Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi again everyone, and welcome back to Ben and K25. Hope you are keeping well.
A quick point on the Mk3 Chinook fiasco - Interesting that, yet again, the Government choose to have this information released to the public at the start of the Easter Recess, thereby avoiding further awkward questions on such a shamboic procurement.
Still, as John Cook was quoted as saying in a newspaper article, "At least we haven't had to do a body count this time to prove they were wrong."
Right, a date for your diaries: 2 June 2004. This will be the tenth anniversary of the accident. Memorial services are being held on the Mull of Kintyre, with a mirror service at a church in Hampshire (to allow John Cook to attend, as he is unable to get to the Mull). The services will be conducted at the same time, commencing 2.00PM. Interested parties wishing to pay their respects are invited to attend.
I must stress that the memorial services are to remember all 29 individuals who were lost, and for their families. They are not connected to the campaign. All campaign activities will be suspended for a 24 hour period as a mark of respect.
It would be useful to know, in advance, of numbers attending, so may I ask you please either e-mail me or PM me with numbers, stating your preferred location. Once the Hampshire Church details have been finalised, I will post full details here, along with a Multimap Link for directions.
As always, my regards.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
A quick point on the Mk3 Chinook fiasco - Interesting that, yet again, the Government choose to have this information released to the public at the start of the Easter Recess, thereby avoiding further awkward questions on such a shamboic procurement.
Still, as John Cook was quoted as saying in a newspaper article, "At least we haven't had to do a body count this time to prove they were wrong."
Right, a date for your diaries: 2 June 2004. This will be the tenth anniversary of the accident. Memorial services are being held on the Mull of Kintyre, with a mirror service at a church in Hampshire (to allow John Cook to attend, as he is unable to get to the Mull). The services will be conducted at the same time, commencing 2.00PM. Interested parties wishing to pay their respects are invited to attend.
I must stress that the memorial services are to remember all 29 individuals who were lost, and for their families. They are not connected to the campaign. All campaign activities will be suspended for a 24 hour period as a mark of respect.
It would be useful to know, in advance, of numbers attending, so may I ask you please either e-mail me or PM me with numbers, stating your preferred location. Once the Hampshire Church details have been finalised, I will post full details here, along with a Multimap Link for directions.
As always, my regards.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Grounding at Boscombe
K52 writes "I always understood that the Boscombe Pilots DID NOT refuse to fly the Chinook but that pre - planned maintenance was brought forward whilst awaiting further data to arrive to enable icing trials to be carried out."
This is not correct. Boscombe grounded the aircraft for safety reasons. A report had been prepared for the Commandant explaining why the flight trials should not continue. As I recollect, the premise was that further work would be unjustifiable (on safety grounds) until a solution had been found to the existing FADEC issues.
As it happens, the Mull accident happened between the date the report was completed (and the appointment with the Commandant was booked) and the meeting taking place.
Be in no doubt that all concerned realised the magnitude of the step they were taking in stopping the trials.
This is not correct. Boscombe grounded the aircraft for safety reasons. A report had been prepared for the Commandant explaining why the flight trials should not continue. As I recollect, the premise was that further work would be unjustifiable (on safety grounds) until a solution had been found to the existing FADEC issues.
As it happens, the Mull accident happened between the date the report was completed (and the appointment with the Commandant was booked) and the meeting taking place.
Be in no doubt that all concerned realised the magnitude of the step they were taking in stopping the trials.
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astazou
Let me get this right.
Are you stating that A&AEE had decided to ground the Chinook Mk2 BUT THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BECAUSE THEY WERE UNABLE TO GET AN INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDANT?
Let me get this right.
Are you stating that A&AEE had decided to ground the Chinook Mk2 BUT THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BECAUSE THEY WERE UNABLE TO GET AN INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDANT?
If that's true, it'll be the most ridiculous piece of administrative bungling since the Japanese translator was unable to type out the Pearl Harbour warning note in time for it to be delivered before the attack took place.
Perhaps because to have done so would have obliged MoD to admit that there were critical safety of flight concerns over the Mk2 - and perhaps a case of corporate homicide would have been open to the realtives of the deceased.
I still hold the view that the appalling verdict of 'Gross Negligence' was brought to protect MoD from some very expensive claims being made against it for allowing passengers to be flown in an aircraft which Boscombe Down wouldn't even allow Test Pilots to fly....
I still hold the view that the appalling verdict of 'Gross Negligence' was brought to protect MoD from some very expensive claims being made against it for allowing passengers to be flown in an aircraft which Boscombe Down wouldn't even allow Test Pilots to fly....
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi all.
I am now in a position to confirm that the memorial service in Hampshire will be at the church of St Mary the Virgin, Bagwell Lane, Winchfield, Hampshire. It will start at 2.00pm on 2 June 2004.
As I have stated in previous posts, this service is nothing whatsoever to do with the campaign. It is to remember all who were lost, as well as their families.
For directions to the church, click here It is shown, just below Court House.
If you have any other questions relating to the service, please don't hesitate to contact me.
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I am now in a position to confirm that the memorial service in Hampshire will be at the church of St Mary the Virgin, Bagwell Lane, Winchfield, Hampshire. It will start at 2.00pm on 2 June 2004.
As I have stated in previous posts, this service is nothing whatsoever to do with the campaign. It is to remember all who were lost, as well as their families.
For directions to the church, click here It is shown, just below Court House.
If you have any other questions relating to the service, please don't hesitate to contact me.
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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kilo52
Perhaps I can help. You wrote:
"WORSE - because if the Chinook HC2 was supposed to be grounded before the crash then why was it not grounded AFTER the crash?"
I am familiar with all the flight crew that perished in the Chinook accidents of the 1980s, and 1990s. Your question reminds me of one that occured in the Falkland Islands in the mid '80s.
It was the first time the aircraft had flown since a deep service, when (amongst other things) the aft pylon had been removed, and refitted, with no supporting paperwork.
On a clear sunny day, in the cruise, the aircraft very gently nosed forward from 500'agl.
45 seconds later it crashed at high speed in a vertical dive.
Eyewitnesses saw no succesful attempt to correct the flight path, with the inescapable conclusion that the aircraft was uncontrollable. All (7, I believe) on board perished, in spite of one's effort to vacate the aircraft prior to impact.
The only transmision made, was the middle portion of the phrase **cking he**, from one of my fine colleagues.
The subsequent reaction of the RAF, to this 'one in a million' accident which HAD EYEWITNESSES!! Was this.
"We should really ground every Chinook, until we find out what caused this crash. However, there is so little of the aircraft still remaining, we have to accept we may NEVER know what caused it!"
We now enter 'La-La' logic.
Their worry was that, once this enormously important resource was grounded, how would they clear it to fly again, if the cause was never determined!
They incredibly arrogantly, calmed everyone's sensitivities by placing the Station Commander, the Squadron commander, and one or two other 'faces' on the next chinook to fly, and upon their successful return, proclaimed:
There you are boys, WE believe it's safe, and we've just proved it is, off you go!!
The subsequent, extremely protracted, investigation did indeed find no definite cause. Two plausible technical possibilities were advanced, neither of which could be proven. One of which had massive implications for the manufacturer, Mr Boeing.
10 years later, neither of these possibilities was excluded as being responsible for the tragedy on the Mull.
Imagine the fun Messrs Wratten, and Day could have had with the Falklands accident, had there been NO EYEWITNESSES!
As a footnote, this was one of the accidents whose subsequent recommendations was that CVRs, and FDRs be fitted to all Chinooks.
Ten years later, it seems to me, two fine men, and pilots, have paid an enormously heavy price for the continued absence of that equipment.
God bless them.
Think of them ALL on the 2nd June.
Perhaps I can help. You wrote:
"WORSE - because if the Chinook HC2 was supposed to be grounded before the crash then why was it not grounded AFTER the crash?"
I am familiar with all the flight crew that perished in the Chinook accidents of the 1980s, and 1990s. Your question reminds me of one that occured in the Falkland Islands in the mid '80s.
It was the first time the aircraft had flown since a deep service, when (amongst other things) the aft pylon had been removed, and refitted, with no supporting paperwork.
On a clear sunny day, in the cruise, the aircraft very gently nosed forward from 500'agl.
45 seconds later it crashed at high speed in a vertical dive.
Eyewitnesses saw no succesful attempt to correct the flight path, with the inescapable conclusion that the aircraft was uncontrollable. All (7, I believe) on board perished, in spite of one's effort to vacate the aircraft prior to impact.
The only transmision made, was the middle portion of the phrase **cking he**, from one of my fine colleagues.
The subsequent reaction of the RAF, to this 'one in a million' accident which HAD EYEWITNESSES!! Was this.
"We should really ground every Chinook, until we find out what caused this crash. However, there is so little of the aircraft still remaining, we have to accept we may NEVER know what caused it!"
We now enter 'La-La' logic.
Their worry was that, once this enormously important resource was grounded, how would they clear it to fly again, if the cause was never determined!
They incredibly arrogantly, calmed everyone's sensitivities by placing the Station Commander, the Squadron commander, and one or two other 'faces' on the next chinook to fly, and upon their successful return, proclaimed:
There you are boys, WE believe it's safe, and we've just proved it is, off you go!!
The subsequent, extremely protracted, investigation did indeed find no definite cause. Two plausible technical possibilities were advanced, neither of which could be proven. One of which had massive implications for the manufacturer, Mr Boeing.
10 years later, neither of these possibilities was excluded as being responsible for the tragedy on the Mull.
Imagine the fun Messrs Wratten, and Day could have had with the Falklands accident, had there been NO EYEWITNESSES!
As a footnote, this was one of the accidents whose subsequent recommendations was that CVRs, and FDRs be fitted to all Chinooks.
Ten years later, it seems to me, two fine men, and pilots, have paid an enormously heavy price for the continued absence of that equipment.
God bless them.
Think of them ALL on the 2nd June.
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Tandemrotor
As you are probably aware, it is the duty of the President of the BOI to issue a signal WITHIN 48 hours of an Accident giving the BOI's initial findings and any subsequent recommendation regarding airworthyness.
I happen to know (because I asked the question) that during my relatively short RAF career there were 764 "accidents" (including motorised gliders). If the RAF grounded the fleet every time an accident occurred the the RAF would never get airborne.
The finding of negligence in the Mull accident was because the Pilots were attempting to fly VFR in weather conditions that (in the words of the BOI) "required flght in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".
Incidentally, I put "accidents" in inverted comma's because the definition has changed over the years.
As you are probably aware, it is the duty of the President of the BOI to issue a signal WITHIN 48 hours of an Accident giving the BOI's initial findings and any subsequent recommendation regarding airworthyness.
I happen to know (because I asked the question) that during my relatively short RAF career there were 764 "accidents" (including motorised gliders). If the RAF grounded the fleet every time an accident occurred the the RAF would never get airborne.
The finding of negligence in the Mull accident was because the Pilots were attempting to fly VFR in weather conditions that (in the words of the BOI) "required flght in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".
Incidentally, I put "accidents" in inverted comma's because the definition has changed over the years.
The finding of negligence in the Mull accident was because the Pilots were attempting to fly VFR in weather conditions that (in the words of the BOI) "required flght in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".
Which was their opinion and cannot be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever.
It is an unjust finding and must be quashed. Is MoD guilty of corporate manslaughter in that they knowingly allowed passengers to fly in an aircraft which experienced TPs had stated was unsafe?
Which was their opinion and cannot be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever.
It is an unjust finding and must be quashed. Is MoD guilty of corporate manslaughter in that they knowingly allowed passengers to fly in an aircraft which experienced TPs had stated was unsafe?
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BEagle
The quote was from the BOI's assessment of the Wx forecast; ie the planning for the flight SHOULD have been for "flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre". It was not; and was not so conducted. Moreover, the witness statements from those on the Mull at the time of the accident leave no doubt as to the unsuitability of the Wx for VFR flight. I would draw your attention to the statements from the hillwalkers who heard the impact, felt the heat of the fireball and were enveloped in smoke but saw nothing until they stumbled into the wreckage some 100 metres later.
It was not the C in C or AOC who processed the aircraft into Service. That was the Controller of Aircraft, after the Chinook had been assessed by A&AEE. The release to service use of an aircraft type is his responsibility unless that aircraft is one that has been adopted without modification from the Civil Register.
I find it difficult to believe that A&AEE were aware of a significant safety problem with the Chinook Mk2 but that no action was taken because the Commandant was unavailable. IF, however. that was the case then that lets the AOC and CinC "off the hook" because they were utilising an asset that had been cleared by A&AEE without any knowledge of a potential problem.
The quote was from the BOI's assessment of the Wx forecast; ie the planning for the flight SHOULD have been for "flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre". It was not; and was not so conducted. Moreover, the witness statements from those on the Mull at the time of the accident leave no doubt as to the unsuitability of the Wx for VFR flight. I would draw your attention to the statements from the hillwalkers who heard the impact, felt the heat of the fireball and were enveloped in smoke but saw nothing until they stumbled into the wreckage some 100 metres later.
It was not the C in C or AOC who processed the aircraft into Service. That was the Controller of Aircraft, after the Chinook had been assessed by A&AEE. The release to service use of an aircraft type is his responsibility unless that aircraft is one that has been adopted without modification from the Civil Register.
I find it difficult to believe that A&AEE were aware of a significant safety problem with the Chinook Mk2 but that no action was taken because the Commandant was unavailable. IF, however. that was the case then that lets the AOC and CinC "off the hook" because they were utilising an asset that had been cleared by A&AEE without any knowledge of a potential problem.
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That mist was forming as the prevailing air current rose up the Mull and therefore was localised - common conditions there - a short way out to sea conditions were fine for VFR - they just needed to judge their distance off the Mull.
This was a regular flight plan - a milk run - there's no way such conditions would have mandated IMC in the vicinity of the Mull spoiling so many such flights.
It boils down to how they were judging - or measuring - their distance off before their planned close in turn.
All the conjecture about possible mechanical/control problems (that leave no trace) is puzzling to me - the a/c needed to have been pushing along at its high cruise speed in a normal attitude without disturbance to have got to where it did when the final evasive manouvre was executed - at which point it seemed to have been very controlable.
The Americans were so close by that they were lucky not to have been hit by pieces of wreckage ... do any of them have any comments?
This was a regular flight plan - a milk run - there's no way such conditions would have mandated IMC in the vicinity of the Mull spoiling so many such flights.
It boils down to how they were judging - or measuring - their distance off before their planned close in turn.
All the conjecture about possible mechanical/control problems (that leave no trace) is puzzling to me - the a/c needed to have been pushing along at its high cruise speed in a normal attitude without disturbance to have got to where it did when the final evasive manouvre was executed - at which point it seemed to have been very controlable.
The Americans were so close by that they were lucky not to have been hit by pieces of wreckage ... do any of them have any comments?
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In response to my note about a planned meeting with the commandant of A&AEE, K52 wrote "Are you stating that A&AEE had decided to ground the Chinook Mk2 BUT THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BECAUSE THEY WERE UNABLE TO GET AN INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDANT?"
The answer is easy "No, I am not saying that !!" I did not say that NO action was taken and I did not say that no interview was granted.
A meeting had been arranged with the commandant but the accident happened before the interview. It is not unusual to have to suspend a trial. In this case it was clear to all concerned that not only were the safety issues very significant but also that this was a very politically charged decision; and that was BEFORE the accident! With hindsight, we might think an immediate meeting should have been granted. However, it was not unreasonable that an appointment had been made a few days ahead and time was needed to marshal the facts for such an important meeting.
That the RAF should have been continuing to fly the aircraft (not only on training but also, latterly, operationally) when not only A&AEE but their own people were expressing concern is THE ISSUE. The expressions of concern made by A&AEE to the RAF about the FADEC modification went back to 1989 (sic). This was no new issue. The meeting with the commandant was more about preparing him for the inevitable flak from MoD about stopping the trials. I don't think anyone thought that the RAF would change its decision to plough on regardless with using the aircraft.
Don't overestimate the power of A&AEE to restrict the services in using imperfect equipment. Whether A&AEE's "recommendations" are followed is, in the end, up to the Services. In those days, there was a document called a Service Deviation [probably still is]; a very useful way of over-riding or ignoring a restriction or recomemendation made by A&AEE. The most obvious risk of using a SD is to the career of the senior officer who signs it ! How sensitive would you feel if an aircraft you were operating on a Service Deviation crashed in apparently inexplicable circumstances ?
The answer is easy "No, I am not saying that !!" I did not say that NO action was taken and I did not say that no interview was granted.
A meeting had been arranged with the commandant but the accident happened before the interview. It is not unusual to have to suspend a trial. In this case it was clear to all concerned that not only were the safety issues very significant but also that this was a very politically charged decision; and that was BEFORE the accident! With hindsight, we might think an immediate meeting should have been granted. However, it was not unreasonable that an appointment had been made a few days ahead and time was needed to marshal the facts for such an important meeting.
That the RAF should have been continuing to fly the aircraft (not only on training but also, latterly, operationally) when not only A&AEE but their own people were expressing concern is THE ISSUE. The expressions of concern made by A&AEE to the RAF about the FADEC modification went back to 1989 (sic). This was no new issue. The meeting with the commandant was more about preparing him for the inevitable flak from MoD about stopping the trials. I don't think anyone thought that the RAF would change its decision to plough on regardless with using the aircraft.
Don't overestimate the power of A&AEE to restrict the services in using imperfect equipment. Whether A&AEE's "recommendations" are followed is, in the end, up to the Services. In those days, there was a document called a Service Deviation [probably still is]; a very useful way of over-riding or ignoring a restriction or recomemendation made by A&AEE. The most obvious risk of using a SD is to the career of the senior officer who signs it ! How sensitive would you feel if an aircraft you were operating on a Service Deviation crashed in apparently inexplicable circumstances ?
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W K
The BOI based their statement on the same weather forecast that the crew had. This view was upheld at HQ 1 Gp, STC and MOD by highly experienced helicopter aircrew. Irrespective of the actual conditions (which would not be apparent until they approached the Mull) the forecast required that the flight be planned to fly in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull.
astazou
Surely the facts should have been marshalled before the decision was taken to request a suspension of the trial?
The BOI based their statement on the same weather forecast that the crew had. This view was upheld at HQ 1 Gp, STC and MOD by highly experienced helicopter aircrew. Irrespective of the actual conditions (which would not be apparent until they approached the Mull) the forecast required that the flight be planned to fly in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull.
astazou
Surely the facts should have been marshalled before the decision was taken to request a suspension of the trial?
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K52
They were in control at waypoint A which was, I suggest, already too close in to climb to IMC height and therefore it is evident that they were going to stay low and turn up the coast VFR in the all-too-common conditions.
So the question still stands - what was the practice in this situation? ie the Mk1 eyeball or TACAN. Or was it always just left up to the crews? - I rather think that this situation was too common on this route for this to have been the case.
Anyone reading this thread or the transcripts of the inquiries would probably think that this particular crew was doing its own thing on some special route in unusual conditions - why the fear of discussing what was the usual practice? Why was this not the starting point for the inquiries?
They were in control at waypoint A which was, I suggest, already too close in to climb to IMC height and therefore it is evident that they were going to stay low and turn up the coast VFR in the all-too-common conditions.
So the question still stands - what was the practice in this situation? ie the Mk1 eyeball or TACAN. Or was it always just left up to the crews? - I rather think that this situation was too common on this route for this to have been the case.
Anyone reading this thread or the transcripts of the inquiries would probably think that this particular crew was doing its own thing on some special route in unusual conditions - why the fear of discussing what was the usual practice? Why was this not the starting point for the inquiries?
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kilo 52
The BOI stated quite clearly, that due to the lack of evidence, the captain of the aircraft SHOULD not be criticised, and the co-pilot COULD not be criticised, as it was;
impossible to recreate the sequence of events leading up to the accident.
The President of the BOI, was a highly experienced SH (Support Helicopter) pilot, with very extensive Chinook experience. Certainly the most relevant flying experience of any officer involved in the entire BOI!
How can it be that he came to completely the opposite conclusion to you?
Unsurprisingly EVERY SINGLE SUBSEQUENT INQUIRY, has totally endorsed his line of thinking, and discredited yours.
Why do you think that is?
The BOI stated quite clearly, that due to the lack of evidence, the captain of the aircraft SHOULD not be criticised, and the co-pilot COULD not be criticised, as it was;
impossible to recreate the sequence of events leading up to the accident.
The President of the BOI, was a highly experienced SH (Support Helicopter) pilot, with very extensive Chinook experience. Certainly the most relevant flying experience of any officer involved in the entire BOI!
How can it be that he came to completely the opposite conclusion to you?
Unsurprisingly EVERY SINGLE SUBSEQUENT INQUIRY, has totally endorsed his line of thinking, and discredited yours.
Why do you think that is?
Just a numbered other
the forecast required that the flight be planned to fly in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull.
Instead, the crew were faced with a 'VFR or nothing' transit. Lack of a decent forecast never prevented SH crews form quite legally having a go. Provided that VMC was maintained, then there is nothing wrong with that. If the SH force was grounded by every poor forecast then they would rarely fly. It was only a forecast after all.
That transit, Walter, would require that the crew flew in accordance with VFR, in VMC and no other than visual contact would be legal for use in terrain avoidance, so the DME is not relevant.
What subsequently caused the crash would have to be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever in order to find the pilots guilty of gross negligence.
The fact that that has not been done is why we are still here ten years on fighting for justice.
I'll be away on 2nd June, but my thoughts will be with those who perished on that day, as they were this morning, when leaving BFS with the Mull in sight.
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Ark Royal
Thank you for your posting of 4th May it was refreshingly clear on the options that the pilots had; unless I am mistaken, you are affirming that the turn up the coast at low level was their intention as planning for IMC was not on.
On the issue of the use of navaids in VFR, however, I would like to restate my hypothesis:
I have been involved in many sea trials in the NW of Scotland over many years and am very familiar with typical weather conditions; further, I have done much precise coastal navigation off the SE of the Isle of Wight (running wreck diving trips) and on many occasions the prevailing wind formed localized mist as it rose over the landmass; on one such occasion I was coming into our most popular site which I fixed visually with transits; I could see the shoreline clearly and was not using Decca or radar to get to the approximate position to wait for the mist to clear for the transits; however I could not see familiar features that were higher up from the shoreline and when the mist momentarily cleared I was surprised at how (dangerously for the boat) close in I had got; subsequently, in those conditions I moved in using Decca and not the Mk1 eyeball and that is with the shoreline clearly visible at a very familiar location.
ZD576 was coming in very fast and was heavy;
If, say for operational reasons, it was desired to turn as close as possible to the land just clear above the ground hugging mist (as a helicopter actually did while I was talking to the lighthouse keeper in identical weather conditions) it must have been awfully tempting to use the TACAN for a convenient countdown (distance wise) to the starting point for the turn; they would have been approaching in clear air with the land mass clearly visible (and its shoreline) but with detail and features obscured by the ground hugging mist; you would not be comfortable heading towards that coast too closely in a boat at 20 kts never mind 150+; ZD576s TACAN CU was set accordingly.
I believe that I have put my view in an earlier posting that for strictly VFR waypoint A was already rather too close in (fixed by TANS) in those conditions and that it would have been risky to approach closer at their speed unless they were using something else. Dont forget that they had bothered to change the TANS waypoint just before A not something that would have concerned them if they had not been in control at that point. Further, this crew in particular had misgivings about the accuracy of the TANS they would not have relied upon it alone to get as close as waypoint A in those conditions either they got there and beyond visually or they were using the TACAN.
What is needed is for some pilots who regularly did this run to come forward if none read this thread, then someone who does could perhaps contact them.
Thank you for your posting of 4th May it was refreshingly clear on the options that the pilots had; unless I am mistaken, you are affirming that the turn up the coast at low level was their intention as planning for IMC was not on.
On the issue of the use of navaids in VFR, however, I would like to restate my hypothesis:
I have been involved in many sea trials in the NW of Scotland over many years and am very familiar with typical weather conditions; further, I have done much precise coastal navigation off the SE of the Isle of Wight (running wreck diving trips) and on many occasions the prevailing wind formed localized mist as it rose over the landmass; on one such occasion I was coming into our most popular site which I fixed visually with transits; I could see the shoreline clearly and was not using Decca or radar to get to the approximate position to wait for the mist to clear for the transits; however I could not see familiar features that were higher up from the shoreline and when the mist momentarily cleared I was surprised at how (dangerously for the boat) close in I had got; subsequently, in those conditions I moved in using Decca and not the Mk1 eyeball and that is with the shoreline clearly visible at a very familiar location.
ZD576 was coming in very fast and was heavy;
If, say for operational reasons, it was desired to turn as close as possible to the land just clear above the ground hugging mist (as a helicopter actually did while I was talking to the lighthouse keeper in identical weather conditions) it must have been awfully tempting to use the TACAN for a convenient countdown (distance wise) to the starting point for the turn; they would have been approaching in clear air with the land mass clearly visible (and its shoreline) but with detail and features obscured by the ground hugging mist; you would not be comfortable heading towards that coast too closely in a boat at 20 kts never mind 150+; ZD576s TACAN CU was set accordingly.
I believe that I have put my view in an earlier posting that for strictly VFR waypoint A was already rather too close in (fixed by TANS) in those conditions and that it would have been risky to approach closer at their speed unless they were using something else. Dont forget that they had bothered to change the TANS waypoint just before A not something that would have concerned them if they had not been in control at that point. Further, this crew in particular had misgivings about the accuracy of the TANS they would not have relied upon it alone to get as close as waypoint A in those conditions either they got there and beyond visually or they were using the TACAN.
What is needed is for some pilots who regularly did this run to come forward if none read this thread, then someone who does could perhaps contact them.
Join Date: Aug 2000
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Look, we're missing an essential point here. Forget all the fancy [or primitive] nav gear and nav techniques. I know exactly what the crew were going to do - I've done it many times myself. The plan was to conduct a VFR transit. You use the nav kit to take the hassle out of navigation, timings, etc, but you use the Mk 1 eyeball to make the decisions. The Mull was shrouded in mist - big deal, been there, done that, dozens of times [specifically the Mull - V-Force, flying low level up the West Coast or through the middle] - but I've continued up the coast using the eyeball to avoid hitting the ground. It's called low flying techniques. It doesn't matter that 500 feet above you there is a solid layer of cloud. If, subsequently, the weather threatens to close in on you, you make the decision to either re-route via an area of better weather [spotted by the Mk1 eyeball], or you climb to safety altitude.
We DON'T KNOW why the crew didn't do what they must have done a squillion times - SOMETHING WENT WRONG THAT PREVENTED THEM FROM STOPPING THE AIRCRAFT HITTING THE GROUND.
Sorry to shout, but I am getting increasingly frustrated by people muddying the waters and forgetting the fundimental principle - the first person to die in a crash is the pilot, and self preservation is the strongest instinct for survival. No one will ever convince me that this flight deck had any control over events that led to the crash.
We DON'T KNOW why the crew didn't do what they must have done a squillion times - SOMETHING WENT WRONG THAT PREVENTED THEM FROM STOPPING THE AIRCRAFT HITTING THE GROUND.
Sorry to shout, but I am getting increasingly frustrated by people muddying the waters and forgetting the fundimental principle - the first person to die in a crash is the pilot, and self preservation is the strongest instinct for survival. No one will ever convince me that this flight deck had any control over events that led to the crash.