Airworthiness & Safety Post Haddon-Cave
kiwibrit
The points I make on various threads are;
1. We took 28% cuts in each of the first 3 years of the 90s. (Far deeper cuts than the 5% per year for 4 years General Cowan and ACM pledger were criticised for implementing from 1998, by Haddon-Cave). These cuts were independently verified, and complained about, by the RAF's Inspectorate of Flight Safety.
2. While the funding levels were resurrected a little after that, the 3 years of tasks not being undertaken was never retrospectively corrected. In the late 90s you will have noticed some work being done but the 760 (e.g.) logs will also have told you many were outstanding from that earlier period. Such gaps equate to risks. The status was and remains variable to say the least. Some aircraft offices insisted on bringing their build standards up to date, others completely ignored it (thus rendering their Safety Cases progressively invalid). Their approach depended largely on the background of those responsible. That is the link everyone must always be aware of. MF760s being progressed to completion (as that is the example being used here) are vital to a maintained Build Standard. A maintained BS is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case. And the Aircraft Release, under whatever system (CAR/MAR/GARP etc), must be based on both.
3. The regulations require continuous contractual cover. The way funding was organised at the time (i.e. the beginning of what is called "stove-piping"), one aircraft/range of equipment may have had the odd underspend, so in that year their work may have been done reasonably well. Others suffered at the same time. This scattergun approach was a direct result of centralised specialist units being closed down in 1992-3. The loss of these HQ units meant instead of a small group working 100% of the time on maintaining airworthiness, ensuring consistency and sensible use of what little money they were allowed, the work became a minor task for many. This was exacerbated, certainly in MoD(PE), by CDP's 1996 announcement he did not want engineers managing engineering projects. Hence, wholesale loss of Corporate Knowledge and Experience - which are mandated airworthiness components. This was formally notified to DPA's 3 Star Deputy Chief Executive in January 2000. He took no action. (A piece of evidence H-C ignored).
It is a simple chain and, as Rigga says, not in the least bit scary if you are properly trained. And we've been personally liable since the repeal of Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act in the early 90s. The "sudden realisation" will only be sudden to those who have not been trained ... come to think of it, that will be most MoD recruits since 1996, especially civilian "engineers". Put another way, if this realisation is "sudden" to anyone in MoD today, then I'd say they need a lot more training before receiving their letters of delegation.
We followed up F760s.
The points I make on various threads are;
1. We took 28% cuts in each of the first 3 years of the 90s. (Far deeper cuts than the 5% per year for 4 years General Cowan and ACM pledger were criticised for implementing from 1998, by Haddon-Cave). These cuts were independently verified, and complained about, by the RAF's Inspectorate of Flight Safety.
2. While the funding levels were resurrected a little after that, the 3 years of tasks not being undertaken was never retrospectively corrected. In the late 90s you will have noticed some work being done but the 760 (e.g.) logs will also have told you many were outstanding from that earlier period. Such gaps equate to risks. The status was and remains variable to say the least. Some aircraft offices insisted on bringing their build standards up to date, others completely ignored it (thus rendering their Safety Cases progressively invalid). Their approach depended largely on the background of those responsible. That is the link everyone must always be aware of. MF760s being progressed to completion (as that is the example being used here) are vital to a maintained Build Standard. A maintained BS is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case. And the Aircraft Release, under whatever system (CAR/MAR/GARP etc), must be based on both.
3. The regulations require continuous contractual cover. The way funding was organised at the time (i.e. the beginning of what is called "stove-piping"), one aircraft/range of equipment may have had the odd underspend, so in that year their work may have been done reasonably well. Others suffered at the same time. This scattergun approach was a direct result of centralised specialist units being closed down in 1992-3. The loss of these HQ units meant instead of a small group working 100% of the time on maintaining airworthiness, ensuring consistency and sensible use of what little money they were allowed, the work became a minor task for many. This was exacerbated, certainly in MoD(PE), by CDP's 1996 announcement he did not want engineers managing engineering projects. Hence, wholesale loss of Corporate Knowledge and Experience - which are mandated airworthiness components. This was formally notified to DPA's 3 Star Deputy Chief Executive in January 2000. He took no action. (A piece of evidence H-C ignored).
It is a simple chain and, as Rigga says, not in the least bit scary if you are properly trained. And we've been personally liable since the repeal of Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act in the early 90s. The "sudden realisation" will only be sudden to those who have not been trained ... come to think of it, that will be most MoD recruits since 1996, especially civilian "engineers". Put another way, if this realisation is "sudden" to anyone in MoD today, then I'd say they need a lot more training before receiving their letters of delegation.
Airworthiness, like Flight Safety, costs money and you will only get as much of either as you can afford.......MoD is broke
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Airworthiness & Safety post H-C
There is some highly esoteric stuff appearing here, and it might help the uninitiated to see definitions of (a) Airworthy, and (b) serviceable. Any takers?
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Airworthy or Serviceable?
Oh dear, oh dear! I think the post from JP perfectly illustrates the point made by Tuc - many people cannot distinguish airworthiness from maintenance. My day job is airworthiness, acting as a Type Certificate Holder for some 15 Type Certificates with a worldwide fleet of 1,200 active aircraft (light civvy of course, but I did do 34 years in the mob).
Here is a scenario. We are contacted by the owner of a light single who has had his maintenance organisation fit an additional electric fuel pump to his engine to provide a back up should the mechanical engine-driven pump fail. He thinks this is a good idea. We are sent some details of the work carried out on the aircraft and a load of photographs and we are asked to "put a mod into the CAA - I would like to fly tomorrow". The system as fitted by the maintenance organisation worked - ie, it was serviceable - but there was no supporting design investigation, no certification plan, no electrical load analysis, no flight manual supplement, no maintenance manual supplement etc etc.
The new system fit might have been serviceable (ie the pump worked when the pilot ackled the switch), but it was not airworthy. A quick look at the schematic showed that a failure of any of the new flexible hoses would have the engine driven pump dump all its fuel overboard, presenting the pilot with at best an engine failure, at worst an airborne fire.
Many will say that the process of approving this 'good idea' is time consuming and expensive. It is, but better that than the installation being found to be unairworthy when it counts most - when there has been an airborne failure.
Here is a scenario. We are contacted by the owner of a light single who has had his maintenance organisation fit an additional electric fuel pump to his engine to provide a back up should the mechanical engine-driven pump fail. He thinks this is a good idea. We are sent some details of the work carried out on the aircraft and a load of photographs and we are asked to "put a mod into the CAA - I would like to fly tomorrow". The system as fitted by the maintenance organisation worked - ie, it was serviceable - but there was no supporting design investigation, no certification plan, no electrical load analysis, no flight manual supplement, no maintenance manual supplement etc etc.
The new system fit might have been serviceable (ie the pump worked when the pilot ackled the switch), but it was not airworthy. A quick look at the schematic showed that a failure of any of the new flexible hoses would have the engine driven pump dump all its fuel overboard, presenting the pilot with at best an engine failure, at worst an airborne fire.
Many will say that the process of approving this 'good idea' is time consuming and expensive. It is, but better that than the installation being found to be unairworthy when it counts most - when there has been an airborne failure.
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Airworthiness & Safety
Mandator. Oh Dear! I asked the question in the hope of clearing the air for the uninitiated, of which I am certainly not one!
Last edited by John Purdey; 18th May 2011 at 16:35.
As a likely mug for these things - I'll have a stab at it...
Airworthiness - from design and manufacture to delivery (entry into service) to the customer - To ensure the aircraft is capable of sustaining the designed performance parameters without hazarding life property or the environment and to support the integrity of that product throughout its life cycle.
Continued Airworthiness - from entry into service to permanent withdrawal from service - all of the processes ensuring that, at any time in their operating life, all aircraft comply with the airworthiness requirements in force and are in a condition for safe operation.
Serviceable - a condition for safe operation of an aircraft that may include some loss of levels of redundancy from safety critical systems without seriously hazarding life property of the environment
Terms that cover civil aircraft...unless you can better them? (which I doubt!)
Airworthiness - from design and manufacture to delivery (entry into service) to the customer - To ensure the aircraft is capable of sustaining the designed performance parameters without hazarding life property or the environment and to support the integrity of that product throughout its life cycle.
Continued Airworthiness - from entry into service to permanent withdrawal from service - all of the processes ensuring that, at any time in their operating life, all aircraft comply with the airworthiness requirements in force and are in a condition for safe operation.
Serviceable - a condition for safe operation of an aircraft that may include some loss of levels of redundancy from safety critical systems without seriously hazarding life property of the environment
Terms that cover civil aircraft...unless you can better them? (which I doubt!)
Last edited by Rigga; 17th May 2011 at 22:31. Reason: changed to "..some loss..."
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I'll simplify/expand on that if I may...
Serviceable: A transient event where all the systems on an aircraft are functioning in the manner they were "advertised". Serviceability changes from second to second. At any moment during any flight items may change from serviceable to unserviceable. The effect on overall safety of the aircraft and crew should be mitigated by other systems or procedures on an airworthy aircraft.
Airworthy: A permanent state within each modification state of an aircraft. All systems function exactly as expected at all times and there are no unpredictable, unmitigated events. Airworthiness does not change during a flight but only with modifications to the aircraft or it's components.
Un-Airworthy: A state of build or modification that has known areas of failure or potential failure that are ignored, avoided or remain unmitigated that will have catastrophic consequences for the aircraft or crew.
Criminal Negligence: A state were men and women who place their trust in their superiors are knowingly expected to fly aircraft that have known, unmitigated and unaddressed problems that might result in the loss of the aircraft and it's crew, (see Un-Airworthy).
The forces is a dangerous game. Everyone who joins to be at the pointy end knows that and understands that they might die a premature death even during training. It's the nature of the game. But to place additional, unnecessary dangers on those fine young men and women because it costs a few shekels to save them from dying unnecessarily is worse than criminal. It's time to start treating our servicemen and women the way they deserve rather than treating them as "Tommy".
Serviceable: A transient event where all the systems on an aircraft are functioning in the manner they were "advertised". Serviceability changes from second to second. At any moment during any flight items may change from serviceable to unserviceable. The effect on overall safety of the aircraft and crew should be mitigated by other systems or procedures on an airworthy aircraft.
Airworthy: A permanent state within each modification state of an aircraft. All systems function exactly as expected at all times and there are no unpredictable, unmitigated events. Airworthiness does not change during a flight but only with modifications to the aircraft or it's components.
Un-Airworthy: A state of build or modification that has known areas of failure or potential failure that are ignored, avoided or remain unmitigated that will have catastrophic consequences for the aircraft or crew.
Criminal Negligence: A state were men and women who place their trust in their superiors are knowingly expected to fly aircraft that have known, unmitigated and unaddressed problems that might result in the loss of the aircraft and it's crew, (see Un-Airworthy).
The forces is a dangerous game. Everyone who joins to be at the pointy end knows that and understands that they might die a premature death even during training. It's the nature of the game. But to place additional, unnecessary dangers on those fine young men and women because it costs a few shekels to save them from dying unnecessarily is worse than criminal. It's time to start treating our servicemen and women the way they deserve rather than treating them as "Tommy".
...but, Kiwibrit, you don't say what that was for? Pencils? typewriters? Nimrod?
Crab said:
"Airworthiness, like Flight Safety, costs money and you will only get as much of either as you can afford.......MoD is broke"
"Airworthiness" costs a lot of money - but you'd be surprised how cost effective playing to "Continued Airworthiness" rules is. But you do have to play at it properly for a while to get the benefit.
See Post 26 for clarification
...nice to see your casual dismissal of flight safety too. (What's the point if there's no money, eh?) May as well fly without it.
Crab said:
"Airworthiness, like Flight Safety, costs money and you will only get as much of either as you can afford.......MoD is broke"
"Airworthiness" costs a lot of money - but you'd be surprised how cost effective playing to "Continued Airworthiness" rules is. But you do have to play at it properly for a while to get the benefit.
See Post 26 for clarification
...nice to see your casual dismissal of flight safety too. (What's the point if there's no money, eh?) May as well fly without it.
(What's the point if there's no money, eh?) May as well fly without it.
As you say last, you don't need a committee for Flight Safety to work. But if you're spending money in the wrong areas your operation is bound to fail in some way due to that lack of funding.
In EASA-world (which is slightly emulated in MAOS) the Accountable Manager (or from 1st July, the AOA ODH) has to be able to place funds where they are most needed to keep their operation going SAFELY. If your "Fund Holder" is incapable of placing that money in the right place, he is not really the AM but a mere budget code holder. Your DDH should be able to help in making that decision too. Your Staish (DDH) and Base Maintenance OC should have publicly available AOA LoD by now, stating their Continued Airworthiness duties to them and to you.
As weak as this reads, I hope this helps to get your message to the right place.
The power of the MAA's incestuous "Duty Holder" network has yet to be challenged by anyone - but unfortunately it may take yet more fatalities to change attitudes to care about more than personal careers.
In EASA-world (which is slightly emulated in MAOS) the Accountable Manager (or from 1st July, the AOA ODH) has to be able to place funds where they are most needed to keep their operation going SAFELY. If your "Fund Holder" is incapable of placing that money in the right place, he is not really the AM but a mere budget code holder. Your DDH should be able to help in making that decision too. Your Staish (DDH) and Base Maintenance OC should have publicly available AOA LoD by now, stating their Continued Airworthiness duties to them and to you.
As weak as this reads, I hope this helps to get your message to the right place.
The power of the MAA's incestuous "Duty Holder" network has yet to be challenged by anyone - but unfortunately it may take yet more fatalities to change attitudes to care about more than personal careers.
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Ahhh... "Managing risk"... Back when the Falklands Chinook went in that included ordering people not to discuss the probable cause with the bereaved lest it embarrass Boeing.
Alright, it wasn't an order as in "is to/are to" but everyone clearly understood that there were dire consequences for doing so... That's an order in my book, that fact that it was stated in the way it was makes it even worse.
Alright, it wasn't an order as in "is to/are to" but everyone clearly understood that there were dire consequences for doing so... That's an order in my book, that fact that it was stated in the way it was makes it even worse.
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Rigga, I don't say because I don't want to get involved in detailed discussion for years to come. But briefly, electrical and some electronic systems on a specific aircraft.
Last edited by kiwibrit; 18th May 2011 at 22:13.
In EASA-world (which is slightly emulated in MAOS) the Accountable Manager (or from 1st July, the AOA ODH) has to be able to place funds where they are most needed to keep their operation going SAFELY.
That was the case in MoD prior to funding being transferred to AMSO in the early 90s. The person holding airworthiness delegation was able to allocate / prioritise funding as required, across his range of responsibilities. He may not have always had enough funding, but it was generally spent wisely.
AMSO withdrew this authority to make decisions based on engineering judgement (despite it being mandated by SofS and PUS) and gave it instead to suppliers, who henceforth were encouraged to over-rule engineering decisions based on cost. (The thrust of the Haddon-Cave report, although he ignored the evidence as to when this started, claiming 1998). In simple, but very real terms, "airworthiness" does not have a Ref No, it is an intangible and does not generate a "due-in" on the stock computer; therefore must be a waste of money. The written evidence supporting this is with Lord Philip and was given to Haddon-Cave.
As I said, the situation gradually improved as those responsible got promoted as reward for generating such efficiencies (i.e. savings at the expense of safety and aircrew lives). It only took a few with an eye on the greasy pole for the system to run down. I'd say that, with about 10 years hard work, proper funding and judicious culling, MoD may just get back to their pre-1988 baseline. Of course, this could be brought forward and the task reduced somewhat if whole fleets were retired early. But that would merely serve to hide the problem and provide an easy solution for the beancounters. They wouldn't do that, would they?
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...and theres another thing?
The other thing is what effect has it had on the external agencies? BAES and QQ were also implicated…but what about the processes by which these private companies operate? DAOS/MAOS or not have they and others been vetted? And what about the accountability of the overseas supplier?
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Where are we at the moment with the Duty Holder v Rank v competence?
I know they are not properly in place, but is the senior rank the suitable person to hold the position of Duty Holder?
Perhaps outsourcing all military aircraft to a civilian Part M organisation is ultimately the way to go? Comments?
Do I need to take cover?
I know they are not properly in place, but is the senior rank the suitable person to hold the position of Duty Holder?
Perhaps outsourcing all military aircraft to a civilian Part M organisation is ultimately the way to go? Comments?
Do I need to take cover?
Princess Lala, you asked the question, so what do you think of the answers? You could perhaps suggest to your boss that it might be as well to wait for Lord Philip to present his report later in the year, to get a real take on "where now?" for UK Military Airworthiness. There again you might just decide to go ahead and make it all up as you mentioned. In which case why not go for the totally off the wall solution that will have your boss's jaws agape with incredulity? Not without risk for you of course, but airworthiness is a poison chalice for anyone employed in the MOD or HM Forces right now, so why not suggest that the solution could be to move UK Military Airworthiness Provision and UK Military Air Accident Investigation outside of those organisations to independent and separate authorities? They could be called something like the MAA and the MAAIB for example. They already exist? Maybe, but they are not separate and independent of the MOD, or even of each other, are they? No, really, they are not, and that is the problem. The fundamental reason for the Mull Chinook, the Iraq Hercules, and the Afghanistan Nimrod tragedies as well as host of other Airworthiness Related Fatal Air Accidents is that the Military Operator, Regulator and Investigator are one and the same, aka the MOD. It is not by chance that they are independent and separate in civil aviation but of necessity. That necessity extends likewise to military aviation.
Well there you are, Princess. Unacceptable, impossible and unworkable no doubt, but the incestuous setup that presently exists does not work and it kills, as we all know.
Feeling lucky? Then go for the unmentionable, independence! See where it got that nice Mr Salmon!
And now a word from our sponsor:
Self Regulation Never Works and in Aviation it Kills!
Well there you are, Princess. Unacceptable, impossible and unworkable no doubt, but the incestuous setup that presently exists does not work and it kills, as we all know.
Feeling lucky? Then go for the unmentionable, independence! See where it got that nice Mr Salmon!
And now a word from our sponsor:
Self Regulation Never Works and in Aviation it Kills!
Phut,
You just wouldn't believe the learning curves and Risk Register entries!
SS,
Rank may have its privileges but it certainly does not provide competency in all fields... Does that mean "incompetence" in some fields?
Tuc & Chug,
Luvvit. Keep it up. Independance is the way forward
Having a fine old night with the Teachers...
You just wouldn't believe the learning curves and Risk Register entries!
SS,
Rank may have its privileges but it certainly does not provide competency in all fields... Does that mean "incompetence" in some fields?
Tuc & Chug,
Luvvit. Keep it up. Independance is the way forward
Having a fine old night with the Teachers...