So the actual process of getting anything done about aircraft faults has not improved one jot - in fact it would seem that the very worry of having to address issues on some platforms has meant they have been removed from service under the guise of SDR.
It is 20 years since the RAF, in the guise of AMSO, ruled that Engineering Authorities should not even bother raising a MF760A upon receipt of a MF760, because funding to investigate had been chopped. Princess, ask if the overarching process has been fully funded and resurrected and gaps filled. (Best of luck; the only Def Stan dedicated to it was cancelled 3 years ago having been declared obsolescent 20 years ago. That single act tells you all about the anti-airworthiness ethos fostered by AMSO/AML in the 90s). If not, then no Safety Case can be proven valid.
The last part is absolutely true. One of the problems during SDSR was that a re-assessment was required when it was suggested airworthiness funding be chopped even further. Just think about that for a moment. Even after Haddon-Cave, MoD still had senior staff officers who thought the subject a waste of time and money. They were in posts with authority to directly affect airworthiness yet knew nothing about the subject. People like that have no place in today’s MoD.
All in all MAA promised a lot but doesn't seem to have delivered anything.
I think we expect too much from them. 25+ years of deliberate neglect cannot be resurrected overnight, especially when some of those who took this deliberate action remain in MoD. It was obvious what was going to happen, and predicted on the Nimrod thread. Project Teams that had inherited decades of neglect and had few if any staff trained on the subject, automatically lobbed any airworthiness problem, or what they thought may be remotely connected to airworthiness, in the MAA’s direction. The MAA should take a stand (they already did on the above “savings” proposals). They should reply to PTs saying it is incumbent upon them to employ experts in the field and if they don’t have sufficient competence, either train people or get shot of them and employ those who are suitable.
What real authority does the MAA have? I suspect they are sat in the middle between PTs and top level committees (those who failed in their management oversight duties over the years) and simply act as a post office on many issues. Have they the authority or even the expertise to identify the gaps created over 25 years and approve amelioration plans and funding? I don’t think so.
Go back and read the Nimrod and C130 threads. Read the on-going Chinook thread. Same people, same policies, same result. What could have prevented all (which is the whole point)? Implement the regulations. That takes resources and good quality staff. Always bear in mind that Haddon-Cave was nothing new. His report is a simplistic top level skim through numerous similar, more detailed and infinitely more damning reports since 1988. Until MoD accept this simple fact, the correct action cannot be taken. What does it need to ram this home? My opinion is that clearing Air Cdre George Baber on the grounds that he inherited 15 years of systemic neglect and could not possibly be expected to resurrect Nimrod airworthiness in a 2 year tour, would really flag this up. Then the true scale would be known – at the moment Mod are still in denial. Also, the time taken to pursue this case against Baber is, I believe, hampering the MAA. It may actually be the Mull of Kintyre Review that is the catalyst because of course the same names crop up there.
Finally, I notice a concentration of effort on front line maintenance activities. There is still a tendency to confuse serviceability and airworthiness. You have to get the basics right and that is what has been ignored over the years. If the basics aren’t there, then front line’s excellent engineers are still hamstrung. Crab has mentioned MF760s, but another common failing noted in many BoIs is poor publications. Take either one of those examples, map out the mandated process and see where the breakdown occurred. Same every time. The basic lesson that has not been taught in MoD since 1992 is that key airworthiness activities are not volume-related. They cost the same whether you have 1000 or 1 aircraft. Understand that one, structure the resources (mainly funding) accordingly, and you automatically have everyone thinking airworthiness again, if only because PTs will notice and welcome the change, and perhaps ask why.
Hope this helps. PM me if you have any questions.