F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
So, the Liberals have won the Canadian general election.....
Goodbye F-35s, hello marijuana: What the Liberals are likely to do first
5. Fighter jets
The Liberals have promised to cancel the Conservative purchase of F-35 jets, which is expected to cost $44 billion over the jets’ four-decade life cycle. “We will immediately launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft,” the platform says, specifying that the F-35’s “stealth first-strike capability” is not needed to defend Canada.
Goodbye F-35s, hello marijuana: What the Liberals are likely to do first
5. Fighter jets
The Liberals have promised to cancel the Conservative purchase of F-35 jets, which is expected to cost $44 billion over the jets’ four-decade life cycle. “We will immediately launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft,” the platform says, specifying that the F-35’s “stealth first-strike capability” is not needed to defend Canada.
I've seen the argument for the Super Hornets (or it's like) twin engine for Canada and a lot of them make sense to me.
I agree that Super Hornet E/F/G makes perfect sence for Canadian CF-18 replacement capability wise....but like most other places politics and perfect sence do not go hand in hand. I am sure the Canadian contractors involved as a level 3 F-35 partner may be worried. Worst case is studying it to death and putting band aids on existing gear, while crews fly around in 40+ year old aircraft... Just get on with it and purchace off the shelf quickly....
Last edited by sandiego89; 20th Oct 2015 at 19:48.
Interesting views considering the range of the F-35
Retreat from Range: The Rise and Fall of Carrier Aviation
OCTOBER 19, 2015 Jerry Hendrix
Defense Strategies and Assessments Program Director Dr. Jerry Hendrix argues that aircraft carriers, at a cost over $13 billion a piece, risk becoming obsolete without a major shift in strategy. In particular, he argues carriers must switch to a mixed manned/unmanned airwing or risk becoming too vulnerable to counter attacks to put into battle.
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/fi...ing-151016.pdf
According to Hendrix, the prime time of aircraft carriers may be coming to an end as strategic mistakes committed by the US over the past 20 years has limited these vessel's capabilities while leaving them open to strikes from new emerging threats. Writing in the Center for a New American Security, he makes the case that aircraft carriers have steadily lost their utility over the past two decades.
At fault for this are twin mistakes of the US Navy: a steady introduction of aircraft with decreasing flight ranges in addition to a failure to foresee rising military capabilities from countries like China that could target carriers.
"American power and permissive environments were assumed following the end of the Cold War, but the rise of new powers, including China and its pursuit of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies and capabilities to include the carrier-killing 1,000 nautical mile (nm) range Dong Feng-21 anti-ship ballistic missile, now threatens to push the Navy back beyond the range of its carrier air wings," Hendrix notes.
Essentially, any carrier that operates within 1,000 nautical miles of Chinese military placements could be open to a strike from an antiship ballistic missile. This would not be a problem, except that the average unrefueled combat range of US carrier air wings operates at half that distance.
And even that average combat range is a decrease from the height of the Cold War.
In 1956, for example, air wings had an average range of 1,210 nautical miles on internal fuel alone. This range was achieved even though the US Navy was using an older class of aircraft carriers that could support less aircraft than today's modern carriers.
The move to shrink the flight range of carrier air wings occurred following the fall of the Soviet Union and the Navy's decision to shift the strategic purpose of carriers away from long-range missions toward acting as platforms for faster and shorter-range sortie missions.
"[P]lanner elected to invest in lower-end conflict scenarios that foresaw carriers operating in the littoral waters nearer their targets," Hendrix wrote. "Emphasis was placed on reliability and sortie generation capabilities. In the language of strategic planners, long range was an area where the Navy and the Department of Defense decided to 'accept risk.'"
These decisions meant that the average unrefueled range of carrier air wings since 1996, at 496 nautical miles, are at their lowest point since the 1930s. In 1930, for instance, the average range was 258 nautical miles. By 1943, this range was extended to 758 nautical miles unrefueled.
And according to Hendrix, the Navy's current procurement strategy does nothing to alleviate the issue.
The decision to follow through with the F-35 only serves as "completing the retreat from range," according to Hendrix. The F-35 was meant to replace long-range legacy aircraft such as the F-14 and the A-6 — which are no longer in service — but the F-35's initial specs of having a combat range of 730 nautical miles was a 75% decrease in capability from those aircraft.
But in actuality, the F-35C's combat range is expected to be 550 nautical miles, only 50 nautical miles longer than the Navy's current complement of F/A-18E and F Super Hornets.
This lack of range, unless the Navy changes course, will continue to mean that the Navy will have little choice but to continue to operate in waters off potential enemy coasts.
And this means that carriers, for all their cost and high-tech capabilities, would either hypothetically fall within range of Chinese antiship ballistic missiles or would be forced to operate beyond the unrefueled range of their air wings.
"Today’s Navy looks remarkably like it has for the past 70 years, just smaller and more expensive," Hendrix noted in an article for the National Review. "It is an evolutionary force, not a revolutionary force, and it's an easy target for rising powers that seek to overtake it."
Retreat from Range: The Rise and Fall of Carrier Aviation
OCTOBER 19, 2015 Jerry Hendrix
Defense Strategies and Assessments Program Director Dr. Jerry Hendrix argues that aircraft carriers, at a cost over $13 billion a piece, risk becoming obsolete without a major shift in strategy. In particular, he argues carriers must switch to a mixed manned/unmanned airwing or risk becoming too vulnerable to counter attacks to put into battle.
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/fi...ing-151016.pdf
According to Hendrix, the prime time of aircraft carriers may be coming to an end as strategic mistakes committed by the US over the past 20 years has limited these vessel's capabilities while leaving them open to strikes from new emerging threats. Writing in the Center for a New American Security, he makes the case that aircraft carriers have steadily lost their utility over the past two decades.
At fault for this are twin mistakes of the US Navy: a steady introduction of aircraft with decreasing flight ranges in addition to a failure to foresee rising military capabilities from countries like China that could target carriers.
"American power and permissive environments were assumed following the end of the Cold War, but the rise of new powers, including China and its pursuit of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies and capabilities to include the carrier-killing 1,000 nautical mile (nm) range Dong Feng-21 anti-ship ballistic missile, now threatens to push the Navy back beyond the range of its carrier air wings," Hendrix notes.
Essentially, any carrier that operates within 1,000 nautical miles of Chinese military placements could be open to a strike from an antiship ballistic missile. This would not be a problem, except that the average unrefueled combat range of US carrier air wings operates at half that distance.
And even that average combat range is a decrease from the height of the Cold War.
In 1956, for example, air wings had an average range of 1,210 nautical miles on internal fuel alone. This range was achieved even though the US Navy was using an older class of aircraft carriers that could support less aircraft than today's modern carriers.
The move to shrink the flight range of carrier air wings occurred following the fall of the Soviet Union and the Navy's decision to shift the strategic purpose of carriers away from long-range missions toward acting as platforms for faster and shorter-range sortie missions.
"[P]lanner elected to invest in lower-end conflict scenarios that foresaw carriers operating in the littoral waters nearer their targets," Hendrix wrote. "Emphasis was placed on reliability and sortie generation capabilities. In the language of strategic planners, long range was an area where the Navy and the Department of Defense decided to 'accept risk.'"
These decisions meant that the average unrefueled range of carrier air wings since 1996, at 496 nautical miles, are at their lowest point since the 1930s. In 1930, for instance, the average range was 258 nautical miles. By 1943, this range was extended to 758 nautical miles unrefueled.
And according to Hendrix, the Navy's current procurement strategy does nothing to alleviate the issue.
The decision to follow through with the F-35 only serves as "completing the retreat from range," according to Hendrix. The F-35 was meant to replace long-range legacy aircraft such as the F-14 and the A-6 — which are no longer in service — but the F-35's initial specs of having a combat range of 730 nautical miles was a 75% decrease in capability from those aircraft.
But in actuality, the F-35C's combat range is expected to be 550 nautical miles, only 50 nautical miles longer than the Navy's current complement of F/A-18E and F Super Hornets.
This lack of range, unless the Navy changes course, will continue to mean that the Navy will have little choice but to continue to operate in waters off potential enemy coasts.
And this means that carriers, for all their cost and high-tech capabilities, would either hypothetically fall within range of Chinese antiship ballistic missiles or would be forced to operate beyond the unrefueled range of their air wings.
"Today’s Navy looks remarkably like it has for the past 70 years, just smaller and more expensive," Hendrix noted in an article for the National Review. "It is an evolutionary force, not a revolutionary force, and it's an easy target for rising powers that seek to overtake it."
Last edited by Wokkafans; 21st Oct 2015 at 15:19. Reason: Changed A-16 to A-6
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My Liberal Canadian MP, who has just been re-elected, stated to me that the Liberals had a sub-committee advising them, including some ex-RCAF fighter pilots, and they were recommending Super Hornet. They had discussed other options including Rafale and Typhoon. That was three months ago.
Interesting article, however the way you extend range is with organic AAR ... wait a sec, we pissed that away decades ago. 
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The F-35 was meant to replace long-range legacy aircraft such as the F-14 and the A-16...
-RP
What's an A-16? I assume this is just a simple typo, and A-6 is what was really meant?
The charts and article are interesting and do a good job at demonstrating the retreat from long range carrier aviation. The 1956 airwing chart (Skyraider, Banshee, Fury, Skywarrior) is likely a little weighted with the Skywarrior upping the average quite a bit. It did bring a lot of range/payload, but only a handfull were aboard at any one time. It should be noted (and the artilce does) that a major focus of the Postwar/Supercarrier was longer range nuclear strike- so the airwing reflected that with designs such as the Savage, A-3, Vigilante, A-4, A-6. This range advantage later payed off well for conventional strike.
I do agree that the abandonment of long range strike with no A-6 replacement (A-12 cancelled), and dedicated tankers, has undermined the value of the supercarrier. An A-6 replacement with long range would have been better suited for Iraq and Afghanistan.
I would like to see the KS-3 Viking brought out of the boneyard and upgraded as has been mulled.
Bringing back some tankers would be a lovely idea, but I fear this is a bit of a rerun (only slightly bigger) of Typhoon eating up so much of the defence budget that other programmes got hurt and there was certainly no room to resurrect old ones or start new ones.
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With V-22 being discussed (selected?) for the COD role, even for CVN, it isn't a surprise to see an organic AAR capability (single hose) being developed as a roll-on fit.
If we asked nicely maybe the QE could embark a USMC Squadron of V-22 in this role when required?
If we asked nicely maybe the QE could embark a USMC Squadron of V-22 in this role when required?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
McCain: 'Have To' Reduce F-35 Total Buy
WASHINGTON — The powerful chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John McCain, R-Ariz., said Tuesday the US will have to cut the numbers of F-35 fighter jets it will purchase.
In a brief comment to reporters, McCain seemed to signal that the total projected buy for the Pentagon's most costly and ambitious program — 2,443 in total, spread across three models for the Air Force, Marines and Navy — is out of whack with budget realities. He said that cost growth in the program will mean fewer jets overall. "We're going to have to reduce the buy," he said. "The number they are now quoting — there's just not going to be that many."
McCain, a longtime critic of the F-35, is known for hitting the program for a series of cost overruns and delays. But calling for a formal reduction in the Pentagon's buy of the jets has been a touchy subject in the Defense Department.
For years, the Pentagon and backers in Congress have fiercely guarded the 2,443 figure for the F-35, quickly shooting down talk that the number could be reduced. That seemed to change earlier this year, when Gen. Joseph Dunford, now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in testimony that the Pentagon is "presently taking the newest strategic foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number." That was followed by similar written comments from Adm. John Richardson, who, during his hearing to be named Chief Naval Officer, wrote that he would work to "re-validate the appropriate number of aircraft the Navy requires."
The Pentagon has since denied that there is a major review of the F-35 buy underway – but acknowledged that, with budget uncertainty, all programs may be up for review. Combined, the comments seem to have opened the door for a discussion – one that McCain, a critic of the F-35 program, appears eager to open wider.
It's bad timing for the program, which, after a relatively quiet year of success, has hit speed bumps in the last month. In September, Defense News revealed that concerns over ejection safety have forced the Pentagon to ground any F-35 pilots under 138 pounds from flying the jet.
WASHINGTON — The powerful chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John McCain, R-Ariz., said Tuesday the US will have to cut the numbers of F-35 fighter jets it will purchase.
In a brief comment to reporters, McCain seemed to signal that the total projected buy for the Pentagon's most costly and ambitious program — 2,443 in total, spread across three models for the Air Force, Marines and Navy — is out of whack with budget realities. He said that cost growth in the program will mean fewer jets overall. "We're going to have to reduce the buy," he said. "The number they are now quoting — there's just not going to be that many."
McCain, a longtime critic of the F-35, is known for hitting the program for a series of cost overruns and delays. But calling for a formal reduction in the Pentagon's buy of the jets has been a touchy subject in the Defense Department.
For years, the Pentagon and backers in Congress have fiercely guarded the 2,443 figure for the F-35, quickly shooting down talk that the number could be reduced. That seemed to change earlier this year, when Gen. Joseph Dunford, now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in testimony that the Pentagon is "presently taking the newest strategic foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number." That was followed by similar written comments from Adm. John Richardson, who, during his hearing to be named Chief Naval Officer, wrote that he would work to "re-validate the appropriate number of aircraft the Navy requires."
The Pentagon has since denied that there is a major review of the F-35 buy underway – but acknowledged that, with budget uncertainty, all programs may be up for review. Combined, the comments seem to have opened the door for a discussion – one that McCain, a critic of the F-35 program, appears eager to open wider.
It's bad timing for the program, which, after a relatively quiet year of success, has hit speed bumps in the last month. In September, Defense News revealed that concerns over ejection safety have forced the Pentagon to ground any F-35 pilots under 138 pounds from flying the jet.
Having an anthro limitation doesn't matter. Over 50% of Navy pilots, for example, are helicopter pilots. Not all Air Force pilots are going to be Lightning II pilots. There's a lot of drama going on here ... for what looks to me to be no good reason.
As to the larger issue, cutting the buy just bumps the price per unit up again. Lovely. The Hi Low Mix fails yet again.
re the testimony at US House of Representatives:
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS...C-20151021.pdf
3 potential fixes to ejection seat: Low weight (of pilot) switch slightly delaying chute opening, lighter helmet, head support sewn onto the risers.
Lots of stuff in there, I noted B-61 integration coming, long time to integrate other weapons, acknowledgement of not being a dog-fighter and reduced rearward visibility, gun accuracy "favaorable to most legacy aircraft" (hmm interesting wording- I thought it was supposed to be hyper accurate), the ALIS system being much more consuming than thought, partner progress with Italian and Japanese lines, among other things.
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS...C-20151021.pdf
3 potential fixes to ejection seat: Low weight (of pilot) switch slightly delaying chute opening, lighter helmet, head support sewn onto the risers.
Lots of stuff in there, I noted B-61 integration coming, long time to integrate other weapons, acknowledgement of not being a dog-fighter and reduced rearward visibility, gun accuracy "favaorable to most legacy aircraft" (hmm interesting wording- I thought it was supposed to be hyper accurate), the ALIS system being much more consuming than thought, partner progress with Italian and Japanese lines, among other things.
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Canada pulling out of F-35 program