F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
And besides the apparent integration issues of the death ray system, the F-35 will be focused on maintaining air superiority. 
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And besides the apparent integration issues of the death ray system, the F-35 will be focused on maintaining air superiority.
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Maybe it's not the fault of the ejection seat after all
F-35's Heavier Helmet Complicates Ejection Risks
WASHINGTON — In the latest hurdle for the Pentagon's F-35 joint strike fighter, testers this summer discovered an increased risk of neck damage when a lightweight pilot is ejecting from the plane. The Joint Program Office blamed the phenomenon on the jet's ejection seat, Martin-Baker's US16E. But interviews conducted by Defense News in recent weeks indicate the added weight and bulk of the new F-35 helmet complicates the problem. It is still unclear whether the blame rests squarely with the helmet, or the seat, or somewhere in between.
F-35's Heavier Helmet Complicates Ejection Risks
WASHINGTON — In the latest hurdle for the Pentagon's F-35 joint strike fighter, testers this summer discovered an increased risk of neck damage when a lightweight pilot is ejecting from the plane. The Joint Program Office blamed the phenomenon on the jet's ejection seat, Martin-Baker's US16E. But interviews conducted by Defense News in recent weeks indicate the added weight and bulk of the new F-35 helmet complicates the problem. It is still unclear whether the blame rests squarely with the helmet, or the seat, or somewhere in between.
F-35's Heavier Helmet Complicates Ejection Risks
FlyPony,
Two comments - first of all what are you doing dragging the subject off topic - don't you know this is a thread about airborne laser systems?
Secondly, in the case of the USAF, with only 180 odd F-22s available globally, then surely the F-35 will have to undertake a considerable amount of air superiority tasking, no matter what it was primarily designed for?
Two comments - first of all what are you doing dragging the subject off topic - don't you know this is a thread about airborne laser systems?
Secondly, in the case of the USAF, with only 180 odd F-22s available globally, then surely the F-35 will have to undertake a considerable amount of air superiority tasking, no matter what it was primarily designed for?
Last edited by Biggus; 16th Oct 2015 at 07:22.
The whole escape system has been of concern to me for years. Management of pitch vs seat c of g, insufficient testing and seat clearances for higher yaw rates on F-35B, clearance from canopy debris, the over-reliance on correct posture on ejection, off-axis lumpy helmet vs airflow etc etc....
I'm surprised they even release the stills from the sled-shots and the depressingly large bits of canopy shown in close proximity to the test dummy.
The JPO spin makes me wince - 'we are in the SDD phase...' yet ask them a different question and they champion the IOC declared by the USMC. The spin monkeys needs to sit down and decide if this is an operational platform or not.
I'm surprised they even release the stills from the sled-shots and the depressingly large bits of canopy shown in close proximity to the test dummy.
The JPO spin makes me wince - 'we are in the SDD phase...' yet ask them a different question and they champion the IOC declared by the USMC. The spin monkeys needs to sit down and decide if this is an operational platform or not.
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I read the natops FA-18ef manual has a 136lb weight limit too. Anyone know what the euro planes minimum weights are?
or if one read past the clickbait headline of the article posted
DellaVedova stressed that helmet weight was not a factor in the Aug. 27 decision to ground lightweight pilots.
"That was an ejection seat issue discovered during the parachute opening phase and was not related to the differences between the Gen II and Gen III helmets," DellaVedova said. "For lightweight pilots in a low speed ejection condition, there is a possibility the pilot could rotate to a position in the ejection sequence where the parachute opening shock could cause the head to rotate backward."
(but are still lightening the helmet)
In addition to designing a lighter helmet, the JPO is looking into two other fixes to reduce the potential for an increased risk of neck injury, DellaVedova said. First, the team is working on installing a switch on the seat for lightweight pilots that will delay deployment of the main parachute. Also, the program will mount a "head support panel," which is a fabric panel sewn between the parachute risers that will protect the pilot's head from moving backwards during the parachute opening. These two fixes will be introduced when the next upgrade of the ejection seat comes online near the end of 2016.
All three fixes will be fully implemented by summer 2017, DellaVedova noted.
or if one read past the clickbait headline of the article posted
DellaVedova stressed that helmet weight was not a factor in the Aug. 27 decision to ground lightweight pilots.
"That was an ejection seat issue discovered during the parachute opening phase and was not related to the differences between the Gen II and Gen III helmets," DellaVedova said. "For lightweight pilots in a low speed ejection condition, there is a possibility the pilot could rotate to a position in the ejection sequence where the parachute opening shock could cause the head to rotate backward."
(but are still lightening the helmet)
In addition to designing a lighter helmet, the JPO is looking into two other fixes to reduce the potential for an increased risk of neck injury, DellaVedova said. First, the team is working on installing a switch on the seat for lightweight pilots that will delay deployment of the main parachute. Also, the program will mount a "head support panel," which is a fabric panel sewn between the parachute risers that will protect the pilot's head from moving backwards during the parachute opening. These two fixes will be introduced when the next upgrade of the ejection seat comes online near the end of 2016.
All three fixes will be fully implemented by summer 2017, DellaVedova noted.
Last edited by a1bill; 16th Oct 2015 at 09:10.
JTO - It's been a complex issue. I had the VSI folks complaining that at one point they'd run a test and blown a hole in the helmet. Everyone wanted to blame them, but it turned out that LM had upgunned the MDF to make sure that the canopy fractured.
The canopy issue is that it has to be one-piece because fat kid needs magic cloak. The front bit has to be bird-proof so the top can be only so thin, and because of commonality it had to hinge at the front (because the rear canopy line is different on the B) so it can't be jettisoned. So how do you adequately fracture the canopy without fracturing the pilot?
And they've been trying different things to keep the pilot's head straight for six or seven years, with interventions from UTC Aerospace (formerly Goodrich) who have their own ideas.
I see what you mean about the photo. That's not a big hole to go through, and those look like new and bigger canopy-breakers on top of the seat.
a1b - Why don't you read the abundant public record about the "expanded pilot population" decisions of the early 1990s? I know it's easier to copy and paste from the program's PR guy, but it might put you in a position where you make sense.
The canopy issue is that it has to be one-piece because fat kid needs magic cloak. The front bit has to be bird-proof so the top can be only so thin, and because of commonality it had to hinge at the front (because the rear canopy line is different on the B) so it can't be jettisoned. So how do you adequately fracture the canopy without fracturing the pilot?
And they've been trying different things to keep the pilot's head straight for six or seven years, with interventions from UTC Aerospace (formerly Goodrich) who have their own ideas.
I see what you mean about the photo. That's not a big hole to go through, and those look like new and bigger canopy-breakers on top of the seat.
a1b - Why don't you read the abundant public record about the "expanded pilot population" decisions of the early 1990s? I know it's easier to copy and paste from the program's PR guy, but it might put you in a position where you make sense.
Just This Once:....... clearance from canopy debris............
I'm surprised they even release the stills from the sled-shots and the depressingly large bits of canopy shown in close proximity to the test dummy........
I'm surprised they even release the stills from the sled-shots and the depressingly large bits of canopy shown in close proximity to the test dummy........
Seats have been going through the canopy, or assisted with minature det cord for decades, and many airframes have tight clearances.....
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LO-L, what a lot of tripe that funny old bill sweetman writes. One minute it's a stink about not having code access, Then there is a stink when he finds out that the threat library codes are user programmed, as they wanted.
The UK, aus and canada (when they decide) are going to jointly fund and develop theirs and there are other partners and buyers that are also joining into joint threat libraries .
also he should check if this misleading sentence "but in most cases allowed local users to manage their own “threat libraries,”" Infact the US locks the threat library normally, Aust had problems with accessing the f-111, the Fa-18 and I assume the FA-18f and Growler. The F-111 codes were held at the US embassy in australia. We tried to hack into the hornet codes so we could target US supplied planes in our neighborhood. which is well publicised.
also he seems to be confusing threat library and mission data files, isn't he?
The UK, aus and canada (when they decide) are going to jointly fund and develop theirs and there are other partners and buyers that are also joining into joint threat libraries .
also he should check if this misleading sentence "but in most cases allowed local users to manage their own “threat libraries,”" Infact the US locks the threat library normally, Aust had problems with accessing the f-111, the Fa-18 and I assume the FA-18f and Growler. The F-111 codes were held at the US embassy in australia. We tried to hack into the hornet codes so we could target US supplied planes in our neighborhood. which is well publicised.
also he seems to be confusing threat library and mission data files, isn't he?
Last edited by a1bill; 16th Oct 2015 at 13:10.
SD89 - If you look at your photos, the entire canopy has been removed. Not the case with the F-35.
But wait, there's more...
http://www.rollcall.com/news/exclusi...&dczone=policy
But wait, there's more...
http://www.rollcall.com/news/exclusi...&dczone=policy
Last edited by LowObservable; 16th Oct 2015 at 14:23.
LowObservable SD89 - If you look at your photos, the entire canopy has been removed. Not the case with the F-35
Some more shards:
Unless I am mistaken, this image shows the location of the mini-detcord fitted around the inside of the frame of the F-35's cockpit canopy. Unlike aircraft with which I am more familiar, it does not appear to wiggle longitudinally over the pilot's head:
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Guys,
Perhaps I can help here. I was on the F-35 programme when a number of design decisions were being finalised and also worked closely with the cockpit and escape system teams.
I have to gently disagree with some posts here. Happy to discuss, I'm just trying to present the facts as best I know them.
First, the F-35 was planned from the outset to use LO as an integral part of the overall design - LO wasn't added to compensate for any performance characteristics. A one piece canopy certainly helped with the LO signature, as it got rid of a straight line joint - but it also reduced weight. LM/GD had many years of one piece canopy experience with F-16 as well as F-22, and didn't see it as a big deal.
The front of the canopy isn't 'bird proof', but is much more bird strike resistant than legacy US canopies, mainly as a result of more stringent UK requirements. The front part initially had an additional internal shell bonded to the outer shell, this may have subsequently changed. The rest of the canopy's thickness was driven by normal design constraints including external and internal loads.
The front hinge design was driven by a number of factors. Commonality certainly played a part, as identified by LO. There was also a desire to get the best opening for entry, and the forward hinge provided better clearance around the seat. It also gave better access to the avionics items located behind the seat, and it also made seat removed much easier. The F-35B's lift fan also made an aft hinge design problematic. As ever, any design choice is driven by many factors, not just one.
It's also quite true that the F-35B's flight envelope ruled out jettison of an aft hinged canopy as an escape option, the same logic that drove the initial development of MDC canopy shattering for the Harrier. Commonality meant that the escape system had to go across all three variants. LO meant that the legacy MDC patterns (wavy lines) had to be replaced by a single central line (as per the Gripen). (I hope that answers Fod's observation). No-one said it was going to be easy....
Getting the big canopy shards away from the seat was a challenge, especially at the lower speeds of F-35B transition, as well as at F-35C carrier ops speeds. The seat is required to handle an exceptionally wide range of weights, and also achieve a very low installed weight. (That weight was further trimmed after the weight problems of 2004 - it's now a very light seat indeed). Oh, and they were required to meet some very tough requirements for seat maintenance. MB's efforts were well regarded by all the programme partners as well as the customers. Sometimes, aircraft design is just plain hard.
The helmet has been an ongoing saga for some years, with VSI struggling to achieve weight targets that were probably over optimistic at the outset. The decision a couple of years ago to look at the BAES helmet as an option certainly spurred VSI to some rapid improvements, but the aircraft was always going to have a US sourced helmet, driven by Congressional politics.
It's a 'big hat', driven by an explicit customer requirement for an HMD. That's presented challenges since day one, and I recall that it was being handled as a significant programme risk. Things weren't helped by high level decisions to reduce the number of track ejection tests. These had to be reinstated at a later date. As I've often posted, people can make decisions that later don't work. It doesn't mean that they are bad or stupid people.
To be clear, I'm not trying to 'defend the programme'. But I do try to present the complexity of a real programme, and reassure some readers that the F-35 team has lots of clever and dedicated engineers doing their damnedest to deliver a world beating aircraft to the front line. I think they'll succeed. Others don't. That's fine - free forum and all that.
Best regards as ever to all those working hard to get the aircrew into the aircraft and back out in one piece.
Engines
.
Perhaps I can help here. I was on the F-35 programme when a number of design decisions were being finalised and also worked closely with the cockpit and escape system teams.
I have to gently disagree with some posts here. Happy to discuss, I'm just trying to present the facts as best I know them.
First, the F-35 was planned from the outset to use LO as an integral part of the overall design - LO wasn't added to compensate for any performance characteristics. A one piece canopy certainly helped with the LO signature, as it got rid of a straight line joint - but it also reduced weight. LM/GD had many years of one piece canopy experience with F-16 as well as F-22, and didn't see it as a big deal.
The front of the canopy isn't 'bird proof', but is much more bird strike resistant than legacy US canopies, mainly as a result of more stringent UK requirements. The front part initially had an additional internal shell bonded to the outer shell, this may have subsequently changed. The rest of the canopy's thickness was driven by normal design constraints including external and internal loads.
The front hinge design was driven by a number of factors. Commonality certainly played a part, as identified by LO. There was also a desire to get the best opening for entry, and the forward hinge provided better clearance around the seat. It also gave better access to the avionics items located behind the seat, and it also made seat removed much easier. The F-35B's lift fan also made an aft hinge design problematic. As ever, any design choice is driven by many factors, not just one.
It's also quite true that the F-35B's flight envelope ruled out jettison of an aft hinged canopy as an escape option, the same logic that drove the initial development of MDC canopy shattering for the Harrier. Commonality meant that the escape system had to go across all three variants. LO meant that the legacy MDC patterns (wavy lines) had to be replaced by a single central line (as per the Gripen). (I hope that answers Fod's observation). No-one said it was going to be easy....
Getting the big canopy shards away from the seat was a challenge, especially at the lower speeds of F-35B transition, as well as at F-35C carrier ops speeds. The seat is required to handle an exceptionally wide range of weights, and also achieve a very low installed weight. (That weight was further trimmed after the weight problems of 2004 - it's now a very light seat indeed). Oh, and they were required to meet some very tough requirements for seat maintenance. MB's efforts were well regarded by all the programme partners as well as the customers. Sometimes, aircraft design is just plain hard.
The helmet has been an ongoing saga for some years, with VSI struggling to achieve weight targets that were probably over optimistic at the outset. The decision a couple of years ago to look at the BAES helmet as an option certainly spurred VSI to some rapid improvements, but the aircraft was always going to have a US sourced helmet, driven by Congressional politics.
It's a 'big hat', driven by an explicit customer requirement for an HMD. That's presented challenges since day one, and I recall that it was being handled as a significant programme risk. Things weren't helped by high level decisions to reduce the number of track ejection tests. These had to be reinstated at a later date. As I've often posted, people can make decisions that later don't work. It doesn't mean that they are bad or stupid people.
To be clear, I'm not trying to 'defend the programme'. But I do try to present the complexity of a real programme, and reassure some readers that the F-35 team has lots of clever and dedicated engineers doing their damnedest to deliver a world beating aircraft to the front line. I think they'll succeed. Others don't. That's fine - free forum and all that.
Best regards as ever to all those working hard to get the aircrew into the aircraft and back out in one piece.
Engines
.
One of the most questionable roots of this whole thing is the original "95th percentile" decision. Whether or not it was wholly political (can we remember who was in the White House then, and seems to be in the news every day now?), it was taken on the basis of very limited knowledge of what would be required.
And it's not exactly easy:
We've since found stability issues we didn't know were there, as well as adding bigger helmets to the equation.
And it's not exactly easy:
We've since found stability issues we didn't know were there, as well as adding bigger helmets to the equation.
Engine's post eloquently outlined the history where more and more project 'risk' was introduced into the escape system due to various reasons; usually to offset other issues. There was much resistance to this from a number of well-educated corners of the room, but the matter was to be finally settled during testing.
What happened next is not covered in Engine's post - the test program was then curtailed considerably. Of course, it did not help that the USAF were not particularly interested in the 'weird and wacky' ejection envelop required for the B or the expensive testing required.
Project 'risk' has turned into actual risk for the pink bodies. The first high yaw rate combined with nose-down pitch ejection will happen with a real fleshy thing strapped to the seat with SMEs clutching their models that suggest that the outcome is not assured.
We have become rather adept at ignoring some very capable engineers when projects start to slide.
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Secondly, in the case of the USAF, with only 180 odd F-22s available globally, then surely the F-35 will have to undertake a considerable amount of air superiority tasking, no matter what it was primarily designed for?
1. The F-22 is not the only air superiority fighter in the US or NATO inventory. It is the only stealth air superiority fighter, but there are several hundreds of non-stealth air superiority fighters (F-15s, Typhoons, Rafales, etc) in the various inventories.
2. I believe there is a significant difference between "focused on maintaining air superiority" and "undertake a considerable amount of air superiority tasking."
FlyPony,
First of all I'm only here to debate, not argue. I'm also more than willing to be informed or educated, hopefully politely. While you don't know my background (or I yours), I'm an ex military aviator, albeit not a fighter pilot, and fully aware of the existence of F-15, Typhoon, etc, thank you.
I was only discussing the USAF use of F-35, but, if you're going to mention other NATO countries, I should point out that for many/most NATO countries planning to buy the F-35, such as Norway and the Netherlands, it will be their only fast jet, and therefore their only option for air superiority missions.
Open sources report that the USAF intends to keep 178 F-15C/Ds, the ones with the AESA upgrade, to supplement the low numbers of F-22s (187 F-22s delivered vs USAF planned requirements for 750, then 648, then 339, then 277...), but that even these numbers face reductions as a result of sequestration, or the need to generate savings to fund, yes, you guessed it, the F-35. F-15C/D production ended in 1985, making the youngest of them already 30 years old, with the prospect of what, 20+ more years in service?
With the USAF planning to buy 1,700 odd F-35s (no doubt that number has changed), as compared to 360 dedicated air superiority aircraft (180 F-22s and 180 ageing F-15C/Ds) I find it difficult to believe that the F-35 won't be required to carry out a considerable portion of air superiority tasking throughout the duration of any conflict.
I also said months (years?) ago that software, especially software testing, would be a major issue with the F-35.
But hey, what would I know?
I apologise to more learned and knowledgeable F-35 commentators for taking up some of your bandwidth!!
First of all I'm only here to debate, not argue. I'm also more than willing to be informed or educated, hopefully politely. While you don't know my background (or I yours), I'm an ex military aviator, albeit not a fighter pilot, and fully aware of the existence of F-15, Typhoon, etc, thank you.
I was only discussing the USAF use of F-35, but, if you're going to mention other NATO countries, I should point out that for many/most NATO countries planning to buy the F-35, such as Norway and the Netherlands, it will be their only fast jet, and therefore their only option for air superiority missions.
Open sources report that the USAF intends to keep 178 F-15C/Ds, the ones with the AESA upgrade, to supplement the low numbers of F-22s (187 F-22s delivered vs USAF planned requirements for 750, then 648, then 339, then 277...), but that even these numbers face reductions as a result of sequestration, or the need to generate savings to fund, yes, you guessed it, the F-35. F-15C/D production ended in 1985, making the youngest of them already 30 years old, with the prospect of what, 20+ more years in service?
With the USAF planning to buy 1,700 odd F-35s (no doubt that number has changed), as compared to 360 dedicated air superiority aircraft (180 F-22s and 180 ageing F-15C/Ds) I find it difficult to believe that the F-35 won't be required to carry out a considerable portion of air superiority tasking throughout the duration of any conflict.
I also said months (years?) ago that software, especially software testing, would be a major issue with the F-35.
But hey, what would I know?
I apologise to more learned and knowledgeable F-35 commentators for taking up some of your bandwidth!!
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FlyPony, First of all I'm only here to debate, not argue.
And for whatever its worth, the F-15E (and its many derivatives) retains all the air superiority capabilities of the F-15C/D. USAF has 224 F-15Es in service which they'll keep flying at least as long the upgraded C/Ds and likely longer. And FWIW, there will be many hundreds of block 40 and later F-16s remaining in service with USAF and many other nations for many more years to come. They are reasonably capable air superiority fighters. My conclusion is that IF a laser weapon is ever be made to fit into an F-35 or F-15 (a rather huge if, LM spokespeople notwithstanding), there will likely be enough F-35s and/or F-15s available to modify to perform that mission. And FWIW, I have no idea what mission a laser equipped F-35 would be tasked to perform. I don't even know if it would be air-to-air, air-to-ground, or something else entirely. It would literally be a new paradigm that I cannot fathom at present.