Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[bast0n]

AA

He's only here to cause trouble

They call them trolls and, despite his delusions and self aggrandizement, Baston is not a very good one...

Ah well - a good, succinct and well argued defence for the case for the poor chaps who may have made the ultimate error. Personal abuse is never a substitute for rational debate. I hope that you are proud of yourself AA. Pass the coffee.................................

At the end of the day the aircraft hit the rock and to use this forum to throw abuse at those of us who may have a different concept of the events that led to that awfull moment is a disgrace to the memory of those that died. AA - I hope that you are ashamed of yourself..............but I fear you will not be.

With best wishes, to all of you with better manners than AA.

[Airborne Aircrew]

Brian:

Is the John Cook in your sig the same man who was Crewman Leader on 7 Sqn in the mid to late 80's? If so, and if you are in contact with him, please give him my best regards. He probably won't remember me, (I was a 33 Sqn Crewman), but I always saw him as a good man and well worthy of respect.

[ShyTorque]

John Cook was Rick Cook's late father.

Not the same Cooke as the other.

[Airborne Aircrew]

Shy:

Thanks...

Nice thought either way...

[tucumseh]

I think I’d be more concerned about the contradictions between what Witness 20 said about the SuperTANS / GPS. Why on earth, as he claimed, would the crew be “complacent” and “over reliant” about a system with the following limitations;

Section O – Navigation Installations

2.2 TNL 8000 GPS – GPS has not yet been declared operational (at IOC) by the US Department of Defense and accuracy is therefore not guaranteed to any level.

2.3 (a) RNS252 GPS (Ext) Position – In addition to paragraph 2.2 above, the GPS is highly susceptible to jamming of which the only crew indication is loss of GPS. ….. The “Err” figure displayed, which has conventionally been taken as a measure of GPS performance, is meaningless and so no indication of the accuracy of the GPS is available to the user.


I don’t know about anyone else, but I find this exchange astonishing. Any pilots here think they’d be complacent or over-reliant about a system which doesn’t have IOC and another which has meaningless (and hence confusing, distracting, worrying) error codes? If anyone says Yes, I’ll retract.

To all my detractors – come on, this is a golden opportunity to rid pprune of a really annoying git who thinks aircraft should be airworthy and fit for purpose. If, as a pilot (or any aircrew at all), you have no problem with all the above, then I’ll just give up and go away. You may as well formalise MoD’s refusal to implement the regs and Ainsworth can just rescind JSP 553 (he doesn’t agree with it anyway).

This is not trivia. MoD’s case is built on their claim that negligence had taken place at or before Waypoint A (depending which version you listen to). Their “proof” is largely based on the assumption that because the Nav inputs to SuperTANS were present, they were both accurate and not corrupted. And, importantly, being presented correctly.

Closely related to this, MoD rejects the possibility of Electro-Magnetic Interference, yet the RTS has many references to such problems affecting Mk2 systems.

How are the two related? Read the BoI report for evidence that Mk2 pilots often had to switch off SuperTANS to clear EMI problems on ATC frequencies, or make speech on these frequencies intelligible. (Remember the unanswered ATC radio call. The fact someone heard it doesn’t mean the crew knew it had got through. That would come with an acknowledgment, which wasn’t forthcoming). Another distraction caused by a system with known problems; a system described by the RTS as “not yet declared operational”, “accuracy not guaranteed”, “meaningless”. Can no-one see that such a combination of terms, applied to a navigation system in a new Mk of aircraft, MUST raise red flags about design maturity?

“Over reliant”? It seems the only thing you could rely upon was interference when using VHF and dodgy error messages. “Complacent”? That would be MoD, and the lunatic who signed off on such a poor and immature design (or, if he wasn’t told, which is probable, those who withheld this vital information from him).

This child-like and simplistic approach to system integration and safety has been the direct cause of many of the accidents discussed on pprune. To dismiss such evidence out of hand is foolhardy. I don’t know what happened, but no-one here needs to. What I discuss is direct evidence of a possible cause, which introduces doubt. And doubt means the criteria for Gross Negligence has not been met. Yet not a single comment.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Brian Dixon. The one big unknown in all this, is why the crew pressed on instead of following the coast. We shall never know, but I have (many times) offered a perfectly reasonable and logical explanation, which has not been refuted by you or by anyone else. With all due regards, JP

[BOAC]

Brian - I don't think JP saw your questions?

I'll have ago at 'refuting' the logic of his 'explanation'.

1) He seems to accept that they were visual with the coast - good. One foot on board.

2) Unlike the other notable 'mis-ident' around there (the Loganair crash on Islay) their route did NOT require overflight of the landmass.

Thus logic surely suggests that WHICHEVER coastal feature they had seen, it would have shown where the coast was, behind which lies land?

[chinook240]

Can no-one see that such a combination of terms, applied to a navigation system in a new Mk of aircraft, MUST raise red flags about design maturity?

The GPS and RNS 252 were the same ones fitted to the Mk 1 for Op Granby in 1991 and then went into the Boeing factory for the midlife update to become Mk2s. We'd been using that 'design combination' for at least 4 years. Unfortunately, I don't recognise the EMI problems referred to, certainly not switching the 252 off or being unable to use the VHF.

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey,
one big unknown is all that is required to undermine the MoD's position.

The reason I have not refuted your explanation is that, taking into account the limited available evidence, it is just as valid as anything I have put forward. Unfortunately, neither of us can prove with absolutely no doubt whatsoever which one of us is correct (or if we are both wrong).

Now, how about answering my questions?

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Originally Posted by John Purdey

Brian Dixon. The one big unknown in all this, is why the crew pressed on instead of following the coast. We shall never know, but I have (many times) offered a perfectly reasonable and logical explanation, which has not been refuted by you or by anyone else. With all due regards, JP

JP,

I doubt anyone on here questions the logic of your conclusion but can you prove it to us ?

[tucumseh]

The GPS and RNS 252 were the same ones fitted to the Mk 1 for Op Granby in 1991 and then went into the Boeing factory for the midlife update to become Mk2s. We'd been using that 'design combination' for at least 4 years. Unfortunately, I don't recognise the EMI problems referred to, certainly not switching the 252 off or being unable to use the VHF.

Thanks C240. I have quoted witness statements who were very specific about the frequencies affected (and they were used during the last flight). The plot thickens if the Mk1 didn't have the problems. The inference is that the conversion to Mk2 somehow introduced these EMI issues which (to me) narrows down when and by whom they should have been discovered, evaluated and resolved.

The fact the problems existed in the Mk2 was acknowledged even by Wratten, in his verdict (overturn), stating that action was in hand to resolve them. Which begs the question why it wasn't done before. (I'm uncertain if this question was ever asked. Too awkward probably, as it would expose yet more malpractice).


"Resolution" may correctly be a limitation in the RTS, but this particular problem is not mentioned, except in the general sense that performance of the comms and nav kit cannot be guaranteed. That's one hell of a blanket limitation / caveat, and unacceptable.


This, of course, should always be viewed in the wider context, especially Ingram's disingenuous inference that the Mk2 was a new aircraft, not a conversion (and hence legacy problems from a "Mk1" were simply not an issue). He didn't explain in his letter why he disagreed with the rest of MoD on this point, or with the regulations issued by his boss.

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by B Dixon

Now, how about answering my questions?

- i don't expect we will see any answers to yours, or indeed to mine, Brian. The 'SOP' is where a question is too difficult to answer because it might discredit my theory, I will ignore it.

I note also that Baston appears to have found evidence that we have not seen that they did NOT run a 'timed leg' to the Mull.

Again I say - DR/basic airmanship - stopwatch/distance calculation as a back up to all the electronic navigational wizadry would have ensured they did not hit the granite.

I wonder if this evidence could be shared? I wonder where it was found?

[John Purdey]

Chinook

BOAC. Your "Thus logic surely suggests that WHICHEVER coastal feature they had seen, it would have shown where the coast was, behind which lies land?" Absolutely right; but unfortunately the land behind one of the two features (lighthouse, fog station) was something like 300 feet higher than it was behind the other.
Brian Dixon. I have said before, I decline to jump aboard your caroussel. I can quite see that you are anxious to keep the subject afloat, but after SofS had comprehensively turned down your very detailed dossier, I really think you might give it a rest!
With good wishes, and my respect for your tenacity and loyalty to the dead crew,
JP

[BOAC]

Talk about missing the point! I think, Brian, we can take that as 'don't know'= 'sufficient doubt' to your questions and a 'No' to mine. How many do we have to go now?

[tucumseh]

I decline to jump aboard your caroussel.

An interesting choice of word, given the limitations in the RTS concerning the Carousel IV Inertial Navigation System. “The Carousel IV position must not be used for navigation”.

Albeit noting that the RTS at the time of the accident is contradictory, inferring on one hand that the INS is not fitted, then in the same breath saying it is. (Typical of the whole document in fact). The above entry was added just after the accident, presumably as a result of operational experience (as they don’t seem to have bothered with tests and trials). I wonder what experience?



Nice one JP. Good reminder of the lack of attention given to airworthiness detail and fitness for purpose.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

BOAC. Your post not understood- again! Please explain what it is you are trying to tell us about the differing height of the hills behind the coast.

Tucumseh. As to attention to detail, please check on the meanings of infer and imply.

With all good wishes, JP

[bast0n]

BOAC

I note also that Baston appears to have found evidence that we have not seen that they did NOT run a 'timed leg' to the Mull.
Quote:
Again I say - DR/basic airmanship - stopwatch/distance calculation as a back up to all the electronic navigational wizadry would have ensured they did not hit the granite.

I wonder if this evidence could be shared? I wonder where it was found?

I think that it is self evident that had they done the DR correctly they would not have hit the Mull. Of course I have not found evidence that they "did NOT run a timed leg" to the Mull. All I am implying is if they had done so with a modicum of that feeling that old and bold pilots have always had when doing something potentialy dodgy, (creepy feeling inside one's mind), they would have allowed for error on the bright side and never have hit the hill. Turning a few miles/kilometers/yards short has never killed anyone. Ploughing on regardless of ones DR position, relying on good old technology to prove your gut instincts incorrect is not a good idea. Believe me - I have been there, done that - and it was not clever. I was lucky..............

[bast0n]

BOAC

Sorry I missed out 7

7. The BoI reported that spatial disorientation could not be discounted. Air Marshal Day said he spoke to the Board President who stated that spatial disorientation was not a factor. Who is correct - the BoI or AM
Day?

Spatial disorientation,(disorientation I think they mean), is a beastly thing when it happens to you when you are flying. Are you saying that these two highly qualified pilots both suffered from it at the same time and did nothing? Quite how the Board president stated as he did is a bit of a mystery.

[tucumseh]

Tucumseh. As to attention to detail, please check on the meanings of infer and imply.

Thanks as ever JP. Given the accompanying correspondence MoD has provided, I meant both of course. Brevity I'm afraid. It's difficult keeping a straight face when they say one thing, contradict themselves in the same sentence and the next paragraph says something entirely different. And none of it is the truth.

[dalek]

Walter,
Sorry for the delay, I have been away for the weekend.
Wpt D. A position chosen from two grid lines or a precise aiming point? I don't know.
Wpt C. Selected by grid lines, B/D, or L/L? I don't know.
Whether they are an IP to TGT or simply well chosen route turning points, they define a good ( if not precise) run in track to the airfield.
Wpt A. An LZ or a fairly accurate position for the lighthouse? I don't know.
My guests for the weekend included a Tornado Nav and a Puma pilot. They, like me, would have inserted a Waypoint between Belfast and an LZ.
It doesn't make your theory wrong. It just suggests alternatives.
Cazatou,
Lt K inserted an LZ as Wpt A. You know this how?
JT did not know that Lt K had inserted this LZ. You know this how?
They were in the same planning room.
You are a trained TS pilot. Remember Ground School, Low Level Nav Lesson 1.
A LL turning point should be large, unambiguous and have vertical extent.
What fits the bill? Lighthouse or LZ.
Why was Lt K planning when there was a GD Nav present? I don't know. On all of the aircraft I have been on, the Captain / Operating Pilot frequently picked the route, involving the Nav a little further in the planning cycle.