kiwibrit
We followed up F760s.
The points I make on various threads are;
1. We took 28% cuts in each of the first 3 years of the 90s. (Far deeper cuts than the 5% per year for 4 years General Cowan and ACM pledger were criticised for implementing from 1998, by Haddon-Cave). These cuts were independently verified, and complained about, by the RAF's Inspectorate of Flight Safety.
2. While the funding levels were resurrected a little after that, the 3 years of tasks not being undertaken was never retrospectively corrected. In the late 90s you will have noticed some work being done but the 760 (e.g.) logs will also have told you many were outstanding from that earlier period. Such gaps equate to risks. The status was and remains variable to say the least. Some aircraft offices insisted on bringing their build standards up to date, others completely ignored it (thus rendering their Safety Cases progressively invalid). Their approach depended largely on the background of those responsible. That is the link everyone must always be aware of. MF760s being progressed to completion (as that is the example being used here) are vital to a maintained Build Standard. A maintained BS is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case. And the Aircraft Release, under whatever system (CAR/MAR/GARP etc), must be based on both.
3. The regulations require continuous contractual cover. The way funding was organised at the time (i.e. the beginning of what is called "stove-piping"), one aircraft/range of equipment may have had the odd underspend, so in that year their work may have been done reasonably well. Others suffered at the same time. This scattergun approach was a direct result of centralised specialist units being closed down in 1992-3. The loss of these HQ units meant instead of a small group working 100% of the time on maintaining airworthiness, ensuring consistency and sensible use of what little money they were allowed, the work became a minor task for many. This was exacerbated, certainly in MoD(PE), by CDP's 1996 announcement he did not want engineers managing engineering projects. Hence, wholesale loss of Corporate Knowledge and Experience - which are mandated airworthiness components. This was formally notified to DPA's 3 Star Deputy Chief Executive in January 2000. He took no action. (A piece of evidence H-C ignored).
It is a simple chain and, as Rigga says, not in the least bit scary if you are properly trained. And we've been personally liable since the repeal of Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act in the early 90s. The "sudden realisation" will only be sudden to those who have not been trained ... come to think of it, that will be most MoD recruits since 1996, especially civilian "engineers". Put another way, if this realisation is "sudden" to anyone in MoD today, then I'd say they need a lot more training before receiving their letters of delegation.