Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
It was a systemic failure across the board, operators and engineers, driven by the pressures to not say no. Heads rolled if individuals spoke out, or they were worked around.
e(r):
There in a nutshell is the common link that connects all the varied abuses that UK Military Airworthiness has suffered over three decades. STF is one tree in that wood, but there are many more, and it is the wood that needs looking at and dealing with as a whole.
Nothing gets near 2 star or above it would seem, least of all being held to account for their actions, or indeed inaction. I have a very strong feeling that whatever else happens that at least will continue. That is for the RAF (which I'm thinking of particularly in this regard) but for its own good it has to grasp that nettle I would suggest. Going back to our "airworthiness wood", it has to be moved away from MOD meddling, then the sort of abuse described by Engines et al, should stop. From that point of view this supersedes individual service practice, as what point tight RN engineering control if the kit itself is delivered compromised, having had MOD's hands all over it? The MAA's master will go on killing until the MAA has the independence and clout to stop it.
It was a systemic failure across the board, operators and engineers, driven by the pressures to not say no. Heads rolled if individuals spoke out, or they were worked around.
RAF instructions never got near 2 star
The purpose of a Regularity Authority is not to bring aviation to a halt, on the contrary it is to keep it airworthy and therefore flying. If the MAA is not doing that you have my sympathy and it confirms my suspicions that this is not a Regulator but a bureaucracy, busy at being busy. It cannot do its job because it does not know how nor even if it did, despite how you feel, the clout. If it had the clout, practices as have been described here and elsewhere would not occur as they would be jumped on from a great height. The MAA cannot climb to any great height so it wastes its time snapping at peoples heels. Meanwhile the chronic condition of UK Military Airworthiness continues, waiting to manifest itself in another sad thread on this very forum. We have to beat it to it!
STFs etc
Because the regulations governing STFs are so vague and ambiguous, some of this is opinion.
When regs covering whole aircraft are vague (e.g. Def Stan 05-123, 00-970) I always found it wise to consult those applicable to Avionic equipment, because they are the best available. Despite being scrapped two years ago, without replacement, any sensible project manager still has his personal copy to hand. The solution to almost every airworthiness related problem aired on this forum is contained in that one Def Stan. (But D/Stan can no longer provide you with a complete copy, and haven’t been able to since 1993).
These state that the equipment equivalent, a Trials Installation, can be (a) Temporary or (b) Retainable.
As the regs are so vague and, as stated by Engines, STFs are a peculiarly RAF device, the question posed here often arose. The answers were equally vague but official MoD airworthiness training says an STF can be Retained and used operationally, subject to a Certificate of Design and inclusion in the Safety Case. Then, and only then, the RTSA may issue a Service Deviation. The point here is that the CAR/MAR was not amended, due to time constraints – clearly implying operational imperative was a factor. This was meant to catch up in due course. The SD would dictate how long the STF was valid for. At this point the system failed as there was seldom follow-up action.
This process has changed now, but the principles remain valid; however legacy aircraft will take some time to conform.
Having said all that, there is a contradictory regulation (as ever!) which says one cannot infer such a thing, there must be a positive statement. My personal view is that the retention of STFs for operational use is fine, but subject to basic rules (above) being implemented. The reason why the system became abused was simple – AMSO slashed funding to implement the regs in 1991, and then issued orders that they were NOT to be implemented. No Configuration Control or maintained drawings. Hence, progressively invalid Safety Cases and RTSs. This wasn’t incompetence on the part of project staff, EAs or RTSAs. It was a deliberate supplier-led policy. The basic rules were not implemented, leading to a situation whereby numerous STFs (and SRIMs, NSMs etc) were either “safe but didn’t work” or “worked but were unsafe”. In particular, systems integration disciplines and interoperability were routinely ignored, so that a STF that was “safe and worked” could subsequently be rendered unsafe by another STF. And, of course, the Safety Case was not maintained at the In Use Build Standard.
This is where detailed specialist knowledge of Modification procedures comes in (and airworthiness in general). When AMSO ruled in 1991 that he didn’t need such expertise, the inevitable happened. It didn’t happen overnight of course, but it was progressive throughout the 90s and got to the stage it was impossible to resurrect. However, the effect was predictable and predicted, but senior staffs chose to ignore it.
This is where I wholeheartedly agree with Tourist. The result, a complete dumbing down, has eroded flexibility and hamstrung front line. But everyone must understand this hamstringing is not as a result of Haddon-Cave. That report merely brought well established facts to the attention of those in power who HAD to do something. But I believe the MAA reaction to be driven by the fact there remains so little expertise in MoD to plan resurrection. Lack of expertise breeds inflexibility.
It is easy (and reasonable) for Haddon-Cave to say “implement the regs”. Fifteen years ago I’d have given us a chance. Eleven years ago (11th January 2000) DPA’s Deputy Chief Executive (DCE – 3 Star) was given an internal report in response to the Public Accounts Committee’s report “Modifying Defence Equipment”. He took no action. Demonstrably, had he taken even the simplest action and reiterated mandatory regulations should be implemented, subsequent accidents would have been avoided. I don’t know why he took no action (he didn’t reply to the report) but, to be fair, his immediate boss (CDP) had the previous year upheld rulings that airworthiness regs were NOT to be implemented; echoing AMSO and AML rulings from the early 90s. Management sets the tone.
When regs covering whole aircraft are vague (e.g. Def Stan 05-123, 00-970) I always found it wise to consult those applicable to Avionic equipment, because they are the best available. Despite being scrapped two years ago, without replacement, any sensible project manager still has his personal copy to hand. The solution to almost every airworthiness related problem aired on this forum is contained in that one Def Stan. (But D/Stan can no longer provide you with a complete copy, and haven’t been able to since 1993).
These state that the equipment equivalent, a Trials Installation, can be (a) Temporary or (b) Retainable.
As the regs are so vague and, as stated by Engines, STFs are a peculiarly RAF device, the question posed here often arose. The answers were equally vague but official MoD airworthiness training says an STF can be Retained and used operationally, subject to a Certificate of Design and inclusion in the Safety Case. Then, and only then, the RTSA may issue a Service Deviation. The point here is that the CAR/MAR was not amended, due to time constraints – clearly implying operational imperative was a factor. This was meant to catch up in due course. The SD would dictate how long the STF was valid for. At this point the system failed as there was seldom follow-up action.
This process has changed now, but the principles remain valid; however legacy aircraft will take some time to conform.
Having said all that, there is a contradictory regulation (as ever!) which says one cannot infer such a thing, there must be a positive statement. My personal view is that the retention of STFs for operational use is fine, but subject to basic rules (above) being implemented. The reason why the system became abused was simple – AMSO slashed funding to implement the regs in 1991, and then issued orders that they were NOT to be implemented. No Configuration Control or maintained drawings. Hence, progressively invalid Safety Cases and RTSs. This wasn’t incompetence on the part of project staff, EAs or RTSAs. It was a deliberate supplier-led policy. The basic rules were not implemented, leading to a situation whereby numerous STFs (and SRIMs, NSMs etc) were either “safe but didn’t work” or “worked but were unsafe”. In particular, systems integration disciplines and interoperability were routinely ignored, so that a STF that was “safe and worked” could subsequently be rendered unsafe by another STF. And, of course, the Safety Case was not maintained at the In Use Build Standard.
This is where detailed specialist knowledge of Modification procedures comes in (and airworthiness in general). When AMSO ruled in 1991 that he didn’t need such expertise, the inevitable happened. It didn’t happen overnight of course, but it was progressive throughout the 90s and got to the stage it was impossible to resurrect. However, the effect was predictable and predicted, but senior staffs chose to ignore it.
This is where I wholeheartedly agree with Tourist. The result, a complete dumbing down, has eroded flexibility and hamstrung front line. But everyone must understand this hamstringing is not as a result of Haddon-Cave. That report merely brought well established facts to the attention of those in power who HAD to do something. But I believe the MAA reaction to be driven by the fact there remains so little expertise in MoD to plan resurrection. Lack of expertise breeds inflexibility.
It is easy (and reasonable) for Haddon-Cave to say “implement the regs”. Fifteen years ago I’d have given us a chance. Eleven years ago (11th January 2000) DPA’s Deputy Chief Executive (DCE – 3 Star) was given an internal report in response to the Public Accounts Committee’s report “Modifying Defence Equipment”. He took no action. Demonstrably, had he taken even the simplest action and reiterated mandatory regulations should be implemented, subsequent accidents would have been avoided. I don’t know why he took no action (he didn’t reply to the report) but, to be fair, his immediate boss (CDP) had the previous year upheld rulings that airworthiness regs were NOT to be implemented; echoing AMSO and AML rulings from the early 90s. Management sets the tone.
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Tuc
I think that because STF were peculiar to the RAF, they were covered by the RAF AP 100B-01, which I no longer have access to. It was far less conditional than the guidance you quote. The effect of the installation was not considered against the safety case and it could only be retained through a SEM or DO cover mod.
Time, tide and red wine does of course dull the memory.
regards
retard
I think that because STF were peculiar to the RAF, they were covered by the RAF AP 100B-01, which I no longer have access to. It was far less conditional than the guidance you quote. The effect of the installation was not considered against the safety case and it could only be retained through a SEM or DO cover mod.
Time, tide and red wine does of course dull the memory.
regards
retard
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OWMIGAWD! What a shucking fambles this whole process has become! It sounds like the front-line are being hampered by a lack of engineering expertise and safety-awareness while the MAA obviously need to get people like you guys back doing the jobs you were once so good at (that was until AMSO slashed the funds for you to implement SoS's regulations!).
Eng
I agree there was variable (to say the least) application. AP100B-01 (Order 1120) outlines the rules regarding SDs, as applied to STFs.
However, 553 was absolutely clear, the Safety Case must be updated. Kind of difficult when AMSO have ****** funding down the drain and robbed hitherto ring-fenced airworthiness funding to compensate (or hide their fraud, as some would say).
This policy also chopped funding for Cover Mods or Superseding Cover Mods - what you say is absolutely right but the resource simply wasn't available. In time, it became the accepted norm to ignore the regs. In fact, in time very few knew the regs existed and new project managers in PE/DPA/DLO were formally trained that they need not implement the airworthiness regs. This ethos was fully embedded by 1996.
The ambiguity caused uncertainty, which is fatal in airworthiness.
I agree there was variable (to say the least) application. AP100B-01 (Order 1120) outlines the rules regarding SDs, as applied to STFs.
However, 553 was absolutely clear, the Safety Case must be updated. Kind of difficult when AMSO have ****** funding down the drain and robbed hitherto ring-fenced airworthiness funding to compensate (or hide their fraud, as some would say).
This policy also chopped funding for Cover Mods or Superseding Cover Mods - what you say is absolutely right but the resource simply wasn't available. In time, it became the accepted norm to ignore the regs. In fact, in time very few knew the regs existed and new project managers in PE/DPA/DLO were formally trained that they need not implement the airworthiness regs. This ethos was fully embedded by 1996.
The ambiguity caused uncertainty, which is fatal in airworthiness.
Chugalug2 - absolutely spot on - MAA has become bogged down in process-driven box ticking - exactly what H-C wanted to remove. There are currently hundreds of staff officers completing nugatory paperwork that won't make anything safer or more airworthy but will help to find someone to blame in the event of an accident.
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Gentlemen,
There were definitely conflicting regulations. My point of view is, possibly, a bit simpler if less informed.
STFs were designed to be used for trials, and that limited use (duration and other safety related measures for a trial) were judged by the RAF to allow less documentation, oversight and supporting evidence than for the next step up, an SEM.
My view was (and remains) that if you are putting a modification on an aircraft that is going to operations, you do it properly the first time - and that means an SEM (or SM these days). And as an engineer, you have a professional duty (to your Chief Engineer) to tell the operators how long that will take. As a serving officer, you set that time to be as fast as possible to meet the operational need.
There's no excuse for using an STF when the SEM route is available. And lack of time is not an excuse, in my book - we must not let our aircrew down by putting mods on aircraft that can hazard that aircraft - even if they tell us to do so. I was lucky - my aircrew bosses never did anything so ill advised.
Anyway, moot point now, no more STFs. Just those 'in theatre' mods to watch out for...
Best Regards as ever to those doing the job out in the sand
Engines
There were definitely conflicting regulations. My point of view is, possibly, a bit simpler if less informed.
STFs were designed to be used for trials, and that limited use (duration and other safety related measures for a trial) were judged by the RAF to allow less documentation, oversight and supporting evidence than for the next step up, an SEM.
My view was (and remains) that if you are putting a modification on an aircraft that is going to operations, you do it properly the first time - and that means an SEM (or SM these days). And as an engineer, you have a professional duty (to your Chief Engineer) to tell the operators how long that will take. As a serving officer, you set that time to be as fast as possible to meet the operational need.
There's no excuse for using an STF when the SEM route is available. And lack of time is not an excuse, in my book - we must not let our aircrew down by putting mods on aircraft that can hazard that aircraft - even if they tell us to do so. I was lucky - my aircrew bosses never did anything so ill advised.
Anyway, moot point now, no more STFs. Just those 'in theatre' mods to watch out for...
Best Regards as ever to those doing the job out in the sand
Engines
I met a guy who said he worked for the MAA - and he'd spent several months researching what I (and anyone in the aviation industry) could have told him in five minutes.
The poor guy had researched several companies, and national and military organisations to guess that they all "do similar things" - without realising that the things they do are all to an internationally recognised standard.
It seems there is a policy of not asking anyone anything, forcing people to do the google thing and getting "half a fact" to report to the top.
I now assume this is how they (MAA) made such wild interpretations of rules that already exist? By ignoring the standard and inventing your own byan uneducated interpretation of what you think you might need!
Is this a form of "NIH" - Not Invented Here? A term I first heard applied to ship hull designs rejected by the RN.
The poor guy had researched several companies, and national and military organisations to guess that they all "do similar things" - without realising that the things they do are all to an internationally recognised standard.
It seems there is a policy of not asking anyone anything, forcing people to do the google thing and getting "half a fact" to report to the top.
I now assume this is how they (MAA) made such wild interpretations of rules that already exist? By ignoring the standard and inventing your own byan uneducated interpretation of what you think you might need!
Is this a form of "NIH" - Not Invented Here? A term I first heard applied to ship hull designs rejected by the RN.
Engines
You are quite right about SEMs, of any kind. If they were envisaged to take over a certain time to embody, they were not allowed. 50 hours I seem to recall. This was routinely ignored. This time limit was related, in part, to complexity of design and the need to minimise the integration/interoperability risks I mentioned. For a start, the Service designers seldom have access to the correct drawings or an integration rig - AMSO/AML dismantled many of the latter when they cut funding.
But the overriding factor, also routinely ignored, was that the SEM design had to be appraised by the Aircraft Design Authority and subsumed within the Safety Case.
Many believed this to cause delay and used it as justification for corner cutting, but actually the work could largely be done in parallel, always assuming the mandated, continuous contract was in place.
Like many aspects of this business, many know the effect, but not the true cause. It is not necessarily the DA Mod route that is slow, but the refusal to let mandated, continuous enabling contracts so the DA can be switched on immediately (or self task), thus avoiding lengthy negotiations every time. Ah, self tasking. If one simple Def Stan / Specification is invoked, as mandated, then the User can phone an operational problem direct to the Design Engineer and he's up and running immediately. Or, if the DA spots the problem, he is obligated to immediately start work on a fix. How many DA contracts have that facility now, the delegation of financial signing powers to the DA in order to maintain safety and airworthiness?
To me, that one point proves Rigga right about the MAA. I'd guarantee not one of them can name that Specification, or even produce it. But it is the fundamental basis for efficiently maintaining airworthiness and fitness for purpose. Reading some of the papers they've produced, I'd say someone has dug out copies of the ludicrous Chief of Defence Procurement Instructions (CDPIs) from 1993/4. These were meant to replace Controller Aircraft Instructions, but were so bad it became a joke. They were quietly cancelled, but the problem was, so were CAIs. The final straw for CDPIs was when they made an attempt at defining the process for maintaining the Build Standard and Safety Case. Despite the definition being front and centre in the already mandated Def Stan, they got it 100% wrong, rendering everything that followed meaningless. MAA made precisely the same mistake, using almost exactly the same words.
You are quite right about SEMs, of any kind. If they were envisaged to take over a certain time to embody, they were not allowed. 50 hours I seem to recall. This was routinely ignored. This time limit was related, in part, to complexity of design and the need to minimise the integration/interoperability risks I mentioned. For a start, the Service designers seldom have access to the correct drawings or an integration rig - AMSO/AML dismantled many of the latter when they cut funding.
But the overriding factor, also routinely ignored, was that the SEM design had to be appraised by the Aircraft Design Authority and subsumed within the Safety Case.
Many believed this to cause delay and used it as justification for corner cutting, but actually the work could largely be done in parallel, always assuming the mandated, continuous contract was in place.
Like many aspects of this business, many know the effect, but not the true cause. It is not necessarily the DA Mod route that is slow, but the refusal to let mandated, continuous enabling contracts so the DA can be switched on immediately (or self task), thus avoiding lengthy negotiations every time. Ah, self tasking. If one simple Def Stan / Specification is invoked, as mandated, then the User can phone an operational problem direct to the Design Engineer and he's up and running immediately. Or, if the DA spots the problem, he is obligated to immediately start work on a fix. How many DA contracts have that facility now, the delegation of financial signing powers to the DA in order to maintain safety and airworthiness?
To me, that one point proves Rigga right about the MAA. I'd guarantee not one of them can name that Specification, or even produce it. But it is the fundamental basis for efficiently maintaining airworthiness and fitness for purpose. Reading some of the papers they've produced, I'd say someone has dug out copies of the ludicrous Chief of Defence Procurement Instructions (CDPIs) from 1993/4. These were meant to replace Controller Aircraft Instructions, but were so bad it became a joke. They were quietly cancelled, but the problem was, so were CAIs. The final straw for CDPIs was when they made an attempt at defining the process for maintaining the Build Standard and Safety Case. Despite the definition being front and centre in the already mandated Def Stan, they got it 100% wrong, rendering everything that followed meaningless. MAA made precisely the same mistake, using almost exactly the same words.
Contract management and monitoring seems to be a very weak point, especially when 2 contracts overlap/meet.
There is an aircraft with a near-rejection level engine (96.8% PPI with a rejection of 96% PPI) that has had every component changed more than once (except the ECU itself) because the engine contractors won't let the maintenance contractors do it.
It is costing massive amounts of man hours, using up valuable spares and delaying the return of the aircraft to the front line because no-one in the military has the clout to bang heads together.
This is all to save an engine that will be changed within 50 hours (and probably a lot less) when it finally gets to its unit.
There is an aircraft with a near-rejection level engine (96.8% PPI with a rejection of 96% PPI) that has had every component changed more than once (except the ECU itself) because the engine contractors won't let the maintenance contractors do it.
It is costing massive amounts of man hours, using up valuable spares and delaying the return of the aircraft to the front line because no-one in the military has the clout to bang heads together.
This is all to save an engine that will be changed within 50 hours (and probably a lot less) when it finally gets to its unit.
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I was until 6 weeks ago, the Capability and Integration Manager for one of the role fit 'modifications' fitted to MR2, which was migrated to, and successfully flown on MRA4, before the programme was dropped.
STF's along with SEM's, disappeared under GARP, and as Engines has said, were only ever designed to be used for trials. The embodiment of a service modification (SM) requires an update to the (fully substantiated) safety case, covering both the equipment, and aircraft modifications, regardless if they were done in service (EDIT) or by the DO/A. The certification requires both a Form 100A and Form 100C to be produced is support of the design assurance evidence. Where the safety case cannot be fully substantiated (generally due to lack of evidence), then it is possible to gain either a CLE or OEC depending on the nature of the risk and the use.
For the systems that I was responsible for, particularly during the transition to MRA4 the degree of safety scrutiny was considerable. The degree of engineering, safety and hazard analysis before first flight was at the opposite end of the spectrum to that inferred under a STF regime.
I'm not sure I understand the comments made about the MAA not being able to name or produce the specifications. In my last appointment, I worked very closely with the MAA on issues where interpretation of system/equipment compliance in respect of Def-Stan 05-123 and Def-Stan 00-970. Particularly over complex issues where one DAOS approved supplier were calling into question other DAOS suppliers evidence and Certification/QA process. A non-particularly interesting subject, I grant you, but still one that requires the regulator to arbitrate over whether a piece of equipment, designed for both fixed and rotary wing environments has to comply with the FW or RW elements of Def-Stan 00-970. My point is that in these discusions, I found the MAA Technical Division to be fully aware of the standards and the requirements they pertain to.
edited for pants spolling
STF's along with SEM's, disappeared under GARP, and as Engines has said, were only ever designed to be used for trials. The embodiment of a service modification (SM) requires an update to the (fully substantiated) safety case, covering both the equipment, and aircraft modifications, regardless if they were done in service (EDIT) or by the DO/A. The certification requires both a Form 100A and Form 100C to be produced is support of the design assurance evidence. Where the safety case cannot be fully substantiated (generally due to lack of evidence), then it is possible to gain either a CLE or OEC depending on the nature of the risk and the use.
For the systems that I was responsible for, particularly during the transition to MRA4 the degree of safety scrutiny was considerable. The degree of engineering, safety and hazard analysis before first flight was at the opposite end of the spectrum to that inferred under a STF regime.
I'm not sure I understand the comments made about the MAA not being able to name or produce the specifications. In my last appointment, I worked very closely with the MAA on issues where interpretation of system/equipment compliance in respect of Def-Stan 05-123 and Def-Stan 00-970. Particularly over complex issues where one DAOS approved supplier were calling into question other DAOS suppliers evidence and Certification/QA process. A non-particularly interesting subject, I grant you, but still one that requires the regulator to arbitrate over whether a piece of equipment, designed for both fixed and rotary wing environments has to comply with the FW or RW elements of Def-Stan 00-970. My point is that in these discusions, I found the MAA Technical Division to be fully aware of the standards and the requirements they pertain to.
edited for pants spolling
BINGO!!! .
Care to explain? Has a penny dropped?
Good posts on STFs Engines and Tucumseh. I think we all know both of you are right. The rules probably intended them to be for trials only but are so contradictory it is no wonder confusion reigned. Tuc is right. The only Defence Standard that spells out the process in any real detail expressly permits them to be retained. "Retained" STFs were common place in RAF fleets I came across, some aircraft with dozens of them. Chinook was particularly bad. Nimbus, the rules outlined by tuc aren't in either 553 or 00/970. But the RN were also serial abusers of their NSM system but I'd qualify that by saying the worst excesses were when DHSA took over. I don't think the RN had as much control when DHSA was formed. Someone should ask Westland how often they were tasked to implement the NSM rules. Not a lot.
I would agree that the MAA know alot about Def-Stans and JAPs and probably many other military-type rules and regulations too - and so they should.
But they don't appear to be able, or capable even, of looking beyond their own limited, tiny horizons.
The MAA have been tasked with developing a system which is "as civil as possible, as military as necessary" but still they seem devoid of the nous to consult outside their office walls.
The contract with Baines-Simmons seems to have produced a particulary twisted view of how "they" can wedge what was a perfectly workable system into what they already have so that 'they' don't have to change anything at all and can carry on, carrying on with the same low standards of work-around practices, effectively preventing any service benefits or maintenance improvements at all.
It defeats me, after all those years of change for change's sake, that those who have the power to change things....don't!
It all points to the "Earn your 'K' Club" or invitations to the Mason's to raise your trouser leg.
A friend tells me that a recent drive for maintenance efficiencies was thwarted by the lack of evidence to help remove unnecessary effort from scheduled maintenance - the "lack" seems to be caused by a "resistance" from service personnel to report anything properly and work around the issues instead. A self-defeating tactic if I ever heard of one.
I am not saying that there is a conspiracy to defeat the private sector, nor am I saying that tradesmen are doing things deliberately. This is all the way the MOD has allowed things to degrade over past decades and it has now become the "Norm" to do things in this way.
I can understand that this standard creep is partly due to being on Ops for over twenty years and that Front Line practices have bled through to normal line practices. I am not blaming anyone for doing bad things - just stating that, to get better, they have to change their strategy and tactics.
But they don't appear to be able, or capable even, of looking beyond their own limited, tiny horizons.
The MAA have been tasked with developing a system which is "as civil as possible, as military as necessary" but still they seem devoid of the nous to consult outside their office walls.
The contract with Baines-Simmons seems to have produced a particulary twisted view of how "they" can wedge what was a perfectly workable system into what they already have so that 'they' don't have to change anything at all and can carry on, carrying on with the same low standards of work-around practices, effectively preventing any service benefits or maintenance improvements at all.
It defeats me, after all those years of change for change's sake, that those who have the power to change things....don't!
It all points to the "Earn your 'K' Club" or invitations to the Mason's to raise your trouser leg.
A friend tells me that a recent drive for maintenance efficiencies was thwarted by the lack of evidence to help remove unnecessary effort from scheduled maintenance - the "lack" seems to be caused by a "resistance" from service personnel to report anything properly and work around the issues instead. A self-defeating tactic if I ever heard of one.
I am not saying that there is a conspiracy to defeat the private sector, nor am I saying that tradesmen are doing things deliberately. This is all the way the MOD has allowed things to degrade over past decades and it has now become the "Norm" to do things in this way.
I can understand that this standard creep is partly due to being on Ops for over twenty years and that Front Line practices have bled through to normal line practices. I am not blaming anyone for doing bad things - just stating that, to get better, they have to change their strategy and tactics.
Last edited by Rigga; 22nd Sep 2011 at 22:18. Reason: addition:
Maybe the first change should be to make the Monday to Friday support staff work the same 24/7 as the front-line
And that goes for IT support as well!
And that goes for IT support as well!
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Couldn't agree more.
I've just finished a post where had to be an call at weekends and out of hours for 2 years. A commitment I took very seriously, but unfortunately I was only one deep. When I needed back-up of certain elements within DE&S on Saturday afternoon, it was not there.
I've just finished a post where had to be an call at weekends and out of hours for 2 years. A commitment I took very seriously, but unfortunately I was only one deep. When I needed back-up of certain elements within DE&S on Saturday afternoon, it was not there.
^^ Wot he said. Times have indeed changed. When we moved from London to ShabbeyWood, we were immediately informed what work we were expected to do (a) in office (b) in the evenings at home and (c) at week-ends at home. And before someone shouts "over-time" or "TOIL", there was no such thing. In my case (b) and (c) was "only" Secret UK Eyes, so this involved waltzing back and forward with papers that were not entirely Unclassified.