The ADF Helicopter Imbroglio - Part 4
Sagy 34; your comment re the irrelevance of Vietnam war-fighting experience is concerning and perhaps central to much that is wrong with Australian military capabilities planning and procurement. The lessons of war are timeless and should always be heeded – much of what was (or should have been) learned during the Vietnam War is applicable in Iraq, Afghanistan or wherever. Our defence planners need to be thinking closer to home and operations in our regional tropical jungle archipelago environment are likely to be quite similar in many respects to the Vietnam scenario.
Former Prime Minister John Howard approved MRH-90 and LPD (smallish aircraft carrier) acquisitions as a final act before Election 2007 and the connections between a former Minister for Defence in his government (who latterly worked for Tenix) and these projects are obvious. If our defence planners had objectively analyzed the lessons of warfare from amphibious operations during WW2, the Falklands War, aircraft carrier operations by the US Navy and RAN (particularly regarding the resources, operating costs and escort penalties involved), the acquisition of 2 x LPD could not have been justified for the small ADF. More about that in another part when I address combat air assault/airmobile operations.
The MRH-90 and LPD decisions seemed to me irrational so I did some probing in the capabilities area of Defence. I managed to make contact with a civilian officer - he might be termed a ‘military theorist’- who has a university degree, perhaps done a course or 2 at military training institutions but has nil military background and particularly no war-fighting experience. Many involved in so-called ‘think tanks’ patronized by Defence, also the Air Combat Capability Review and White Paper formulation teams, have similar qualifications.
First up, I queried the suitability of Tiger for intimate close air support activities in regional jungle scenarios, also mentioning the strong criticism of the project by the Australian National Audit Office which he ignored. When I outlined what is often necessary in casevac and ammo resupply situations in very high wet and dense jungle, he was emphatic that such accurate close quarters fire support could be provided with stand-off missilery and cannon. I disagreed explaining why and he told me I did not know what I was talking about although I had made him aware of my background.
The conversation moved to the MRH-90 and I pointed out the relatively small payloads frequently carried by utility helos in routine battlefield support for which the Iroquois is very cost-effective. The goose agreed that the MRH-90 will be too expensive to use at the coal-face of combat then flippantly advised that Defence had in mind to buy yet another type to replace the Iroquois!
Australian military capacity has declined significantly from 1974 and so has ADF helo operational effectiveness since 1989. Significant overspending on aviation by Army over the past 2 decades has disadvantaged the other fighting arms of that force and expenditure on the Fleet Air Arm has also been misdirected (Seahawk has never been adequately operational in ASW for which acquired and Seasprite failed).
Emergov defends the supposed aim of Project Air 9000 to rationalize the ADF helo force but it has hitherto proved farcical with 2 additional types being recently introduced that were not in the program. The burning question is just who determined that optimized Chinook, Blackhawk, Iroquois (Huey II), Kiowa versions would not be adequate for Australia’s helicopter needs for the foreseeable future? It seems to me that those 4 types (suitably equipped) would be quite adequate and supportable for all ADF needs, including gunship, recce, training and fleet support roles, perhaps to 2030 and beyond. The Navy really does not need anything more than the Huey II suitably adapted for particular roles. My gut feeling is the senior echelons of Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will eventually further diminish their air arm capabilities through profligate spending on high tech expensive gear not well suited for combat roles.
Much mention is made of ‘risk management’ in capabilities planning and procurement discussion but virtually nil reference is made to ‘cost-benefit analysis’ or operating the ADF ‘cost-effectively’. If rigorous cost-benefit analysis had been applied to the following projects when they were first mooted, most might never have emerged: Collins submarine, Seasprite, Abrams tanks, Wedgetail, F/A-18A refurbishment, Super Hornet, MRTT, Tiger, MRH-90, LPD (and perhaps others).
The Howard Government pledged to increase the defence vote to 3 percent of GDP over the next decade and this was echoed by the Rudd Government. In my view, this was a very foolish commitment which has only encouraged ill-conceived projects and reckless spending. Realistically, Australia can only afford about 2 percent of GDP spent on defence which is closer to the worldwide average and we could have a pretty capable ADF for that money if it was spent wisely.
It behoves the Service Chiefs to maintain their respective force operational capabilities and to operate cost-effectively; yet invaluable Kiowa, Iroquois and eventually Blackhawk capabilities are being prematurely forsaken and similarly the B707 tanker! If it is acceptable to military leaders to shed an operational capability for a few years pending introduction of a replacement, then is the replacement capability really justifiable? Operational commitments can emerge at very short notice so any existing capabilities should be continually optimized and maintained until envisaged replacement equipments are of adequate operational status before being introduced into service, temporarily putting the new stuff into storage if necessary so manning can be transferred when appropriate.
A reality check: Australia is entering a likely protracted economic decline with critical social needs fast escalating so unfettered defence spending cannot be condoned. Lots of expensive hardware is really useless if unable to be manned to operational levels and operated cost-effectively so it seems probable that all 3 Australian armed forces will be forced into rationalizing their capabilities. The mindset of our defence planners therefore needs to change pretty quickly.
A few more bits to follow soon (with imagery) relating to lessons of warfare which may be of interest to forum contributors.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 22nd Jan 2009 at 07:19.