TBM-L; some thread drift in response unavoidable so herewith repeat of bits from Defence White Paper 2009 aired previously:
'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.
In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...
Deterrence of interference with regional trade corridors is realistic; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is arguably militarily impractical. The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations and not for wandering the world, although governments might choose to also engage in international combined operations, if Australia has suitable capacity.
However, the strategic basis for DWP2009 already warrants review by national intelligence agencies. The US will inevitably be forced to withdraw from South East Asia (China's First Island Chain) toward American territories in the South West Pacific (China's perceived Second Island Chain). The US island fortress Guam is the same distance from Darwin as is Canberra so the ANZUS alliance will henceforth be more focused on Australia's immediate neighbourhood. China appears not to have any territorial ambitions beyond its regional FIC, but has an economic stranglehold on Australia and thus no need to exert military pressure. In effect, China's growing economic strength in our region could be seen as a defacto form of security assurance in parallel with the US alliance.
The fundamental weakness in Australian defence planning is focusing on a mythical force structure 2 decades downstream instead of progressively optimising in-service hardware (where cost-effective) to continually maintain adequate and credible military capabilities for regional operations. Multiple capability gaps have emerged from flawed hardware acquisition planning, ergo the prudent acquisition of a Bay Class amphibious support ship for $100million.
There are ongoing manufacturer upgrade programs for aircraft that Australia intends shedding so it would seem wise to suspend the Defence Capabilities Plan, put the C-130H through the factory refurbishment program as 'herkman' suggests, spend another $100million on 50 x Huey II to recover forfeited utility helo capability, perhaps another $100million or so optimising Sea Kings and acquiring some more. These comparatively modest cost actions would materially enhance capabilities for regional military operations and restore some credibility in defence planning.