Can someone explain why the MRA4 has been cancelled before we screw up big time.
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Two hours worth
It is perhaps of interest that nobody has answered the original question of this thread after some months, other than by guessing and often guessing is all one can do until 25 or 30 years have elapsed and documents presently classified are revealed to public gaze.
It is also perhaps of interest that tiny New Zealand today has more MPA assets than does the UK.
Moreover, NZ is presently upgrading its six P-3C Orions and the first one, after all manner of delays, some of them due to the original airframe and not the new software, not to mention at least one birdstrike during testing, is due back from the US in a few months as the first P-3K2.
I have flown an eight hour sortie in one of the P-3Cs and have no doubt that with the enhanced capabilities of the P-3K2 and its Elta radar that the RNZAF will have both the personnel and the platforms that many other nations will envy.
But while that is pleasing if you are domiciled in NZ, as I am, it is surely fundamentally horribly wrong that the RNZAF should have far greater maritime surveillance capabilities than does the RAF.
Nor are UAVs or RPAs being ignored for when I talked to the Minister of Defence a few weeks ago he acknowledge that they may, in future, have a role to play.
He also mentioned the P-8 and told me about the small fleet of converted commercial aircraft being considered for SAR missions.
The 'two hours later' heading refers to the time it has taken me to read this thread from its beginning.
It is an ironic twist on the ancient adage that capabilities take years to acquire but intentions can change overnight.
The ghosts of the crews of Short Singapores, Sunderlands, Shackletons and MR2s will surely be distressed as they watch MR4s being scrapped and of course it is that scrapping that most people, certainly the mainstream media have focussed on.
That screens have been erected in a futile attempt to stop cameras observing the carnage only makes it more appealing to take a camera higher and show the broken metal.
But that is not really the point ... the point that matters, the point that ALWAYS matters and is almost always overlooked, is not something you can easily capture on film.
It is the broken hearts, the crushing of hopes, the squandering of talent, the throwing away of expertise in the men and women who made MPA work.
Because, no matter what the platform, no matter how sophisticated the sensors, what Nimrod did came down to people who had spent years and years out over the seas and slowly, slowly learning their art.
You can easily attach a price tag to the hardware, to the software but to have crews who between then have more than a century of MPA experience, is priceless.
That is the biggest lost. And by far the most difficult and time consuming to regain. Acquiring decades of experience, after all, requires decades.
There are no short cuts and saving money in 'peace time' always costs more lives in war time.
It is also perhaps of interest that tiny New Zealand today has more MPA assets than does the UK.
Moreover, NZ is presently upgrading its six P-3C Orions and the first one, after all manner of delays, some of them due to the original airframe and not the new software, not to mention at least one birdstrike during testing, is due back from the US in a few months as the first P-3K2.
I have flown an eight hour sortie in one of the P-3Cs and have no doubt that with the enhanced capabilities of the P-3K2 and its Elta radar that the RNZAF will have both the personnel and the platforms that many other nations will envy.
But while that is pleasing if you are domiciled in NZ, as I am, it is surely fundamentally horribly wrong that the RNZAF should have far greater maritime surveillance capabilities than does the RAF.
Nor are UAVs or RPAs being ignored for when I talked to the Minister of Defence a few weeks ago he acknowledge that they may, in future, have a role to play.
He also mentioned the P-8 and told me about the small fleet of converted commercial aircraft being considered for SAR missions.
The 'two hours later' heading refers to the time it has taken me to read this thread from its beginning.
It is an ironic twist on the ancient adage that capabilities take years to acquire but intentions can change overnight.
The ghosts of the crews of Short Singapores, Sunderlands, Shackletons and MR2s will surely be distressed as they watch MR4s being scrapped and of course it is that scrapping that most people, certainly the mainstream media have focussed on.
That screens have been erected in a futile attempt to stop cameras observing the carnage only makes it more appealing to take a camera higher and show the broken metal.
But that is not really the point ... the point that matters, the point that ALWAYS matters and is almost always overlooked, is not something you can easily capture on film.
It is the broken hearts, the crushing of hopes, the squandering of talent, the throwing away of expertise in the men and women who made MPA work.
Because, no matter what the platform, no matter how sophisticated the sensors, what Nimrod did came down to people who had spent years and years out over the seas and slowly, slowly learning their art.
You can easily attach a price tag to the hardware, to the software but to have crews who between then have more than a century of MPA experience, is priceless.
That is the biggest lost. And by far the most difficult and time consuming to regain. Acquiring decades of experience, after all, requires decades.
There are no short cuts and saving money in 'peace time' always costs more lives in war time.
DFM
Your main reasons to your main questions are answered in today's Sunday papers. If you care to roll back the threads you will see half a dozen Pruners were trying to spell this out - but obviously couldn't because it was still sensitive (now it's out there it isn't so much anymore).
I suggest those that tried to defend the MRA4 by saying it was great and just about ready; those that had flown it or worked on it, need to take a large dose of STFU!
I am pleased someone had the b@lls to cancel it so we never have to console the likes of Tapper's Dad again.
Why was it cancelled? It was nowhere near being safe enough to fly in today's world and enough was enough.
iRaven
Your main reasons to your main questions are answered in today's Sunday papers. If you care to roll back the threads you will see half a dozen Pruners were trying to spell this out - but obviously couldn't because it was still sensitive (now it's out there it isn't so much anymore).
I suggest those that tried to defend the MRA4 by saying it was great and just about ready; those that had flown it or worked on it, need to take a large dose of STFU!
I am pleased someone had the b@lls to cancel it so we never have to console the likes of Tapper's Dad again.
Why was it cancelled? It was nowhere near being safe enough to fly in today's world and enough was enough.
iRaven
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Why was it cancelled? It was nowhere near being safe enough to fly in today's world and enough was enough.
Its statements like this that have led to the position we are now in with the MRA4.
People who no fookall should STFU
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Anybody got a link to an article revealing
because the only online articles dated 30 Jan that I can find are all still calling for Fox/Cameron's heads, and saying quite the opposite to what iRaven is suggesting.
As for the rudeness - STFU yourself.
Dave
Edited to add - okay, the list is on another Nimrod thread, apparently the info was in the Times.
I suggest those that tried to defend the MRA4 by saying it was great and just about ready; those that had flown it or worked on it, need to take a large dose of STFU!
As for the rudeness - STFU yourself.
Dave
Edited to add - okay, the list is on another Nimrod thread, apparently the info was in the Times.
Last edited by davejb; 30th Jan 2011 at 11:58.
Your main reasons to your main questions are answered in today's Sunday papers. ......Why was it cancelled? It was nowhere near being safe enough to fly in today's world and enough was enough.
The rest are all excuses being wheeled out to lessen the association between themselves, savage cuts and the resulting decimation of the armed forces. The ST seem content to swallow and repeat this.
The previous administration ducked having a defence review until after the general election.
Be in no doubt that if they were still in power a defence review would also have resulted in cuts (the main reason not to have it before the election - to avoid any bad PR fallout with the voters). All you can "what if" about is how big the cuts would have been under a Labour administration, and what would have gone.
The truth is, we will never know...
Be in no doubt that if they were still in power a defence review would also have resulted in cuts (the main reason not to have it before the election - to avoid any bad PR fallout with the voters). All you can "what if" about is how big the cuts would have been under a Labour administration, and what would have gone.
The truth is, we will never know...
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Well for the FJ community trips across the pond will be a bit more risky now, saying that the option to hop across Iceland Greenland is not as viable now with Diversion, we do have Lossie and Kinloss...oh hold on we dont . Lajes it is 
Foxed moth.....Since when was NZ a tiny place, area wise its bigger than the UK!!!!! Agree with what you say about the new a/c coming in, it takes time but when they come they will be great something MOD need to take on board
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Why I disagree with iRaven's comment
iRaven,
The Sunday Times story clearly suffers from a total lack of technical understanding and context. So you will not be surprised to hear that, in my opinion, this article does not answer my original question or provide the reasoning behind the cancellation of the MRA4. As for the Ppruners who have been trying to spell it out under an apparent cloud of secrecy but were afraid to break ranks; well I guess now they can all come forward with the juicy details.
I have many reasons why I think the article is just another piece of journalistic licence to provide sensational stories rather than a well constructed attempt to find the truth. But rather than get into the emotive language that they ply so well, I will respond with a couple of points that are based on facts and in a context that hopefully speaks for itself.
Firstly, I trust the BAes (inc contractors) and RAF engineers professionalism and intimate knowledge of the air vehicle above that of a Sunday newspaper. These engineers were responsible for the aircraft's construction, servicing, maintenance and its introduction into service; whereas the newspaper was trying to make capital out of a technical report that they clearly do not understand. Those same engineers were content that they were very close to reaching the major hurdle of RTS certification. Therefore, I and every other member of the current MPA community that I have spoken to were content with its safety.
Secondly, do you not think it is a touch implausible that CAS would have risked his reputation within Govt and MoD circles in defending the MRA4 to the hilt if it was so dangerous? Or are you suggesting he wasn’t briefed about all these supposed shortfalls and critical safety issues? Much more important than the reputation of CAS though; ask the ShortFatOne (amongst others) if he was content with the overall safety of this aircraft.
e.g. A Quote from an SFO post in Oct 10 that I hope he will not mind me using:
“I cannot say what other platforms are doing, I don't have first hand experience of them but if they are applying the rules with the rigour that we did (and I am sure they are?) then we must have the safest fleets of aircraft in the world (does that last bit sound a little too sarcastic?).
A sad end to what promised to be one of the most capable, flexible, agile and adaptable platforms the RAF had had for years. Still, I look back on my 150 hours airborne (and about 3000 in the simulator) with fond memories and a wistful glint in my eye (possibly caused by a small tear).”
Finally, I wonder if the true reason may be linked to the alarmingly rapid start to the act of vandalism this week, though I am still not quite sure why or how that would be. However, what I am sure of is that I do not believe newspapers when they have a choice between sensationalism and the more mundane truth, even when they have the truth in their hands……which in this case I would say they do not.
The Sunday Times received restricted information about specific technical defects or specification issues that were catalogued and in the process of being addressed. That’s what engineers do with pre-production aircraft before they go into production; just a thought but it is also what they do throughout the life of any aircraft. As I have said previously; the RTS issue for the MRA4 was always going to be emotive and all those close to the project know that this has undoubtedly been unduly influenced by the fall-out from the “Nimrod” handle as well as being the first in-production aircraft post the advent of MAA.
This is yet another example of that.
DFM over & out
The Sunday Times story clearly suffers from a total lack of technical understanding and context. So you will not be surprised to hear that, in my opinion, this article does not answer my original question or provide the reasoning behind the cancellation of the MRA4. As for the Ppruners who have been trying to spell it out under an apparent cloud of secrecy but were afraid to break ranks; well I guess now they can all come forward with the juicy details.
I have many reasons why I think the article is just another piece of journalistic licence to provide sensational stories rather than a well constructed attempt to find the truth. But rather than get into the emotive language that they ply so well, I will respond with a couple of points that are based on facts and in a context that hopefully speaks for itself.
Firstly, I trust the BAes (inc contractors) and RAF engineers professionalism and intimate knowledge of the air vehicle above that of a Sunday newspaper. These engineers were responsible for the aircraft's construction, servicing, maintenance and its introduction into service; whereas the newspaper was trying to make capital out of a technical report that they clearly do not understand. Those same engineers were content that they were very close to reaching the major hurdle of RTS certification. Therefore, I and every other member of the current MPA community that I have spoken to were content with its safety.
Secondly, do you not think it is a touch implausible that CAS would have risked his reputation within Govt and MoD circles in defending the MRA4 to the hilt if it was so dangerous? Or are you suggesting he wasn’t briefed about all these supposed shortfalls and critical safety issues? Much more important than the reputation of CAS though; ask the ShortFatOne (amongst others) if he was content with the overall safety of this aircraft.
e.g. A Quote from an SFO post in Oct 10 that I hope he will not mind me using:
“I cannot say what other platforms are doing, I don't have first hand experience of them but if they are applying the rules with the rigour that we did (and I am sure they are?) then we must have the safest fleets of aircraft in the world (does that last bit sound a little too sarcastic?).
A sad end to what promised to be one of the most capable, flexible, agile and adaptable platforms the RAF had had for years. Still, I look back on my 150 hours airborne (and about 3000 in the simulator) with fond memories and a wistful glint in my eye (possibly caused by a small tear).”
Finally, I wonder if the true reason may be linked to the alarmingly rapid start to the act of vandalism this week, though I am still not quite sure why or how that would be. However, what I am sure of is that I do not believe newspapers when they have a choice between sensationalism and the more mundane truth, even when they have the truth in their hands……which in this case I would say they do not.
The Sunday Times received restricted information about specific technical defects or specification issues that were catalogued and in the process of being addressed. That’s what engineers do with pre-production aircraft before they go into production; just a thought but it is also what they do throughout the life of any aircraft. As I have said previously; the RTS issue for the MRA4 was always going to be emotive and all those close to the project know that this has undoubtedly been unduly influenced by the fall-out from the “Nimrod” handle as well as being the first in-production aircraft post the advent of MAA.
This is yet another example of that.
DFM over & out
Last edited by DFM; 30th Jan 2011 at 20:18.
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Those same engineers were content that they were very close to reaching the major hurdle of RTS certification. Therefore, I and every other member of the current MPA community that I have spoken to were content with its safety.
The MRA4 was SAFE, was ready to FLY but was culled as a ill thought out cost saving exercise that ultimately will cost more than it ever saved.
Shame on you people who disbelieved and shame on you fookers who killed it.....one day this will come back to bite you.
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Manccowboy well said 
We have lost something good but its now time to let it go and move on. Nothing will bring it back unfortunately but those that have chopped it this will come back and haunt them there is no doubt on that.
Its just a shame there is so much more that can be said but for many of us its not worth loosing our job over. The truth will come out soon though that Is 100% certain.
We have lost something good but its now time to let it go and move on. Nothing will bring it back unfortunately but those that have chopped it this will come back and haunt them there is no doubt on that.
Its just a shame there is so much more that can be said but for many of us its not worth loosing our job over. The truth will come out soon though that Is 100% certain.
From today's Sunday Times...
What I know about the MRA4 program over the last year or so:
1. Some bright spark put the main control box for the ailerons at the back of the bomb bay - open the doors and catch a bird and you go for a swim (at the very best!)
2. The company tried to deliver the aircraft to the RAF without a sonobuoy clearance (hence you may as well use Sentry maritime modes)
3. The flap brackets completely failed (on I think 2 out of 3) after just a bit of flying (this one is not mentioned by the ST)
4. The nose gear had an issue with poor tolerance (just another indicator of shoddyness - see above and below for more)
5. Hot air, fuel and an ignition source inside the same zonal area without a means to extinguish (
- shame on you) and that was in the wing.
6. A rudder that was too small and gave a pitiful amount of authority for VMCA and VMCG issues when assymetric (I think they have got on top of that one).
7. An aircraft without an icing clearance - not too clever for something based in Scotland and that hunts in the Iceland-Faroes gap!
8. Issues with build quality, where things were not torqued correctly or wire locked off correctly - so much so that the company were asked to go back and look at everything again plus get new signatures for all of the work
Fine, you protect it all you like, but I for one am glad to waste £3-4Bn if its saves a RAF crew from pressing ahead for the sake of British industry for something that quite frankly was unsafe. Yes, you can "polish a turd" but it takes a lot of time, money and effort; something we don't have at present.
I suspect that CAS wanted to keep the capability (ie. long range ASW/ASuW) - but probably did not have this heap of sh!t in mind. Also, the investment appraisal board (IAB) for this Cat A project (>£400M) would have been told all of this by DE&S and then passed to the SoS Def. He would have been all too aware that it was time for "enough is enough".
Finally, this is never going to be remembered as a "TSR2 moment" but more akin to the "NimWACS debacle". Here's hoping there is an inquiry into this and that the true issues are brought out into the open of rank incompetence within the Company and areas of the MoD.
iRaven
THE nine Nimrod aircraft cancelled amid a storm of condemnation and at a cost of £4 billion were designed with the same critical safety fault blamed for the downing of an RAF Nimrod in 2006 with the loss of 14 lives.
Liam Fox, the defence secretary, has been accused of leaving a “massive gap” in the nation’s security by scrapping the fleet of maritime patrol planes.
But classified documents seen by The Sunday Times reveal Ministry of Defence (MoD) safety tests conducted last year on the first Nimrod MRA4, built by BAE Systems, found “several hundred design non-compliances”.
Among them were problems opening and closing the bomb bay doors, failures of the landing gear to deploy, overheating engines and gaps in the engine walls, limitations operating in icy conditions, and concerns that “a single bird-strike” could disable the aircraft’s controls.
However, the most serious problem discovered by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) inspectors at MoD Abbey Wood in Bristol involved a stillunresolved design flaw. It concerns the proximity of a hot air pipe to an uninsulated fuel line, widely blamed for an explosion on board Nimrod XV230 on September 2, 2006, near Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. A three-page summary of the faults, labelled “restricted” and written on September 17, last year, stated: “The work being undertaken by the MoD to validate the BAE Systems aircraft’s safety case during the week of September 13, 2010, identified a potentially serious design defect: a small section of a hot air pipe was discovered to be uninsulated in an area that also contains fuel pipes, which is outside the design regulations.”
It added: “Parallels could be drawn between this design defect and that which is thought to have caused the loss of the Nimrod MR2 (XV230) in Afghanistan in September 2006 resulting in the death of 14 personnel.”
The revelations support Fox’s claim that the aircraft simply was not airworthy. The Nimrod is designed as a maritime aircraft capable of roles including submarine detection and warfare, and long-range sea rescue.
But the DE&S report found the ability of the new MRA4 aircraft to drop sonar buoys, depth charges or life rafts would be seriously hampered: “The aircraft will enter service with a restriction preventing the opening of the bomb bay doors and a longer term solution has yet to be found.”
It added: “A single bird-strike has a potential to cause it critical damage, which could disable primary aileron flight control to both wings.” The first “few flights” of the first Nimrod saw it failing to deploy its nose landing gear “due to incorrect tolerance design”. Inspectors also found the Nimrod had “severe limitations for operating in icing [sic] conditions”, without going into detail, and said there were unresolved problems with “wing fatigue”.
They also highlighted overheating in the engine bay, and gaps in the engine bay firewalls that BAE Systems had claimed did not exist: “BAES had previously produced a report that incorrectly stated that these had been inspected and met design and build standards.”
The MoD report concluded: “MRA4 carries in total several hundred design non-compliances. Whilst many of these relate to legacy design and necessary design constraints, a significant number (including some of the issues listed above) are not what we would expect to find in a well-designed aircraft.”
Last night, a defence source said: “The project has been a disaster and should have been cancelled years ago.
“There were clearly serious safety concerns about the aircraft, and it is incredible that the flaw that saw 14 people killed near Kandahar was repeated in this new Nimrod. It would cost another £1 billion to fix all these problems, but there comes a point where you just have to say enough is enough.”
BAE Systems said: “At the time of the cancellation of the MRA4 programme, we were working with the Ministry of Defence — in the normal way — to resolve a number of issues relating to the aircraft.
“We are confident that these would have been resolved to enable the aircraft’s entry into service as planned
Liam Fox, the defence secretary, has been accused of leaving a “massive gap” in the nation’s security by scrapping the fleet of maritime patrol planes.
But classified documents seen by The Sunday Times reveal Ministry of Defence (MoD) safety tests conducted last year on the first Nimrod MRA4, built by BAE Systems, found “several hundred design non-compliances”.
Among them were problems opening and closing the bomb bay doors, failures of the landing gear to deploy, overheating engines and gaps in the engine walls, limitations operating in icy conditions, and concerns that “a single bird-strike” could disable the aircraft’s controls.
However, the most serious problem discovered by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) inspectors at MoD Abbey Wood in Bristol involved a stillunresolved design flaw. It concerns the proximity of a hot air pipe to an uninsulated fuel line, widely blamed for an explosion on board Nimrod XV230 on September 2, 2006, near Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. A three-page summary of the faults, labelled “restricted” and written on September 17, last year, stated: “The work being undertaken by the MoD to validate the BAE Systems aircraft’s safety case during the week of September 13, 2010, identified a potentially serious design defect: a small section of a hot air pipe was discovered to be uninsulated in an area that also contains fuel pipes, which is outside the design regulations.”
It added: “Parallels could be drawn between this design defect and that which is thought to have caused the loss of the Nimrod MR2 (XV230) in Afghanistan in September 2006 resulting in the death of 14 personnel.”
The revelations support Fox’s claim that the aircraft simply was not airworthy. The Nimrod is designed as a maritime aircraft capable of roles including submarine detection and warfare, and long-range sea rescue.
But the DE&S report found the ability of the new MRA4 aircraft to drop sonar buoys, depth charges or life rafts would be seriously hampered: “The aircraft will enter service with a restriction preventing the opening of the bomb bay doors and a longer term solution has yet to be found.”
It added: “A single bird-strike has a potential to cause it critical damage, which could disable primary aileron flight control to both wings.” The first “few flights” of the first Nimrod saw it failing to deploy its nose landing gear “due to incorrect tolerance design”. Inspectors also found the Nimrod had “severe limitations for operating in icing [sic] conditions”, without going into detail, and said there were unresolved problems with “wing fatigue”.
They also highlighted overheating in the engine bay, and gaps in the engine bay firewalls that BAE Systems had claimed did not exist: “BAES had previously produced a report that incorrectly stated that these had been inspected and met design and build standards.”
The MoD report concluded: “MRA4 carries in total several hundred design non-compliances. Whilst many of these relate to legacy design and necessary design constraints, a significant number (including some of the issues listed above) are not what we would expect to find in a well-designed aircraft.”
Last night, a defence source said: “The project has been a disaster and should have been cancelled years ago.
“There were clearly serious safety concerns about the aircraft, and it is incredible that the flaw that saw 14 people killed near Kandahar was repeated in this new Nimrod. It would cost another £1 billion to fix all these problems, but there comes a point where you just have to say enough is enough.”
BAE Systems said: “At the time of the cancellation of the MRA4 programme, we were working with the Ministry of Defence — in the normal way — to resolve a number of issues relating to the aircraft.
“We are confident that these would have been resolved to enable the aircraft’s entry into service as planned
1. Some bright spark put the main control box for the ailerons at the back of the bomb bay - open the doors and catch a bird and you go for a swim (at the very best!)
2. The company tried to deliver the aircraft to the RAF without a sonobuoy clearance (hence you may as well use Sentry maritime modes)
3. The flap brackets completely failed (on I think 2 out of 3) after just a bit of flying (this one is not mentioned by the ST)
4. The nose gear had an issue with poor tolerance (just another indicator of shoddyness - see above and below for more)
5. Hot air, fuel and an ignition source inside the same zonal area without a means to extinguish (
- shame on you) and that was in the wing. 6. A rudder that was too small and gave a pitiful amount of authority for VMCA and VMCG issues when assymetric
(I think they have got on top of that one).7. An aircraft without an icing clearance - not too clever for something based in Scotland and that hunts in the Iceland-Faroes gap!
8. Issues with build quality, where things were not torqued correctly or wire locked off correctly - so much so that the company were asked to go back and look at everything again plus get new signatures for all of the work
Fine, you protect it all you like, but I for one am glad to waste £3-4Bn if its saves a RAF crew from pressing ahead for the sake of British industry for something that quite frankly was unsafe. Yes, you can "polish a turd" but it takes a lot of time, money and effort; something we don't have at present.
I suspect that CAS wanted to keep the capability (ie. long range ASW/ASuW) - but probably did not have this heap of sh!t in mind. Also, the investment appraisal board (IAB) for this Cat A project (>£400M) would have been told all of this by DE&S and then passed to the SoS Def. He would have been all too aware that it was time for "enough is enough".
Finally, this is never going to be remembered as a "TSR2 moment" but more akin to the "NimWACS debacle". Here's hoping there is an inquiry into this and that the true issues are brought out into the open of rank incompetence within the Company and areas of the MoD.
iRaven
Stumpy
"A three-page summary of the faults, labelled “restricted” and written on September 17, last year [2010]" - I don't have to "prove" anything as someone else has already done it.
iRaven
"A three-page summary of the faults, labelled “restricted” and written on September 17, last year [2010]" - I don't have to "prove" anything as someone else has already done it.
iRaven
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iRaven
All the faults you have listed in your post I heard about back in October last year via a reliable source. But I have one to add, when someone was attempting to repair a leaking fuel coupling as they undid the coupling the fuel pipes sprang apart approx 9ins. The pipes were too short to join together and had been forced together putting an intolerable strain on the coupling.
While I am here I also believe that ther will be no public inquiry into this fiasco as BAE Systems appear to be teflon coated. Remember how the National Fraud Office were told to drop their case days before it was due in court. Do your home work guys and find out why Big Business Rules !!!!
Plus the Chairman of BAE Systems is a member of the Prime Minister's Business Advisory Group.
All the faults you have listed in your post I heard about back in October last year via a reliable source. But I have one to add, when someone was attempting to repair a leaking fuel coupling as they undid the coupling the fuel pipes sprang apart approx 9ins. The pipes were too short to join together and had been forced together putting an intolerable strain on the coupling.
While I am here I also believe that ther will be no public inquiry into this fiasco as BAE Systems appear to be teflon coated. Remember how the National Fraud Office were told to drop their case days before it was due in court. Do your home work guys and find out why Big Business Rules !!!!
Plus the Chairman of BAE Systems is a member of the Prime Minister's Business Advisory Group.
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So we now drop sonobuoys from the bomb bay do we??
And we're being blamed for the lack of a saftey case (and safety issues) on the GFE sonobuoys
Roughly translates as damned if you do and damned if you don't!
And we're being blamed for the lack of a saftey case (and safety issues) on the GFE sonobuoys
Roughly translates as damned if you do and damned if you don't!
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Stumpy - stay away dude!
iRaven,
I worked with SFO on this project and anything he writes is completely 'un-spun' and correct as to the true state of the aircraft.
As to the so called 'list' it is very poor. I am travelling so don't want to waste time answering all points but here's a few.
VMCA - stall limited as predicted. I should know I personally flew the test points. Same with VMCL - both static and dynamic.
VMCG - very cross wind dependent and initially higher than predicted. Gurney flap on the rudder brought VMCG to a useable number. I should know, I personally flew the test points. VMC numbers are just that, numbers defined from test points - no handling issues as you suggest.
Sonobouy restriction. All test points flown, no issues. Again I should know... Awaiting the formal clearance following analysis. Agreed that it is poor that the aircraft did not have the clearance but it was on its way - no more flying needed.
Ailerons - it was the Aieron Feel Trim Unit located at the back of the bomb bay. Please show me a birdsrtike report from the MR2/MR1 from in the bomb bay - not a credible failure...
I could go on but the snow is too good.
I accept that the aircraft is cancelled but true facts only please.
SFO/Betty/Rum stay strong!
iRaven,
I worked with SFO on this project and anything he writes is completely 'un-spun' and correct as to the true state of the aircraft.
As to the so called 'list' it is very poor. I am travelling so don't want to waste time answering all points but here's a few.
VMCA - stall limited as predicted. I should know I personally flew the test points. Same with VMCL - both static and dynamic.
VMCG - very cross wind dependent and initially higher than predicted. Gurney flap on the rudder brought VMCG to a useable number. I should know, I personally flew the test points. VMC numbers are just that, numbers defined from test points - no handling issues as you suggest.
Sonobouy restriction. All test points flown, no issues. Again I should know... Awaiting the formal clearance following analysis. Agreed that it is poor that the aircraft did not have the clearance but it was on its way - no more flying needed.
Ailerons - it was the Aieron Feel Trim Unit located at the back of the bomb bay. Please show me a birdsrtike report from the MR2/MR1 from in the bomb bay - not a credible failure...
I could go on but the snow is too good.
I accept that the aircraft is cancelled but true facts only please.
SFO/Betty/Rum stay strong!
Last edited by MOA; 31st Jan 2011 at 15:57. Reason: Typos on the iphone
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Nor are UAVs or RPAs being ignored for when I talked to the Minister of Defence a few weeks ago he acknowledge that they may, in future, have a role to play.
He also mentioned the P-8 and told me about the small fleet of converted commercial aircraft being considered for SAR missions.
I still suspect we'll see P-8s operating in UK service by 2020.