Hi lastvarker; your comment is interesting.
Too small a service, too few aircraft and flying hours, too much tasking.
In the early 1970s, I established the Helicopter Operations Cell at RAAF Headquarters Operational Command, which worked hand in glove with co-located Army HQ 1 Ground Liaison Group regarding tasking of helicopter effort for Army support training in Australia. At that time, there were a myriad of Army sub-units that managed to get a degree of helicopter training; however, that no longer seems to be the case. It would be really interesting to know now just how much of hours flown now is directed to Army sub-unit training.
On takeover of battlefield support helos in 1989, Army boasted in media recruitment advertising that it was the biggest helicopter operator in Australia with a Kiowa, Squirrel, Iroquois, Blackhawk and subsequently Chinook fleet. If there is now an airframe shortage within Army Aviation, the question arises just how much is that due to the folly of the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan?
The wisdom of Army clamouring to get an AAH also comes to the fore. The RAAF previously viewed the Bushranger gunship capability adequate as it was very cost-effective considering the versatility of the Iroquois platform, enabling adaptation as required for periodic weapons camps so aircrew could be primarily employed for utility aircraft roles. That platform was very economically upgradable making it way superior to the Tiger for intimate close support, in my view. The UH-60L Blackhawk DAP is conceptually similar.
So; considering the politicians are presumably unwilling to commit ADF Tigers to combat (regardless of airworthiness considerations or what the French are doing in Afghanistan), then presumably all of the hours and aircrew resources being burned up on aircrew training in Australia are more or less just boring holes in the sky!
Maybe delusions of grandeur by some former Service Chiefs are now becoming apparent with the ADF trying to operate just too many capabilities. General Peter Leahy, recently retired Chief of Army, wrote an article last week in 'The Australian' positing that Australia cannot afford expeditionary forces, nor that we should involve any more in SE Asia, allowing nations in that region of the world to resolve their own issues. He opined we have to focus more on maritime deterrence capabilities to discourage interference with trade corridors. He speaks great common sense, in my opinion.
The ADF is quite small (about 58,000 sans reserves) and defence expenditure will logically be curbed due to looming national economic circumstances. It seems that the respective armed forces must inevitably also be rationalised to maintain affordable adequate and credible military capacity. Jolting the politicians and DoD into that reality will of course be problematic. From an Air point of view, the question has to be asked, how can 3 separate air arms be justified for such a small military?
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 9th Dec 2012 at 01:33.
Reason: Grammar