Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Aircraft losses are not always due to equipment failings and it is a disservice to our people, particularly those working heroically in Afghanistan, to see a conspiracy behind every tragic loss.
To my mind, it is a disservice to 'our people' to pin the blame on them for an accident with totally inadequate evidence. No CVR evidence, no idea of the human factors stress being suffered by the pilots on the day through being ordered to fly a non-airworthy, immature aircraft.
No-one knows 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' what caused the accident - and Dalton's drivel just perpetuates the MoD's clear desire to stick to their untenable position.
Given Boscombe's advice was consistent, over a long period before Release to Service, why on earth "factor in" the implications arising from a statement that the software was "positively dangerous".
All the airworthiness and safety management regulations demand that you RESOLVE the problem/risk/hazard on a safety critical system. See the Nimrod thread and the discussions over ALARP.
Do you think the risk was ALARP when, in June 94, Boscombe grounded their PE Fleet? Surely, if the risk mitigation was already "factored in", they (Boscombe) would have been party to the necessary trials/testing and drafting of changes to the documentation and would have no good reason to stop flying?
Frankly, this is a far more clear cut case than either C130 or Nimrod.
Dalton is, in effect, admitting MoD breached their own mandated regulations.
All the airworthiness and safety management regulations demand that you RESOLVE the problem/risk/hazard on a safety critical system. See the Nimrod thread and the discussions over ALARP.
Do you think the risk was ALARP when, in June 94, Boscombe grounded their PE Fleet? Surely, if the risk mitigation was already "factored in", they (Boscombe) would have been party to the necessary trials/testing and drafting of changes to the documentation and would have no good reason to stop flying?
Frankly, this is a far more clear cut case than either C130 or Nimrod.
Dalton is, in effect, admitting MoD breached their own mandated regulations.
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What utter rubbish from CAS - he's only spouting the same party line as everyone else before him. I thought he had more 'nous' and 'cahunas'. Obviously not, it appears! Perhaps he's been got at by the mandarins?
CAS's statment is bollox because:
1.
This is disingenuous, as the AAIB said that evidence of a control restriction/jam 'could not be discounted' but the BOI did not address this. Furthermore, the AAIB report indicated a massive bootful of yaw bar (rudder) at impact - 77% - an unheard of amount. Also bear in mind that there is recorded evidence that faults produced by FADEC left no trace. This proves that just because there was no evidence of a FADEC fault, that cannot mean ther had not been one. The AAIB were not made aware of this and neither did the BOI address these issues. So, to say that the BoI was a
, is demonstrably flawed in so very many ways. In fairness to the BOI members, FADECs were relatively new to the military and the board were no experts - either on the FADEC, the HC2 itself nor wrt to accident investigations. This underlines some of the shortcomings of the military accident investigation process - which were very far from thorough.
2.
This is also misleading and "too low, too fast and in illegal viz" is a line used by Day and Wratten.
Firstly, the ac was not 'too low' - it was at a normal MSD for a transit by a military helicopter.
Secondly, neither was it 'too fast' - but at normal transit speed - approx 130kts IAS but with some following wind.
Lastly, many people have claimed that the ac was in fog at the time of the crash thereby breaking the Low Level mil viz regs. Well, it may have been in cloud at the time of the impact but the position of Mull was clearly discernable from out at sea (from whence the ac arrived). Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman (when asked more diligently by the Sheriff's FAI) described the ac 'in sunlight' and effectively 'clear of cloud, insight of surface'. Furthermore, the MoD have also stated they do not know the extent of the cloud over the sea, if it was at all.
The activation of the next waypoint to Corran is also a clear indication (ask Chinny operators) that the crew were visual with the Mull and were therefore intending to steer left up the coast. Why they did not, we will never know but in the light of a lack of definitive and conclusive evidence, one cannot assume negligence.
3. One cannot use the excuse of
since the crash as evidence that the ac was ok at the time - utter tripe! The airworthiness regs clearly state this is no proof of ac safety. And if any critical components of the HC2 have been modified since the crash, you would have to argue that maybe the ac was not as safe as CAS suggests? Hmmm...!
4.
There is no record of the BOI, FAI, PAC or HoL inquiries addressing the concept of airworthiness. Therefore, by definition, the airworthiness issue is new evidence. Never mind the operational issues of the crash, the Chinook HC2 should not have been allowed to fly operationally, never mind on a passenger/trg sortie in such an immature state of development. Quite simply, it was definitively unairworthy.
5.
A very cheap shot indeed by CAS and not a little small-minded. (He should change his script-writer, methinks!)
Having served in Afghanistan, I am more than a little aware that ac are brought down by people who mean our crews harm. Therefore, it is imperative that the small number of aircraft we have left are properly airworthy and fit-for-purpose.
To fail to do so is doing the enemy's job for him.
Those who continue to serve deserve and receive our total respect.
6. As the crew of ZD576 had already asked for a HC1 for the 'training sortie' to INV, the only people who
were the senior officers who allowed this sortie to go ahead in an aircraft that was demonstrably NOT AIRWORTHY at the time. Included in this are the people who signed the CA Release and the Release to Service against the advice and the pleadings of A&AEE, Boscombe Down and in contravention of regulations, did not record their decision process. This action, no matter how operationally driven it was, might amount to gross negligence should it ever come to court. It is interesting to note that some these people also were the convening authority and reviewing officers of the BOI - make up your own mind as to who let whom down.
flipster
CAS's statment is bollox because:
1.
no evidence of technical failure
diligent and logical analysis
2.
breached their operating rules
Firstly, the ac was not 'too low' - it was at a normal MSD for a transit by a military helicopter.
Secondly, neither was it 'too fast' - but at normal transit speed - approx 130kts IAS but with some following wind.
Lastly, many people have claimed that the ac was in fog at the time of the crash thereby breaking the Low Level mil viz regs. Well, it may have been in cloud at the time of the impact but the position of Mull was clearly discernable from out at sea (from whence the ac arrived). Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman (when asked more diligently by the Sheriff's FAI) described the ac 'in sunlight' and effectively 'clear of cloud, insight of surface'. Furthermore, the MoD have also stated they do not know the extent of the cloud over the sea, if it was at all.
The activation of the next waypoint to Corran is also a clear indication (ask Chinny operators) that the crew were visual with the Mull and were therefore intending to steer left up the coast. Why they did not, we will never know but in the light of a lack of definitive and conclusive evidence, one cannot assume negligence.
3. One cannot use the excuse of
a remarkable safety record
4.
concluded there was no new evidence
5.
Aircraft losses are not always due to equipment failings and it is a disservice to our people, particularly those working heroically in Afghanistan, to see a conspiracy behind every tragic loss.
Having served in Afghanistan, I am more than a little aware that ac are brought down by people who mean our crews harm. Therefore, it is imperative that the small number of aircraft we have left are properly airworthy and fit-for-purpose.
To fail to do so is doing the enemy's job for him.
Those who continue to serve deserve and receive our total respect.
6. As the crew of ZD576 had already asked for a HC1 for the 'training sortie' to INV, the only people who
knowingly placing their aircraft, passengers, crew and themselves at risk
flipster
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if any critical components of the HC2 have been modified since the crash, you would have to argue that maybe the ac was not as safe as CAS suggests?
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I would be as delighted as anyone to see the crew of ZD576 cleared of gross negligence. However, the more I read the thread, the less sure I am of what people are expecting would follow if that should happen.
As I understand it, the majority of contributors believe that if it can be shown that FADEC software (or other failures) could conceivably have contributed to the accident even if there was no evidence that it did, then the extreme verdict of gross negligence (absolutely no doubt at all) is unsustainable.
It gives me no pleasure to make the point but if there are no facts to prove the verdict, by the same logic, there are no facts to show that the crew was not responsible which must remain at least a possibility.
May I ask what happens if the verdict should be over-turned? Please, no heated demands for what it ought to be but simply some facts about what course the law might then be required to pursue or indeed if it needs to pursue any course at all.
As I understand it, the majority of contributors believe that if it can be shown that FADEC software (or other failures) could conceivably have contributed to the accident even if there was no evidence that it did, then the extreme verdict of gross negligence (absolutely no doubt at all) is unsustainable.
It gives me no pleasure to make the point but if there are no facts to prove the verdict, by the same logic, there are no facts to show that the crew was not responsible which must remain at least a possibility.
May I ask what happens if the verdict should be over-turned? Please, no heated demands for what it ought to be but simply some facts about what course the law might then be required to pursue or indeed if it needs to pursue any course at all.
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That is a very good point from Boslandew. What would happen if tomorrow someone turned round and stated that the crew were "not" guilty of Gross negligence? Would then, the families of the passengers be able to sue the families of the crew? That may make matters worse.
When the wholly unjustified verdict is quashed and a verdict along the lines of 'Cause not positively determined' is brought, then the reputations of the two pilots will be reinstated.
Whether the families of the deceased passengers should choose to pursue an action against the MoD for insisting that they flew in a knowingly non-airworthy aircraft will be a an entirely different matter.
Whether the families of the deceased passengers should choose to pursue an action against the MoD for insisting that they flew in a knowingly non-airworthy aircraft will be a an entirely different matter.
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Boslandew
- absolutely, but the principle on which Miltary B of Is have been based is that blame has not been apportioned to dead people. Of course, I'm sure we all accept that it remains a possibility that there was negligence, but it cannot be proven. The revised finding may well reflect that and personally I would have no issue with that finding.
I think that any change in the finding would be incidental to the issues of 'law' to which you refer. I believe that such issues are running a separate course now to the cause of Brian and others and neither are dependent on each other.
but if there are no facts to prove the verdict, by the same logic, there are no facts to show that the crew was not responsible which must remain at least a possibility.
I think that any change in the finding would be incidental to the issues of 'law' to which you refer. I believe that such issues are running a separate course now to the cause of Brian and others and neither are dependent on each other.
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bast0n,
there is only one verdict that would sum up this whole tragedy sufficiently:
Cause not positively determined.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
there is only one verdict that would sum up this whole tragedy sufficiently:
Cause not positively determined.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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flipster
Congratulations on a beautifully constructed and devastating riposte to the tired old rubbish spouted by the new CAS.
Sooner or later, the ill-considered "finding" of gross negligence will have to be reversed. Keep up the good work, chaps. I sense that the pressure might just be starting to build.
When Brown is forced out, anything can happen!
Sooner or later, the ill-considered "finding" of gross negligence will have to be reversed. Keep up the good work, chaps. I sense that the pressure might just be starting to build.
When Brown is forced out, anything can happen!
How the CAS can hide behind remarks like:
when the safety regulation of the organisation he heads has been savaged by the Haddon Cave Inquiry I find difficult to imagine. It shows that they have learned nothing from H-C at all.
and it is a disservice to our people, particularly those working heroically in Afghanistan,
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Vertico,
Very kind of you to say so. It just goes to disprove the saying that you should not write anything in anger - as I was spitting mad when I saw Dalton's very poor statement in the papers! He had seemed a very bright bloke and one who could have been above regurgitating the same tired, trite and lame MoD line. C'est la vie.
Flipster
Very kind of you to say so. It just goes to disprove the saying that you should not write anything in anger - as I was spitting mad when I saw Dalton's very poor statement in the papers! He had seemed a very bright bloke and one who could have been above regurgitating the same tired, trite and lame MoD line. C'est la vie.
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Which bit of "there is no need for new evidence, just correctly assess the evidence you've always had" do they not get?
I'm disappointed in Dalton as I always had strong respect for the man. His letter doesn't appear to have a new man's spin on things - it is as if his PSO has just dusted-off one of the previous 3*+ responses and top-'n-tailed it.
I'm disappointed in Dalton as I always had strong respect for the man. His letter doesn't appear to have a new man's spin on things - it is as if his PSO has just dusted-off one of the previous 3*+ responses and top-'n-tailed it.
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Beagle
With respect, you have given your opinion of what you think ought to happen.
BOAC
I should perhaps have made things clearer by saying "RAF legal procedures" sooner than law. You suggest that it is generally accepted that the crew may have been responsible and that any new verdict might reflect that possibility.
My query was really about what alternative verdicts are possible given that a successful review might not completely exonerate the crew. A very difficult question, but would a new verdict of any level that did not completely exonerate the crew be acceptable to the Campaign leaders. Perhaps Brian Dixon could comment.
With respect, you have given your opinion of what you think ought to happen.
BOAC
I should perhaps have made things clearer by saying "RAF legal procedures" sooner than law. You suggest that it is generally accepted that the crew may have been responsible and that any new verdict might reflect that possibility.
My query was really about what alternative verdicts are possible given that a successful review might not completely exonerate the crew. A very difficult question, but would a new verdict of any level that did not completely exonerate the crew be acceptable to the Campaign leaders. Perhaps Brian Dixon could comment.
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Hi- can anyone provide a link to the original AAIB report? I have tried the AAIB site but don't seem able to find it, and the search function isn't working. Can't find it on the parliamentary site either.
FWIW, I don't see how with so little actual facts to go on, the RAF feel they have reached the level of absolute certainty required to find negligence. I suppose the interesting question here is why are they intent on defending what seems to be indefensible?
FWIW, I don't see how with so little actual facts to go on, the RAF feel they have reached the level of absolute certainty required to find negligence. I suppose the interesting question here is why are they intent on defending what seems to be indefensible?
A not unsurprising response from Mr Dalton.
Love to know what his 'private' thoughts were/are about the XIII Sqn Tornado crew that were killed in similar circumstances i.e. alledgedly perfectly serviceable aircraft flies into the ground for which no evidence can be found as to the reason why, but which, IIRC, was classified NPD. He was, of course, officer commanding XIII sqn at the time ....
Love to know what his 'private' thoughts were/are about the XIII Sqn Tornado crew that were killed in similar circumstances i.e. alledgedly perfectly serviceable aircraft flies into the ground for which no evidence can be found as to the reason why, but which, IIRC, was classified NPD. He was, of course, officer commanding XIII sqn at the time ....
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I doubt CAS is even allowed to think for himself, never mind issue a press release/give an interview/write a letter without an MoD "Moderator" giving the strict line. What a shame, thought he might be someone to break the mould, obviously not...
He now looks as foolish and as self-serving as the rest.
He now looks as foolish and as self-serving as the rest.
Last edited by nigegilb; 6th Jan 2010 at 21:54.