SFO
The MRA4 doors were limited because the clearance testing was removed from the test schedule (along with many other aspects) as a cost saving measure.
Nail, head etc.
Throughout the N2000/RMPA/MRA4 programme I worked under the same 2 Star (DGAS2, later DPA XD1), but not on Nimrod. During that period, the most crass, insane directions came out of his office and that of the Chief of Defence Procurement. One was the seemingly benign “Project Managers must trade out more performance in order to meet Time and Cost targets”. And another - “Accept the 80% solution”.
Tell me where Systems Integration, Installed Performance, Safety and Airworthiness lie in the contract – in Time, Cost or Performance? The 80% solution is cock all use if the 20% you ditch is “clearance testing” being “removed from the test schedule as a cost saving measure”. But that is PRECISELY what both 2 and 4 Star condoned. Critical Design Reviews were waived. Systems Integration ignored (which compromises functional safety). Safety Case contracts cancelled wholesale. Both these senior staffs ruled, in writing, that is was perfectly acceptable to KNOWINGLY deliver an unsafe aircraft to the Services if it meant meeting Time and Cost targets. (But you must leave it to the Services to work it out for themselves. In practice, you hoped a Boscombe Trials Officer was on secondment from the Squadron and was taking notes).
Worse, the above orders were issued right at the time the Chief Engineer’s 1992 policy not to maintain Safety Cases was coming home to roost. (Which is what all the ART reports boil down to, and why their recommendations were never implemented by CE). Most platforms were belatedly realising they need huge cash injections to recover the situation through years of regression work. Not only were they denied this, but were subjected to further cuts which perpetuated CE’s policy.
It wasn’t Baber / Nimrod IPT who screwed up the Safety Case in 1998-03; as a matter of policy they didn’t have a valid one in the first place. It was the job of the N2000/RMPA/MRA4 office to be fully aware of this. They were. Thus, the 2 programmes are inextricably linked.
The unscrupulous greasy polers took full advantage; many inhabit the higher reaches of DE&S today. They are the crashes we read about. However, many ignored these edicts, realising that it wasn’t 2/4 Star signature on the paper, but theirs. That is why some platforms and equipments are safer than others, while other programmes are unmitigated disasters. But the former don’t get any credit, while MoD spend millions protecting those who caused the latter. (Who has ever been prosecuted?). MRA4 and Chinook Mk3 are the ones most mentioned. Same 2 Star (funny old thing). Both predictable, predicted and ignored. I was once asked how to deliver to Time, Cost and Performance (including Safety). The answer, at that time, was “Completely ignore AML, DGAS2 and CDP, and implement mandated regulations”. Still a valid answer, just different job titles.