Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Buffhoon was patently reading the script in the House, and it is unlikely that this was *his* wording - his team have long had the 'never give in' strategy mapped out. This is simply one case that having acknowledged by inference that they can only lose, they are simply holding out until their hand is forced.
The statement was in most respects no surprise. We still need to ponder two aspects.
Who has the political clout to superimpose a change of decision upon the MoD. While the HoL are patently on the march on this matter, can they really, in their diminished form, be expected to take HMG on in this issue, given that they have an awful lot more to lose in terms of overall influence if HMG plays hard ball on the HoL reforms? I suspect it would not take a great number of meetings to warn off the HoL although Chalfont of course answers to no one and is highly versed in matters pertaining to Defence.
Secondly, if MoD are holding out, why? Who has most to lose, and what is the background agenda that is being held together with elastoplast which might fall apart through this can of political worms being opened up? Is it Chinook related - Boeing, US relations, etc? Are the yanks involved, and if so by what means? Is it Peace Process related?? Or is it simple old fashioned Staff Officer intransigence?
I still ponder who might have nailed Wratten and Day; I remain of the opinion that they were nobbled. This whole matter smells, and the longer it goes on, the more mysterious the smell becomes.
Whatever, the bell may have gone, but there are plenty of rounds left to fight. Keep it up, guys.
The statement was in most respects no surprise. We still need to ponder two aspects.
Who has the political clout to superimpose a change of decision upon the MoD. While the HoL are patently on the march on this matter, can they really, in their diminished form, be expected to take HMG on in this issue, given that they have an awful lot more to lose in terms of overall influence if HMG plays hard ball on the HoL reforms? I suspect it would not take a great number of meetings to warn off the HoL although Chalfont of course answers to no one and is highly versed in matters pertaining to Defence.
Secondly, if MoD are holding out, why? Who has most to lose, and what is the background agenda that is being held together with elastoplast which might fall apart through this can of political worms being opened up? Is it Chinook related - Boeing, US relations, etc? Are the yanks involved, and if so by what means? Is it Peace Process related?? Or is it simple old fashioned Staff Officer intransigence?
I still ponder who might have nailed Wratten and Day; I remain of the opinion that they were nobbled. This whole matter smells, and the longer it goes on, the more mysterious the smell becomes.
Whatever, the bell may have gone, but there are plenty of rounds left to fight. Keep it up, guys.
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I have heard that Day will be the next CAS. If this is so could parallels be drawn to the lack of will to remove Saddam at the end of the Gulf War ie who would replace him? A bit simplistic I know, but the whole affair reads like some cheap fiction.
My blood is beginning to boil on this one. Nevertheless I am sure that I am nowhere near as disgusted, angry, ashamed and hurt as some folks are about this travesty.
I have added my name to the petition and just sent a communication to my MP demanding to know why his name is not on the EDM 829. I doubt whether he will have the guts to reply - he has ignored me before - but if he does, I'll gladly let you know what his latest excuse is.
I have added my name to the petition and just sent a communication to my MP demanding to know why his name is not on the EDM 829. I doubt whether he will have the guts to reply - he has ignored me before - but if he does, I'll gladly let you know what his latest excuse is.
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It would appear from an article in The Telegraph today that Buff Hoon must be causing more than his fair share of Defence Debacles.
The article refers to the failure of the current service rifle, and the efforts of MOD to prevent its replacement by 'fudging' a new test and report.
Something must be seriously wrong within the MOD establishment when it is considered that all 3 Armed Services now have a major problem on their plate, and the Secretary of State appears to be the nut behind the wheel in all cases.
Army trials of new SA-80 rifle 'were fudged'
By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
(Filed: 26/07/2002)
Trials of the modified SA-80 rifle in Kuwait to test it in the heat and sand of the desert were a sham, say defence sources.
Hessian matting was laid on the ranges to protect the SA-80 A2s and they were taken to the trials in bags.
A team from the Army's Small Arms School carried out "operational" trials in Kuwait, Norway and Belize, to test the weapon's reaction to arctic, jungle and desert conditions, said a senior source yesterday.
The rifle was modified by Heckler & Koch at a cost of Ł92 million after more than a decade of reports on its failings, most notably in the Gulf War. But it reacted badly to the fine sand and heat in Afghanistan. Royal Marines using it in combat reported stoppages and magazine failures.
A more realistic test by a company of marines for an investigation team sent to Afghanistan led to problems with 30 per cent of the rifles.
The Liberal Democrats will call today for the weapon to be replaced, but senior Army officers and MoD officials are continuing to say the problems were caused by marines not cleaning the rifle properly. Some officers have suggested that the marines deliberately caused the difficulties because they believed they should be treated as special forces and given the G36 rifle used by the SAS.
Paul Keetch, Liberal Democrat spokesman, dismissed this in a letter to Geoff Hoon, Defence Secretary. "It is no good blaming soldiers for inadequate maintenance of the SA-80 when field tests have been fudged.
"For British soldiers to be deployed with a weapon that has operated below par for over a decade is scandalous. The Ł92 million upgrade appears to have done little to improve confidence. The SA-80 is fatally flawed. It must be replaced."
The suggestions that the Royal Marines were to blame was also dismissed by a former Parachute Regiment officer who said the weapon was "an unmitigated disaster". The former officer, who was serving when the weapon was introduced, said: "The first time I had concerns was when the magazine fell out on to my boots on exercise."
The problem, which remains, was typical of the weapon, which worked well in ideal conditions on the range, but did not pass the army's main requirement of any piece of equipment that it should be "squaddy-proof".
He said: "The weapon is not robust enough. The right signals are not getting through to the decision makers."
The MoD said the initial findings of the investigation team had been given to ministers but assessments were continuing.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...26/ixhome.html
The article refers to the failure of the current service rifle, and the efforts of MOD to prevent its replacement by 'fudging' a new test and report.
Something must be seriously wrong within the MOD establishment when it is considered that all 3 Armed Services now have a major problem on their plate, and the Secretary of State appears to be the nut behind the wheel in all cases.
Army trials of new SA-80 rifle 'were fudged'
By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
(Filed: 26/07/2002)
Trials of the modified SA-80 rifle in Kuwait to test it in the heat and sand of the desert were a sham, say defence sources.
Hessian matting was laid on the ranges to protect the SA-80 A2s and they were taken to the trials in bags.
A team from the Army's Small Arms School carried out "operational" trials in Kuwait, Norway and Belize, to test the weapon's reaction to arctic, jungle and desert conditions, said a senior source yesterday.
The rifle was modified by Heckler & Koch at a cost of Ł92 million after more than a decade of reports on its failings, most notably in the Gulf War. But it reacted badly to the fine sand and heat in Afghanistan. Royal Marines using it in combat reported stoppages and magazine failures.
A more realistic test by a company of marines for an investigation team sent to Afghanistan led to problems with 30 per cent of the rifles.
The Liberal Democrats will call today for the weapon to be replaced, but senior Army officers and MoD officials are continuing to say the problems were caused by marines not cleaning the rifle properly. Some officers have suggested that the marines deliberately caused the difficulties because they believed they should be treated as special forces and given the G36 rifle used by the SAS.
Paul Keetch, Liberal Democrat spokesman, dismissed this in a letter to Geoff Hoon, Defence Secretary. "It is no good blaming soldiers for inadequate maintenance of the SA-80 when field tests have been fudged.
"For British soldiers to be deployed with a weapon that has operated below par for over a decade is scandalous. The Ł92 million upgrade appears to have done little to improve confidence. The SA-80 is fatally flawed. It must be replaced."
The suggestions that the Royal Marines were to blame was also dismissed by a former Parachute Regiment officer who said the weapon was "an unmitigated disaster". The former officer, who was serving when the weapon was introduced, said: "The first time I had concerns was when the magazine fell out on to my boots on exercise."
The problem, which remains, was typical of the weapon, which worked well in ideal conditions on the range, but did not pass the army's main requirement of any piece of equipment that it should be "squaddy-proof".
He said: "The weapon is not robust enough. The right signals are not getting through to the decision makers."
The MoD said the initial findings of the investigation team had been given to ministers but assessments were continuing.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...26/ixhome.html
So how accurate is SuperTANS in any case? Do we know what present position was actually displayed to the crew at the time of the accident? In Hoon’s ‘last 20 seconds’?
According to the RAF’s own AP 3456, the TANS computer uses inputs of TAS, heading (from the compass system), drift, along and across heading velocity and vertical velocity (from the Doppler) and manually entered start and waypoint positions, wind velocity, magnetic variation and time to calculate and display present position, continuously predicted steering information from present position direct to a previously inserted waypoint, sensor input values and computed navigation variables, e.g. heading, track and wind velocity. The computer will normally operate using Doppler inputs, however should these fail, navigation calculations will continue using air data information together with the last stored, or manually inserted, value of wind velocity.
More importantly, “The TANS computer has a 6 nm/hr error growth rate when fed by Doppler inputs, and 20 nm/hr in the Air Data System (ADS) mode”
Is it possible then, that in the 18 minutes journey time of this fateful flight (0.3 hours) the TANS would perhaps have indicated to the crew that they were between 1.8 and 6 (0.3 x 6nm to 0.3 x 20nm) miles from where they actually were? Ironically a flight on 13 July 1995 (as recorded in Hansard 19 Mar 2002, column 241) by a similar Chinook Mk 2 tasked with overflying the memorial to Jonathan Tapper displayed an error of.......2 nautical miles. Precisely the accuracy stated in the RAF’s own Manual of Flying. So when encountering what they thought was a patch of mist or low cloud at least some 1.8 to 6 miles off-shore, the crew perhaps elected to press through it rather than climb up into the known icing conditions for which the aircraft wasn’t cleared - thinking that they were at least 45 seconds away from the Mull? Tight indeed - but after a few seconds might they then have realised that they weren’t where their navigation system told them that they were and attempted - albeit too late - to abort from low level? An error of judgement, perhaps, but certainly not ‘gross negligence’? We will never know - because their Chinook didn’t have a CVR or FDR. Even when used for the Public Transport of government employees.....
Is this plausible - or can it be ruled out with ‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’?
According to the RAF’s own AP 3456, the TANS computer uses inputs of TAS, heading (from the compass system), drift, along and across heading velocity and vertical velocity (from the Doppler) and manually entered start and waypoint positions, wind velocity, magnetic variation and time to calculate and display present position, continuously predicted steering information from present position direct to a previously inserted waypoint, sensor input values and computed navigation variables, e.g. heading, track and wind velocity. The computer will normally operate using Doppler inputs, however should these fail, navigation calculations will continue using air data information together with the last stored, or manually inserted, value of wind velocity.
More importantly, “The TANS computer has a 6 nm/hr error growth rate when fed by Doppler inputs, and 20 nm/hr in the Air Data System (ADS) mode”
Is it possible then, that in the 18 minutes journey time of this fateful flight (0.3 hours) the TANS would perhaps have indicated to the crew that they were between 1.8 and 6 (0.3 x 6nm to 0.3 x 20nm) miles from where they actually were? Ironically a flight on 13 July 1995 (as recorded in Hansard 19 Mar 2002, column 241) by a similar Chinook Mk 2 tasked with overflying the memorial to Jonathan Tapper displayed an error of.......2 nautical miles. Precisely the accuracy stated in the RAF’s own Manual of Flying. So when encountering what they thought was a patch of mist or low cloud at least some 1.8 to 6 miles off-shore, the crew perhaps elected to press through it rather than climb up into the known icing conditions for which the aircraft wasn’t cleared - thinking that they were at least 45 seconds away from the Mull? Tight indeed - but after a few seconds might they then have realised that they weren’t where their navigation system told them that they were and attempted - albeit too late - to abort from low level? An error of judgement, perhaps, but certainly not ‘gross negligence’? We will never know - because their Chinook didn’t have a CVR or FDR. Even when used for the Public Transport of government employees.....
Is this plausible - or can it be ruled out with ‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’?
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Beags
There is no proof that JT or the rest of the crew could not see the coast at this so important (apparently) 20 sec to run. I seem to remember both Day and Wratton looking down and shuffling their feet when the HoL select committee started to quiz them on this very point.
Although there are witnesses on the Mull to say they could not see out to sea, there were only four witnesses to say what was visible from the height and distance of the aircraft at twenty seconds to run. IF the crew were visual with the coastline* what stands of the Day/Wratton argument? Nothing, absolutely nothing.
*This is not impossible by any means. If one considers the cloud to be associated with the geography of the Mull of Kintyre then you will realise that it would be possible to sit anywhere between the lighthouse and the summit in cloud yet be clear of cloud and in sight of the coast at 10 to 10 000 feet amsl and 0.1 to 10 miles out from the coast.
There is no proof that JT or the rest of the crew could not see the coast at this so important (apparently) 20 sec to run. I seem to remember both Day and Wratton looking down and shuffling their feet when the HoL select committee started to quiz them on this very point.
Although there are witnesses on the Mull to say they could not see out to sea, there were only four witnesses to say what was visible from the height and distance of the aircraft at twenty seconds to run. IF the crew were visual with the coastline* what stands of the Day/Wratton argument? Nothing, absolutely nothing.
*This is not impossible by any means. If one considers the cloud to be associated with the geography of the Mull of Kintyre then you will realise that it would be possible to sit anywhere between the lighthouse and the summit in cloud yet be clear of cloud and in sight of the coast at 10 to 10 000 feet amsl and 0.1 to 10 miles out from the coast.
Well said OIS.
I have been champing at the bit waiting for someone more qualified than me to point out this obvious ommission from Hoon's statement.
There is strong evidence from the yachtsman that the pilots could see the bottom of the Mull and would probably have assumed that the top was strongly attached to it.
We are only certain that the actual top of the Mull was in cloud. We do not know how far that cloud extended seawards from the Mull. Hoon's statement (Wratten's & Day's) is therefore a dishonest presentation of the facts we do know, and is a typical "spun" version we are accustomed to hearing from this goverment.
I have been champing at the bit waiting for someone more qualified than me to point out this obvious ommission from Hoon's statement.
There is strong evidence from the yachtsman that the pilots could see the bottom of the Mull and would probably have assumed that the top was strongly attached to it.
We are only certain that the actual top of the Mull was in cloud. We do not know how far that cloud extended seawards from the Mull. Hoon's statement (Wratten's & Day's) is therefore a dishonest presentation of the facts we do know, and is a typical "spun" version we are accustomed to hearing from this goverment.
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Reheat on, A few years ago I watched a program suggesting that Churchill "engineered" a plane crash which killed a senior Polish leader in exile. He is supposed to have done it at the request of comrade Stalin. In 1994 more than a score of top anti IRA men die in similar circumstances and within a year the IRA are in ceasefire. Of course Governments nowadays are above such appalling behavior. They are thoroughly honest, truthful, and loyal to all their citizens
Thanks for your info, HPT.
Has it been postively determined that the GPS element was serviceable and providing stable inputs? Does the GPS element of SuperTANS include a military Y-code receiver - and were the appropriate cryptovariables loaded? Or does it rely purely on C/A codes? Was the last known position displayed to the crew obtained from the remains of the SuperTANS recovered from the site?
Has it been postively determined that the GPS element was serviceable and providing stable inputs? Does the GPS element of SuperTANS include a military Y-code receiver - and were the appropriate cryptovariables loaded? Or does it rely purely on C/A codes? Was the last known position displayed to the crew obtained from the remains of the SuperTANS recovered from the site?
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GPS Aspects
I used the same TANS at the time of the accident, and it did on occasion go walkabout, in my experience up to 6NM.
Dont throw the bad numbers in, bad info out argument my way because I checked and double checked and it seemed to happen in the same part of the country on differant days. Leicestershire of all places not too far from the Daventry Antenae.
Another aspect is that the Chinook was probably set up for the Irish National Grid whilst crossing to the the land of British National Grid, and an input error could have arisen, unless as is probably (usually) the case, the crew were using Lat & Long.
For local knowledge, I believe that one of the crewmembers was brought up on the Mull, as I met and spoke to his brother @ Macrihanish once (after the accident). I wonder what wiggly amps were at Macrihanish that nobody will own up to.
It is because of my lack of faith in the Nav kit at that time that I signed the petition, running the gauntlet of the Senior Officers wrath. With photocopied FRCs the MOD must be pooing themselves about an eventual fair outcome, and the litigation that is bound to follow.
We must all remember that to compare the GPS of 2002 to that available in 1994 is a big error of judgement.
Dont throw the bad numbers in, bad info out argument my way because I checked and double checked and it seemed to happen in the same part of the country on differant days. Leicestershire of all places not too far from the Daventry Antenae.
Another aspect is that the Chinook was probably set up for the Irish National Grid whilst crossing to the the land of British National Grid, and an input error could have arisen, unless as is probably (usually) the case, the crew were using Lat & Long.
For local knowledge, I believe that one of the crewmembers was brought up on the Mull, as I met and spoke to his brother @ Macrihanish once (after the accident). I wonder what wiggly amps were at Macrihanish that nobody will own up to.
It is because of my lack of faith in the Nav kit at that time that I signed the petition, running the gauntlet of the Senior Officers wrath. With photocopied FRCs the MOD must be pooing themselves about an eventual fair outcome, and the litigation that is bound to follow.
We must all remember that to compare the GPS of 2002 to that available in 1994 is a big error of judgement.
Quite so mate.
Was the SuperTANS GPS a Y-code device at the time? Or did it rely on the same C/A GPS satellites as any civil non-IFR approved GPS did at the time? Remember that SA hadn't been disabled back then......
Personally I reckon that it's highly likely that the crew believed they were further away from the landmass than in fact they were due to cumulative navigation system errors.
Was the SuperTANS GPS a Y-code device at the time? Or did it rely on the same C/A GPS satellites as any civil non-IFR approved GPS did at the time? Remember that SA hadn't been disabled back then......
Personally I reckon that it's highly likely that the crew believed they were further away from the landmass than in fact they were due to cumulative navigation system errors.
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Helicopters are flown looking out of the window. When a support helicopter goes IMC it is a major event, which is not undertaken lightly. You go IMC early ie when there is nothing much to see out of the window, or turn around. It is as simple as that. Both of these were options for the (four man) crew of ZD576. Day and Wratton sell this as if they were travelling at light speed. It was a Chinook helicopter, not TSR2.
I’m afraid that I see all this speculation about accuracy of the 252 (‘supertans’) as so much froth. The manufacturer stated that any info obtained from the wreckage would be unreliable yet the MOD or, closer to home, the RAF managed to find an ‘expert’ who could state not only what the crew were being shown but, of far greater importance WHAT THE FINAL FLIGHT PATH was of ZD576. Remember this is using information the manufacturer of the kit says is unreliable.
The whole situation is arse. The MOD, Day and Wratton know this to be so and yet they are so far up their own ego’s that they probably do think that they are taking the difficult, but necessary, line to further the cause of the RAF.
Knobs!
I’m afraid that I see all this speculation about accuracy of the 252 (‘supertans’) as so much froth. The manufacturer stated that any info obtained from the wreckage would be unreliable yet the MOD or, closer to home, the RAF managed to find an ‘expert’ who could state not only what the crew were being shown but, of far greater importance WHAT THE FINAL FLIGHT PATH was of ZD576. Remember this is using information the manufacturer of the kit says is unreliable.
The whole situation is arse. The MOD, Day and Wratton know this to be so and yet they are so far up their own ego’s that they probably do think that they are taking the difficult, but necessary, line to further the cause of the RAF.
Knobs!
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Whilst Oh I See is correct in his initial comment regarding heli and VMC flight, once an IMC abort is completed, and especially in that part of the world, reliance is placed upon the GPS to provide a SAFE HEADING. Which clearly did not happen.
You can rarely get a radar service from Scottish Mil between NI and Scotland below 2000`, and Macrihanish was closed. Which takes us back to the only onside navaid available and its accuracy or not therein.
You can rarely get a radar service from Scottish Mil between NI and Scotland below 2000`, and Macrihanish was closed. Which takes us back to the only onside navaid available and its accuracy or not therein.
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Beags
The supertans fitted at the time of the accident worked off the C/A codes only. I too have had spurious GPS readings whilst operating in NI of 300NM!!
Oh I See
I don't agree that going IMC in SH is a major event. Perhaps I misunderstand what you mean.
Try giving yourself an engine run-up with a couple of miles to run to coast in next time you are in the Chinook Sim. Put the weight at about 17-18 tonnes and a low-cloudbase with you VMC below.
Unsurprisingly you will find that you enter cloud as you pull pitch to contain the NR; the nose drops and the speed increases and before you know it, the slow rate of climb achieved, combined with high closure rate equal disaster. Now bring the disorientating effect of very high vibration levels due to increased NR into the equation!
HPT
The supertans fitted at the time of the accident worked off the C/A codes only. I too have had spurious GPS readings whilst operating in NI of 300NM!!
Oh I See
I don't agree that going IMC in SH is a major event. Perhaps I misunderstand what you mean.
Try giving yourself an engine run-up with a couple of miles to run to coast in next time you are in the Chinook Sim. Put the weight at about 17-18 tonnes and a low-cloudbase with you VMC below.
Unsurprisingly you will find that you enter cloud as you pull pitch to contain the NR; the nose drops and the speed increases and before you know it, the slow rate of climb achieved, combined with high closure rate equal disaster. Now bring the disorientating effect of very high vibration levels due to increased NR into the equation!
HPT
Last edited by Hydraulic Palm Tree; 28th Jul 2002 at 07:06.
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Yozzer
The thrust of your argument appears to be that an IMC abort had been flown with sole reliance to the 252. This is not only unrealistic it also adds weight to the single point scoring arguments of the MOD.
HPT
Apologies, probably my poor use of englese! I was trying to explain that an IMC abort is not carried out every day and that when approaching weather likely to require such action it is discussed within the crew beforehand. Remember this was a straight and level transit over water, not whistling around the bend of a valley.
Your final two paragraphs sum up what, IMHO, probably occurred to ZD576.
The thrust of your argument appears to be that an IMC abort had been flown with sole reliance to the 252. This is not only unrealistic it also adds weight to the single point scoring arguments of the MOD.
HPT
Apologies, probably my poor use of englese! I was trying to explain that an IMC abort is not carried out every day and that when approaching weather likely to require such action it is discussed within the crew beforehand. Remember this was a straight and level transit over water, not whistling around the bend of a valley.
Your final two paragraphs sum up what, IMHO, probably occurred to ZD576.
Avoid imitations
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Never forget this:
New MK2 aircraft well behind schedule in coming into service. Old MK1 Chinook airframes being withdrawn from service and being rebuilt as new aircraft. General shortage of Chinook helicopters resulting.
Test flying and documentation of new type incomplete. Generic random, unexplained engine control excursions to high power, causing overspeeding of rotor system and resulting in destruction on the ground of another airframe of new type. Engine computer software problems. Old / obsolescent software language, now difficult to find and rectify problems. MOD suing aircraft manufacturer. MOD's own test pilots refuse to fly aircraft any more, even for a ten minute flight to return test airframe to main Chinook base for maintenance.
Airframe shortage looking critical. General loss of face and frustration perceived by RAF hierarchy. Aircraft type cannot be released for service in normal way but MOD give limited release to ease aircraft shortage.
25 highly valued personnel from same anti-terrorist department required to go to meeting on mainland. No available aircraft except one of previously mentioned new type. Airframe has, in addition to generic problems, previous recent report of navigation system errors, no fault found. Marginal weather forecast, especially in view of aircraft's limited release to fly. Further frustration to hierarchy, too much loss of face already. Crew protest, don't want to take the new aircraft, not happy to fly it but carry out flight as required.
Tragic accident occurs to aircraft en route, all occupants deceased. No conclusive evidence of cause found by RAF inquiry team but evidence of possible crew intercom failure in wreckage. RAF hierarchy over-rule findings of President of Board of Inquiry team and criticise him as too inexperienced and lacking strength of character to form correct opinion, despite ordering previous appointment as President. Ignore evidence of witness to weather conditions at time of accident.
Deceased crew given blame, all other problems swept under carpet. MOD off hook, involved senior officer promoted. Won't change stance until forced. No further loss of face tolerated.
That's it so far. The question now remains: Does a system exist to oblige MOD to change stance? 
New MK2 aircraft well behind schedule in coming into service. Old MK1 Chinook airframes being withdrawn from service and being rebuilt as new aircraft. General shortage of Chinook helicopters resulting.
Test flying and documentation of new type incomplete. Generic random, unexplained engine control excursions to high power, causing overspeeding of rotor system and resulting in destruction on the ground of another airframe of new type. Engine computer software problems. Old / obsolescent software language, now difficult to find and rectify problems. MOD suing aircraft manufacturer. MOD's own test pilots refuse to fly aircraft any more, even for a ten minute flight to return test airframe to main Chinook base for maintenance.
Airframe shortage looking critical. General loss of face and frustration perceived by RAF hierarchy. Aircraft type cannot be released for service in normal way but MOD give limited release to ease aircraft shortage.
25 highly valued personnel from same anti-terrorist department required to go to meeting on mainland. No available aircraft except one of previously mentioned new type. Airframe has, in addition to generic problems, previous recent report of navigation system errors, no fault found. Marginal weather forecast, especially in view of aircraft's limited release to fly. Further frustration to hierarchy, too much loss of face already. Crew protest, don't want to take the new aircraft, not happy to fly it but carry out flight as required.
Tragic accident occurs to aircraft en route, all occupants deceased. No conclusive evidence of cause found by RAF inquiry team but evidence of possible crew intercom failure in wreckage. RAF hierarchy over-rule findings of President of Board of Inquiry team and criticise him as too inexperienced and lacking strength of character to form correct opinion, despite ordering previous appointment as President. Ignore evidence of witness to weather conditions at time of accident.
Deceased crew given blame, all other problems swept under carpet. MOD off hook, involved senior officer promoted. Won't change stance until forced. No further loss of face tolerated.
That's it so far. The question now remains: Does a system exist to oblige MOD to change stance?
My thanks to David Cameron MP for having sent me a copy of Hansard for 22 Jul 02 and for his courteous letter in which he has also promised to pose certain questions to Buff.
Bernard Jenkins' response is succinct and accurate. He demolishes Hoon's ridiculous position; e.g.
"May I refer briefly to the SoS' own statement today? At one point he said:
"This evidence at the crash site also indicates that the aircraft was almost certainly responding properly to its controls, at least in the final seconds before impact"
I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that "almost certainly" is not "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". He then went on to say:
"These, then are the facts".
I put it to him that these are not the facts.
Nothing in BuffHoon's utterance in the House changes the level of doubt surrounding this accident.
Bernard Jenkins' response is succinct and accurate. He demolishes Hoon's ridiculous position; e.g.
"May I refer briefly to the SoS' own statement today? At one point he said:
"This evidence at the crash site also indicates that the aircraft was almost certainly responding properly to its controls, at least in the final seconds before impact"
I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that "almost certainly" is not "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". He then went on to say:
"These, then are the facts".
I put it to him that these are not the facts.
Nothing in BuffHoon's utterance in the House changes the level of doubt surrounding this accident.