In EASA-world (which is slightly emulated in MAOS) the Accountable Manager (or from 1st July, the AOA ODH) has to be able to place funds where they are most needed to keep their operation going SAFELY.
That was the case in MoD prior to funding being transferred to AMSO in the early 90s. The person holding airworthiness delegation was able to allocate / prioritise funding as required, across his range of responsibilities. He may not have always had enough funding, but it was generally spent wisely.
AMSO withdrew this authority to make decisions based on engineering judgement (despite it being mandated by SofS and PUS) and gave it instead to suppliers, who henceforth were encouraged to over-rule engineering decisions based on cost. (The thrust of the Haddon-Cave report, although he ignored the evidence as to when this started, claiming 1998). In simple, but very real terms, "airworthiness" does not have a Ref No, it is an intangible and does not generate a "due-in" on the stock computer; therefore must be a waste of money. The written evidence supporting this is with Lord Philip and was given to Haddon-Cave.
As I said, the situation gradually improved as those responsible got promoted as reward for generating such efficiencies (i.e. savings at the expense of safety and aircrew lives). It only took a few with an eye on the greasy pole for the system to run down. I'd say that, with about 10 years hard work, proper funding and judicious culling, MoD may just get back to their pre-1988 baseline. Of course, this could be brought forward and the task reduced somewhat if whole fleets were retired early. But that would merely serve to hide the problem and provide an easy solution for the beancounters. They wouldn't do that, would they?