Duncs
Are you insinuating that it is only MPA that had airworthiness 'bypassed', and that all other fleets are squeaky clean?
No, and apologies if you got that impression.
The airworthiness failings are systemic, the main reason being core elements were centralised services within MoD, meaning that if a given element was cancelled to save money, then all aircraft/equipments suffered, not just one. This is not a case of putting all eggs in one basket. Specially trained staffs managed these core services and their funding was ring-fenced.
It was the 1991 policy by AMSO (RAF Chief Engineer), the final part implemented in June 1993, that (a) un-ring-fenced this funding and (b) made airworthiness subject to proportional cuts when most of the services are not volume related. For example, regardless of aircraft numbers, you need a Safety Case. Three consecutive 28% cuts in direct airworthiness funding says it all.
Put another way, the Nimrod Integrated Project Team was not wholly responsible for the poor Safety Case; and nor is any aircraft office. That it was in such a poor state was actually mandated policy. Not an unforeseen result of a poor policy, but predicted and ignored, with disciplinary action taken against those who insisted on the aircraft being safe. The dead giveaway is that Gp Capt George Baber, NIPTL, had to let a Safety Case task. Haddon-Cave criticised the way the task was conducted, but conveniently ignored the fact that Baber should not have had to let the task – he should have inherited a seamless contract and a robust Safety Case.
This formed (or didn’t, as the case may be) a crucial part of the MRA4 audit trail. Having accepted Haddon-Cave’s confirmation of the root problem (savings at the expense of safety), MoD had little choice but to insist on implementing the regs on MRA4 – something that had not been policy since 1991. Regression became too difficult, not least because Haddon-Cave had protected the perpetrators by saying the problems only commenced in 1998. This suited certain VSOs as it was used to blame General Cowan and others, but it meant that the MRA4 IPTL would (a) have to admit he taken his eye off the airworthiness ball and (b) have to seek funding to regress to, at least, 1991; if not the 1968 baseline set by the Coroner. Doing so would expose Haddon-Cave and the VSOs.
The above is what links almost every accident discussed here.