to and very occasionally beyond its published limits, and in some I even flew 2 or 3 times a day as well, supported by a pretty robust FS system that didn't generate any extra paperwork for me as an operator.
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5 Forward 6 Back
I only made my observations as one who is now on the sideline and thus not directly involved any more. From your comments you appear to be defending a particular corner. You are obviously involved, may I suggest that you step back for a second. I am aware of two stations in Lincolnshire where 2 persons are fulltime employed in FS paperwork.
I fully accept that HC opened up a number of areas where we were not too good. I do, however, believe that the RAF has gone headlong in taking up the recommendations from HC in a belief that this will make all of the problems go away and make flying totally safe.
What is the point of electronic docs if each sqn is going to print it own "unregulated" documents. I have seen first hand a number of times how ammendments to electronic docs at Stn and Gp level have not been promulgated properly and aircrew have flown without being aware of a change in regulations.
I only made my observations as one who is now on the sideline and thus not directly involved any more. From your comments you appear to be defending a particular corner. You are obviously involved, may I suggest that you step back for a second. I am aware of two stations in Lincolnshire where 2 persons are fulltime employed in FS paperwork.
I fully accept that HC opened up a number of areas where we were not too good. I do, however, believe that the RAF has gone headlong in taking up the recommendations from HC in a belief that this will make all of the problems go away and make flying totally safe.
What is the point of electronic docs if each sqn is going to print it own "unregulated" documents. I have seen first hand a number of times how ammendments to electronic docs at Stn and Gp level have not been promulgated properly and aircrew have flown without being aware of a change in regulations.
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Dom...2.
" The change to all Order Books being electronic is fundamentally floored."
Was that a Freudian slip, or just too much polish?
5F6B
"supported by a pretty robust FS system that didn't generate any extra paperwork for me as an operator."
Then you weren't doing it properly. Any FS system requires feedback (e.g. reporting) which, of course, requires extra paperwork - it has been so since Pontius was on the OCU!
But, mostly, deep respect to Jon and his beautiful wife. What a wonderful example they both give to the young people of this country. They are truly heroes!
Rgds SOS
" The change to all Order Books being electronic is fundamentally floored."
Was that a Freudian slip, or just too much polish?
5F6B
"supported by a pretty robust FS system that didn't generate any extra paperwork for me as an operator."
Then you weren't doing it properly. Any FS system requires feedback (e.g. reporting) which, of course, requires extra paperwork - it has been so since Pontius was on the OCU!
But, mostly, deep respect to Jon and his beautiful wife. What a wonderful example they both give to the young people of this country. They are truly heroes!
Rgds SOS
Last edited by SOSL; 21st Dec 2012 at 10:01. Reason: Add "a" & Add "Any" Add "of course" Add "!"