Airworthiness & Safety Post Haddon-Cave
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Fairyland
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Airworthiness & Safety Post Haddon-Cave
Allo all,
Apologies but this is for military groundcrew as well as aircrew and anyone else involved in the safety of our military aircraft.
So... we've begun to implement the recommendations of Haddon-Cave. How do we feel the overall airworthiness and safety of our platforms has been affected by these changes? Interested to hear both good and bad!
Apologies but this is for military groundcrew as well as aircrew and anyone else involved in the safety of our military aircraft.
So... we've begun to implement the recommendations of Haddon-Cave. How do we feel the overall airworthiness and safety of our platforms has been affected by these changes? Interested to hear both good and bad!
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Fairyland
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I've been tasked with writing a presentation on it for my boss. I was going to ask through more formal channels but I hoped i'd gain a more sincere level of comment by asking in this forum. Don't need to know anything too specific, just general feelings/observations. I'm happy to make something up though... Used to that 
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Detroit MI
Age: 66
Posts: 1,460
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Alright... I suppose that's half the answer. The next question would be:-
What is your bosses interest... Journalist? MoD? A dolt who enjoys giving pointless, unrelated projects to staff for the fun of it?
What is your bosses interest... Journalist? MoD? A dolt who enjoys giving pointless, unrelated projects to staff for the fun of it?
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Fairyland
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks RA nearly gave myself away!!! 
I'm a senior engineer in MoD and people in the know should be able to have a good guess at who I am from that. The fact that this is still such a touchy subject is fairly telling in itself. Like I said, I have my own opinions i.e. staff, both internal and external are increasingly risk averse and/or scared to death to take on any airworthiness responsibility.
But seriously folks, if you don't wanna talk it's fine. It really was just an impulsive attempt to gain some genuine feedback
I'm a senior engineer in MoD and people in the know should be able to have a good guess at who I am from that. The fact that this is still such a touchy subject is fairly telling in itself. Like I said, I have my own opinions i.e. staff, both internal and external are increasingly risk averse and/or scared to death to take on any airworthiness responsibility.
But seriously folks, if you don't wanna talk it's fine. It really was just an impulsive attempt to gain some genuine feedback
Princess - if you are for real then the main effect of MAA is a massive increase in staff-work which still doesn't address the problems of airworthiness.
If an airworthiness issue is highlighted then either money has to be spent to fix it so the risk is reduced to ALARP, or someone has to have the cojones to accept that risk.
The new MAA means that if a senior officer has the cojones to accept the risk (as he did in the past), he will now find himself in court if something goes wrong - strangely that is a fairly unpalatable choice.
Now the airworthiness issues are passed up and down the chain of command, bounced back by the various PTs, placed on ever more meaningless lists of risk and mired in red-tape.
So the actual process of getting anything done about aircraft faults has not improved one jot - in fact it would seem that the very worry of having to address issues on some platforms has meant they have been removed from service under the guise of SDR.
Staff officers find themselves juggling the lists of faults and prioritising them in a way that the actual operators certainly wouldn't agree with.
All in all MAA promised a lot but doesn't seem to have delivered anything.
If an airworthiness issue is highlighted then either money has to be spent to fix it so the risk is reduced to ALARP, or someone has to have the cojones to accept that risk.
The new MAA means that if a senior officer has the cojones to accept the risk (as he did in the past), he will now find himself in court if something goes wrong - strangely that is a fairly unpalatable choice.
Now the airworthiness issues are passed up and down the chain of command, bounced back by the various PTs, placed on ever more meaningless lists of risk and mired in red-tape.
So the actual process of getting anything done about aircraft faults has not improved one jot - in fact it would seem that the very worry of having to address issues on some platforms has meant they have been removed from service under the guise of SDR.
Staff officers find themselves juggling the lists of faults and prioritising them in a way that the actual operators certainly wouldn't agree with.
All in all MAA promised a lot but doesn't seem to have delivered anything.
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: arrrrrrrgh
Age: 55
Posts: 147
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Edited by Mods
Okay lets give Airborne a chance here. Please give us your feelings on how the overall airworthiness and safety of our platforms has been affected by these changes, based on your current experience of how the aircraft are used in all of our theatres of war and during training as well and how the various engineering squadrons are currently run in the RAF.
Okay lets give Airborne a chance here. Please give us your feelings on how the overall airworthiness and safety of our platforms has been affected by these changes, based on your current experience of how the aircraft are used in all of our theatres of war and during training as well and how the various engineering squadrons are currently run in the RAF.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Detroit MI
Age: 66
Posts: 1,460
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Edited by Mods
I was attempting to assist Princess_Lala if she had a legitimate reason for her question. If I hadn't been asking the questions you'd have been bitching at someone else... Because no-one was going to answer the question until some level of legitimacy was established.
As to whether I am qualified to discuss the current changes in airworthiness and safety improvements under Haddon Cave - you're right, I cannot speak with any authority whatsoever. But I'm still, almost certainly, the first and only person to tell the RAF that I would not fly on one specific aircraft type based entirely on that type's lack of airworthiness but was quite happy to go to any other type anywhere they wanted me to go. I'm probably the only one that the RAF decided that I must be mentally unstable for doing so and sent me to a Trick Cyclist in London to "convict" me only to have him send me back with a rating of "perfectly sane".
At which point, with no leg to stand, on the RAF and I parted ways.
It is little wonder I follow threads regarding airworthiness with some interest. Personally, I hope she is who she says she is. I'm looking forward to the responses.
I was attempting to assist Princess_Lala if she had a legitimate reason for her question. If I hadn't been asking the questions you'd have been bitching at someone else... Because no-one was going to answer the question until some level of legitimacy was established.
As to whether I am qualified to discuss the current changes in airworthiness and safety improvements under Haddon Cave - you're right, I cannot speak with any authority whatsoever. But I'm still, almost certainly, the first and only person to tell the RAF that I would not fly on one specific aircraft type based entirely on that type's lack of airworthiness but was quite happy to go to any other type anywhere they wanted me to go. I'm probably the only one that the RAF decided that I must be mentally unstable for doing so and sent me to a Trick Cyclist in London to "convict" me only to have him send me back with a rating of "perfectly sane".
At which point, with no leg to stand, on the RAF and I parted ways.It is little wonder I follow threads regarding airworthiness with some interest. Personally, I hope she is who she says she is. I'm looking forward to the responses.
So the actual process of getting anything done about aircraft faults has not improved one jot - in fact it would seem that the very worry of having to address issues on some platforms has meant they have been removed from service under the guise of SDR.
The last part is absolutely true. One of the problems during SDSR was that a re-assessment was required when it was suggested airworthiness funding be chopped even further. Just think about that for a moment. Even after Haddon-Cave, MoD still had senior staff officers who thought the subject a waste of time and money. They were in posts with authority to directly affect airworthiness yet knew nothing about the subject. People like that have no place in today’s MoD.
All in all MAA promised a lot but doesn't seem to have delivered anything.
What real authority does the MAA have? I suspect they are sat in the middle between PTs and top level committees (those who failed in their management oversight duties over the years) and simply act as a post office on many issues. Have they the authority or even the expertise to identify the gaps created over 25 years and approve amelioration plans and funding? I don’t think so.
Go back and read the Nimrod and C130 threads. Read the on-going Chinook thread. Same people, same policies, same result. What could have prevented all (which is the whole point)? Implement the regulations. That takes resources and good quality staff. Always bear in mind that Haddon-Cave was nothing new. His report is a simplistic top level skim through numerous similar, more detailed and infinitely more damning reports since 1988. Until MoD accept this simple fact, the correct action cannot be taken. What does it need to ram this home? My opinion is that clearing Air Cdre George Baber on the grounds that he inherited 15 years of systemic neglect and could not possibly be expected to resurrect Nimrod airworthiness in a 2 year tour, would really flag this up. Then the true scale would be known – at the moment Mod are still in denial. Also, the time taken to pursue this case against Baber is, I believe, hampering the MAA. It may actually be the Mull of Kintyre Review that is the catalyst because of course the same names crop up there.
Finally, I notice a concentration of effort on front line maintenance activities. There is still a tendency to confuse serviceability and airworthiness. You have to get the basics right and that is what has been ignored over the years. If the basics aren’t there, then front line’s excellent engineers are still hamstrung. Crab has mentioned MF760s, but another common failing noted in many BoIs is poor publications. Take either one of those examples, map out the mandated process and see where the breakdown occurred. Same every time. The basic lesson that has not been taught in MoD since 1992 is that key airworthiness activities are not volume-related. They cost the same whether you have 1000 or 1 aircraft. Understand that one, structure the resources (mainly funding) accordingly, and you automatically have everyone thinking airworthiness again, if only because PTs will notice and welcome the change, and perhaps ask why.
Hope this helps. PM me if you have any questions.
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: north of barlu
Posts: 6,207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
More paper, less inspection
I would take a guess that the end result of the MAA will be much more paperwork (& cost) and less real inspection of aircraft.
The result of EASA part M on the civil GA sector is that I have to spend much more time in the office pushing paper and so am only on the hangar floor when required rather than being able to have the time to take more of an overview of the work being carried out.
IMO this is a backward step as about 50% of the paper I deal with is not aircraft safety related , it is about people covering their six.
I would take an educated guess that if you talked to the guys who are fixing aircraft on a day to day basis you would get the same answer about the introduction of the MAA.
The result of EASA part M on the civil GA sector is that I have to spend much more time in the office pushing paper and so am only on the hangar floor when required rather than being able to have the time to take more of an overview of the work being carried out.
IMO this is a backward step as about 50% of the paper I deal with is not aircraft safety related , it is about people covering their six.
I would take an educated guess that if you talked to the guys who are fixing aircraft on a day to day basis you would get the same answer about the introduction of the MAA.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
THe one flaw I see with the system, and its pretty indicative on here with the trades posting, its too engineering centric imho. Haddon Cave said it himself - airworthiness involves the operation of aircraft as well as maintainance. I think we need to be careful in ensuring the MAA is shaped across the entire flight safety piece and not just the findings of the nimrod enquiry, no matter how big an impact that report had.
Its all well and good talking about airworthiness, but unless those up top see th importance of it and more importantly want it, we will not see full spectrum of safety improvements that are possible.
Its all well and good talking about airworthiness, but unless those up top see th importance of it and more importantly want it, we will not see full spectrum of safety improvements that are possible.
Join Date: Nov 2003
Location: Next door
Posts: 74
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Airworthiness & Safety Post Haddon-Cave
I decided to post a new thread in reply to one that disappeared
QuoteA and C
More paper, less inspection
I would take a guess that the end result of the MAA will be much more paperwork (& cost) and less real inspection of aircraft.
The result of EASA part M on the civil GA sector is that I have to spend much more time in the office pushing paper and so am only on the hangar floor when required rather than being able to have the time to take more of an overview of the work being carried out.
IMO this is a backward step as about 50% of the paper I deal with is not aircraft safety related , it is about people covering their six.
I would take an educated guess that if you talked to the guys who are fixing aircraft on a day to day basis you would get the same answer about the introduction of the MAA.
Isn't the role of a Part M organisation (CAMO) the monitoring, auditing and approvals of what the 145s do, so I would expect nothing less than what you say is causing you problems. As a CAMO you have access to numerous Quality monitoring processes, releasing you to make the paperwork intensive, but vital airworthiness decisions.
As tucumseh has pointed out the training and ability of those people in the PTs responsible for airworthiness decisions are the areas that need to be addressed asap.
Others have pointed out how its very scary making airworthiness decisions, but Accountable Managers in the civil sector make them daily, so what makes it so traumatic for those responsible in the PTs (as long as they have the appropriate training).
Communication between 145 organisations and 1st line (RAF / forward organisations) is where there is major potential for, or real problems, both in cultural approaches and normalisation (thats the way we have always done it)
QuoteA and C
More paper, less inspection
I would take a guess that the end result of the MAA will be much more paperwork (& cost) and less real inspection of aircraft.
The result of EASA part M on the civil GA sector is that I have to spend much more time in the office pushing paper and so am only on the hangar floor when required rather than being able to have the time to take more of an overview of the work being carried out.
IMO this is a backward step as about 50% of the paper I deal with is not aircraft safety related , it is about people covering their six.
I would take an educated guess that if you talked to the guys who are fixing aircraft on a day to day basis you would get the same answer about the introduction of the MAA.
Isn't the role of a Part M organisation (CAMO) the monitoring, auditing and approvals of what the 145s do, so I would expect nothing less than what you say is causing you problems. As a CAMO you have access to numerous Quality monitoring processes, releasing you to make the paperwork intensive, but vital airworthiness decisions.
As tucumseh has pointed out the training and ability of those people in the PTs responsible for airworthiness decisions are the areas that need to be addressed asap.
Others have pointed out how its very scary making airworthiness decisions, but Accountable Managers in the civil sector make them daily, so what makes it so traumatic for those responsible in the PTs (as long as they have the appropriate training).
Communication between 145 organisations and 1st line (RAF / forward organisations) is where there is major potential for, or real problems, both in cultural approaches and normalisation (thats the way we have always done it)
Airworthiness decisions aren't scary! - it's the sudden realisation, by those that previously played at it, that they are now to be held responsible for their decisions that they find scary.
As the MOD is so used to cherry-picking from practicle and proven regulations, and sensible reports and recommendations it is obvious they have done the same with the EASA regulation set - only choosing the bits they think can cope with and disregard the 'difficult' or seemingly unsavoury bits. I recently heard a senior officer saying the use of a F731 was a mistake too. - Wow! Bring on the Mil Form One!
Line and Base organisations can only ever start to "work together" if they work to the same rules...It appears that someone doesn't play Cricket and refuses to look at the rules.
As the MOD is so used to cherry-picking from practicle and proven regulations, and sensible reports and recommendations it is obvious they have done the same with the EASA regulation set - only choosing the bits they think can cope with and disregard the 'difficult' or seemingly unsavoury bits. I recently heard a senior officer saying the use of a F731 was a mistake too. - Wow! Bring on the Mil Form One!
Line and Base organisations can only ever start to "work together" if they work to the same rules...It appears that someone doesn't play Cricket and refuses to look at the rules.
Join Date: May 1999
Location: Sunny (or Rainy) Somerset, England
Posts: 2,026
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The thread has now - as you see - been re-opened. It will stay open for as long as you don't bitch and whine at each other and discuss the matter in a civilized manner.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Lincolnshire
Posts: 106
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is 20 years since the RAF, in the guise of AMSO, ruled that Engineering Authorities should not even bother raising a MF760A upon receipt of a MF760, because funding to investigate had been chopped......
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: north of barlu
Posts: 6,207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Small Spinner
You are half correct in that what you discribe is half the picture.
Part M is devided into subparts, the ones you are talking about are subpart F & subpart G
Subpart F is the the approval for the maintenance of aircraft.
Subpart G is the continued airworthiness management (CAMO)
It is not unusual to have both types of companies in the same building run by the same people, the result is a lot more paperwork to do the same job as under the old BCAR M3.
EASA 145 is just a more of the same but with uprated Quality managment within the company and so EASA 145 is the required standard for AOC maintenance.
My personal opinion is that Subpart G is well over the top in terms of airworthiness managment for light private aircraft ( after all BCAR M3 delivered a light aircraft accident rate that was one of the lowest in the world).
As for EASA 145 it is only slightly excessive for an AOC operation and has a number of business advantages and so that is why we dropped the Subpart F & G and went EASA 145. However I still dont have the luxury of enough time just walking around the hangar floor and looking over aircraft with no particular inspection in mind because of the level of paperwork.
I guess the important message for any safety system is to keep the paperwork burden to a minimum and keep it aimed firmly towards the primary task. With EASA I am sure the primary aim of the paperwork it to keep down the level of unemplyment in Cologne NOT aircraft safety.
Part M is devided into subparts, the ones you are talking about are subpart F & subpart G
Subpart F is the the approval for the maintenance of aircraft.
Subpart G is the continued airworthiness management (CAMO)
It is not unusual to have both types of companies in the same building run by the same people, the result is a lot more paperwork to do the same job as under the old BCAR M3.
EASA 145 is just a more of the same but with uprated Quality managment within the company and so EASA 145 is the required standard for AOC maintenance.
My personal opinion is that Subpart G is well over the top in terms of airworthiness managment for light private aircraft ( after all BCAR M3 delivered a light aircraft accident rate that was one of the lowest in the world).
As for EASA 145 it is only slightly excessive for an AOC operation and has a number of business advantages and so that is why we dropped the Subpart F & G and went EASA 145. However I still dont have the luxury of enough time just walking around the hangar floor and looking over aircraft with no particular inspection in mind because of the level of paperwork.
I guess the important message for any safety system is to keep the paperwork burden to a minimum and keep it aimed firmly towards the primary task. With EASA I am sure the primary aim of the paperwork it to keep down the level of unemplyment in Cologne NOT aircraft safety.
Re-read the thread...
The "Continued Airworthiness" of your aircraft - all of them - has not improved one bit...YET. But in the next few years they will...if YOU follow the rules!
If you carry on, as you did before, expecting some magic wand to cure all your faults, there will be no progress nor improvements made and those in the nimrod, chinook, seaking and herc (and all mentioned on these threads) will have died for no reason whatsoever - and only bits of granite will eventually keep them remembered.
The bits of "admin" you are required to conduct now are no worse than the hassle of Met Checks or NOTAMS when they were first introduced. (no, I wasn't there)
Get used to it - it aint going away!
...and I suspect there is a lot more to come.
The "Continued Airworthiness" of your aircraft - all of them - has not improved one bit...YET. But in the next few years they will...if YOU follow the rules!
If you carry on, as you did before, expecting some magic wand to cure all your faults, there will be no progress nor improvements made and those in the nimrod, chinook, seaking and herc (and all mentioned on these threads) will have died for no reason whatsoever - and only bits of granite will eventually keep them remembered.
The bits of "admin" you are required to conduct now are no worse than the hassle of Met Checks or NOTAMS when they were first introduced. (no, I wasn't there)
Get used to it - it aint going away!
...and I suspect there is a lot more to come.
A&C,
If your trying to equate EASA to the "MAOS" system - dont bother. There is no ARC at the moment (though a sort of Review is being mooted), no Form One and no Part 66.
Without any of those things completing the airworthiness review loop, the military "system" can't quite work.
Having worked under CAP360, JAR and now EASA I find their system is now quite good - but I haven't used my B1.2 for some years now, just my B1.1 and B1.3 on CAT.
If your trying to equate EASA to the "MAOS" system - dont bother. There is no ARC at the moment (though a sort of Review is being mooted), no Form One and no Part 66.
Without any of those things completing the airworthiness review loop, the military "system" can't quite work.
Having worked under CAP360, JAR and now EASA I find their system is now quite good - but I haven't used my B1.2 for some years now, just my B1.1 and B1.3 on CAT.
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Cambs
Posts: 110
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's a few years since I worked in an EA but in my opinion Engineers no longer made airworthiness decisions but finance did. I say this because we (engineers) went to great lengths to investigate problems with the manufacturer and assess the risk that a problem presented. We could then (relatively scientifically) prioritise the airworthiness risk based on probability of failure and consequence. Logically, those managing this would then set a level of risk above which would not be tolerated and call it ALARP. However, the ALARP decision was purely based on the cost of rectification of each problem, thereby making ALARP purely a financial decision. Some lower risks were picked off because they were cheap fixes but sometimes more expensive higher level risks were considered ALARP because they were too expensive to do anything about.