Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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CHINOOK
Arkroyal.
Yes indeed, we have been here too many times already.
PPRuNe Pop.
Not deliberate; I found your post less than clear. In any case, what you describe as a question is simply a statement '....no doubt whatever...'
It is quite clear, without any doubt whatever, that we are not going to agree on the matter, and nor are we likely to convice one another. I think we should agree to disagree about the matter of doubt. That, after all, is what this discussion has been about.
With all good wishes
JP.
Yes indeed, we have been here too many times already.
PPRuNe Pop.
Not deliberate; I found your post less than clear. In any case, what you describe as a question is simply a statement '....no doubt whatever...'
It is quite clear, without any doubt whatever, that we are not going to agree on the matter, and nor are we likely to convice one another. I think we should agree to disagree about the matter of doubt. That, after all, is what this discussion has been about.
With all good wishes
JP.
Ark Royal & Tandemrotor
But surely, WOrker and JP are not basing their argument on what might have happened in the last 15 seconds or so.
If I understand them correctly, they are arguing that the negligence is based on the fact that, at waypoint change they were under control and that, under the prevailing conditions, they were negligent in not turning away then, and BEFORE anything might have gone wrong. This has been the consistent argument from Wratten himself as I understand it.
This sounds very reasonable to me as an informed layman and this debate will not make any progress until that point is dealt with.
For me, any doubt must arise from a lack of knowledge of the exact conditions as seen from that point, at waypoint change. This is where I get frustrated by the Workers and JP’s of this world because it appears that the only known conditions they quote were at the lighthouse itself where, as our friend Walter Kennedy says, there was orographic cloud which could have been extremely local. The only other thing we know is that the Chinook was in sunlight about 2 miles before impact.
So the question now for me is – what could the crew (and I mean the whole crew) see at waypoint change which determines without any doubt that the pilots were negligent at that point. We know that they could not see the lighthouse. Can we know without any doubt what they could see? Some argue reasonably that they must have seen the base of the Mull or they would not have changed waypoint. That is all that is known.
If it is negligent to fly towards and within 20 seconds of a single cloud covered hill, then they must be guilty because that is the only thing we KNOW that they did. Yes, I expect that lots of nearby hills were cloud covered but I am not sure that we know that or to what extent that it limited their spatial awareness.
To sum up, can we say there is no doubt without seeing exactly what the crew could see when JP thinks they should have turned away?
For me, there is still too much extrapolation going on here. i.e. it’s like drawing the graph you want with too few measurements.
But surely, WOrker and JP are not basing their argument on what might have happened in the last 15 seconds or so.
If I understand them correctly, they are arguing that the negligence is based on the fact that, at waypoint change they were under control and that, under the prevailing conditions, they were negligent in not turning away then, and BEFORE anything might have gone wrong. This has been the consistent argument from Wratten himself as I understand it.
This sounds very reasonable to me as an informed layman and this debate will not make any progress until that point is dealt with.
For me, any doubt must arise from a lack of knowledge of the exact conditions as seen from that point, at waypoint change. This is where I get frustrated by the Workers and JP’s of this world because it appears that the only known conditions they quote were at the lighthouse itself where, as our friend Walter Kennedy says, there was orographic cloud which could have been extremely local. The only other thing we know is that the Chinook was in sunlight about 2 miles before impact.
So the question now for me is – what could the crew (and I mean the whole crew) see at waypoint change which determines without any doubt that the pilots were negligent at that point. We know that they could not see the lighthouse. Can we know without any doubt what they could see? Some argue reasonably that they must have seen the base of the Mull or they would not have changed waypoint. That is all that is known.
If it is negligent to fly towards and within 20 seconds of a single cloud covered hill, then they must be guilty because that is the only thing we KNOW that they did. Yes, I expect that lots of nearby hills were cloud covered but I am not sure that we know that or to what extent that it limited their spatial awareness.
To sum up, can we say there is no doubt without seeing exactly what the crew could see when JP thinks they should have turned away?
For me, there is still too much extrapolation going on here. i.e. it’s like drawing the graph you want with too few measurements.
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....but misses the point that no-one knows what may or may not have occurred in or to the aircraft at and after that point. There is therefore a failure to meet the rigorous test for a finding of negligence.
"Only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever, should deceased aircrew be found negligent"
As mentioned earlier, it is a question of language rather than aeronautics. No-one, from the Air Officers down, has been able to eliminate doubt.
"Only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever, should deceased aircrew be found negligent"
As mentioned earlier, it is a question of language rather than aeronautics. No-one, from the Air Officers down, has been able to eliminate doubt.
But Chippy, the point which Mr Purdey is making is this:
If he had been a senior officer, sitting as a passenger on the flight deck of this aeroplane when they changed waypoint, he would have accused the pilots of gross negligence even if they had not hit anything and nothing had gone wrong. He is beyond any doubt that they should have turned away or slowed down. That is his view, beyond any doubt, and it appears to be the view of Wratten and Day.
That is the view which needs the full examination by debate from those who are qualified to judge.
Sorry, Mr P, if I put words in your mouth but that is the logic of your argument as I see it. In other words, had you been the pilot, you definitely would have turned away.
If he had been a senior officer, sitting as a passenger on the flight deck of this aeroplane when they changed waypoint, he would have accused the pilots of gross negligence even if they had not hit anything and nothing had gone wrong. He is beyond any doubt that they should have turned away or slowed down. That is his view, beyond any doubt, and it appears to be the view of Wratten and Day.
That is the view which needs the full examination by debate from those who are qualified to judge.
Sorry, Mr P, if I put words in your mouth but that is the logic of your argument as I see it. In other words, had you been the pilot, you definitely would have turned away.
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He wasn't a senior officer afaik and he wasn't sitting on the flight deck. He therefore has no knowledge of what may or may not have occurred or the state of the aircraft at the time. He is not entitled to conjecture. He therefore fails the "no shadow of doubt" test.
John Purdey,
Thank you for confirming my interpretation of your view.
I would now like ask how you can know, beyond any doubt whatsoever, what the pilots could see at the point of waypoint change?
All we know is that they could not see the lighthouse. Are you saying that, and only that, is enough to eliminate any doubt whatsoever in your mind?
That, to me, is beginning to look like a high degree of prejudice.
E.g. How do you know that they couldn't see up the coast for some miles?
Regards, p1
Thank you for confirming my interpretation of your view.
I would now like ask how you can know, beyond any doubt whatsoever, what the pilots could see at the point of waypoint change?
All we know is that they could not see the lighthouse. Are you saying that, and only that, is enough to eliminate any doubt whatsoever in your mind?
That, to me, is beginning to look like a high degree of prejudice.
E.g. How do you know that they couldn't see up the coast for some miles?
Regards, p1
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Mr Purdey,
correct me if I'm wrong but your viewpoint, and that of Mr Wratten is simply this - the crew changed the waypoint to Corran and then about 15 seconds later crashed into the Mull because they flew straight on.
Could you then, please tell me the time that the waypoint change was made, and provide factual evidence to support your claim.
According to the AAIB and Racal, there is no record of what time the waypoint change was made.
Perhaps the crew made the waypoint change a few minutes earlier then spent those few minutes struggling with the controls, or were distracted by a spurious caption light. Perhaps not. They may even have done a bit of sightseeing - who knows!
Whatever your opinion, the mere fact that it is not known what time the change was made (and therefore the flight time, and profile, between the waypoint change and impact is unknown), throws into question the very simulation that everyone bases their negligent claim on.
AAIB Investigation/Racal Report
See last line of report.
Kind regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
correct me if I'm wrong but your viewpoint, and that of Mr Wratten is simply this - the crew changed the waypoint to Corran and then about 15 seconds later crashed into the Mull because they flew straight on.
Could you then, please tell me the time that the waypoint change was made, and provide factual evidence to support your claim.
According to the AAIB and Racal, there is no record of what time the waypoint change was made.
Perhaps the crew made the waypoint change a few minutes earlier then spent those few minutes struggling with the controls, or were distracted by a spurious caption light. Perhaps not. They may even have done a bit of sightseeing - who knows!
Whatever your opinion, the mere fact that it is not known what time the change was made (and therefore the flight time, and profile, between the waypoint change and impact is unknown), throws into question the very simulation that everyone bases their negligent claim on.
AAIB Investigation/Racal Report
See last line of report.
Kind regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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CHINOOK
Pulse1.
We do not of course know what the crew could see ahead of them, but the reports we have make it clear that there was cloud/mist/fog (take your pick) over some or all of those hilltops. I do know those hills, and I simply say that I myself would have turned away, especially since, having just made a sea crossing, I could not have known without any doubt whatever that I knew precisely where I was. Perhaps you would have made a different decision, in which case good luck to you.
I am sorry if this is not clear enough for you.
JP
We do not of course know what the crew could see ahead of them, but the reports we have make it clear that there was cloud/mist/fog (take your pick) over some or all of those hilltops. I do know those hills, and I simply say that I myself would have turned away, especially since, having just made a sea crossing, I could not have known without any doubt whatever that I knew precisely where I was. Perhaps you would have made a different decision, in which case good luck to you.
I am sorry if this is not clear enough for you.
JP
So then, Mr Purdey, it is possible that they could have seen enough of the terrain to be sure of their position at that point. So, maybe, they were not being quite so negligent at that point. Maybe some doubt creeping in here, don't you think?
p1
p1
Methinks he is as sure of his beliefs as was former Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, otherwise known as 'Comical Ali'.
Who simply refused to bow to the obvious even when it was staring him in the face....
'No doubt whatever' is simple enough for most people to comprehend.
Who simply refused to bow to the obvious even when it was staring him in the face....
'No doubt whatever' is simple enough for most people to comprehend.
Just a numbered other
JP,
The yachtsman could see the lighthouse, so it is very likely that the crew of the chinook could too.
I have flown a very similar route too, in pre TANS Wessex days, and would bet a pound to a penny that the intention was never to overfly the lighthouse, or any of the high ground. I would have positively ID'd the waypoint, or mull, and then turned left to 'handrail' the west coast to the mouth of the Great Glen.
Now. Why they did not do that will never be known to a balance of probability, let alone with no doubt whatsoever.
You are postulating as FACT that they saw the high ground, changed waypoint, and then deliberately flew on to their deaths.
Which of our two scenarios has the ring of truth, then?
The yachtsman could see the lighthouse, so it is very likely that the crew of the chinook could too.
I have flown a very similar route too, in pre TANS Wessex days, and would bet a pound to a penny that the intention was never to overfly the lighthouse, or any of the high ground. I would have positively ID'd the waypoint, or mull, and then turned left to 'handrail' the west coast to the mouth of the Great Glen.
Now. Why they did not do that will never be known to a balance of probability, let alone with no doubt whatsoever.
You are postulating as FACT that they saw the high ground, changed waypoint, and then deliberately flew on to their deaths.
Which of our two scenarios has the ring of truth, then?
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SQUWARK CODE - LIES IN INQUIRY OR MISUNDERSTANDING?
In one list of squwark codes I have come across,
7760 means “Ground Transponders Tests/Trials”.
That is, in mode 3a ZD576 was using its IFF system to interrogate a ground transponder and was telling the world it was doing so. This would have given ZD576 a range to a portable transponder of a common type used by US & UK special forces (the PRC-112 family or equivalent). The US unit at the mull at the time would have had access to these items if equipment – they can easily be set to a DME transponder mode. Without going into conspiracy theories, I would have thought that this situation should have been discussed at the inquiries – especially as the question of the 7760 code was raised several times; I think it appropriate to paste some relevant sections here:
Questions 826-829
<<Witness A raised the matter of the transponder settings found in the wreckage of ZD576. These were "0000" and "7760" and Witness A pointed out that the emergency setting is "7700".
The normal responder codes for a Visual Flight Rules flight would be "0000" and "7000". "7760" is a meaningless code and it is most likely that the settings were disturbed by the impact with the Mull.>>
<<(iii) Is it likely that the crew would have had the mindset attributed to them by H to the effect that the Mull of Kintyre was to their right and not directly in front of them and hence have underestimated the imminence of their landfall?
…… It appears that the aircraft's TACAN, VOR and ADR were unlikely to have been relied upon by the crew at the time of the accident. The IFF/Transponder was found in mode 1 with the numbers 0000 selected and in mode 3A with the numbers 7760. So apart from the SuperTANS the only other methods of navigation available to the crew were maintaining visual references so far as possible and dead reckoning.>>
<< 712. Was there any significance in the finding that the emergency squawk code was at 7760?
A. I cannot give you an answer to that. There may well be but I just do not know. They had a very professional crewman. The late Mr Forbes was the best crewman I had ever flown with, incidentally. He was very quick in emergency procedures when he was reacting. If I was flight testing I would try and get him. If there was anything really serious he was there. >>
826. One entirely different matter, the IFF was found at 7,700 squawk.
A. No, my Lord, I think you will find it was 7,760.[8]
827. Am I right in thinking that is not the normal setting you would expect?
A. That is correct, my Lord.
828. What is the normal setting?
A. The normal setting for a helicopter flying at low level not in receipt of a radar service would be 7000.
829. Yes.
A. The emergency squawk is 7,700 and I believe in the aftermath of the accident the IFF in this particular aircraft was found at 7,760. The significance of this is that in the IFF system, there are no eights and nines, the rotating dial where you select numbers goes from zero to seven. The rotating dial where you select the numbers goes from zero to seven and back to zero again so the selection of 7760 is pretty close to the emergency squawk setting.
830. Would you draw a possible inference from that setting that somebody thought they were in trouble and made an alteration or not?
A. That could be nothing more than pure speculation, my Lord, but I guess if any inference were to be drawn on that then it would be that someone was trying to set a different squawk from 7000.
<< 831. Supposing they decided to fly IMC, what would be the normal setting for that?
A. The normal setting would still be 7000 until they were in receipt of a radar service from an aircraft control unit when they would be allocated a separate code to set into the equipment. The only variation to that would be if they were doing an emergency low level abort which took them into controlled airspace when they would be obliged to set 7700. From memory, there was no such airspace above the area they were flying at the time >>
<<993. What about the transponder settings? We have been told that one of them was not what would normally be expected to be found, 7760, instead of 7000; could that have been displaced by the impact?
(Mr Cable) Yes, my Lord Chairman. I cannot remember what confidence level I put on that, but certainly it was possible. I believe you asked me about this before.
994. I did, I think; then I am sorry.
(Mr Cable) But, certainly, in the impact, yes, the way in which the digits were changed was with a little sticking-out lever, if you like, next to each drum of digits; yes, it appeared quite possible that there could have been a mild impact in that area that would have changed the setting and not have left evidence of the impact.>>
AND especially this from Lord Bowness:
995. My Lord Chairman, I do not think it actually had a sort of, it was not categorised, was it, as I read it, it has not got a number? If I am reading the right thing, it says "IFF Functioned; Transponding 7760, BITE and Mode 1,2,3A Tx check passed." Paragraph 7.2.11 of your report. Please tell me if I am reading the wrong thing, but it does not appear to have a category assigned to it?
(Mr Cable) This was the functional test that was done on this piece of equipment after the examination.
996. Forgive me; does it tell me it worked?
(Mr Cable) With 7760 set, it transponded on the 7760 code. So, that said, yes, it was transponding the code that was set, in this case; it does not tell you whether that code was set before or after impact.
997. No, I appreciate that; but would it work in the way that you describe, if it had been damaged by the impact?
(Mr Cable) When I say damaged, I am talking about the face of the indicator which has the four drums of digits, which are set manually by means of a little lever next to each drum. So to change a code you move it round, as I recall, on this type. All I was saying was, it would seem possible to me that in the general turmoil of the impacts that it would be possible for those levers to get knocked and change the setting, and not necessarily for there to be marks on the panel which would show that they had been knocked. It is another case of a single indication, which I do not feel that I can place too much reliance on in isolation.
Now, I think that there was ample opportunity for someone to address this issue in the inquiries – I do not take the view that any other security concerns regarding, say code allocation, could possibly justify leaving the inquiries in ignorance.
I am half expecting the thrust of future posts from some contributors to be on the lines of “why was this leaked out” rather than progress to what the actual navigation practice was.
My personal feeling has been, for the last 10 years, that the crew were using DME of some form and that they were not negligent in doing this as special forces crews used extra navigation practices (including the use of a non pilot crewman checking nav) but rather that they were using an aid that could have been used to willfully mislead them and THIS POSSIBILTY SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST BEEN CONSIDERED BEARING IN MIND WHO WAS ABOARD. I think that most readers will agree that the tone of the responses to the reasonable questions at the inquiries appears intended to obfuscate and mislead.
In one list of squwark codes I have come across,
7760 means “Ground Transponders Tests/Trials”.
That is, in mode 3a ZD576 was using its IFF system to interrogate a ground transponder and was telling the world it was doing so. This would have given ZD576 a range to a portable transponder of a common type used by US & UK special forces (the PRC-112 family or equivalent). The US unit at the mull at the time would have had access to these items if equipment – they can easily be set to a DME transponder mode. Without going into conspiracy theories, I would have thought that this situation should have been discussed at the inquiries – especially as the question of the 7760 code was raised several times; I think it appropriate to paste some relevant sections here:
Questions 826-829
<<Witness A raised the matter of the transponder settings found in the wreckage of ZD576. These were "0000" and "7760" and Witness A pointed out that the emergency setting is "7700".
The normal responder codes for a Visual Flight Rules flight would be "0000" and "7000". "7760" is a meaningless code and it is most likely that the settings were disturbed by the impact with the Mull.>>
<<(iii) Is it likely that the crew would have had the mindset attributed to them by H to the effect that the Mull of Kintyre was to their right and not directly in front of them and hence have underestimated the imminence of their landfall?
…… It appears that the aircraft's TACAN, VOR and ADR were unlikely to have been relied upon by the crew at the time of the accident. The IFF/Transponder was found in mode 1 with the numbers 0000 selected and in mode 3A with the numbers 7760. So apart from the SuperTANS the only other methods of navigation available to the crew were maintaining visual references so far as possible and dead reckoning.>>
<< 712. Was there any significance in the finding that the emergency squawk code was at 7760?
A. I cannot give you an answer to that. There may well be but I just do not know. They had a very professional crewman. The late Mr Forbes was the best crewman I had ever flown with, incidentally. He was very quick in emergency procedures when he was reacting. If I was flight testing I would try and get him. If there was anything really serious he was there. >>
826. One entirely different matter, the IFF was found at 7,700 squawk.
A. No, my Lord, I think you will find it was 7,760.[8]
827. Am I right in thinking that is not the normal setting you would expect?
A. That is correct, my Lord.
828. What is the normal setting?
A. The normal setting for a helicopter flying at low level not in receipt of a radar service would be 7000.
829. Yes.
A. The emergency squawk is 7,700 and I believe in the aftermath of the accident the IFF in this particular aircraft was found at 7,760. The significance of this is that in the IFF system, there are no eights and nines, the rotating dial where you select numbers goes from zero to seven. The rotating dial where you select the numbers goes from zero to seven and back to zero again so the selection of 7760 is pretty close to the emergency squawk setting.
830. Would you draw a possible inference from that setting that somebody thought they were in trouble and made an alteration or not?
A. That could be nothing more than pure speculation, my Lord, but I guess if any inference were to be drawn on that then it would be that someone was trying to set a different squawk from 7000.
<< 831. Supposing they decided to fly IMC, what would be the normal setting for that?
A. The normal setting would still be 7000 until they were in receipt of a radar service from an aircraft control unit when they would be allocated a separate code to set into the equipment. The only variation to that would be if they were doing an emergency low level abort which took them into controlled airspace when they would be obliged to set 7700. From memory, there was no such airspace above the area they were flying at the time >>
<<993. What about the transponder settings? We have been told that one of them was not what would normally be expected to be found, 7760, instead of 7000; could that have been displaced by the impact?
(Mr Cable) Yes, my Lord Chairman. I cannot remember what confidence level I put on that, but certainly it was possible. I believe you asked me about this before.
994. I did, I think; then I am sorry.
(Mr Cable) But, certainly, in the impact, yes, the way in which the digits were changed was with a little sticking-out lever, if you like, next to each drum of digits; yes, it appeared quite possible that there could have been a mild impact in that area that would have changed the setting and not have left evidence of the impact.>>
AND especially this from Lord Bowness:
995. My Lord Chairman, I do not think it actually had a sort of, it was not categorised, was it, as I read it, it has not got a number? If I am reading the right thing, it says "IFF Functioned; Transponding 7760, BITE and Mode 1,2,3A Tx check passed." Paragraph 7.2.11 of your report. Please tell me if I am reading the wrong thing, but it does not appear to have a category assigned to it?
(Mr Cable) This was the functional test that was done on this piece of equipment after the examination.
996. Forgive me; does it tell me it worked?
(Mr Cable) With 7760 set, it transponded on the 7760 code. So, that said, yes, it was transponding the code that was set, in this case; it does not tell you whether that code was set before or after impact.
997. No, I appreciate that; but would it work in the way that you describe, if it had been damaged by the impact?
(Mr Cable) When I say damaged, I am talking about the face of the indicator which has the four drums of digits, which are set manually by means of a little lever next to each drum. So to change a code you move it round, as I recall, on this type. All I was saying was, it would seem possible to me that in the general turmoil of the impacts that it would be possible for those levers to get knocked and change the setting, and not necessarily for there to be marks on the panel which would show that they had been knocked. It is another case of a single indication, which I do not feel that I can place too much reliance on in isolation.
Now, I think that there was ample opportunity for someone to address this issue in the inquiries – I do not take the view that any other security concerns regarding, say code allocation, could possibly justify leaving the inquiries in ignorance.
I am half expecting the thrust of future posts from some contributors to be on the lines of “why was this leaked out” rather than progress to what the actual navigation practice was.
My personal feeling has been, for the last 10 years, that the crew were using DME of some form and that they were not negligent in doing this as special forces crews used extra navigation practices (including the use of a non pilot crewman checking nav) but rather that they were using an aid that could have been used to willfully mislead them and THIS POSSIBILTY SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST BEEN CONSIDERED BEARING IN MIND WHO WAS ABOARD. I think that most readers will agree that the tone of the responses to the reasonable questions at the inquiries appears intended to obfuscate and mislead.
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Hi everyone.
Just to let you all know that James Arbuthnot MP had his promised meeting with the Prime Minister on 7 July. Unfortunately he was not in a position to make this public knowledge until a response was received regarding Mr Blair's views.
And here is that response........
10 Downing Street Headed Paper
Dated: 27 July 2004
Dear James,
Thank you for coming to see me on 7 July with other members of your group. I promised to give further consideration to your representations on the Mull of Kintyre air crash. We all agree that this was a terrible tragedy and we have examined all the evidence with meticulous care, compassion and thoroughness.
I know that many have found the findings of the RAF Board of Inquiry, particularly the judgement against the pilots, difficult to accept. I appreciate that this has been very hard for their families and I have the greatest sympathy with them.
In considering the evidence and the Board’s report, Air Marshal Day, himself a highly experience helicopter pilot, discounted, through lack of evidence, any possibility of technical failure having a bearing on the accident. He considered the actions of the crew in approaching a deteriorating weather situation while flying under visual flight rules. He concluded that they had failed either to ensure that they remained under visual conditions (which would on all accounts have been perfectly possible, by turning away or back), or to make an appropriate transfer to flying under instrumental rules (by selecting an appropriate rate of climb early enough to ensure proper separation from the terrain). Instead, the crew continued to fly the aircraft at high speed and at a low level towards rising ground. As the crew were experienced, and trained to cope with such a change, Air Marshal Day reluctantly concluded that the actions of the crew were the direct cause of the crash.
I recognise that the standard of proof required for Reviewing Officers to arrive at such a decision is necessarily high. Before reaching such a judgement the Air Marshals were required to consider the evidence as a whole, and then use their own experience of military flying. If after this they were left with no honest or genuine doubt that the air crew had been negligent, it was their duty to find accordingly.
From the detailed study by the Air Accident Investigation Branch inspector, it is apparent that there was no catastrophic airframe failure prior to the first impact. Campaigners have therefore considered the possibility of some form of “untraceable” problem that cleared itself before the actual crash. They have concentrated on the Chinook’s FADEC system. But all the available evidence indicates that the engines were working normally up to the point of impact.
Both Geoff Hoon and I are conscious that the other bodies that have looked into this case have disagreed with the findings of the Board of Inquiry. The most detailed analysis of the Board was conducted by the House of Lords’ Committee. The Ministry of Defence studied the Committee’s report in detail and responded on 22 July 2002. I am sure that you will be familiar with this response, but I attach a copy for you as this provides a comprehensive account of our consideration of this case.
When the Government was elected in 1997, and again when Geoff Hoon became Secretary of State, the details of this case were studied carefully. If an injustice had been done, we would have been able to correct it and exonerate the pilots. But despite having approached this case with a degree of scepticism about the findings, we can still find no fresh evidence or other cause to overturn the verdict of the Board of Inquiry.
We will of course look at this again if any new evidence arises. Geoff Hoon would also be willing to arrange a briefing for your group to discuss the facts of the incident if you would find that helpful.
I am copying this letter to David Davis, Sir Menzies Campbell and Martin O’Neill.
Yours ever,
Tony
I have my own opinions as to the content, but will leave you all to read and digest its content prior to starting the responses!
The only thing I promise, is that I am not ready to give up just yet!
My best, as always,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just to let you all know that James Arbuthnot MP had his promised meeting with the Prime Minister on 7 July. Unfortunately he was not in a position to make this public knowledge until a response was received regarding Mr Blair's views.
And here is that response........
10 Downing Street Headed Paper
Dated: 27 July 2004
Dear James,
Thank you for coming to see me on 7 July with other members of your group. I promised to give further consideration to your representations on the Mull of Kintyre air crash. We all agree that this was a terrible tragedy and we have examined all the evidence with meticulous care, compassion and thoroughness.
I know that many have found the findings of the RAF Board of Inquiry, particularly the judgement against the pilots, difficult to accept. I appreciate that this has been very hard for their families and I have the greatest sympathy with them.
In considering the evidence and the Board’s report, Air Marshal Day, himself a highly experience helicopter pilot, discounted, through lack of evidence, any possibility of technical failure having a bearing on the accident. He considered the actions of the crew in approaching a deteriorating weather situation while flying under visual flight rules. He concluded that they had failed either to ensure that they remained under visual conditions (which would on all accounts have been perfectly possible, by turning away or back), or to make an appropriate transfer to flying under instrumental rules (by selecting an appropriate rate of climb early enough to ensure proper separation from the terrain). Instead, the crew continued to fly the aircraft at high speed and at a low level towards rising ground. As the crew were experienced, and trained to cope with such a change, Air Marshal Day reluctantly concluded that the actions of the crew were the direct cause of the crash.
I recognise that the standard of proof required for Reviewing Officers to arrive at such a decision is necessarily high. Before reaching such a judgement the Air Marshals were required to consider the evidence as a whole, and then use their own experience of military flying. If after this they were left with no honest or genuine doubt that the air crew had been negligent, it was their duty to find accordingly.
From the detailed study by the Air Accident Investigation Branch inspector, it is apparent that there was no catastrophic airframe failure prior to the first impact. Campaigners have therefore considered the possibility of some form of “untraceable” problem that cleared itself before the actual crash. They have concentrated on the Chinook’s FADEC system. But all the available evidence indicates that the engines were working normally up to the point of impact.
Both Geoff Hoon and I are conscious that the other bodies that have looked into this case have disagreed with the findings of the Board of Inquiry. The most detailed analysis of the Board was conducted by the House of Lords’ Committee. The Ministry of Defence studied the Committee’s report in detail and responded on 22 July 2002. I am sure that you will be familiar with this response, but I attach a copy for you as this provides a comprehensive account of our consideration of this case.
When the Government was elected in 1997, and again when Geoff Hoon became Secretary of State, the details of this case were studied carefully. If an injustice had been done, we would have been able to correct it and exonerate the pilots. But despite having approached this case with a degree of scepticism about the findings, we can still find no fresh evidence or other cause to overturn the verdict of the Board of Inquiry.
We will of course look at this again if any new evidence arises. Geoff Hoon would also be willing to arrange a briefing for your group to discuss the facts of the incident if you would find that helpful.
I am copying this letter to David Davis, Sir Menzies Campbell and Martin O’Neill.
Yours ever,
Tony
I have my own opinions as to the content, but will leave you all to read and digest its content prior to starting the responses!
The only thing I promise, is that I am not ready to give up just yet!
My best, as always,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just a numbered other
So Tony knows how to cut and paste from Hoon's replies to our letters, written by Mrs Bellchambers.
He has not considerred this at all.
It needs no new evidence to overturn a wrong finding.
He has not considerred this at all.
It needs no new evidence to overturn a wrong finding.
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Doubtlessly drafted by first class honours graduates of the Sir Humphrey Appleby School of Ethics for Integrity, Transparency and Honesty in Public Administration.
Yet another nail in the coffin of politicians being openly honest in their pronouncements and to be seen to be motivated by justice, a conviction for honesty and determination to do good.
Yet another nail in the coffin of politicians being openly honest in their pronouncements and to be seen to be motivated by justice, a conviction for honesty and determination to do good.
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Arkroyal
I strongly suspect you are correct. The PM would appear to have taken little, if any, personal interest in this at all!
I do confess to feeling utterly disillusioned with politics, and politicians in general! I have to say, this particular administration seems (as far as one can tell) to have a track record of playing fast and loose with the truth, so I am not at all surprised, and was never hopefull!
However, a word in their defence:
Ministers, even Prime Ministers, are hardly ever experts in the fields for which they have responsibility. They depend entirely on briefings from their advisors. I, along with many others, have heard John Day giving his briefing.
I have to say he was quite effective in building a cogent argument for his version of events. He almost convinced me, and I know the problems with his hypothesis!
He was utterly unable to convince his listeners, as they had been briefed in detail, and were able to see that he was being 'economical with the truth' when he continually stated "we know as a fact that," when patently, what he was referring to, was not 'fact' at all!
It would be a brave minister indeed who listened to all his professional advisors, and then ignored them in a feat of independent thinking!
Where would that leave him? Biting the hand that feeds is an expression that springs to mind!
Interesting though isn't it, that once out of the Westminster bubble, so many politicians (Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Defence, Northern Ireland Secretary, Defence Ministers, Whips etc.) all change their minds on the issues involved!
Perhaps independent thinking is restored, once removed from the 'food chain'!
So, if I may, I would like to suggest the following:
Let\'s move this particular piece of cyberspace into a \'grown up\', and hopefully enlightened, debate about the actual \'nuts and bolts\', the \'foundation\' of the allegation of negligence!
As WOrkER implied, it is just possible that people in a position of influence MAY skim this site, if only for \'background\'. I am guided by WOrkER, and follow Brian\'s lead, and suggest it is utterly counter productive to be rude or disparraging (just hope I\'m up to it!)
I believe it IS important to answer the so-called \'exam questions\', but I don\'t agree that this should be the starting point! It implies acceptance of everything that precedes the questions, as fact!
In my opinion, this would be a false premise!
Rather we should begin by scrutinising, in microscopic detail, the shreds of \'evidence\' (implied, reconstructed, or recorded) that place the aircraft, at any point in space or time, and at any given speed, and weather conditions.
After all, those asking the questions cannot even tell us something as fundamental, as whether the aircraft was VMC, or IMC, as it approached the Mull, but maintain it is irrelevent to the finding of negligence!
We are only interested in FACTS! and we should not allow those facts to be extended in ways which are not logical!
We should also scrutinise closely the source of any \'evidence\' to establish it\'s quality, and assess how FACTUAL it is!
To save time, I think everyone would accept all evidence given by the AAIB, IN THE TERMS THEY GAVE IT!
This may get extremely technical. The devil truly is in the detail.
So, let me start.
I know as FACT that there is no SINGLE point (other than the point of impact) when we know with certainty, the aircraft\'s height, and speed, and attitude, and geographical position, or meteorological conditions. Other than the evidence given by a yachtsman. The only eye witness?
The implication of this being an IMC CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) incident is problematic to PROVE, and if they weren\'t IMC, why did they crash?
I strongly suspect you are correct. The PM would appear to have taken little, if any, personal interest in this at all!
I do confess to feeling utterly disillusioned with politics, and politicians in general! I have to say, this particular administration seems (as far as one can tell) to have a track record of playing fast and loose with the truth, so I am not at all surprised, and was never hopefull!
However, a word in their defence:
Ministers, even Prime Ministers, are hardly ever experts in the fields for which they have responsibility. They depend entirely on briefings from their advisors. I, along with many others, have heard John Day giving his briefing.
I have to say he was quite effective in building a cogent argument for his version of events. He almost convinced me, and I know the problems with his hypothesis!
He was utterly unable to convince his listeners, as they had been briefed in detail, and were able to see that he was being 'economical with the truth' when he continually stated "we know as a fact that," when patently, what he was referring to, was not 'fact' at all!
It would be a brave minister indeed who listened to all his professional advisors, and then ignored them in a feat of independent thinking!
Where would that leave him? Biting the hand that feeds is an expression that springs to mind!
Interesting though isn't it, that once out of the Westminster bubble, so many politicians (Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Defence, Northern Ireland Secretary, Defence Ministers, Whips etc.) all change their minds on the issues involved!
Perhaps independent thinking is restored, once removed from the 'food chain'!
So, if I may, I would like to suggest the following:
Let\'s move this particular piece of cyberspace into a \'grown up\', and hopefully enlightened, debate about the actual \'nuts and bolts\', the \'foundation\' of the allegation of negligence!
As WOrkER implied, it is just possible that people in a position of influence MAY skim this site, if only for \'background\'. I am guided by WOrkER, and follow Brian\'s lead, and suggest it is utterly counter productive to be rude or disparraging (just hope I\'m up to it!)
I believe it IS important to answer the so-called \'exam questions\', but I don\'t agree that this should be the starting point! It implies acceptance of everything that precedes the questions, as fact!
In my opinion, this would be a false premise!
Rather we should begin by scrutinising, in microscopic detail, the shreds of \'evidence\' (implied, reconstructed, or recorded) that place the aircraft, at any point in space or time, and at any given speed, and weather conditions.
After all, those asking the questions cannot even tell us something as fundamental, as whether the aircraft was VMC, or IMC, as it approached the Mull, but maintain it is irrelevent to the finding of negligence!
We are only interested in FACTS! and we should not allow those facts to be extended in ways which are not logical!
We should also scrutinise closely the source of any \'evidence\' to establish it\'s quality, and assess how FACTUAL it is!
To save time, I think everyone would accept all evidence given by the AAIB, IN THE TERMS THEY GAVE IT!
This may get extremely technical. The devil truly is in the detail.
So, let me start.
I know as FACT that there is no SINGLE point (other than the point of impact) when we know with certainty, the aircraft\'s height, and speed, and attitude, and geographical position, or meteorological conditions. Other than the evidence given by a yachtsman. The only eye witness?
The implication of this being an IMC CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) incident is problematic to PROVE, and if they weren\'t IMC, why did they crash?
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 14th Aug 2004 at 22:15.