Australian Army Aviation Corps
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"The topic, gentlemen, is mutiny. Mutiny most foul." Captain Jack Sparrow
Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian
Army pilots stage mutiny over chopper fears
- EXCLUSIVE by Ian McPhedran, defence writer
- From: News Limited Network
- December 05, 2012 11:23AM
- Tiger chopper pilots stage mutiny over safety fears
- Mutiny follows aircrew being hit with cockpit fumes
- Defence denies mutiny, says it has support of crew
DOZENS of Army pilots have conducted a mini-mutiny by going on "strike'' and refusing to fly new Tiger attack helicopters after aircrew were hit by cockpit fumes for the third time this year.
The latest emergency occurred at the Cultana military training area in South Australia on November 4 after earlier incidents in March and July. The fleet was not grounded after the third incident.
"The crew applied the standard procedure for smoke or fumes in the cockpit and landed safely at El Alamein Airfield,'' Defence told News Limited.
Pilots were angered by the decision not to suspend flying and aircrew from the Darwin-based 1st Aviation Regiment voted against flying, effectively a mutiny, until all safety concerns were addressed.
The emergency was isolated to the air conditioning unit of a single European built and Brisbane assembled Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH).
Tiger flying was "suspended'' in March and July this year due to cockpit fumes and since 2007 the aircraft has recorded 24 "fume incidents'' which is on a par with other military aircraft.
I don't think so!Defence refused to acknowledge that pilots had actually refused to fly and put the lack of flying down to "a prolonged period in the field and absence from home''.
It did acknowledge aircrew concerns and said a lull in activity was not unusual during "maintenance reset and administration catch-up on return to the unit''.
"Steps being taken by the Chain of Command to address 1st Aviation Regiment aircrew concerns have the full support of the aircrew,'' Defence said.
The army is still flying its Tiger training aircraft at Oakey in southern Queensland and other nations including Germany and France, that chalked up 4000 Tiger hours in Afghanistan, continue to operate the machines.
The Army's 22 Tigers (16 in Darwin) were built by European giant EADS and its subsidiary Eurocopter and assembled in Brisbane by Australian Aerospace at a cost of $2 billion.
A well-placed source said many military pilots were shocked that army pilots were allowed to vote not to fly effectively defying senior officers who judged the aircraft safe to operate.
"Usually you have to fight to stop military pilots from flying,'' a source said.
Defence confirmed that the 1st Aviation Regiment fleet had not flown since the incident at Cultana Training Area on November 4.
"There has been no scheduled operational flying of the ARH aircraft by the 1st Aviation Regiment in Darwin since the fumes incident at Cultana,'' it said.
During the emergency, the two-person crew of the tandem Tiger Helicopter had to open small weather windows inside the cramped cockpit as they conducted a sideslip manoeuvre to rapidly circulate air and dissipate the acrid fumes.
Tiger flying was "suspended'' in March and July this year due to cockpit fumes and since 2007 the aircraft has recorded 24 "fume incidents'' which is on a par with other military aircraft.
In the second incident in July, the window was jammed shut after not being checked during pre-flight inspections so the crew was forced to take the risky step of blowing the canopy off to ventilate the cockpit.
The source of the fumes in the first two incidents has been identified as a faulty capacitor in older models of a power module in the aircraft's multi-function display system.
It is understood a dud air conditioning unit was responsible for the Cultana event and it was isolated to a single aircraft - number 05 off the production line.
According to whistleblowers, safety concerns have prompted several pilots to commence discharge procedures.
In the past year, 22 helicopter pilots have left the army including two from the 1st Aviation Regiment.
Last September, the officer in command of the 1st Aviation Regiment's 162 Reconnaissance Squadron, Major Hayden Archibald, told News Limited that he would love to go to Afghanistan with the Tigers.
The Army was criticised during the inquiry into the death in Afghanistan of pilot Lieutenant Marcus Case where air force investigators highlighted examples of Army's inability to meet operational airworthiness regulations.
Unlike the Navy and RAAF the Army's operational airworthiness authority is non-pilot anmd Forces Commander Major General Mick Slater.
Last edited by Felix the Cat; 5th Dec 2012 at 09:44. Reason: To put in the appropriate skull and crossbones smilie
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Poor Army aviation.......
Something needs to change. Army pilots progress to be senior very rapidly.....and then depart the service almost as quickly, on trend, not that anyone can blame them.
Too small a service, too few aircraft and flying hours, too much tasking.
Someone probably needs to remind government that if you want aviation in the military it costs money. That is unavoidable.
I feel sorry for the Tiger guys. Its not bloody good enough, and they deserve to be looked after - that chopper needs to be fixed or f'd off.
Something needs to change. Army pilots progress to be senior very rapidly.....and then depart the service almost as quickly, on trend, not that anyone can blame them.
Too small a service, too few aircraft and flying hours, too much tasking.
Someone probably needs to remind government that if you want aviation in the military it costs money. That is unavoidable.
I feel sorry for the Tiger guys. Its not bloody good enough, and they deserve to be looked after - that chopper needs to be fixed or f'd off.
How many MRH90's are in service with Army/Navy right now? All quiet on this.
Boeing's offer re ARH was 18 AH-64's for roughly the same dough as the 22 Tigers. Hardly a hard decision to go Boeing....we now pay the price!
Boeing's offer re ARH was 18 AH-64's for roughly the same dough as the 22 Tigers. Hardly a hard decision to go Boeing....we now pay the price!
Last edited by TBM-Legend; 8th Dec 2012 at 10:31.
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Hi lastvarker; your comment is interesting.
In the early 1970s, I established the Helicopter Operations Cell at RAAF Headquarters Operational Command, which worked hand in glove with co-located Army HQ 1 Ground Liaison Group regarding tasking of helicopter effort for Army support training in Australia. At that time, there were a myriad of Army sub-units that managed to get a degree of helicopter training; however, that no longer seems to be the case. It would be really interesting to know now just how much of hours flown now is directed to Army sub-unit training.
On takeover of battlefield support helos in 1989, Army boasted in media recruitment advertising that it was the biggest helicopter operator in Australia with a Kiowa, Squirrel, Iroquois, Blackhawk and subsequently Chinook fleet. If there is now an airframe shortage within Army Aviation, the question arises just how much is that due to the folly of the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan?
The wisdom of Army clamouring to get an AAH also comes to the fore. The RAAF previously viewed the Bushranger gunship capability adequate as it was very cost-effective considering the versatility of the Iroquois platform, enabling adaptation as required for periodic weapons camps so aircrew could be primarily employed for utility aircraft roles. That platform was very economically upgradable making it way superior to the Tiger for intimate close support, in my view. The UH-60L Blackhawk DAP is conceptually similar.
So; considering the politicians are presumably unwilling to commit ADF Tigers to combat (regardless of airworthiness considerations or what the French are doing in Afghanistan), then presumably all of the hours and aircrew resources being burned up on aircrew training in Australia are more or less just boring holes in the sky!
Maybe delusions of grandeur by some former Service Chiefs are now becoming apparent with the ADF trying to operate just too many capabilities. General Peter Leahy, recently retired Chief of Army, wrote an article last week in 'The Australian' positing that Australia cannot afford expeditionary forces, nor that we should involve any more in SE Asia, allowing nations in that region of the world to resolve their own issues. He opined we have to focus more on maritime deterrence capabilities to discourage interference with trade corridors. He speaks great common sense, in my opinion.
The ADF is quite small (about 58,000 sans reserves) and defence expenditure will logically be curbed due to looming national economic circumstances. It seems that the respective armed forces must inevitably also be rationalised to maintain affordable adequate and credible military capacity. Jolting the politicians and DoD into that reality will of course be problematic. From an Air point of view, the question has to be asked, how can 3 separate air arms be justified for such a small military?
Too small a service, too few aircraft and flying hours, too much tasking.
On takeover of battlefield support helos in 1989, Army boasted in media recruitment advertising that it was the biggest helicopter operator in Australia with a Kiowa, Squirrel, Iroquois, Blackhawk and subsequently Chinook fleet. If there is now an airframe shortage within Army Aviation, the question arises just how much is that due to the folly of the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan?
The wisdom of Army clamouring to get an AAH also comes to the fore. The RAAF previously viewed the Bushranger gunship capability adequate as it was very cost-effective considering the versatility of the Iroquois platform, enabling adaptation as required for periodic weapons camps so aircrew could be primarily employed for utility aircraft roles. That platform was very economically upgradable making it way superior to the Tiger for intimate close support, in my view. The UH-60L Blackhawk DAP is conceptually similar.
So; considering the politicians are presumably unwilling to commit ADF Tigers to combat (regardless of airworthiness considerations or what the French are doing in Afghanistan), then presumably all of the hours and aircrew resources being burned up on aircrew training in Australia are more or less just boring holes in the sky!
Maybe delusions of grandeur by some former Service Chiefs are now becoming apparent with the ADF trying to operate just too many capabilities. General Peter Leahy, recently retired Chief of Army, wrote an article last week in 'The Australian' positing that Australia cannot afford expeditionary forces, nor that we should involve any more in SE Asia, allowing nations in that region of the world to resolve their own issues. He opined we have to focus more on maritime deterrence capabilities to discourage interference with trade corridors. He speaks great common sense, in my opinion.
The ADF is quite small (about 58,000 sans reserves) and defence expenditure will logically be curbed due to looming national economic circumstances. It seems that the respective armed forces must inevitably also be rationalised to maintain affordable adequate and credible military capacity. Jolting the politicians and DoD into that reality will of course be problematic. From an Air point of view, the question has to be asked, how can 3 separate air arms be justified for such a small military?
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 9th Dec 2012 at 01:33. Reason: Grammar
From an Air point of view, the question has to be asked, how can 3 separate air arms be justified for such a small military?
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Careful, Bushy 71, you'll get the Army wanting to get their mitts on C-17s and Hornets now!
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No intention by me to start WW3 here; but whichever way you look at the ADF, it is becoming badly broken. The Air Force also has pilot issues with FTS graduates waiting 18 months or so for a Hornet conversion.
There is most urgent need to look at the bigger picture and try to analyse the reasons for emerging shortcomings. Throwing money at hardware will not remedy organisational deficiencies. Unless the political class awakens to the deteriorating military readiness status, the whole show will become more or less moribund pretty quickly.
There is most urgent need to look at the bigger picture and try to analyse the reasons for emerging shortcomings. Throwing money at hardware will not remedy organisational deficiencies. Unless the political class awakens to the deteriorating military readiness status, the whole show will become more or less moribund pretty quickly.
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I read somewhere in the last few days that AAVN is actively recruiting Brit Army Apache pilots, and we've read here of at least one US Army helo pilot joining AAVN.
I appreciate the need for a leavening of experienced crews among the Tiger pilots' ranks, (how in the world could any of the AAVN pilots have gained any experience in state of the art equipment over the last ten years?), but it must really rankle the poor buggers awaiting a conversion course or simply waiting to log some continuation training to see pilots being brought in from overseas.
I think Bushranger has a point: three air arms in a military as small (and shrinking) as Australia's isn't good economics. Can't see anything being done about it without a lot of people with empires to protect being dragged screaming and very unwilling to the table, even to discuss it.
I appreciate the need for a leavening of experienced crews among the Tiger pilots' ranks, (how in the world could any of the AAVN pilots have gained any experience in state of the art equipment over the last ten years?), but it must really rankle the poor buggers awaiting a conversion course or simply waiting to log some continuation training to see pilots being brought in from overseas.
I think Bushranger has a point: three air arms in a military as small (and shrinking) as Australia's isn't good economics. Can't see anything being done about it without a lot of people with empires to protect being dragged screaming and very unwilling to the table, even to discuss it.
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Australian Army Aviation Corps
Perhaps you're right. That should be pretty easy to sort out, no? 
Although maybe Big Army might just be keen to hand 'em all over at the moment.
Although maybe Big Army might just be keen to hand 'em all over at the moment.
Last edited by CW Pirate; 12th Dec 2012 at 07:10. Reason: On request for the smiley
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That should be pretty easy to sort out, no?
I have heard that the Army (or at least someone in the Army) did suggest handing the helicopters back to the RAAF during the investigation into the Townsville Blackhawk accident. Perhaps unfortunately, (although I'm sure they'd be many who'd stridently disagree with that sentiment), the RAAF demurred. Can anyone confirm or deny that?
Bushranger 71 has made the point in earlier discussions here on this same point that one of the big disadvantages to the splitting of the three air arms is the lack of surge capacity should one part of the air force (note the lack of capital letters) require crews at short notice. Even disregarding the (to me) blatantly obvious inefficiencies and costs that three separate air arms incur, that point alone makes a single air service the more desirable option.
A bit like nuke submarines rather than diesels for the RAN, (another no-brainer, in my opinion), I don't think it'll ever happen though. Not without some politician taking over the Defence portfolio who has balls and foresight in another league to that displayed by the last couple of men who've occupied that position.
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It was surge capacity (mentioned by MTOW) that enabled the RAAF from mid-1962 to begin forming a helo force, build a comprehensive structure within Australia for helo training, maintenance, Army support and SAR. Then within about 2 years, provide Army support on the Malay/Thai border and about another 2 years hence, redeploy from Malaysia to Vietnam.
From end of WW2 to maybe 1990, it was commonplace for Air Force aircrew to serve in multiple roles. I did transport, fighters, helos and many of the junior pilots that first went on to choppers in the Vietnam War era later moved on to high speed stuff, maritime, transport, etcetera. That of course gave them much broader career paths and allowed the Service greater flexibility in use of aircrew resources. Alas, that does not seem to happen so much these days.
If I was CAF/CDF, I would advocate Army refocusing on its core functions and disbandment of Army Aviation. Transfer Kiowa, remaining Iroquois in storage, Blackhawk, Chinook to the RAAF and Tiger, MRH-90 to the Navy. Optimise Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk via ongoing manufacturer enhancement programs. Offer Army Aviation personnel the option of transfer to Air Force or Navy, but shed Army Aviation Officers from Lieutenant Colonel upwards. There would of course be some further training needed for some aircrew because of present differences in flight training arrangements and depending on roles envisaged for their employment; but they would have broader scope for career progression, especially in the Air Force.
Regarding Tiger and MRH-90. Navy lobbied hard for 2 bloody big aircraft carriers ostensibly to deploy expeditionary forces, but that is not going to be affordable in the opinion of General Peter Leahy (and me). Better to lump all of the least usable stuff into the one area and, if necessary, put much of it into storage. Let Navy do the basic helo training utilising existing resources, insofar as is now practicable.
Mission impossible? NO. It just requires people to think outside the square, objectively analyse a worsening scenario and come up with the most cost-effective options to remediate military preparedness.
From end of WW2 to maybe 1990, it was commonplace for Air Force aircrew to serve in multiple roles. I did transport, fighters, helos and many of the junior pilots that first went on to choppers in the Vietnam War era later moved on to high speed stuff, maritime, transport, etcetera. That of course gave them much broader career paths and allowed the Service greater flexibility in use of aircrew resources. Alas, that does not seem to happen so much these days.
If I was CAF/CDF, I would advocate Army refocusing on its core functions and disbandment of Army Aviation. Transfer Kiowa, remaining Iroquois in storage, Blackhawk, Chinook to the RAAF and Tiger, MRH-90 to the Navy. Optimise Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk via ongoing manufacturer enhancement programs. Offer Army Aviation personnel the option of transfer to Air Force or Navy, but shed Army Aviation Officers from Lieutenant Colonel upwards. There would of course be some further training needed for some aircrew because of present differences in flight training arrangements and depending on roles envisaged for their employment; but they would have broader scope for career progression, especially in the Air Force.
Regarding Tiger and MRH-90. Navy lobbied hard for 2 bloody big aircraft carriers ostensibly to deploy expeditionary forces, but that is not going to be affordable in the opinion of General Peter Leahy (and me). Better to lump all of the least usable stuff into the one area and, if necessary, put much of it into storage. Let Navy do the basic helo training utilising existing resources, insofar as is now practicable.
Mission impossible? NO. It just requires people to think outside the square, objectively analyse a worsening scenario and come up with the most cost-effective options to remediate military preparedness.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 11th Dec 2012 at 20:39. Reason: Clarification
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Transfer ... Tiger, MRH-90 to the Navy.
There would of course be some further training needed for some aircrew because of present differences in flight training arrangements
So; considering the politicians are presumably unwilling to commit ADF Tigers to combat (regardless of airworthiness considerations or what the French are doing in Afghanistan), then presumably all of the hours and aircrew resources being burned up on aircrew training in Australia are more or less just boring holes in the sky!
From an Air point of view, the question has to be asked, how can 3 separate air arms be justified for such a small military?
In my experience with the British Armed Forces, any transfer of assets, and hence budget, out of one particular service would be strongly opposed by that service.
As CDF is Army he may not be keen to see AAAvn split between the Navy and Air Force.
As CDF is Army he may not be keen to see AAAvn split between the Navy and Air Force.
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Bushy 71,
Re: If I was CAF/CDF, I would advocate Army refocusing on its core functions and disbandment of Army Aviation. Transfer Kiowa, remaining Iroquois in storage, Blackhawk, Chinook to the RAAF and Tiger, MRH-90 to the Navy. Optimise Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk via ongoing manufacturer enhancement programs. Offer Army Aviation personnel the option of transfer to Air Force or Navy, but shed Army Aviation Officers from Lieutenant Colonel upwards. There would of course be some further training needed for some aircrew because of present differences in flight training arrangements and depending on roles envisaged for their employment; but they would have broader scope for career progression, especially in the Air Force.
A lot of us in blue have been saying that since 1989!
DF
Re: If I was CAF/CDF, I would advocate Army refocusing on its core functions and disbandment of Army Aviation. Transfer Kiowa, remaining Iroquois in storage, Blackhawk, Chinook to the RAAF and Tiger, MRH-90 to the Navy. Optimise Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk via ongoing manufacturer enhancement programs. Offer Army Aviation personnel the option of transfer to Air Force or Navy, but shed Army Aviation Officers from Lieutenant Colonel upwards. There would of course be some further training needed for some aircrew because of present differences in flight training arrangements and depending on roles envisaged for their employment; but they would have broader scope for career progression, especially in the Air Force.
A lot of us in blue have been saying that since 1989!
DF
Devil's Advocate
Like the Hornets and the recently retired F111...or even like the King Airs.
I would go further and move every tactical asset used in support of land force operations to the Army. Everything that could serve a maritime, CAIRS and/or air defence role - to the navy. That way the air force can be happy running around commuters in 'tactical' King Air's and BBJs, completing 'rest' tours on PC9s.
Last edited by Trojan1981; 12th Dec 2012 at 05:17.
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Three sadly all too predictable unproductive posts in response to Bushranger's VERY sensible post. Gents, it's not a dick-measuring contest, but an attempt to come up with a system that will serve the ADF - I'm assuming that includes YOU - best so that a credible and best possible force can be fielded with the minimum assets available should push ever come to shove.
Is there someone out there who really believes that our helicopter assets today are as they should be, particularly when you consider the huge amount of money that has been outlaid? If your answer is yes, many would say you're in cloud cuckoo land. If your answer is yes, someone should accept responsibility for today's sad state of affairs and maybe hand over to someone else who may be able to address - and solve - the problem better.
Who would be towards the top of YOUR list in who should accept that responsibility?
Bushranger 71 has been a voice in the wilderness for some years now saying that things could and should be done better in the ADF helo world, and a number of people here have resorted to pretty crass personal attacks in reply rather than properly discuss the issue.
I'd like to see a helicopter force that delivers 'product' to ADF sub-units as widely - and with the frequency - that it was once delivered. Despite a grossly inaccurate urban myth pushed very hard within certain areas of the Army and retired Army ranks today to the contrary, I'm damned certain that today's AAVN does not deliver even a pale shadow of what was once offered by the RAAF.
Surely to God we can all put our tape measures away, zip up our flies, and DISCUSS this problem - for problem it is - sensibly rather than point score? Everyone would be a winner if all military aircrew could transfer and cross-train in at least two different roles - as the RAAF system used to do until some years ago. Current Army pilots - with absolutely no insult to their abilities inferred - would probably need some extra training in fast jet or heavy multi-engine operations before being on the same level as others who have already had that training.
A single stream and a single service would serve EVERYONE better than the current system has proven not to.
Is there someone out there who really believes that our helicopter assets today are as they should be, particularly when you consider the huge amount of money that has been outlaid? If your answer is yes, many would say you're in cloud cuckoo land. If your answer is yes, someone should accept responsibility for today's sad state of affairs and maybe hand over to someone else who may be able to address - and solve - the problem better.
Who would be towards the top of YOUR list in who should accept that responsibility?
Bushranger 71 has been a voice in the wilderness for some years now saying that things could and should be done better in the ADF helo world, and a number of people here have resorted to pretty crass personal attacks in reply rather than properly discuss the issue.
I'd like to see a helicopter force that delivers 'product' to ADF sub-units as widely - and with the frequency - that it was once delivered. Despite a grossly inaccurate urban myth pushed very hard within certain areas of the Army and retired Army ranks today to the contrary, I'm damned certain that today's AAVN does not deliver even a pale shadow of what was once offered by the RAAF.
Surely to God we can all put our tape measures away, zip up our flies, and DISCUSS this problem - for problem it is - sensibly rather than point score? Everyone would be a winner if all military aircrew could transfer and cross-train in at least two different roles - as the RAAF system used to do until some years ago. Current Army pilots - with absolutely no insult to their abilities inferred - would probably need some extra training in fast jet or heavy multi-engine operations before being on the same level as others who have already had that training.
A single stream and a single service would serve EVERYONE better than the current system has proven not to.
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Predictable thread drift
I'd never have believed that this would turn into a "RAAF should have the choppers back debate..." (sarky smiley for MTOW). Aren't there other threads on here for that debate?
News out this week that RAAF is paying ACA for junior SQNLDRs and WGCDRs ($30000?). Can't be long before Army must consider the same. McPhedran's latest Helicopter pilots fleeing army over pay | thetelegraph.com.audescribes the problem in his typically sensationlist style. Civil industry, with significantly better rates of pay and conditions, will take up any pilots out of ROSO.
(sarky smiley for MTOW). Aren't there other threads on here for that debate?News out this week that RAAF is paying ACA for junior SQNLDRs and WGCDRs ($30000?). Can't be long before Army must consider the same. McPhedran's latest Helicopter pilots fleeing army over pay | thetelegraph.com.audescribes the problem in his typically sensationlist style. Civil industry, with significantly better rates of pay and conditions, will take up any pilots out of ROSO.
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Andu
"I'd like to see a helicopter force that delivers 'product' to ADF sub-units as widely"
I would call it a service, be it delivery of troops / stores, weapons on target,
ASW, you name it, the helo is just the method being used for delivery of that service.
Who gets them ?
Give them to the Navy ? I don't think so, too far removed from the main users,
land and sea based Army.
Agree re waste of money for the outlay but couple of points.
1. Longer term plan needed with $$$$ costed INCLUDING flying time
so the people get a meaningful skills kept up to date.
2. Sort out the Pollies and below so that when we have an assett
it is used. I still can't believe the Tiger hasn't been used in Afghan
where Aussie supports Aussie. It would have been a perfect learning
scenario where the skills would be around for a long time.
"I'd like to see a helicopter force that delivers 'product' to ADF sub-units as widely"
I would call it a service, be it delivery of troops / stores, weapons on target,
ASW, you name it, the helo is just the method being used for delivery of that service.
Who gets them ?
Give them to the Navy ? I don't think so, too far removed from the main users,
land and sea based Army.
Agree re waste of money for the outlay but couple of points.
1. Longer term plan needed with $$$$ costed INCLUDING flying time
so the people get a meaningful skills kept up to date.
2. Sort out the Pollies and below so that when we have an assett
it is used. I still can't believe the Tiger hasn't been used in Afghan
where Aussie supports Aussie. It would have been a perfect learning
scenario where the skills would be around for a long time.
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I still can't believe the Tiger hasn't been used in Afghan
where Aussie supports Aussie.
where Aussie supports Aussie.
This gets back to Bushranger's repeated comments here and on other sites that, since the RAAF 'was retired' from the helicopter world, the whole concept of the affordable (both to buy and operate) utility helicopter has been lost in the ADF. We're using Bentlys, and paying the price of buying and operating Bentlys, to do the job of a Kingswood ute.
Oh, did I say we're using Bentlys? Because we're not. We've bought Bentlys, (the newest, cutting-edge model, that hadn't even been road tested before we bought them), but ten years or more since doing so, they still don't work.