ShyT
I take it that your post is aimed at recent readers as so many of your points have been addressed over a long period of time - regretfully, I feel I have to waste time briefly putting you straight on them:
<<What you have probably seen at air shows is a demonstration of the limits of helicopter physical manoeuvrability, not much more than that.
You should understand that this is very different to how a helicopter is flown on an operation, especially in bad weather, more especially when at relatively high weights and on a passenger carrying flight. >>
The bad weather was localised on the Mull and would have affected their ability to recognise local features (such as there are on that ground);
the weight was within limits for single engine flight, was it not? and so not anywhere near "high" for a Chinook; the passengers were not grannies on a church outing, either; the reference to air shows was merely to point out that no info on distances to slow down were volunteered on this site (and I note that you still do not use this opportunity to quantify "where the gradually decelerating landing approach can begin from") but from air shows the observer can get an idea - my original question on this was to substantiate the view that being 1/2 a mile or so out in judgement of distance to go would have explained that they were still at such a high speed despite having started to coast (letting drag wash off the speed) after their turn onto 035 (Boeings calcs).
<<Crew are trained to use something like a tree line, a ridge line, a valley, a track, railway line or any other useful feature; each locality having it's own unique scenario. >> If you can't consistently see the lighthouse clearly, there is naff all else to spot in that area - I suggest that you ask crew familiar with CPLS how it can be used in such conditions.
<<DME is not accurate enough>> What else is more accurate? I think I posted some time back the accident on an Aussie vessel where the eyeball was used but the TACAN would have been the safe option; ZD576 did not have radar; the UHF DME function of a PRC112 with CPLS is intrinsically very accurate and reliable - just needs to have been where it was meant to be.
<< Bearing in mind the BOI found evidence of the co-pilot's comms box selected to its "emergency" position ...>> You talk to an operator on the ground with a PRC112 on the UHF guard channel - other than someone very local, UHF would not have done them any good at their height, would it? We know their VHF was working when they called ScotMil.
<<...after a reported time at quite a low speed, (yachtsman's evidence) subsequently accelerated under high power, to a speed equal or higher than the normal cruise speed, then hit the ground in a slight climb, with the yaw pedals (helicopters don't have "rudders") deflected to almost full travel.>> I put "rudder" in quotes, didn't I? - just for simplicity - I have posted several times on Sqn Ldr Burke's misleading statement on those pedals, demonstrating, I think adequately, that I am understanding their application to tandem rotor craft so I think your sarcasm is a bit silly here; other than that the rest of this paragraph of yours shows a lack of willingness to go through the distance/time analysis that I have suggested you all do along the lines of Boeing's "Analysis of Available Data" - the most obvious scenario from the analysis is that it flew at a consistent cruising speed until the turn to 035 (at the position of waypoint change whereon it started to slow down in terms of TAS (this was masked by the increase in tail wind component near the landmass) which was consistent with the matched engine power levels - regarding the yachtsman's judgement, I challenge any of you to judge the speed of an unfamiliar a/c with any accuracy at the distance involved - a big Chinook would look very slow without a nearby familiar object to someone who had previously only seen other types.
<<During any emergency abort/climb, (I've done quite a few in my time) a helicopter's yaw pedals would normally be deflected only enough to keep the aircraft in balanced flight; i.e. with the balance ball in the middle, as speed was traded for climb performance, in addition to use of full power. This would not be anywhere near full deflection, such as was strangely apparent in this accident.>> A bit like Sqn Ldr Burke's view - why not leave this answer to those who I put the question to?
That is to Chinook pilots, what do you do with these pedals when initiating a "quick stop"? Or was all this smoke of yours aimed at hiding the lack of response to this basic, relevant question?
<<Also, only one "row" selection of the transponder was just one digit away from 7, which would have completed a selection of 7700, the full emergency code to alert ATC units>> The code selected was found to be 7760 - from the expected 7000 that is one wheel switch two positions out and another one - they are hard to move - it is not the practice to change this in a sudden emergency, is it? - the SSR recordings (which would have cleared this up) are said to have shown nothing despite a reliable report from someone who had seen them - a code from the domestic allocation (at that time there was a shortage of available codes for special usage) where no ambiguity was likely could be used for special exercises (not forgetting the callsign was likewise suggestive of an exercise).
<<We will never know>> This mantra is often repeated by many - especially media and politicians - enough data has been retrieved, instrument settings preserved, etc to further our understanding considerably beyond the "official" version, to establish that the approach to the Mull was an excursion from a safer planned route, to which it is evident that they were to rejoin, and that they were set up for a close pass or landing at an LZ that had been used prior to this crash on numerous occasions by mil helos including Chinooks, close to which the crash happened. This is enough to justify quashing the verdicts, that such has been so far withheld from inquiries. It would require consensus support from interested parties to get anything done.
I will be in the UK for a couple of months from next week, and will PM contact details for anybody genuinely interested in going through the detailed chart work, etc in a group meeting where perhaps a bit of open discussion can take our understanding a bit further.
OhOh - another from ShyT
<<...these passengers would have no operational or technical interest in a homing system.>> A Covert Personnel Locator System - "just the thing when
your men are in an OP from which they need to be extracted in a hurry - whatever the conditions - understanding our new capability will aid you in tactical decisions - besides, it is new kit for us and we are short of time to train with it and this location is ideal and it will not delay your itinery a bit ..." an easy sell.
<< ...if the purpose of the flight was to demonstrate a homing device fitted to this particular Mk2 airframe, how on earth does this possibly fit in with the captain's request for a completely different airframe, a Mk1?>> while ultimately the CPLS was intended to be fitted to HC2s with the Remote Display Unit fitted to the left hand pilot's console, the connections for power and to the intercom system for the palletised kit were simplicity itself and so perhaps Flt Lt Tapper thought the trial set could just as easily have been screwed to the floor of a Mk1 and the readings relayed by a loadmaster - I dunno, just a thought - perhaps he had a bad feeling and was looking for an excuse not to do the Mull demo - otherwise, preferring a Mk1??!! - I would have thought the advantages of FADEC in the power management of such a beast would have more than compensated for any anticipated glitches - it was the future, after all, akin in terms of workload to the transition from steam to Diesel/Electric for loco drivers.
I think you should use your connections with the RAF to satisfy yourself of the initial use of the CPLS and just let us in the public domain know if you are happy with the explanation or not - if you are willing, I am sure many of us would be interested to know of its initial fitting and evaluation - if you don't know and are unwilling to find out, please stop filling up the pages with your less than constructive spin.
And as I have said, so many times before, don't get hung up on this specific piece of equipment - it is only a candidate that I have suggested - what is needed is an objective discussion on the parameters that I have pointed to that indicate their intentions in terms of track and set up for a close approach or landing at a known LZ - that gets the ball rolling. That, to date, so many of you who should have been qualified to do so have not recognised at least as a possibility that such parameters had a significance is very disappointing to say the least - they really do go together to make a very obvious picture - please make an effort.