Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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I have recently posted twice requesting information. Unfortunately those responding have answered the question they wanted to answer and not that which was asked. I'll try again.
1. Who has the authority to overturn the verdict or to set up an appeal board to consider the verdict again?
2. If the verdict of 'gross negligence' was overturned, does the matter end there or does another verdict have to be reached?
3. If another verdict has to be reached, what other verdicts are possible?
4. Would any lesser verdict which did not completely exonerate the pilots be acceptable to the Campaign team?
1. Who has the authority to overturn the verdict or to set up an appeal board to consider the verdict again?
2. If the verdict of 'gross negligence' was overturned, does the matter end there or does another verdict have to be reached?
3. If another verdict has to be reached, what other verdicts are possible?
4. Would any lesser verdict which did not completely exonerate the pilots be acceptable to the Campaign team?
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Bols
1. I believe the Def Sec can do this but the Sheriff can also re-open the FAI.
The HoL and PAC I'm not sure about but it would save everyone trouble if the MoD decreed 'CNPD'.
2. Dunno - too many interested parties - Boeing, Textron Lycoming, BAe (who now own Hawker Siddeley Dynamics), the Gov't and MoD, Retired Offs various and, not least, the families of the crew and the pax!
3. IIRC - Pilot Error, Engineering Error, Normal Operating Hazard, Cause Not Positively Determined - I can't remember if there is one for 'Design Fault'. In view of the outcome of the Glen Ogle Tornado (with much more technical data), CNPD is the only one that fits.
4. I cannot speak for the families but, for me, the answer to your question is a resounding 'NO'. One cannot prove nor disprove any error on the part of the crew. As they are deceased and there was no CVR nor ADR, the only reasonable outcome is CNPD. Which is what the original BoI was trying to say!
1. I believe the Def Sec can do this but the Sheriff can also re-open the FAI.
The HoL and PAC I'm not sure about but it would save everyone trouble if the MoD decreed 'CNPD'.
2. Dunno - too many interested parties - Boeing, Textron Lycoming, BAe (who now own Hawker Siddeley Dynamics), the Gov't and MoD, Retired Offs various and, not least, the families of the crew and the pax!
3. IIRC - Pilot Error, Engineering Error, Normal Operating Hazard, Cause Not Positively Determined - I can't remember if there is one for 'Design Fault'. In view of the outcome of the Glen Ogle Tornado (with much more technical data), CNPD is the only one that fits.
4. I cannot speak for the families but, for me, the answer to your question is a resounding 'NO'. One cannot prove nor disprove any error on the part of the crew. As they are deceased and there was no CVR nor ADR, the only reasonable outcome is CNPD. Which is what the original BoI was trying to say!
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Tucumseh
Being a practical sort of flyer, I have always thought that if the aircraft was deemed serviceable by the engineers, and more importantly by the crew for the task on the day, a design flaw that may make the aircraft "unairworthy" in some circumstance or other rather took second place.
I just cannot under any circumstances think of how a crew would accept an aircraft that they thought was unfit for the task.
Career above survival? - I don't think so.
“not technically airworthy aircraft”
If you are so indifferent to safety, what airworthiness components would you be happy for MoD to ignore?
If you are so indifferent to safety, what airworthiness components would you be happy for MoD to ignore?
I just cannot under any circumstances think of how a crew would accept an aircraft that they thought was unfit for the task.
Career above survival? - I don't think so.
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I just cannot under any circumstances think of how a crew would accept an aircraft that they thought was unfit for the task.
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Chinook
John Blakeley - re speculation. We seem to be agreed at last that the key element in this long-running discussion is the decision of the crew to press on towards the Mull, or to turn away. You know my view, but if, as you seem to believe, there was some tenable reason why they did not turn away -distraction (both of them ?), engine problem, control restriction, oil on the widscreens, bird-strike etc (you recall them I'm sure), then how come the aircraft soon entered a climb profile, which, had they been on track, would have carried them over the crest of the hills with a couple of hundred feet to spare? And how was it that in the last few seconds of flight the crew were able to make extreme control imputs? But of course we have been here before John. JP
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Have not Graydon and Alcock 'missed' (or blurred?) the vital point?
- is not a technical fault which was known to the RAF at the time an equally blameworthy event? It would seem that they both think that it would be 'someone else's' fault! Obviously placing all the blame on two dead pilots is the ideal escape route thereby avoiding any flak on their cronies.
Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?
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I cannot go back through 298 pages and it has probably been said before. However, the first tenet of accident investigation when investigating the case of a fatal accident where the crew are not available to provide evidence, and as taught on all military Flight Safety/Authoriser/Supervisor Courses, is:
Gross Negligence cannot be apportioned to the deceased crew or individual crew members if there is any doubt at all as to what caused the accident
Here there is doubt; so their Air Marshalships, worthy or not, were wrong IMHO to find both pilots so in this accident.
Would that they would realise that and admit the mistake of those who amended the report and allow these 2 chaps to Rest in Peace.
Foldie
Gross Negligence cannot be apportioned to the deceased crew or individual crew members if there is any doubt at all as to what caused the accident
Here there is doubt; so their Air Marshalships, worthy or not, were wrong IMHO to find both pilots so in this accident.
Would that they would realise that and admit the mistake of those who amended the report and allow these 2 chaps to Rest in Peace.
Foldie
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Airborne
I say again..................
and put themselves and their passengers at risk.
A Mk1 was requested and refused perhaps...
I just cannot under any circumstances think of how a crew would accept an aircraft that they thought was unfit for the task.
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and put themselves and their passengers at risk.
bast0n:
I just cannot think of how a Controller of Aircraft would accept an aircraft that was unfit for any task into Royal Air Force service. Can you?
I just cannot under any circumstances think of how a crew would accept an aircraft that they thought was unfit for the task.
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AA
Then there must be a lot of extremely stupid people in the RAF. This attitude would NEVER be allowed in the FAA.
Fact.
There are very few people with the courage/conviction to refuse to fly an aircraft they were expected to fly on the basis that they believe it to be dangerous at the cost of their career.
Fact.
Baston
Thank you.
As AA said, a Mk1 was sought and refused. What is clear though, is that the crew did not appreciate the scale of the problems, not least because the ACM and FRCs were so immature they didn't have enough evidence to go on. It seems to me they had to rely a lot on gut feeling, and that told them the aircraft was not yet fit for purpose.
As we know, in the preceding 3 years MoD had stopped routinely updating such key documentation so crews were progressively becoming used (immune? hardened?) to working it out for themselves.
That uncertainty is a Human Factors hazard, exacerbated by them having been "converted" to Mk2 4 months earlier, then reverting to flying Mk1, with its completely different RTS conditions and clearances. Or should I say, the Mk1 had clearances, the Mk2 mostly lacked them. A simple example - the intercom was not cleared for use. Pretty fundamental I'd say! Obviously they used it - in some eyes I suppose that constitutes negligence on their part, but it is a far greater negligence on the part of the idiots who released it in that condition.
I wonder if they knew of the test pilots' experiences, whereby after a long straight run, attempts to execute a slight turn (as described and questioned above) resulted in a sudden lurch in the opposite direction? Probably not, primarily because the Release to Service was premature because such events were not fully understood or ironed out. Boscombe is not geared up to provide front line aircrew training "on the fly". The airworthiness system demands the aircraft is safe and, following a training regime on a safe aircraft, RTS is granted. You do not rush out the RTS and then expect pilots to learn from the rumour mill how the aircraft behaves.
And simple understanding can often suffice, which negates much of MoD's argument when they say "never happened since". Often there is no need for a modification, although in the Mk2's case there was a significant software update initiated ("Block 1") and, 2 years later, a new DECU variant was introduced. Set against the background of Boscombe's advice not to grant CAR until safety critical software problems were resolved (admitted now by MoD, along with various system integration issues), this is damning evidence of immaturity.
Thank you.
As AA said, a Mk1 was sought and refused. What is clear though, is that the crew did not appreciate the scale of the problems, not least because the ACM and FRCs were so immature they didn't have enough evidence to go on. It seems to me they had to rely a lot on gut feeling, and that told them the aircraft was not yet fit for purpose.
As we know, in the preceding 3 years MoD had stopped routinely updating such key documentation so crews were progressively becoming used (immune? hardened?) to working it out for themselves.
That uncertainty is a Human Factors hazard, exacerbated by them having been "converted" to Mk2 4 months earlier, then reverting to flying Mk1, with its completely different RTS conditions and clearances. Or should I say, the Mk1 had clearances, the Mk2 mostly lacked them. A simple example - the intercom was not cleared for use. Pretty fundamental I'd say! Obviously they used it - in some eyes I suppose that constitutes negligence on their part, but it is a far greater negligence on the part of the idiots who released it in that condition.
I wonder if they knew of the test pilots' experiences, whereby after a long straight run, attempts to execute a slight turn (as described and questioned above) resulted in a sudden lurch in the opposite direction? Probably not, primarily because the Release to Service was premature because such events were not fully understood or ironed out. Boscombe is not geared up to provide front line aircrew training "on the fly". The airworthiness system demands the aircraft is safe and, following a training regime on a safe aircraft, RTS is granted. You do not rush out the RTS and then expect pilots to learn from the rumour mill how the aircraft behaves.
And simple understanding can often suffice, which negates much of MoD's argument when they say "never happened since". Often there is no need for a modification, although in the Mk2's case there was a significant software update initiated ("Block 1") and, 2 years later, a new DECU variant was introduced. Set against the background of Boscombe's advice not to grant CAR until safety critical software problems were resolved (admitted now by MoD, along with various system integration issues), this is damning evidence of immaturity.
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Then there must be a lot of extremely stupid people in the RAF. This attitude would NEVER be allowed in the FAA.
Fact
Fact
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people to fly an aircraft that had had unexplained issues in the previous few days, that wasn't even able to climb to SA due to it's inability to deal with icing despite a marginal weather forecast, that had known, unpredictable and serious issues with it's FADEC, yada, yada, yada, the list goes on.
And they still signed for it and flew it? How really stupid is that, Airborne?
Presumably you would also classify as "stupid" crews that
an aircraft whose functional anti-collision lights were replaced with dysfunctional HISL's in that in cloud, haze or low over water they dazzled the pilots with reflection? Or was the SOP to switch them off in the very conditions that they were most needed an indication of the superiority of the FAA over the RAF? Or did the fault lie rather with the higher command that supplied them with yet another example of unairworthy aircraft?
still signed for it and flew
bast0n:
That was the point bast0n. Perhaps I was being too deep?
Then there must be a lot of extremely stupid people in the RAF. This attitude would NEVER be allowed in the FAA.
Fact.
Fact.
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Gents
I'm somewhat surprised the following hasn't been articulated:
Chinook crash inquiry
The Times has published a letter from Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the Air Staff, in response to media coverage of alleged new evidence in the crash of a Chinook helicopter on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994. Sir Stephen wrote:
"Sir, Your editorial ('Unfit for Purpose (Continued)') yesterday unfairly argued that 'new' information made the findings of the Board of Inquiry into the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash 'unsustainable and unacceptable'. Far from 'bureaucratic stubbornness', we have always made clear that we would revisit the findings if new evidence was presented. Despite the efforts over many years of those campaigning to clear the pilots, including an exhaustive report submitted in 2008, no such evidence has ever been found.
"The computer software issues raised in the documents obtained by the BBC were well known at the time and had been factored into the operating instructions. These issues were discounted in the context of this accident following a thorough independent assessment by the Air Accident Investigation Branch. This led the Board of Inquiry to conclude - along with those who have repeatedly reconsidered this over the years - that there was no evidence of technical failure which would have been a factor in the crash.
"What was exposed, in a diligent and logical analysis, was that the pilots consciously breached their operating rules, thereby knowingly placing their aircraft, passengers, crew and themselves at risk. This was the basis for the gross negligence finding.
"The Chinook helicopter has a remarkable safety record and has proved a mainstay of recent operations. Aircraft losses are not always due to equipment failings and it is a disservice to our people, particularly those working heroically daily in Afghanistan, to see a conspiracy behind every tragic loss.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the Air Staff."
The Daily Telegraph also ran a letter from former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, which read:
"Sir - The current Chief of the Air Staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CAS's have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; 'consistent' might be a more balanced term.
"You suggest we may be 'trying to hide something'. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence? As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons Defence Committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF - through the MOD - has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable.
"It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored. Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners' various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant.
"In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did. This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.
"Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible? You suggest that 'institutionalised resistance' might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
I'm somewhat surprised the following hasn't been articulated:
Chinook crash inquiry
The Times has published a letter from Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the Air Staff, in response to media coverage of alleged new evidence in the crash of a Chinook helicopter on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994. Sir Stephen wrote:
"Sir, Your editorial ('Unfit for Purpose (Continued)') yesterday unfairly argued that 'new' information made the findings of the Board of Inquiry into the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash 'unsustainable and unacceptable'. Far from 'bureaucratic stubbornness', we have always made clear that we would revisit the findings if new evidence was presented. Despite the efforts over many years of those campaigning to clear the pilots, including an exhaustive report submitted in 2008, no such evidence has ever been found.
"The computer software issues raised in the documents obtained by the BBC were well known at the time and had been factored into the operating instructions. These issues were discounted in the context of this accident following a thorough independent assessment by the Air Accident Investigation Branch. This led the Board of Inquiry to conclude - along with those who have repeatedly reconsidered this over the years - that there was no evidence of technical failure which would have been a factor in the crash.
"What was exposed, in a diligent and logical analysis, was that the pilots consciously breached their operating rules, thereby knowingly placing their aircraft, passengers, crew and themselves at risk. This was the basis for the gross negligence finding.
"The Chinook helicopter has a remarkable safety record and has proved a mainstay of recent operations. Aircraft losses are not always due to equipment failings and it is a disservice to our people, particularly those working heroically daily in Afghanistan, to see a conspiracy behind every tragic loss.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the Air Staff."
The Daily Telegraph also ran a letter from former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, which read:
"Sir - The current Chief of the Air Staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CAS's have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; 'consistent' might be a more balanced term.
"You suggest we may be 'trying to hide something'. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence? As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons Defence Committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF - through the MOD - has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable.
"It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored. Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners' various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant.
"In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did. This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.
"Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible? You suggest that 'institutionalised resistance' might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
