The ADF buys another Lemon

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Freewheel]

I don't claim to know more than the collective AAAvn & anybody else, otherwise I would have had a set of points to put rather than questions.

The NH90 is in a similar payload/range category to the EC225/S92. The Puma is currently selling well and without it slumping I can't see EADS certifying it themselves. If they wanted to sell it, they'd certify it.

You're absolutely right about the cost of operation being a big factor, witness the failure of the civil EH101. The Chinook is used by a heavy lifting company, Colombia. It used to be used on the oil fields of the north sea, but it's size was difficult to accomodate on the rigs and it became unfashionable after an accident.


On your points;

1. payload and range,:

Can't think of a reason where more of both of these isn't better, however the mix does need to be flexible enough to meet unknown requirements.

2. proven simplicity and reliability (just the basics as you need the smallest logistical backup possible. Helo's are complicated enough and by design are a logisticians nightmare). Must have a rugged build and be able to withstand climatic extremes (hot, cold, dust, sand, humidity, tropical rainfall,salt etc) :

Comparing a concept without any operational history against one with 30+ years of operations is an apples/oranges exercise. There is certainly more potential for reliability to be an issue in a concept much closer to it's start date than the Blackhawk was when it was purchased in the 80's, time will tell. As you point out, Helos are complicated enough beasts for new problems to be found in airframes approaching 50 years in service.

3. Ability to rapid egress and emplane troops (via rope or direct).:

You've mentioned that both airframes can do both.

4. Survivability. Airframe must have key components protected including crew and pax (from small arms fire). Key system redundancy where ever possible. Threat (missile/radar) early warning and evasion/protection equipment.:

You've doubted the NH-90's survivability, without any specifics. I understand that the blades are designed to be "ballistically tolerant", as with most military blades nowadays, but what weaknesses does the NH-90 have? We all know the Blackhawk can receive a large amount of damage and remain intact, along with several demonstrations of it's ability to withstand very high accident forces, but without an NH-90 with a full load of troops getting pranged, what concerns do you have? I understand that the NH-90 has crashworth seating for all persons. Is this a retrograde step? FBW provides more options for redundancy than hydro-mechanical controls, but the weakness is still a single disk/swashplate/link set.

5. Self protection for landing at unsecured LZ's whilst carrying out function 3. Normally GPMG's or mini guns from both side gunners stations provides this.

You've made your point about the NH-90 repeatedly. Are you suggesting that the NH90 is completely defenceless because it's gun is mounted in the doors or that the field of fire is restricted? I'm having trouble picturing this one.

6. Ability to operate by day/night, preferably in poor weather (but need to balance this with requirement 2. Probably Req 2 more important as broken helo's are of no use to anyone).

Broadly speaking, modern avionics are a) more reliable and b) more modular, ie easily replaceable, than older avionics. I can't comment specifically on the NH-90, but that's been my experience.

7. Good cargo hook load capacity.

Agreed, we'll see how it goes. I suspect it'll groan and complain like everything else, but the RPM won't droop if you need to move in a hurry.

8. Large and proven spare parts supply chain (read previous comment about logistics). This is crucial.


See my response to point 2.

[Lodown]

With respect to buying proven technology and equipment. The ADF is not buying a platform for today, but instead trying to determine what is going to be important in 10 or 15 years. Something proven now will be on its last legs strategically in 10 or 15 years. Products and strategies will have advanced to reduce the effectiveness of equipment that is proven now.

[Willoz269]

AFGAN,


I doubt this NH90 is carrying flower pods on their doors!

YouTube - M134D Gatling Gun on Italian NH90

Does this satisfy your concerns for self protection??? Maybe your sources have not seen this?

Or the "normal" gun configuration for troop carrying

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Willoz269]

That's what I am trying to show you Afghan, in the UH60 you have 2 extra wide doors which srhink to half the size when you put a door gunner that the troops have to scurry past when deplaning.

The NH90 has 2 rear windows for side gun mountings and still leaves 2 doors and a rear ramp with no obstacles to deplane. I will have this any day!

I have seen the bird up close and know a fair bit about it, and am keeping an open mind until I see the final production series, but the gun support is not an issue in my view!

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Freewheel]

Afgan,

Governments of various kinds have ignored numerous recommendations from the ADF over time;

The adoption of the Steyr rifle
The associated adoption of the 5.56 for broad use rather than specialist use
The F18 (I believe the RAAF wanted F15A with the then projected E for an F111 replacement some time later)
Not buying a carrier
Building Collins

There have duly been some problems with each of these items and considerable opposition to their adoption. By and large, with the notable exception of not buying a carrier of some form (a pair of LHA's would have been more sensible, but even more expensive), all have been justified with time (and it has to be said, more money than they should have been).

It was also a requirement of the ADF that brought us Seasprite.....(don't mention the war!)


I take your point about the door size and a kinked egress path, but while the NH90 may lose on the swings and gain on the roundabouts compared to Blackhawk, anybody who currently operates from Sea Kings will be very glad they don't have to all go through a single door, with no gun at all.......

[Hempy]

Originally Posted by Willoz269

That's what I am trying to show you Afghan, in the UH60 you have 2 extra wide doors which srhink to half the size when you put a door gunner that the troops have to scurry past when deplaning.

[Gnadenburg]

With respect to buying proven technology and equipment. The ADF is not buying a platform for today, but instead trying to determine what is going to be important in 10 or 15 years. Something proven now will be on its last legs strategically in 10 or 15 years. Products and strategies will have advanced to reduce the effectiveness of equipment that is proven now.

I think the taxpayer has been too often bitten. In the above approach, the cost is prohibitive in hindsight when compared to proven solutions.

Wessex provided a comparative listing of total defence expenditure by differing countries. There are many nations spending less than Australia, with on-paper credible looking defence forces- how Israel spends less than us beats me though.

But look at the old chestnut Singapore versus Oz. The ruthless Chinese negotiation and procurement techniques. Their budget is 28% the size of ours.

Here's their air force-

RSAF Assets
Type Country of Origin Role Quantity Program
Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft 143

Boeing F-15SG Strike Eagle United States Air superiority/Strike 24 (o/o) Peace Carvin V

Lockheed Martin F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Interceptor 8 Peace Carvin II

Lockheed Martin F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Interceptor 4 Lease and Buy

Lockheed Martin F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Interceptor 10 Peace Carvin III

Lockheed Martin F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Strike 10 Peace Carvin II

Lockheed Martin F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Strike 8 Lease and Buy

Lockheed Martin F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Strike 2 Peace Carvin III

Lockheed Martin F-16D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon United States Strike 20 Peace Carvin IV

Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon United States Interceptor/Strike 12 Lease(US based)

Northrop F-5S Tiger II United States Interceptor 36
?
Northrop F-5T Tiger II United States Interceptor/Trainer 9 ?


Helicopters 78

Boeing CH-47SD Chinook United States Heavy Transport 18 Peace Prairie

Eurocopter AS-332M Super Puma France Medium transport/Search And Rescue 22 ?

Eurocopter AS-532UL Cougar France Medium Transport 12
?
Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow United States Attack 20 Peace Vanguard

Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk United States ASW/ASuW 6 (o/o) ?

Transport Aircraft 14


Lockheed C-130 Hercules United States Heavy Transport 10 ?

Fokker 50UTL Netherlands Medium Transport/VIP 4 ?

Support Aircraft 17

Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker United States Aerial Refuelling/Transport 4 ?

Grumman E-2C Hawkeye United States AEW & C 4 ?

Fokker F50ME2 Netherlands Maritime Patrol 5
?
Gulfstream G550 with the EL/M-2075 Phalcon AESA AEW radar[28].

United States / Israel AEW & C 4 (o/o) ?

Trainer Aircraft 42
Pilatus PC-21 Switzerland Trainer 19 ?

ST Aerospace A-4SU/TA-4SU Super Skyhawk Singapore Advanced/Lead-in Jet Trainer[29] 18 ?

Eurocopter EC-120 Colibri France / Singapore / China Trainer 5 total 10 ordered

UAV ~40
IAI Searcher Mk 2 Israel Reconnaissance 40 ?

Elbit Hermes 450 UAV Israel Reconnaissance ? ?

Stored Aircraft 69

ST Aerospace A-4SU Super Skyhawk Singapore Fighter-bomber 30 ?
ST Aerospace TA-4SU Super Skyhawk Singapore Trainer 10 ?

Bell UH-1H United States Light Transport 19 ?

Eurocopter AS-550A2 Fennec France Trainer 3 ?

Eurocopter AS-550C2 Fennec France Scout 7 ?

Air Defense Artillery/Surface-to-Air Missiles/Radar

MIM-23B I-Hawk United States SAM ? ?

Mistral France SAM - MANPADS ? ?

Rapier Mk II United Kingdom SAM ? ?

9K38 Igla Russia SAM - MANPADS ? ?

M113A2 Ultra Mechanised Igla Singapore Mobile SAM (SHORAD) ? ?
RBS 70 Sweden SAM - MANPADS ? ?

Cadillac Gage V-200 RBS 70 Singapore Mobile SAM (SHORAD) ? ?

Oerlikon 35 mm twin cannon Switzerland AA Gun ? ?
Ericsson GIRAFFE Radar S

The F111 was used as an argument for technological patience versus pragmatic defence procurement.

An airplane, that by accident became a niche capability for the RAAF in the 70's and 80's. Yet prior to that it was 10 years late, required the RAAF to maintain an obsolete bomber force against a credible Indonesian threat; as well as deploying the same obsolete aircraft ( Canberra ) to Vietnam where one was lost to a SAM. Though it did fair well as a bomber in the relatively benign south of the country. Then, a desperate capability gap emerged ( ring a bell ) and the Phantom was leased where its multi-role capacity wasn't fully utilized.

If F111 could not be delivered, a re-structured RAAF was getting 48 F4's at the expense of a Mirage squadron. Coming with that 8 tankers. A Multi-role capability that would have skipped the generation of the low-level F111 niche. When this capability needed replacing in the early 90's say- there was a plethora of options available including the Strike Eagle.

A pragmatic approach would have had, in hindsight, a balanced set of capabilities without the capability gap technology seems to always present.

In the case of the army, proven American solutions and capabilities would provide just that. Proven, low-risk solutions that allow for an eventual comfortable transition to higher levels of technology....

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

If F111 could not be delivered, a re-structured RAAF was getting 48 F4's at the expense of a Mirage squadron. Coming with that 8 tankers. A Multi-role capability that would have skipped the generation of the low-level F111 niche. When this capability needed replacing in the early 90's say- there was a plethora of options available including the Strike Eagle.

A pragmatic approach would have had, in hindsight, a balanced set of capabilities without the capability gap technology seems to always present.

A purchase of 24-36 Strike Eagles in the early 90s to replace the Pig would have meant no AUP, and possibly no F/A-18 HUG either as the F-15Es could have been upgraded with APG-63(V)3 AESAs and other improvements, and possibly supplemented with additional new build F-15s (which were being marketed as at the time) from 2002. There were even some who were pushing, as far back as 1998, for a buy of F/A-18E/F Block Is instead of doing HUG...

If we had gone down this road, this would have put the F-15Es into the sweet spot for replacement from late next decade or into the early 2020s, with no chance of a capability gap opening up, and with the follow on F-15s or F/A-18E/Fs being rolled over in the late 2020s.

But then again, everyone can be a genius with 2020 hindsight!

[Bushranger 71]

The Adf Helicopter Imbroglio

Some clarification is offered re this thread from AFGAN and multiple responses thereto, but first some credentials. I flew mainly Dakotas, Sabres, Iroquois with the RAAF including Vietnam War stints in 1968, 1969, 1971 and was Project Officer for development and operational introduction of the unique Iroquois ‘Bushranger’ gunship. Post-Air Force, I was involved in airline flight training around the world for a decade.

A few facts to counter inaccurate folklore that has emerged over the past 40 years. During 5.5 years (2,000 days) of Vietnam War operations, No. 9 Squadron RAAF with about 170 personnel flew 58,768 hours which was the highest effort for any Australian Air Force unit in any campaign since inception of that armed force in 1921. Aircraft on-line availability averaged about 83 percent or 13 of 16 aircraft with all major servicing being conducted internally within the squadron. The unit was directly involved in hundreds of enemy engagement situations embracing numerous ammunition resupplies, 4,357 casevacs/medevacs and 900 days of gunship operations. Near 16 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and over 29,000 2.75inch rockets were expended. 7 aircraft were lost due to multiple causes and another 23 suffered mostly minor battle damage. 6 aircrew were killed and 8 wounded.

Basing of 9SQN at Vung Tau where substantial aircraft engineering and supply facilities existed has often been criticized; but the proceedings of the Chief of Army History Conference 2002 belatedly admitted that the decision to base 1ATF at Nui Dat instead of Vung Tau (just 25 kilometres south-west) was a major planning error.

Lets talk aircraft utilization, characteristics and approximate costings hoping that a lengthy discourse will be palatable for forum administrators and contributors.

On an average day of operations with 2 battalions and supporting arms deployed within the Phuoc Tuy Province Vietnam area of operations, a single Iroquois could handle most of the routine logistic support for Army elements in about 6 to 8 hours of flying. Payloads for routine unit ‘hash and trash’ were usually pretty small embracing maybe water, clothing, ammunition, radio batteries, hot meals, etcetera and a Kiowa would have been adequate for some of this work. Large quantities of externally loaded stores such as artillery ammunition, bladders of diesel fuel, barbed wire, star pickets, galvanized iron, etcetera were usually delivered by US Army Chinook. In practice, multiple 9SQN Iroquois were deployed to Nui Dat daily (just 10 minutes flight time from Vung Tau) to cope with trooplifting, special operations, casevac, logistic support and gunship roles with 13 or more on-line aircraft often being involved.

Neither the Boeing or Sikorsky UTTAS designs adequately replaced the Iroquois in my view which has superior all round crew visibility, better cabin design features and gun station positioning enabling wide fields of fire behind and beneath the aircraft in particular. This is a major advantage in combat as utility helos have to be intimately involved in close quarters fighting to effectively perform ammunition resupply and casevac roles especially. Operated sensibly, the Huey has proven to be very battle damage resistant with quite modest operating costs whereas the more technologically complex Blackhawk is a much heavier aircraft with stronger rotor downwash and is comparatively very costly to operate.

Methinks the Hotel model Iroquois when first acquired by 9SQN in Vietnam in 1968 cost about $250K per aircraft (cannot recall whether AUD or USD). The now retired Project Officer for the Blackhawk believes unit cost of that aircraft was about AUD8million when first ordered by the RAAF in 1985 with the project cost per aircraft near doubling largely due to comprehensive spares support inclusion which was based on longstanding Air Force provisioning practices. Post-Army takeover of the Blackhawk in 1989, support budgeting for the project was substantially reduced leading to virtual grounding of the fleet in 1992. Army Aviation often operated the Blackhawk at low level with drop tanks fitted against Air Force engineering advice that this practice would quickly degrade the airframe and supportability problems for the Blackhawk have since been exacerbated by over-utilizing the aircraft for functions that would have been much more cost-effectively performed by Iroquois, a la the RNZAF in East Timor.

The Iroquois gunship role was prematurely curtailed mid-2004 and the ADF has now been sans any helo fire support capability for near 5 years. Project Air 87 was driven by Army acquiring the unproven Tiger attack helicopter supposedly to replace the reconnaissance capability of the Kiowa and the gunship role of the RAAF-designed ‘Bushranger’ version of the Iroquois. The reality is it can do neither satisfactorily due to:

a. comparatively very poor visibility from an enclosed tandem seat cockpit limiting visual scanning and the ability to see and hear ground-fire,
b. reliance on a single turreted cannon which can only deliver HE fire support with reasonable safety about 35 metres from friendly forces in very close quarters combat situations such as casualty evacuation and ammunition resupply,
c. the single high recoil cannon has no gun weapon redundancy, will inevitably degrade the airframe and has a quite restrictive cooling cycle limiting repetitive firing (the Germans were smarter and are fitting a better Mauser low recoil weapon); and
d. the Tiger has been accepted into service despite not meeting performance specifications and apparently without prior rigorous trialling in northern tropic environs.

Most tandem seat so-called attack helicopters were designed principally for delivery of highly expensive stand-off weaponry. They are generally not well-suited to the intimate close support role of the gunship wherein multiple gun weaponry is essential for reliable accurate delivery of high volume ball ammunition fire as close as 10 metres from friendly forces. Apache, Tiger, Hueycobra, etcetera are all comparatively technologically more complex and thus not cost-effectively supportable for remote area operations in our neighbouring harsh tropical environs whereas the simplicity and reliability of Iroquois versions has been well proven regionally over 40 plus years. The single engine Huey II is able to hover at maximum operating weight in ground effect at about 10,000 feet at ISA plus 20. Bell Helicopter - The Bell UH-1H (Huey II)

70mm rockets are a poor close air support weapon requiring large safety distances and were only fitted to the Iroquois ‘Bushranger’ because they were a component of the XM-21 system then acquirable from US sources – they are also a logistic headache. More accurate low recoil NC621 fixed forward firing 20mm cannon pods specifically designed for helos and each carrying up to 250 rounds of HE could be easily fitted to a Huey II ‘Bushranger’ in lieu of rocket launchers creating a pretty formidable and versatile weapon system (like the Beaufighter) with twin cannon, twin minigun and four doorguns. This conceptual Huey II ‘Bushranger’ version could be refuelled and reamed within 15 minutes by ground and aircrew working together.

Project Air 9000 supposedly aims at rationalizing the proliferation of helicopter types operated by the ADF but this has proved a farce with 2 additional training types for Army and Navy being recently sanctioned that were not previously heralded. The Defence Material Organization refuses to provide the actual costs being incurred for various helicopter projects, but just crunching numbers bandied about on the web gives an estimated unit project cost for the MRH-90 somewhere near $54million per helicopter and the inadequate Tiger perhaps around $68 million or more! This is inexcusable reckless spending considering the cost of alternative proven types.

The failed Seasprite project forfeited around $1billion and the inferior Tiger perhaps beyond $1.5billion. Seemingly, the MRH-90 program may cost near $2.5billion. Costs for other helo training types unexpectedly introduced, a megabucks aviation industry subsidy for Australian Helicopters (now owned by multi-national EADS) and some arguably unnecessary mission flight simulators plus construction of new facilities might en toto reach $1billion. So; the overall cost of helo related projects for a decade or so of the defence program may approximate a staggering $6billion!

Except for some special operations capabilities, battlefield support helicopters generally perform pretty basic functions and versions of well-proven types such as the Chinook, Iroquois, Kiowa are being utilized in front-line operational service around the world to enable cost-effective military operations wherein some combat losses are always likely and need to be affordable. Some Australian Blackhawks could be upgraded to USAF special operations configurations to offset a non-existent ADF capability for long range covert special operations, submarine support and international search and rescue obligations although a complementary RAAF C130 special operations capability embracing flight refuelling would also be essential.

The hugely expensive Tiger and MRH-90 are both quite unsuited to performing basic battlefield support functions cost-effectively for which the single-engined Huey II would be ideal, also as a substitute for the Seahawk, Seasprite and in other fleet support roles. There are no significant performance benefits in the alternative twin-engined UH-1N which has increased technical complexity, is heavier and has higher operating costs. Numerous bolt-on weapons systems are available to adapt the Huey II for naval support roles (Iroquois versions are operated by multiple other navies) and it could also conceivably be easily fitted with a dunking sonar for ASW which is presently a serious shortcoming in ADF capability – the Seahawk has never been adequately operational in the ASW role.

Refurbished Hotel model Iroquois upgraded to Huey II status (and with multiple enhancement options) are available from Bell Helicopter converted from several hundred UH-1H in US stored reserves for around USD2million per aircraft. UNIFLIGHT Huey II Modernization At Year 2007, over 5,000 Hotel model Hueys remained in service worldwide and long term supportability of the Huey II is envisaged due to common usage of Bell commercial aircraft components. Direct operating costs are reduced by over 30 percent and the USAF ordered 24 Huey II in 2005 with a glass cockpit option The ADF fleet of 25 Iroquois (or whatever are left) could thus be expanded to say 50 aircraft improved to Huey II status at an estimated very modest overall project cost below AUD300million - including all weaponry and support provisioning - approximating just 12 percent of the projected outlay for 46 x MRH-90.

There is much emotive comment in many forums about supposed vulnerability of aircraft in combat zones considering weaponry advancements, but this relates moreso to how they are operated than any significant presence of advanced counter-air weaponry - consider the flawed concept of helo combat assault that generated huge US Army aircraft helo losses and casualties during the Vietnam War compared with the very low figures for RAAF operations. Much war-fighting inevitably involves close quarters engagements with pretty basic weaponry and there will always be some risk of losses in combat if operational tasks are to be satisfactorily accomplished – this is just the reality for warrior aviator roles. I would be quite happy to go back to war in Iraq, Afghanistan or wherever in optimized Huey II versions which can perform very capably.

Changing tack; Network Centric Warfare (NCW) originated conceptually within the US Pentagon and embraces extensive transfer of data via multiple sensors and IT communication networks to create presumed advantages in military tactical information applications. This doctrine is termed Network Enabled Operations (NEO) in the ADF Force 2020 document which envisages a ‘seamless’ networked ADF that seems a very dubious operating concept. The US military of course has comprehensive satellite and other technological resources to facilitate this concept of operations whereas Australia is much more limited in this regard.

The Wedgetail project epitomizes much that is wrong with Australian defence capabilities planning and procurement; this being yet another unique hybrid platform (like Collins submarine and Seasprite) - inspired somewhat by the defence scientific community - with Australia becoming a launch customer for an ambitious concept that is being overtaken by counter-weapon and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology like Global Hawk. Hitherto, the Wedgetail has proven technologically unworkable and would best be cancelled in favour of progressing acquisition of the operationally proven Global Hawk for which versatile multi-function options are being developed.

The Air Force was deskilled through forced disbandment of its very capable Engineering Branch and the majority of aircraft maintenance is now outsourced to civilian contract generally resulting in lessened regular availability of expensive aircraft resources. Minimal procurements of particular aircraft types – 6 x Chinook, 4 x C-17, 5 x MRTT, 6 x Wedgetail – may yield only around half of those small fleets continuously available for operations thus not providing credible military capacities. About 12 x Chinook and 12 x C-17 (in addition to existing C-130s) are essential fleet complements to enable sufficient aircraft availability for rapid deployment of troops and light armour in Australia’s regional military environment where most airfields are pretty basic.

Considering the parlous state of the world economy (especially the US), there will doubtless be further optimizations of existing military hardware (like A-10, B-52, F-15, F-16, KC-135) to sustain adequate military capabilities so some of the highly expensive sophisticated projects of the worldwide defence industry and the unrealistic ambitions of many political and military leaders will have to be curtailed with significant rationalizations of force structures necessary. Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon rightly expresses concern that Australia’s defence planners are too obsessed with futuristic war-fighting notions rather than ensuring existing hardware is progressively optimized (where feasible) to provide adequate present day capabilities and our armed forces are structured to sustain operations within manning availability.

Both Howard and Rudd Governments have rashly committed to spending 3 percent of Australia’s GDP on defence whereas around 2 percent is what is really affordable and about the average worldwide. It will simply not be justifiable to spend an extra $10billion per annum on defence when crisis in health, aged care, etcetera are rapidly mounting.

The virtual last act of the Howard Government before Election 2007 was to approve acquisition of 46 x MRH-90 and 2 x LHD (in reality, a smallish aircraft carrier) and the dots are easily connected between former politicians and major ‘arms bazaar’ players. The military is actively involved in DMO driving dubious merit projects so the ADF is also culpable in irresponsible spending. Clearly, reckless defence spending has to cease but few are held accountable in Australia these days for controversial actions although there are some at the highest levels in Defence and the ADF who really should be fired. The whole shameful scenario is very deserving of a Royal Commission with unlimited terms of reference which of course would never happen as both of the major political parties have been complicit.

[emergov]

Sorry I'm late

I am truly impressed by the ignorance shown by AFGAN on his many posts. His numerous assertions that the MRH 90 will NEVER be able to conduct door gunnery and trooping are false. His assertions that the NH 90 is a civilian helicopter are also false. His statements about ingress and egress are false.

As for his requirements, ably refuted by Freewheel, let me reprise with more specific information:

1. payload and range. MRH 90 has more of both.
2. proven simplicity and reliability... Must have a rugged build and be able to withstand climatic extremes (hot, cold, dust, sand, humidity, tropical rainfall,salt etc). The MRH 90 is made of Carbon Fibre Composites. It does not rust. It has better hot/high performance than Black Hawk. It is not proven. Huey, a truly reliable helo, is proven.
3. Ability to rapid egress and emplane troops (via rope or direct). There is a Ramp.
4. Survivability. Airframe must have key components protected including crew and pax...redundancy where ever possible. Threat (missile/radar) early warning ... equipment. The MRH 90 has an integrated EWSP system. It has better redundancy than Black Hawk. It has been bought with removeable cabin armour. All seats are crashworthy, fully stroking and certified.
5. Self protection for unsecured LZ's. Normally GPMG's or mini guns from both side gunners stations provides this. The MRH 90 is, by this definition, normal. It mounts 2 x GPMG offset in the doors, leaving the ramp clear, and room to egress through the doors. Not as big a door hole as a Black Hawk. But there is a ramp.
6. Ability to operate by day/night, preferably in poor weather. WX Radar, FLIR, HUD, 4-axis digital autopilot, Flat screen displays, 2 x GPS/Doppler/INS/ILS/etc.
7. Good cargo hook load capacity. Better than Black Hawk
8. Large and proven spare parts supply chain. Supplies and spares are a big issue, but improving. Black Hawk serviceability rates are nothing to brag about in Australian service.

MRH 90 is a new aircraft, and it has a long road - 25 years at least - in front of it. All the issues identified by AFGAN are known, and are being worked on. There are solutions available for all of his problems. It is still premature to declare the aircraft a lemon, and unfair in comparison with the development of almost any other brand-new acft type (except the Mustang).

If you define your requirement as "I want a Blackhawk or deriviative", then you will only be satisfied with a Blackhawk. Oh, I should mention, the assertion that Army did not want MRH 90 - False.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Freewheel]

"it has had its problems, however, many are to do with the fact as I have already stated, that it is an orphan variant, not US Army spec and that the spare parts program has always been underfunded."

You've partly contradicted yourself there, but more significantly, see Bushranger 71's post.



"Remember this thing is just a truck. A pilot would list ILS, INS, HUD, FLIR 3 axis A/P as great stuff, a soldier would just say it's more stuff that will break down, that doesn't add much to the fight and needs to be supported by the log chain."


I suggest you look at the level of sophistication in your average truck. The army's next trucks will probably be more sophisticated than the helicopters you yearn for.

Nobody has stated that the Blackhawk is a bad thing (bushranger's comments notwithstanding) but as was stated as early as page 2 of this thread, change needs management.

As the battlefield evolves (the VC didn't have stingers, for example) there is a need for evolution. Modern kevlar helmets have replaced the steel bed pan models of the past, but aren't nearly as good for shaving in....

Electronics are as much a part of the modern battlefield as grit has always been. The infantry's night fighting equipment is a good example of where going away from the American Way (such as the employment of Iroquois) has brought a tangible advantage.


BTW - running down the ramp has the grunts in the firing position on the move AND they can now cover 3 sides including the rear. It also, by necessity, puts the tail rotor up clear of obstructions and people.

[AFGAN]

Deleted by AFGAN

[Wiley]

I really hope we see some reasoned discussion, both for and against, on Bushranger71's post.

Great 'handle', BTW, BD, (I'm assuming from the first paragraph that it is BD), with all sorts of memories for ex RAAF helo drivers "of a certain age", and perhaps more importantly, nice to see it being used by someone you could say is more entitled than most to be using it.

[Dragon79]

I don't post much, becuase winning an argument on the internet.... well some of you might know that quote.

No matter what airframe is chosen a start would be providing support were we are committed (excluding ET and relief efforts) and to date with all the different helos we have, only the CH-47 has been sent OS into battle. With the $6billion that Bushranger71s figure we will be spending, as a tax payer, I certainly hope that we see a little more value for money. Of course this all may change if the BH is deployed.

Me gets the feeling I may have read a book that features Bushranger71's exploits ( a top read if I am correct, up there with Trackers), not even being a twinkle in my dads eye back then, much respect and thanks.

[MTOW]

I can't help but think that most land commanders would prefer to have some sort of helo support available to as many units as possible, even if it isn't 'cutting edge' high technology (which or 80 to 90% of such work is usually not necessary). The SuperHuey idea, if we bought the stock standard US model, would seem to provide to provide something like that, and most importantly, at an affordable price.

But why do I think that if they did follow Bushranger71's suggestion and bought lots of SuperHueys, true to form, they'd "tweak" it to the point with so many Australia-only highly complex mods it would end up another Seasprite, and probably almost as costly?

[Flyingblind]

Did read somethat the Canadians were unhappy with their Grippens in hot, high sandy places, not exactly sure how that machine relates to the Super Huey but would we not face the same H&H performance and internal space constraints.

Having tried to get out of the back end of a BH a few times in a bit of a hurry, and walking around the back end of a NH90 i know which one i'd prefer, especially when i stand 6,3' minus Kelvar,boots and associated gear.

BH is great, but its internal space is surprisingly cramped, NH90 with ramp looks like a great step up to the mighty Chook.