Can someone explain why the MRA4 has been cancelled before we screw up big time.
The complete lack of interest towards mission system testing in particular.
The fact that not integrating and testing precluded the establishment of an installed performance and, hence, Release to Service, didn’t bother them in the slightest. If the contract did include this, it wouldn’t be the first time the contractor chanced their arm and asked for it to be waived, and came up trumps when some dipstick agreed. That is like handing over a blank cheque – again, something said 2 Star more or less insisted on (in fact, he placed this in writing in 1998 and was supported by his 4 Star, CDP). Not saying it happened exactly this way on MRA4 but this is precisely the ethos described by Haddon-Cave and umpteen audits before him.
How did we get into such a mess with the build quality of the aircraft?
Not as simple as blaming MoD, “Procurement” or BAeS. The cancellation and the way it is being “sold” is quite clearly a device to deflect attention away from those responsible. If the Government came out and said it is down to serial incompetence and maladministration a public inquiry would be warranted. After all, we had a Public Accounts Committee report into Chinook HC Mk3, which wasted a pittance compared to MRA4. Perhaps that should be re-opened and Nimrod added to the agenda as an efficiency measure. After all, it would be the same 2/4 Stars who had to answer questions (not that they ever will). The protected species. They are not solely to blame, but interviewing them would certainly expose more detail about what happened than we’ll ever know through pprune posts.
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Not that it matters...
The PM himself has taken it on risk, there's no going back against a decision like that...
Regardless of whether or not he knows what the risk actually is!
The PM himself has taken it on risk, there's no going back against a decision like that...
Regardless of whether or not he knows what the risk actually is!
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I think Tuc's post,
not for the first time, probably nails a significant factor in the progress from Powerpoint to flying shell to scrapyard for the MRA4.
It is very easy to criticise BWoS for milking a contract (although that doesn't really stand up to scrutiny...they'd LIKE to milk it I'm sure, but intent and 'what happened' don't really coincide here).
Until MoD and RAF accept that the only way to manage a project is to have somebody in charge from start to finish, rather than imagining (for some stupid reason) that it's more important to 'groom' people by passing them at 2 year intervals throuhg a major defence project, then we'll never get anything decent done on time, on budget.
It would also help if we didn't select items for the defence budget based on parliamentary boundaries and majorities.
We'd do better to buy off the shelf from Denmark - I don't care what it is, tanks, fighter jets, frigates or hot air balloons...
This is not a capbility gap taken on risk - that's just buzzword bingo - we have currently removed our own ability to protect our coastline, a situation that prevails right this instant, the reality is we would currently be pushed to deter the Vikings.
Dave
not for the first time, probably nails a significant factor in the progress from Powerpoint to flying shell to scrapyard for the MRA4.
It is very easy to criticise BWoS for milking a contract (although that doesn't really stand up to scrutiny...they'd LIKE to milk it I'm sure, but intent and 'what happened' don't really coincide here).
Until MoD and RAF accept that the only way to manage a project is to have somebody in charge from start to finish, rather than imagining (for some stupid reason) that it's more important to 'groom' people by passing them at 2 year intervals throuhg a major defence project, then we'll never get anything decent done on time, on budget.
It would also help if we didn't select items for the defence budget based on parliamentary boundaries and majorities.
We'd do better to buy off the shelf from Denmark - I don't care what it is, tanks, fighter jets, frigates or hot air balloons...
This is not a capbility gap taken on risk - that's just buzzword bingo - we have currently removed our own ability to protect our coastline, a situation that prevails right this instant, the reality is we would currently be pushed to deter the Vikings.
Dave
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One thing that seriously hampers any progress is the MOD PTs inability to coordinate their own efforts. Each are in their own little stovepiped areas, unable to coordinate overall improvements. The exact same is true in the defence industry, and individual SMEs, working their own little area.
Very few managers out there, are able to manage complex systems like the MRA4, both from the MOD PT, or Defence industry. IMO of course, and I have some good evidence to back it up.
Very few managers out there, are able to manage complex systems like the MRA4, both from the MOD PT, or Defence industry. IMO of course, and I have some good evidence to back it up.
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Small Spinner
What you correctly identify was as a direct result of the 'Smart Procurement' (oxymoron surely) process introduced over a period of time from 1999 onwards. There was nothing smart about it. It encouraged individual PTs to go off and do their own thing (an idea borrowed from industry) in an attempt to find better ways of working. That part was all well and good, quite a few PTs came up with some really good ideas. The problem was that, in order for the other PTs to benefit from the good ideas, they had to talk to each other.
Ah.
The situation was highlighted to me a few years back when a particular ageny, one of the few that remained responsible for centrally managing a particular service to the front line, pointed out that they had found in excess of a dozen contracts, from various PTs, all for the same thing. The suppliers must have been laughing their collective t*ts off.
Ah.
The situation was highlighted to me a few years back when a particular ageny, one of the few that remained responsible for centrally managing a particular service to the front line, pointed out that they had found in excess of a dozen contracts, from various PTs, all for the same thing. The suppliers must have been laughing their collective t*ts off.
SFP
What you say is very true except don’t be fooled by Haddon-Cave’s assertion that all this started with the formation of “IPTs” and “Smart Procurement” in the late 90s.
It has to be remembered what the SMART procurement “rules” were intended to replace. The ill-fated and ludicrous “Chief of Defence Procurement Instructions” (CDPIs). Lots of bright young things were recruited to work on them in the early 90s, the common denominator being a 5 year old could see the authors had seldom worked on or near a procurement project. It was thoroughly dispiriting being told to dumb down, delay projects, dilute specs and waste money. Many of the “good ideas” you speak of fell squarely in the “ignore the bosses and revert to pre-CDPI mandated regulations” category.
Absolutely right, but (in the context of aircraft support and airworthiness) this was a policy first introduced in January 1988 by RAF suppliers (AMSO) and continued by their successors, AML and DLO. MoD(PE) railed against it but by the time they morphed into DPA the CDPI kids were in charge of the asylum and the official line was supine appeasement (of Industry and Beancounters). The waste and inefficiency it caused, never mind the safety implications, was formally notified to PUS (the Chief Accounting Officer) in June 1996. He did nothing. A paper was submitted to DPA’s Deputy CE (3 Star) in January 2000 recommending how to fix the problems (i.e. implement regulations) but he didn’t reply either.
To be fair to many suppliers, while they did laugh their tits off they also complained bitterly about the waste, because they knew the MoD budget was finite. If they had multiple contracts to administer on the same subject, it meant there was less to pay for the real, direct labour – like manufacturing, design and so on. Instead of attending Quarterly technical meetings on one contract, they had to employ professional-attenders-of-quarterly-meetings on, as you say, often a dozen contracts which simply regurgitated the same stuff. I can date this precisely, because I left that post in 1993.
As I said, fully agree, but substitute 1999 with 1988. BTW, the first Integrated Project team was formed in 1989 specifically to avoid the above problems which were causing severe operational IN-effectiveness due to AMSO’s wholesale and criminal waste of funding.
What you correctly identify was as a direct result of the 'Smart Procurement' (oxymoron surely) process introduced over a period of time from 1999 onwards. There was nothing smart about it. It encouraged individual PTs to go off and do their own thing (an idea borrowed from industry) in an attempt to find better ways of working. That part was all well and good, quite a few PTs came up with some really good ideas. The problem was that, in order for the other PTs to benefit from the good ideas, they had to talk to each other.
What you say is very true except don’t be fooled by Haddon-Cave’s assertion that all this started with the formation of “IPTs” and “Smart Procurement” in the late 90s.
It has to be remembered what the SMART procurement “rules” were intended to replace. The ill-fated and ludicrous “Chief of Defence Procurement Instructions” (CDPIs). Lots of bright young things were recruited to work on them in the early 90s, the common denominator being a 5 year old could see the authors had seldom worked on or near a procurement project. It was thoroughly dispiriting being told to dumb down, delay projects, dilute specs and waste money. Many of the “good ideas” you speak of fell squarely in the “ignore the bosses and revert to pre-CDPI mandated regulations” category.
The situation was highlighted to me a few years back when a particular ageny, one of the few that remained responsible for centrally managing a particular service to the front line, pointed out that they had found in excess of a dozen contracts, from various PTs, all for the same thing. The suppliers must have been laughing their collective t*ts off.
To be fair to many suppliers, while they did laugh their tits off they also complained bitterly about the waste, because they knew the MoD budget was finite. If they had multiple contracts to administer on the same subject, it meant there was less to pay for the real, direct labour – like manufacturing, design and so on. Instead of attending Quarterly technical meetings on one contract, they had to employ professional-attenders-of-quarterly-meetings on, as you say, often a dozen contracts which simply regurgitated the same stuff. I can date this precisely, because I left that post in 1993.
As I said, fully agree, but substitute 1999 with 1988. BTW, the first Integrated Project team was formed in 1989 specifically to avoid the above problems which were causing severe operational IN-effectiveness due to AMSO’s wholesale and criminal waste of funding.
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Just spoke to a marine engineer contractor, who despairs at the project managers he has to work with. He is making money hand over fist, purely because the PM insists on doing things he has little concept of. He then has to fix the problems, incurring massive extra costs.
His main point is that most of these PMs have never really seen a job done properly, and therefore make, and insist on following, decisions that are often crass in the extreme.
Had a PM promise the customer that the job would be done in 4 days, and when the engineer found out had to inform him that it was a 2 week job. Isn't that page 1 of the project managers handbook? i.e. Ask your engineers before opening you mouth. Beyond belief.
His main point is that most of these PMs have never really seen a job done properly, and therefore make, and insist on following, decisions that are often crass in the extreme.
Had a PM promise the customer that the job would be done in 4 days, and when the engineer found out had to inform him that it was a 2 week job. Isn't that page 1 of the project managers handbook? i.e. Ask your engineers before opening you mouth. Beyond belief.
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The engineers went spare as what had been agreed bore no resemblance to their capabilities.
It make come to me what it was.
I know there was a similar issue on the Apprentice with an agreement to provide 1000 breadrolls and only baking 16!
Small Spinner
Again, you are right.
The problem is actually worse. MoD staffs are granted delegated authority on various matters; e.g. airworthiness, technical approval, financial approval.
Those 3 examples can only be given to engineers. (Financiers merely endorse the availability of the correct funding profile, they don’t approve commitment).
The problem is that the RAF (in1989) and MoD(PE) (a few years later), the latter’s Nimrod 2 Star in particular, regularly ruled that non-engineers could make and/or over-rule airworthiness, engineering and financial decisions. I have only ever known one IPTL (RN aircraft engineer) to jump on this, but he soon backed off when the 2 and 4 Star backed the non-engineer’s decisions. (The subsequent Boards of Inquiry (plural) made pointed references to the problems but, as usual, no action was taken).
An MoD “project manager” who is not an engineer is actually quite toothless. (Same applies to a Requirements Manager). Neither can carry out about 90% of their job. They sit twiddling thumbs because they have no real authority on the project. What does such a PM sign his name to? Where is the manifestation of his supposed authority? That, I believe, is what persuades many to leap in and demonstrate their “authority” by interfering in matters they know nothing about. A classic example I once experienced was the waiving of systems integration, EMC testing and Critical Design Review on an aircraft. Funny old thing, the BoI mentioned that as well, implying they hadn’t been implemented properly; not thinking for one moment they had been waived altogether.
My main point is that Nimrod is not an isolated case (MR2 or MRA4). It has been systemic since the late 80s.
Again, you are right.
The problem is actually worse. MoD staffs are granted delegated authority on various matters; e.g. airworthiness, technical approval, financial approval.
Those 3 examples can only be given to engineers. (Financiers merely endorse the availability of the correct funding profile, they don’t approve commitment).
The problem is that the RAF (in1989) and MoD(PE) (a few years later), the latter’s Nimrod 2 Star in particular, regularly ruled that non-engineers could make and/or over-rule airworthiness, engineering and financial decisions. I have only ever known one IPTL (RN aircraft engineer) to jump on this, but he soon backed off when the 2 and 4 Star backed the non-engineer’s decisions. (The subsequent Boards of Inquiry (plural) made pointed references to the problems but, as usual, no action was taken).
An MoD “project manager” who is not an engineer is actually quite toothless. (Same applies to a Requirements Manager). Neither can carry out about 90% of their job. They sit twiddling thumbs because they have no real authority on the project. What does such a PM sign his name to? Where is the manifestation of his supposed authority? That, I believe, is what persuades many to leap in and demonstrate their “authority” by interfering in matters they know nothing about. A classic example I once experienced was the waiving of systems integration, EMC testing and Critical Design Review on an aircraft. Funny old thing, the BoI mentioned that as well, implying they hadn’t been implemented properly; not thinking for one moment they had been waived altogether.
My main point is that Nimrod is not an isolated case (MR2 or MRA4). It has been systemic since the late 80s.
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The problem is actually worse. MoD staffs are granted delegated authority on various matters; e.g. airworthiness, technical approval, financial approval.
Those 3 examples can only be given to engineers. (Financiers merely endorse the availability of the correct funding profile, they don’t approve commitment).
Those 3 examples can only be given to engineers. (Financiers merely endorse the availability of the correct funding profile, they don’t approve commitment).
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vec, not really.
On the merry-go-round of ideas the RAF went to centralised servicing which took responsibility for the aircraft away from the sqn commanders. Then sqn servicing came back in with HAS as the more convenient way of managing dispersed assets.
For the larger aircraft types they remained under a separate engineering regime with aircraft pooled between sqns or in the case of a single sqn allocated for mission to mission.
On the merry-go-round of ideas the RAF went to centralised servicing which took responsibility for the aircraft away from the sqn commanders. Then sqn servicing came back in with HAS as the more convenient way of managing dispersed assets.
For the larger aircraft types they remained under a separate engineering regime with aircraft pooled between sqns or in the case of a single sqn allocated for mission to mission.
In the case of the MRA4, a consideration is the currency of aircrew, the level of which is set when constructing the safety case.
The decision to withdraw the MR2 early immediately invalidated this baseline assumption, requiring the evolving MRA4 safety case to be re-baselined and re-validated. If the RAF have gone from being able to confirm the crews fly x hours per month to "Nowt", then one cannot sign to say the safety case is valid. This dilemma faced by both BAeS and the MRA project office (with the RTSA packing his bags in the wings) would immediately become the critical path to meeting the ISD. The decision to stop flying the MR2 therefore, by definition, delayed MRA4.
Vec - My comments were based on my part of the world where delegation comes down through a different path. Yours is through Service Chiefs. The simple answer is to ask to see your CO's Letter of Delegation. I imagine one of his responsibilities relates to the above and requires him to ensure currency (including maintainers) and immediately inform his boss if, for whatever reason, he can't. That is, the requirement for ensuring constant feedback is probably his most imporant role in safety management because, of course, he has no control whatsoever over 99.9% of "airworthiness" but, like everyone, plays a vital part.
The decision to withdraw the MR2 early immediately invalidated this baseline assumption, requiring the evolving MRA4 safety case to be re-baselined and re-validated. If the RAF have gone from being able to confirm the crews fly x hours per month to "Nowt", then one cannot sign to say the safety case is valid. This dilemma faced by both BAeS and the MRA project office (with the RTSA packing his bags in the wings) would immediately become the critical path to meeting the ISD. The decision to stop flying the MR2 therefore, by definition, delayed MRA4.
Vec - My comments were based on my part of the world where delegation comes down through a different path. Yours is through Service Chiefs. The simple answer is to ask to see your CO's Letter of Delegation. I imagine one of his responsibilities relates to the above and requires him to ensure currency (including maintainers) and immediately inform his boss if, for whatever reason, he can't. That is, the requirement for ensuring constant feedback is probably his most imporant role in safety management because, of course, he has no control whatsoever over 99.9% of "airworthiness" but, like everyone, plays a vital part.
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Tuc, you remind me, there is a QR(RAF) about 1260 IIRC that refers to the authorised engineer or some such.
As my unit was contractorised and essentially Army centric, having been an RAF unit, the need for an authorised engineer was novel. Our contract manager spotted the anomaly and volunteered to undertake the role, he was an ex-RAF SEngO. Oh, and at no cost.
As my unit was contractorised and essentially Army centric, having been an RAF unit, the need for an authorised engineer was novel. Our contract manager spotted the anomaly and volunteered to undertake the role, he was an ex-RAF SEngO. Oh, and at no cost.
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The only areas that really seems to get a clean bill of health (or as much as can be assured) is the car, and commercial aviation industry, where competition ensures that work carried out is based on good practice engineering standards and quality.
As soon as you start going down the bespoke, low volume specialist projects (defence!) the lower the standard of management. Good engineers, of which there are many, are sidelined, over worked and pressurised into cutting corners. We then become totally reliant on their professionalism and integrity, to do the right thing, but there is a greater risk in working in this environment, as well as a greater risk of errors, mistakes and worse.
As soon as you start going down the bespoke, low volume specialist projects (defence!) the lower the standard of management. Good engineers, of which there are many, are sidelined, over worked and pressurised into cutting corners. We then become totally reliant on their professionalism and integrity, to do the right thing, but there is a greater risk in working in this environment, as well as a greater risk of errors, mistakes and worse.
C130 as MPA
Now that the MR4 is gone.
What plans has the MOD got to replace it function's with other aircraft or did not this occur to them when they cut the nimrod.
I understand that the C130K or J will take some of this roles,But how can it when they are been run down at a fair rates of Knots,Plus they will put out service by 2020.
Is there a plan to re-life a few C130J and convert then to MPA role once the A400 is fully in service?
You could fit the new seachwater 2000 system to be fitted to MR4( you will have at least 12 off system paid for siting in a store unless Bae system have got first dib's on them) on a palett and fit it as a roll on off system to what ever aircraft is avaiable. I would think this would not cost to much to do,plus you can have dual role aircraft.
what do you guys think?
What plans has the MOD got to replace it function's with other aircraft or did not this occur to them when they cut the nimrod.
I understand that the C130K or J will take some of this roles,But how can it when they are been run down at a fair rates of Knots,Plus they will put out service by 2020.
Is there a plan to re-life a few C130J and convert then to MPA role once the A400 is fully in service?
You could fit the new seachwater 2000 system to be fitted to MR4( you will have at least 12 off system paid for siting in a store unless Bae system have got first dib's on them) on a palett and fit it as a roll on off system to what ever aircraft is avaiable. I would think this would not cost to much to do,plus you can have dual role aircraft.
what do you guys think?
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I'm not an engineer, but I'd be surprised to find you could fit Searchwater to a C130 quite as easily as you imply, I'd have thought it would involve significant surgery. That'd still leave you looking for an acoustics fit, as ASW is very much in the acoustics baliwick.
Then you probably already needed your C130 as a transport aircraft - which I suspect is why all the talk about C130 covering the SAR duties of the suddenly retired MR2's didn't seem to turn into actual SAR sorties by C130s.... I am aware that C130 might well have done some SAR that I haven't heard about, but that SAR job in SWAPPS the other week required a French aircraft to go on task as I recall....
Then you probably already needed your C130 as a transport aircraft - which I suspect is why all the talk about C130 covering the SAR duties of the suddenly retired MR2's didn't seem to turn into actual SAR sorties by C130s.... I am aware that C130 might well have done some SAR that I haven't heard about, but that SAR job in SWAPPS the other week required a French aircraft to go on task as I recall....
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Cyril
It wouldn't just be aircraft design mods, the MRA4 Searchwater, like the rest of the sensors (excepting acoustics), was an extension of the Mission System. No Mission System, no radar.
You could redesign the workstation perhaps but it will cost money we don't have. If we can't afford what we've already paid for, how can we justify spending more money on an untried concept?
It wouldn't just be aircraft design mods, the MRA4 Searchwater, like the rest of the sensors (excepting acoustics), was an extension of the Mission System. No Mission System, no radar.
You could redesign the workstation perhaps but it will cost money we don't have. If we can't afford what we've already paid for, how can we justify spending more money on an untried concept?