Baston
Thank you.
As AA said, a Mk1 was sought and refused. What is clear though, is that the crew did not appreciate the scale of the problems, not least because the ACM and FRCs were so immature they didn't have enough evidence to go on. It seems to me they had to rely a lot on gut feeling, and that told them the aircraft was not yet fit for purpose.
As we know, in the preceding 3 years MoD had stopped routinely updating such key documentation so crews were progressively becoming used (immune? hardened?) to working it out for themselves.
That uncertainty is a Human Factors hazard, exacerbated by them having been "converted" to Mk2 4 months earlier, then reverting to flying Mk1, with its completely different RTS conditions and clearances. Or should I say, the Mk1 had clearances, the Mk2 mostly lacked them. A simple example - the intercom was not cleared for use. Pretty fundamental I'd say! Obviously they used it - in some eyes I suppose that constitutes negligence on their part, but it is a far greater negligence on the part of the idiots who released it in that condition.
I wonder if they knew of the test pilots' experiences, whereby after a long straight run, attempts to execute a slight turn (as described and questioned above) resulted in a sudden lurch in the opposite direction? Probably not, primarily because the Release to Service was premature because such events were not fully understood or ironed out. Boscombe is not geared up to provide front line aircrew training "on the fly". The airworthiness system demands the aircraft is safe and, following a training regime on a safe aircraft, RTS is granted. You do not rush out the RTS and then expect pilots to learn from the rumour mill how the aircraft behaves.
And simple understanding can often suffice, which negates much of MoD's argument when they say "never happened since". Often there is no need for a modification, although in the Mk2's case there was a significant software update initiated ("Block 1") and, 2 years later, a new DECU variant was introduced. Set against the background of Boscombe's advice not to grant CAR until safety critical software problems were resolved (admitted now by MoD, along with various system integration issues), this is damning evidence of immaturity.