Nimrod MRA.4
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Beans, you mean I have been buying Coke a Cola to hopefully get a bit of a Nimrod, and you are telling me they went into beans!!!!
Sounds like the Phantom, it all sounds like piss poor procurement and handling in the initial contracting phase, and follow on management, you cannot totally lay the blame at the manufacturer
Heat, fuel and ignition source in the same zone without a fire detection system and means to put it out - that was a worry
Last edited by NutLoose; 5th Jun 2012 at 22:07.
In answer to my critics today I thought I would spell it out what is covering the loss of Nimrod:
Civvy Assets
AgustaWestland AW 139 x3 Search & Rescue CHC
Britten-Norman BN-2A-26 Islander x1 Surveillance AAT
Cessna 404 Titan II x1 Pollution Patrol AAT
Cessna F406 Caravan II x1/1 Pollution Patrol/Spraying AAT
Lockheed L-188 Electra x2 Pollution Spraying AAT
Sikorsky S-92 x4 Search & Rescue CHC
Dornier 228 x2 DEFRA/Cobham :speed ~170kts and ~800nm range
BN Islander x2 DEFRA/Cobham :speed ~140kts and ~600nm range
Cessna F406 x2 DEFRA/Direct Flight :speed ~200kts and ~800nm range
RNLI various
Mil Assets
Royal Navy
Lynx HMA8 flies from Type 23, 42 and 45 :speed ~160kts and ~320nm range (no SONAR capability)
Merlin HM1 flies from Type 23 and Type 45:speed ~150kts and ~450nm range
Sea King HAS6 flies from the Assault Ships ILLUSTRIOUS, OCEAN, ALBION and BULWARK :speed ~120kts and ~400nm range
Type 23 speed ~28kts and ~7,000nm range
Type 42 speed ~30kts and ~4,000nm range
Type 45 speed ~30kts and ~7,000nm range
Assault Ships speed ~25kts and ~5,000nm range
Royal Air Force
C-130 Hercules with a 12-man dinghy :speed ~300kts TAS and ~2,200nm range
Chinook HC2 :speed ~150kts and range ~320nm range
Sea King HAR3 :speed ~120kts and ~320nm range
So now that the Maritime "Top Trumps" lesson is over, there are lots of possibilities. Firstly, inside territorial waters the survivors would probably be swamped with assets! However, I agree that at 300nm range it might be a bit more tricky, but the following could work:
1. ARCC get a SARSAT hit from ship/survivors in distress (a few minutes).
2. Direct any air asset to search area (DEFRA/Coastguard, QRA/TANSOR or others).
2. Launch National Standby Herc with a 12-man dinghy (would take an hour to arrive on scene plus standby time).
3. Direct DD/FF or helo-capable RFA to area and when in range launch Merlin HM1 (or Lynx?) to scene (3hrs steaming time is 90nm, then helo goes to area at 150kts and arrives 1hr 20mins later - don't forget that ship is steaming to area at 30kts so that increases the endurance of the helo on task).
4. Send the shore based helos to the DD/FF to pick up survivors when in range.
Yes, it's untidy, but at least we have some options. Furthermore, most vessels these days have decent liferafts and SARSAT capable beacons which makes the job easier.
For the other tasks that Nimrod recently undertook:
Overland Surveillance is covered with better assets (no need to use a noisy jet with a crew of 12 to support an unarmed MX-15 for less than 4 hours these days!).
FJ Trails are covered by other nations that have MPA, using Southern routes that are more survivable in a 1-man dinghy with decent SAR beacon (I wasn't ever that convinced what the Nimrod would do for me if I went for a swim mid-Atlantic anyway!).
Protecting the sub fleet. Well, I can remember countless days that there were no Nimrods available for this task when we had them in service. The Senior Service coped and I guess they are now. There are also other means at their disposal to help.
All said, I agree we should have a UK LRMPA, but we squandered our cash on a "white elephant" that never should have been ever considered; we, the military and the company that was trying to produce it only have ourselves to blame for that. Will their be a LRMPA in the future? I hope so, IF we can afford it without loss of capability elsewhere.
LJ
Civvy Assets
AgustaWestland AW 139 x3 Search & Rescue CHC
Britten-Norman BN-2A-26 Islander x1 Surveillance AAT
Cessna 404 Titan II x1 Pollution Patrol AAT
Cessna F406 Caravan II x1/1 Pollution Patrol/Spraying AAT
Lockheed L-188 Electra x2 Pollution Spraying AAT
Sikorsky S-92 x4 Search & Rescue CHC
Dornier 228 x2 DEFRA/Cobham :speed ~170kts and ~800nm range
BN Islander x2 DEFRA/Cobham :speed ~140kts and ~600nm range
Cessna F406 x2 DEFRA/Direct Flight :speed ~200kts and ~800nm range
RNLI various
Mil Assets
Royal Navy
Lynx HMA8 flies from Type 23, 42 and 45 :speed ~160kts and ~320nm range (no SONAR capability)
Merlin HM1 flies from Type 23 and Type 45:speed ~150kts and ~450nm range
Sea King HAS6 flies from the Assault Ships ILLUSTRIOUS, OCEAN, ALBION and BULWARK :speed ~120kts and ~400nm range
Type 23 speed ~28kts and ~7,000nm range
Type 42 speed ~30kts and ~4,000nm range
Type 45 speed ~30kts and ~7,000nm range
Assault Ships speed ~25kts and ~5,000nm range
Royal Air Force
C-130 Hercules with a 12-man dinghy :speed ~300kts TAS and ~2,200nm range
Chinook HC2 :speed ~150kts and range ~320nm range
Sea King HAR3 :speed ~120kts and ~320nm range
So now that the Maritime "Top Trumps" lesson is over, there are lots of possibilities. Firstly, inside territorial waters the survivors would probably be swamped with assets! However, I agree that at 300nm range it might be a bit more tricky, but the following could work:
1. ARCC get a SARSAT hit from ship/survivors in distress (a few minutes).
2. Direct any air asset to search area (DEFRA/Coastguard, QRA/TANSOR or others).
2. Launch National Standby Herc with a 12-man dinghy (would take an hour to arrive on scene plus standby time).
3. Direct DD/FF or helo-capable RFA to area and when in range launch Merlin HM1 (or Lynx?) to scene (3hrs steaming time is 90nm, then helo goes to area at 150kts and arrives 1hr 20mins later - don't forget that ship is steaming to area at 30kts so that increases the endurance of the helo on task).
4. Send the shore based helos to the DD/FF to pick up survivors when in range.
Yes, it's untidy, but at least we have some options. Furthermore, most vessels these days have decent liferafts and SARSAT capable beacons which makes the job easier.
For the other tasks that Nimrod recently undertook:
Overland Surveillance is covered with better assets (no need to use a noisy jet with a crew of 12 to support an unarmed MX-15 for less than 4 hours these days!).
FJ Trails are covered by other nations that have MPA, using Southern routes that are more survivable in a 1-man dinghy with decent SAR beacon (I wasn't ever that convinced what the Nimrod would do for me if I went for a swim mid-Atlantic anyway!).
Protecting the sub fleet. Well, I can remember countless days that there were no Nimrods available for this task when we had them in service. The Senior Service coped and I guess they are now. There are also other means at their disposal to help.
All said, I agree we should have a UK LRMPA, but we squandered our cash on a "white elephant" that never should have been ever considered; we, the military and the company that was trying to produce it only have ourselves to blame for that. Will their be a LRMPA in the future? I hope so, IF we can afford it without loss of capability elsewhere.
LJ
LJ , just remind me how long it took the RN to get to the Moray Firth when those Pesky Ruskies and their battle group decided to take shelter from the weather
If they were in the Moray Firth then I don't need a MPA to watch them "Pesky Ruskies" - I can use a frickin' telescope!
LJ
Dear collegue,
I just happened to find your remark about that ferry pilot who owes his life to the crew of a Royal Airforce Nimrod just about 20 years ago.
Reading your words remind me of the endless hours on the flight deck of a nice airplane I ferried from North Dakota to Istanbul and in which I was sure to leave the party after getting struck by lightning in FL 250.
The only radio that had been switched off when I touched the outskirts of that CB gave me the opportunity to make a relay to an airliner crossing 52 North 35 West to pass him my home phone number to say goodbye to my wife in Frankfurt. I was just out there without any nav equipment and two knocked out GPS receivers. I was aware of the fact that I had no chance at all.
Then a Nimrod was scrambled in Kinloss to look out for me and finally found me 200 miles north of my calculated course and guided me safely to Shannon.
You are perfectly right to say that it was the Nimrod crew that saved me.
After the incident I continued to work as a doctor and of course also worked in England as a GP. My English patients never guessed why this doctor was so charming and helpful. He never forgot that it was a Royal Airforce Nimrod that saved his life years ago. I never forgot this. A picture of the Nimrod is in my office, all of the crew have signed it. And althogh I don't know any of them exept the Commander I met in Kinloss weeks later, I do know that without them I'd be just one of many nameless ferry pilots who dindn't make it.
Kind regards
Werner Soehlmann M.D.
I just happened to find your remark about that ferry pilot who owes his life to the crew of a Royal Airforce Nimrod just about 20 years ago.
Reading your words remind me of the endless hours on the flight deck of a nice airplane I ferried from North Dakota to Istanbul and in which I was sure to leave the party after getting struck by lightning in FL 250.
The only radio that had been switched off when I touched the outskirts of that CB gave me the opportunity to make a relay to an airliner crossing 52 North 35 West to pass him my home phone number to say goodbye to my wife in Frankfurt. I was just out there without any nav equipment and two knocked out GPS receivers. I was aware of the fact that I had no chance at all.
Then a Nimrod was scrambled in Kinloss to look out for me and finally found me 200 miles north of my calculated course and guided me safely to Shannon.
You are perfectly right to say that it was the Nimrod crew that saved me.
After the incident I continued to work as a doctor and of course also worked in England as a GP. My English patients never guessed why this doctor was so charming and helpful. He never forgot that it was a Royal Airforce Nimrod that saved his life years ago. I never forgot this. A picture of the Nimrod is in my office, all of the crew have signed it. And althogh I don't know any of them exept the Commander I met in Kinloss weeks later, I do know that without them I'd be just one of many nameless ferry pilots who dindn't make it.
Kind regards
Werner Soehlmann M.D.
Regarding Post #1795 (see above). Yes, a cracking job but it doesn't need to be Nimrod specific. An E-3 AWACS could have found him and the QRA/TANSOR combo would be with him within the same reaction time as the Nimrod.
Please, don't take it that I am maligning the excellent job done by the Nimrod and its crew in this instance - I am not. They did a superb job
. It's just that saving ferry pilots is not the sole "bread and butter" of MPAs.LJ
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Go reread 1813 and1814, I was referring to the aircraft listed, and your saying the navy boats could do the job, yes the E-3 may well do it, but if he ditched can they drop liferafts? nor are they on the mpa list of aerial assets.
Leon and Ralph, thanks for that confirmation.
ratty
But if the people who caused this bean can stockpile are still working in MoD, who's to say they won't try to rebuild it when the pile eventually depletes?
ratty
They are tins of beans now, pop into your local tesco and admire them there. Let it go.
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By the way, the seagull that flew into the bomb bay whilst it was open and managed to bypass the stores - we always carried an ASR set whilst on patrol (even when armed) - in order to carry out any damage would have to be very clever. It was almost inconceiveable that it could happen. AFAIK, there was never a bird strike in either the MR1 or MR2. And I'd be most surprised if any other ac with a bomb bay ever had a bird strike inside the BB.
Whilst it was a single point of failure, the likelihood of it happeneing was minimal. I suspect tolerable and ALARP.
Duncs
Whilst it was a single point of failure, the likelihood of it happeneing was minimal. I suspect tolerable and ALARP.
Duncs
Last edited by Duncan D'Sorderlee; 6th Jun 2012 at 20:57.
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Betts
Unfortunately there will always be those that 'heard' about the 'problems' on the MRA4, do not have the full information, but report it as fact on these forums. I have long since given up trying to correct 'incomplete' information and am now much happier for it.
For those of us who know exactly what the score was, we will just have to live with the short-sighted nature of the cancellation for years to come.
Enjoy flying a LRMPA again!
Duncs - did you copy some of my work....
Unfortunately there will always be those that 'heard' about the 'problems' on the MRA4, do not have the full information, but report it as fact on these forums. I have long since given up trying to correct 'incomplete' information and am now much happier for it.
For those of us who know exactly what the score was, we will just have to live with the short-sighted nature of the cancellation for years to come.
Enjoy flying a LRMPA again!
Duncs - did you copy some of my work....
ALARP and tolerable ^^^^^^^^^
Look what happened to the last big risk we took on the Nimrod with the AAR system...
You can't have it both ways, we either do it safely on new aircraft or we don't bother these days
The B Word
Look what happened to the last big risk we took on the Nimrod with the AAR system...
You can't have it both ways, we either do it safely on new aircraft or we don't bother these days
The B Word
MOA
I used to attend weekly capability meetings where Nimrod was discussed by varying departments amongst other capabilities. I used to sit about 10 feet away from people that "ate, breathed and slept" on the program. They used to show me pictures, e-mails and other documentation that confirms all that I read and hear from others on this Forum.
Canning the white elephant that had cost £4Bn was the right choice IMHO. From what I saw and heard we were looking at another procurement disaster, which had serious safety flaws (ALARP and tolerable doesn't quite cut for me with a new aircraft!) and we might be in the very sad situation of burying our own again (plus others).
I know there are those that worked on the program that say otherwise, but I just don't believe them from what I read and saw with my own eyes. There is always the chance of "going native" and "vested interest". Those that I saw looking at the Program from 2-star downwards, without a connection or "vested interest", always seemed awestruck with how bad things were going (aircrew and engineers).
So, I'm afraid I differ from your view and in my opinion the Govt and MoD were right to can the Nimrod. Tough on those at KIS, but the right thing if you consider the capability and the emergence of its shortfalls.
LJ - out
I used to attend weekly capability meetings where Nimrod was discussed by varying departments amongst other capabilities. I used to sit about 10 feet away from people that "ate, breathed and slept" on the program. They used to show me pictures, e-mails and other documentation that confirms all that I read and hear from others on this Forum.
Canning the white elephant that had cost £4Bn was the right choice IMHO. From what I saw and heard we were looking at another procurement disaster, which had serious safety flaws (ALARP and tolerable doesn't quite cut for me with a new aircraft!) and we might be in the very sad situation of burying our own again (plus others).
I know there are those that worked on the program that say otherwise, but I just don't believe them from what I read and saw with my own eyes. There is always the chance of "going native" and "vested interest". Those that I saw looking at the Program from 2-star downwards, without a connection or "vested interest", always seemed awestruck with how bad things were going (aircrew and engineers).
So, I'm afraid I differ from your view and in my opinion the Govt and MoD were right to can the Nimrod. Tough on those at KIS, but the right thing if you consider the capability and the emergence of its shortfalls.
LJ - out
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LJ,
I'm not going to get into a willie waving contest, I agree with many of the comments both you and other posters make and many of them are perfectly valid.
What I will do is demonstrate how someone who 'used to sit 10 feet away' can still only get half the story and make an incorrect assumption. In an earlier post you stated, in a manner such that a degree of knowledge was implied (apologies if that was not the intention but that's the way it came across), that the MRA4 bomb doors were speed limited to reduce the impact of the infamous suicidal seagull. The correct part of that statement
is that the bomb doors were speed limited (as were the doors on the MR2, they just had a higher limit). The MRA4 doors were limited because the clearance testing was removed from the test schedule (along with many other aspects) as a cost saving measure. Nothing to do with seagulls, suicidal or otherwise.
The Sonobuoy clearance was delayed due to the paperwork waiting to be processed by the Independent QA (QQ), the MOD were still negotiating the contract for their next package of work before they could start, the testing was complete and successful.
So if you, as someone who sat not 10 feet away, can get these small and rather insignificant (in the larger scheme of things) facts wrong, what else was being incorrectly assumed/inferred/interpolated by the people responsible for preparing the parliamentary responses and ultimately, the briefings on which the fundamental decisions on the program were to be taken? I suspect we will never get a truthfull answer as to why MRA4 was canned but until we do, threads like this will continue to flourish.
p.s MOA
Hope life on the other side is suiting you well? Take care dude.
Rgds,
SFO
I'm not going to get into a willie waving contest, I agree with many of the comments both you and other posters make and many of them are perfectly valid.
What I will do is demonstrate how someone who 'used to sit 10 feet away' can still only get half the story and make an incorrect assumption. In an earlier post you stated, in a manner such that a degree of knowledge was implied (apologies if that was not the intention but that's the way it came across), that the MRA4 bomb doors were speed limited to reduce the impact of the infamous suicidal seagull. The correct part of that statement
is that the bomb doors were speed limited (as were the doors on the MR2, they just had a higher limit). The MRA4 doors were limited because the clearance testing was removed from the test schedule (along with many other aspects) as a cost saving measure. Nothing to do with seagulls, suicidal or otherwise.
The Sonobuoy clearance was delayed due to the paperwork waiting to be processed by the Independent QA (QQ), the MOD were still negotiating the contract for their next package of work before they could start, the testing was complete and successful.
So if you, as someone who sat not 10 feet away, can get these small and rather insignificant (in the larger scheme of things) facts wrong, what else was being incorrectly assumed/inferred/interpolated by the people responsible for preparing the parliamentary responses and ultimately, the briefings on which the fundamental decisions on the program were to be taken? I suspect we will never get a truthfull answer as to why MRA4 was canned but until we do, threads like this will continue to flourish.
p.s MOA
Hope life on the other side is suiting you well? Take care dude.
Rgds,
SFO
SFO
Nail, head etc.
Throughout the N2000/RMPA/MRA4 programme I worked under the same 2 Star (DGAS2, later DPA XD1), but not on Nimrod. During that period, the most crass, insane directions came out of his office and that of the Chief of Defence Procurement. One was the seemingly benign “Project Managers must trade out more performance in order to meet Time and Cost targets”. And another - “Accept the 80% solution”.
Tell me where Systems Integration, Installed Performance, Safety and Airworthiness lie in the contract – in Time, Cost or Performance? The 80% solution is cock all use if the 20% you ditch is “clearance testing” being “removed from the test schedule as a cost saving measure”. But that is PRECISELY what both 2 and 4 Star condoned. Critical Design Reviews were waived. Systems Integration ignored (which compromises functional safety). Safety Case contracts cancelled wholesale. Both these senior staffs ruled, in writing, that is was perfectly acceptable to KNOWINGLY deliver an unsafe aircraft to the Services if it meant meeting Time and Cost targets. (But you must leave it to the Services to work it out for themselves. In practice, you hoped a Boscombe Trials Officer was on secondment from the Squadron and was taking notes).
Worse, the above orders were issued right at the time the Chief Engineer’s 1992 policy not to maintain Safety Cases was coming home to roost. (Which is what all the ART reports boil down to, and why their recommendations were never implemented by CE). Most platforms were belatedly realising they need huge cash injections to recover the situation through years of regression work. Not only were they denied this, but were subjected to further cuts which perpetuated CE’s policy.
It wasn’t Baber / Nimrod IPT who screwed up the Safety Case in 1998-03; as a matter of policy they didn’t have a valid one in the first place. It was the job of the N2000/RMPA/MRA4 office to be fully aware of this. They were. Thus, the 2 programmes are inextricably linked.
The unscrupulous greasy polers took full advantage; many inhabit the higher reaches of DE&S today. They are the crashes we read about. However, many ignored these edicts, realising that it wasn’t 2/4 Star signature on the paper, but theirs. That is why some platforms and equipments are safer than others, while other programmes are unmitigated disasters. But the former don’t get any credit, while MoD spend millions protecting those who caused the latter. (Who has ever been prosecuted?). MRA4 and Chinook Mk3 are the ones most mentioned. Same 2 Star (funny old thing). Both predictable, predicted and ignored. I was once asked how to deliver to Time, Cost and Performance (including Safety). The answer, at that time, was “Completely ignore AML, DGAS2 and CDP, and implement mandated regulations”. Still a valid answer, just different job titles.
The MRA4 doors were limited because the clearance testing was removed from the test schedule (along with many other aspects) as a cost saving measure.
Throughout the N2000/RMPA/MRA4 programme I worked under the same 2 Star (DGAS2, later DPA XD1), but not on Nimrod. During that period, the most crass, insane directions came out of his office and that of the Chief of Defence Procurement. One was the seemingly benign “Project Managers must trade out more performance in order to meet Time and Cost targets”. And another - “Accept the 80% solution”.
Tell me where Systems Integration, Installed Performance, Safety and Airworthiness lie in the contract – in Time, Cost or Performance? The 80% solution is cock all use if the 20% you ditch is “clearance testing” being “removed from the test schedule as a cost saving measure”. But that is PRECISELY what both 2 and 4 Star condoned. Critical Design Reviews were waived. Systems Integration ignored (which compromises functional safety). Safety Case contracts cancelled wholesale. Both these senior staffs ruled, in writing, that is was perfectly acceptable to KNOWINGLY deliver an unsafe aircraft to the Services if it meant meeting Time and Cost targets. (But you must leave it to the Services to work it out for themselves. In practice, you hoped a Boscombe Trials Officer was on secondment from the Squadron and was taking notes).
Worse, the above orders were issued right at the time the Chief Engineer’s 1992 policy not to maintain Safety Cases was coming home to roost. (Which is what all the ART reports boil down to, and why their recommendations were never implemented by CE). Most platforms were belatedly realising they need huge cash injections to recover the situation through years of regression work. Not only were they denied this, but were subjected to further cuts which perpetuated CE’s policy.
It wasn’t Baber / Nimrod IPT who screwed up the Safety Case in 1998-03; as a matter of policy they didn’t have a valid one in the first place. It was the job of the N2000/RMPA/MRA4 office to be fully aware of this. They were. Thus, the 2 programmes are inextricably linked.
The unscrupulous greasy polers took full advantage; many inhabit the higher reaches of DE&S today. They are the crashes we read about. However, many ignored these edicts, realising that it wasn’t 2/4 Star signature on the paper, but theirs. That is why some platforms and equipments are safer than others, while other programmes are unmitigated disasters. But the former don’t get any credit, while MoD spend millions protecting those who caused the latter. (Who has ever been prosecuted?). MRA4 and Chinook Mk3 are the ones most mentioned. Same 2 Star (funny old thing). Both predictable, predicted and ignored. I was once asked how to deliver to Time, Cost and Performance (including Safety). The answer, at that time, was “Completely ignore AML, DGAS2 and CDP, and implement mandated regulations”. Still a valid answer, just different job titles.
Last edited by tucumseh; 7th Jun 2012 at 06:22.