What utter rubbish from CAS - he's only spouting the same party line as everyone else before him. I thought he had more 'nous' and 'cahunas'. Obviously not, it appears! Perhaps he's been got at by the mandarins?
CAS's statment is bollox because:
1.
no evidence of technical failure
This is disingenuous, as the AAIB said that evidence of a control restriction/jam 'could not be discounted' but the BOI did not address this. Furthermore, the AAIB report indicated a massive bootful of yaw bar (rudder) at impact - 77% - an unheard of amount. Also bear in mind that there is recorded evidence that faults produced by FADEC left no trace. This proves that just because there was no evidence of a FADEC fault, that cannot mean ther had not been one. The AAIB were not made aware of this and neither did the BOI address these issues. So, to say that the BoI was a
diligent and logical analysis
, is demonstrably flawed in so very many ways. In fairness to the BOI members, FADECs were relatively new to the military and the board were no experts - either on the FADEC, the HC2 itself nor wrt to accident investigations. This underlines some of the shortcomings of the military accident investigation process - which were very far from thorough.
2.
breached their operating rules
This is also misleading and
"too low, too fast and in illegal viz" is a line used by Day and Wratten.
Firstly, the ac was not 'too low' - it was at a normal MSD for a transit by a military helicopter.
Secondly, neither was it 'too fast' - but at normal transit speed - approx 130kts IAS but with some following wind.
Lastly, many people have claimed that the ac was in fog at the time of the crash thereby breaking the Low Level mil viz regs. Well, it may have been in cloud
at the time of the impact but the position of Mull was clearly discernable from out at sea (from whence the ac arrived). Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman (when asked more diligently by the Sheriff's FAI) described the ac 'in sunlight' and effectively 'clear of cloud, insight of surface'. Furthermore, the MoD have also stated they do not know the extent of the cloud over the sea, if it was at all.
The activation of the next waypoint to Corran is also a clear indication (ask Chinny operators) that the crew were visual with the Mull and were therefore intending to steer left up the coast. Why they did not, we will never know but in the light of a lack of definitive and conclusive evidence, one cannot assume negligence.
3. One cannot use the excuse of
a remarkable safety record
since the crash as evidence that the ac was ok at the time - utter tripe! The airworthiness regs clearly state this is no proof of ac safety. And if any critical components of the HC2 have been modified since the crash, you would have to argue that maybe the ac was not as safe as CAS suggests? Hmmm...!
4.
concluded there was no new evidence
There is no record of the BOI, FAI, PAC or HoL inquiries addressing the concept of airworthiness. Therefore, by definition, the airworthiness issue is
new evidence. Never mind the operational issues of the crash, the Chinook HC2 should not have been allowed to fly operationally, never mind on a passenger/trg sortie in such an immature state of development. Quite simply, it was definitively unairworthy.
5.
Aircraft losses are not always due to equipment failings and it is a disservice to our people, particularly those working heroically in Afghanistan, to see a conspiracy behind every tragic loss.
A very cheap shot indeed by CAS and not a little small-minded. (He should change his script-writer, methinks!)
Having served in Afghanistan, I am more than a little aware that ac are brought down by people who mean our crews harm. Therefore, it is imperative that the small number of aircraft we have left are properly airworthy and fit-for-purpose.
To fail to do so is doing the enemy's job for him.
Those who continue to serve deserve and receive our total respect.
6. As the crew of ZD576 had already asked for a HC1 for the 'training sortie' to INV, the only people who
knowingly placing their aircraft, passengers, crew and themselves at risk
were the senior officers who allowed this sortie to go ahead in an aircraft that was demonstrably NOT AIRWORTHY at the time. Included in this are the people who signed the CA Release and the Release to Service against the advice and the pleadings of A&AEE, Boscombe Down and in contravention of regulations, did not record their decision process. This action, no matter how operationally driven it was, might amount to gross negligence should it ever come to court. It is interesting to note that some these people also were the convening authority and reviewing officers of the BOI - make up your own mind as to who let whom down.
flipster