Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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Mileandahalf you are sure right 
Winco my statement was not what you assumed it was, but just in case our words got mixed up , my referral to flying safely means out of the tabloids harm after all the only reason the Nimrod right now is unsafe to fly is the damage the press has done.
Its just a pity that the good stuff is never posted to public.
Winco my statement was not what you assumed it was, but just in case our words got mixed up , my referral to flying safely means out of the tabloids harm after all the only reason the Nimrod right now is unsafe to fly is the damage the press has done.
Its just a pity that the good stuff is never posted to public.
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OK keepItTidy. Fair point, now a question for you. Would you allow your nearest and dearest to fly on Nimrod (hypothetically I accept) on an operational flight (or a training flight that mimics all the conditions) ??
Lets assume that the question of enemy fire is not part of this hypothetical situation.
Would you stake their lives on its ability to function as needed and be safe for them to be in it??
For a comparison I would have to make in my previous job would be would I allow my wife to drive the lorry I have just safety inspected or operate the machinery I maintain. If I cannot answer yes then why should I expect anyone else to, just because a piece of paper from my director says that it is as safe as it needs to be.
Lets assume that the question of enemy fire is not part of this hypothetical situation.
Would you stake their lives on its ability to function as needed and be safe for them to be in it??
For a comparison I would have to make in my previous job would be would I allow my wife to drive the lorry I have just safety inspected or operate the machinery I maintain. If I cannot answer yes then why should I expect anyone else to, just because a piece of paper from my director says that it is as safe as it needs to be.
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The answer to all Cornish
YES
I have no worries about flying Nimrod and im due to fly in a Nimrod very soon as you mention it. I as of recent seen crews fly in and out of theatre and they have gave no concerns either but I cannot speak for all.
For many people they dont have any idea what is done to make every aircraft get into the air but for a few people who have concerns I wish you could all come for one day and work alongside all and I guarentee your thoughts would change after that.
Thats my little piece that I would just like to add , im sure like always Ill be brought down in flames and some microsoft flight sim geek that claims to be a pilot will tell me otherwise.
anyway im ready for the incoming
YES
I have no worries about flying Nimrod and im due to fly in a Nimrod very soon as you mention it. I as of recent seen crews fly in and out of theatre and they have gave no concerns either but I cannot speak for all.
For many people they dont have any idea what is done to make every aircraft get into the air but for a few people who have concerns I wish you could all come for one day and work alongside all and I guarentee your thoughts would change after that.
Thats my little piece that I would just like to add , im sure like always Ill be brought down in flames and some microsoft flight sim geek that claims to be a pilot will tell me otherwise.
anyway im ready for the incoming
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Brave man who states he has no worries flying..... It's been proven that flying is dangerous, as is driving, train travel etc etc. I worry about flying, every time I go. But no more than I worry driving on the A9. Worry is what makes me ask all the difficult questions those who know me hate. Worry is what drives safety and safety leads to less worry. So KIT please worry, every time you work on the aircraft I will fly. Worry that what you are doing is right and that you are doing it to the best of your ability.
The blase way in which many state the aircraft is so safe is, I fear, nothing to do with safety but more to do with feeling that they are under attack form people who want to blame someone for the state of the fleet. You are NOT under attack. I, we, are not blaming the overworked, under staffed, under supported ground trades.
To declare that there are no issues with the Nimrod would be naive in the extreme and those issues are not with individual tradesmen or NLS, they go much deeper, both airframe wise and supervisory. I for one salute NLS for the sterling job they have done in recent years but please beware you don't undermine your opinion by not accepting we have serious issues.
Regards
Mad Eng
Keep up the good work
The blase way in which many state the aircraft is so safe is, I fear, nothing to do with safety but more to do with feeling that they are under attack form people who want to blame someone for the state of the fleet. You are NOT under attack. I, we, are not blaming the overworked, under staffed, under supported ground trades.
To declare that there are no issues with the Nimrod would be naive in the extreme and those issues are not with individual tradesmen or NLS, they go much deeper, both airframe wise and supervisory. I for one salute NLS for the sterling job they have done in recent years but please beware you don't undermine your opinion by not accepting we have serious issues.
Regards
Mad Eng
Keep up the good work
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I will be honest I do fear everytime I go flying but thats any aircraft 
Anyway I have faith everyone has done enough to ensure this can never happen again but you are right there are issues and Im sure in the too near future there will be more issues, and yes maybe I like many are now hiding from the truth rather than fact, why and how I dont know but maybe its the fact every day you open the paper and see negative rather than good. I just cant get over why people are saying the aircraft is unsafe to fly when clearly its from people who are not even part of it. If the aircraft was not fit to fly then it would not ,thats what I cant get my head round. People quote APs, Defstans etc etc about this paragraph and that stating this etc etc , does that make an aircaft they have never worked on able to dictate its U/S. If I can get my head round this I promise never to post again
Anyway I have faith everyone has done enough to ensure this can never happen again but you are right there are issues and Im sure in the too near future there will be more issues, and yes maybe I like many are now hiding from the truth rather than fact, why and how I dont know but maybe its the fact every day you open the paper and see negative rather than good. I just cant get over why people are saying the aircraft is unsafe to fly when clearly its from people who are not even part of it. If the aircraft was not fit to fly then it would not ,thats what I cant get my head round. People quote APs, Defstans etc etc about this paragraph and that stating this etc etc , does that make an aircaft they have never worked on able to dictate its U/S. If I can get my head round this I promise never to post again
Last edited by KeepItTidy; 26th Sep 2008 at 11:56.
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Keep it tidy,
You are a sensitive soul ! It will achieve nothing here trying to convince people your faith in the aircraft we work on , why cant you just let them get on with it, while we get on with the good work we are doing, it needs no justification to others just be happy and content for the part you play.
You are a sensitive soul ! It will achieve nothing here trying to convince people your faith in the aircraft we work on , why cant you just let them get on with it, while we get on with the good work we are doing, it needs no justification to others just be happy and content for the part you play.
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enginesuck
You know me ES do I really look sensitive but you are right , this is the last place really to talk about these matters and If i caused offence to armchair pilots around the world then great.
I was just trying to keep the thread alive as its one of those dying threads that needs some input now and again,saying that in truth it needs putting to bed sooner rather.
Good luck all that stil looking for what they after and ill stay out of conversation from now on, I keep saying this every 6 months and I never seem to learn
You are a sensitive soul ! It will achieve nothing here trying to convince people your faith in the aircraft we work on , why cant you just let them get on with it, while we get on with the good work we are doing, it needs no justification to others just be happy and content for the part you play. 
but you are right , this is the last place really to talk about these matters and If i caused offence to armchair pilots around the world then great. I was just trying to keep the thread alive as its one of those dying threads that needs some input now and again,saying that in truth it needs putting to bed sooner rather.
Good luck all that stil looking for what they after and ill stay out of conversation from now on, I keep saying this every 6 months and I never seem to learn
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Ed Set 100 you said
Clearly, from that statement and the points raised in your posting there is a strong indication that you are not as well informed as you make out to be. I hope you are not too senior in the chain of command.
I did not identify the hazard, nor did I set the severity. They were done by BAE Systems Chadderton Airworthiness Dept and the Nimrod IPT. The hazard in Maitenence Zone 413/443 was identified during the Zonal Hazard Analysis and the development of the Hazard log leading to the issue of the aircraft level baseline safety case in 2004. As a result hazard NM/H66 in the Nimrod Phase 2 Hazard log was raised to detail the potential for hot air leaks from LP & HP ducting on rib 2 to impinge on surrounding structure and systems (electrical wiring, CSDU oil pipes, fuel pipes and hydraulic pipes). As a result of this, the hazard was set at INCREDIBLE/CATASTROPHIC.
Following the second duct failure, which took place in this area, Chadderton recommended, in early 2006, that "the probability of failure should be reassessed to IMPROBABLE or more likely REMOTE" The IPT elected to settle for IMPROBABLE. Subsequently, during a reassessment of the Hazard log structure in 2008, QinetiQ recommended that because there had been a second failure the probalility level should be set at OCCASSIONAL. This has got nothing to do about understanding Nimrod, but about having specialist knowledge in system failure rates.
So at present we have a hazard set at IMPROBABLE/CATASTROPHIC (HRI "C") by the IPT, when QinetiQ believe it should be at OCCASSIONAL/CATASTROPHIC (HRI "A"). But in your posting you state that "I do not have an argument with the upgarde from 'remote' to 'occassional'. Your problem, it seems, is with the severity. Well that has been set at "CATASTROPHIC" from day one, not by me, but BAE and the IPT.
By the way, with regards to mitigation, a temperature sensor (S7) is located at Rib 2 (17 " away from the duct failure), and was unable to detect the failure. But there again, nothing detected the failure on XV227.
Ed, if you still believe there isn't a problem, ask yourself why has MoD finally decided to change some 37 hot air ducts in the engine bay areas, many of which were declared as being "life expired and in need of replacement" back in early 2005. Stop burying your head in the sand and look at the facts.
Not bad for someone out of his depth.
DV
And I say to you, DV, that you are going into areas you know little or nothing about
I did not identify the hazard, nor did I set the severity. They were done by BAE Systems Chadderton Airworthiness Dept and the Nimrod IPT. The hazard in Maitenence Zone 413/443 was identified during the Zonal Hazard Analysis and the development of the Hazard log leading to the issue of the aircraft level baseline safety case in 2004. As a result hazard NM/H66 in the Nimrod Phase 2 Hazard log was raised to detail the potential for hot air leaks from LP & HP ducting on rib 2 to impinge on surrounding structure and systems (electrical wiring, CSDU oil pipes, fuel pipes and hydraulic pipes). As a result of this, the hazard was set at INCREDIBLE/CATASTROPHIC.
Following the second duct failure, which took place in this area, Chadderton recommended, in early 2006, that "the probability of failure should be reassessed to IMPROBABLE or more likely REMOTE" The IPT elected to settle for IMPROBABLE. Subsequently, during a reassessment of the Hazard log structure in 2008, QinetiQ recommended that because there had been a second failure the probalility level should be set at OCCASSIONAL. This has got nothing to do about understanding Nimrod, but about having specialist knowledge in system failure rates.
So at present we have a hazard set at IMPROBABLE/CATASTROPHIC (HRI "C") by the IPT, when QinetiQ believe it should be at OCCASSIONAL/CATASTROPHIC (HRI "A"). But in your posting you state that "I do not have an argument with the upgarde from 'remote' to 'occassional'. Your problem, it seems, is with the severity. Well that has been set at "CATASTROPHIC" from day one, not by me, but BAE and the IPT.
By the way, with regards to mitigation, a temperature sensor (S7) is located at Rib 2 (17 " away from the duct failure), and was unable to detect the failure. But there again, nothing detected the failure on XV227.
Ed, if you still believe there isn't a problem, ask yourself why has MoD finally decided to change some 37 hot air ducts in the engine bay areas, many of which were declared as being "life expired and in need of replacement" back in early 2005. Stop burying your head in the sand and look at the facts.
Not bad for someone out of his depth.
DV
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DV, I wonder if you have tried to pass that information along to the QC carrying out the review?
I understand that the e-mail address for the review (not located at the QC's chambers, but in an MoD building) only gets to the MoD secretariat. (The same Secretariat A shall we call him..... who was seconded to the Deepcut review). Someone with a keen interest in this review sent numerous e-mails, Secretariat A eventually acknowledged receipt of the first submission, but inferred it contained nothing of interest. In an effort to submit it direct to the QC, it was then sent it to his chambers - and got a rather curt reply from.... Secretariat A...... It would seem the Review's MoD staff has direct access to ALL the QC's e-mail!
I am wondering if this will go the same way as the Deepcut review!
I understand that the e-mail address for the review (not located at the QC's chambers, but in an MoD building) only gets to the MoD secretariat. (The same Secretariat A shall we call him..... who was seconded to the Deepcut review). Someone with a keen interest in this review sent numerous e-mails, Secretariat A eventually acknowledged receipt of the first submission, but inferred it contained nothing of interest. In an effort to submit it direct to the QC, it was then sent it to his chambers - and got a rather curt reply from.... Secretariat A...... It would seem the Review's MoD staff has direct access to ALL the QC's e-mail!
I am wondering if this will go the same way as the Deepcut review!
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Fuel Couplings
Ed Sett100, you said
Well, knowing what is stated in the XV235 report, someone should be asking IPT how couplings can be checked for alignment to 1 degree, not 4 degrees. The need for 1 degree alignment is stated in the Declaration of Design and Performance document of 1968, but I am not aware of any procedure to ensure such conformity.
The same DDP clearly states that the max fuel flow rate for the seals/couplings is just over 1000 kg/min, but XV230 recieved fuel at twice that rate. We have got hung-up with delivery pressure, but flow rate seems to have been overlooked when we moved to AAR.
DV
Misaligned coupling were not mentioned in the presentation
The same DDP clearly states that the max fuel flow rate for the seals/couplings is just over 1000 kg/min, but XV230 recieved fuel at twice that rate. We have got hung-up with delivery pressure, but flow rate seems to have been overlooked when we moved to AAR.
DV
Nigegilb:
Which either makes the QC a victim of MOD intrigue or a willing participant in it...you pays your money and makes your choice! Given the "Waiting for Des" saga of the sticky at the top of this forum I know where my suspicions lie. There is dirty work afoot I fear!
It would seem the Review's MoD staff has direct access to ALL the QC's e-mail!
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Keepittidy,
firstly I would like to say that as EX Nimrod aircrew (with many old friends still on them) I am glad to see that the groundcrew remain, as they were in my day (not THAT long ago) comitted to providing a service that far exceeds 'civvy' attitudes to earning a crust. Actually I think you'd find that the vast majority of current and ex Nimrod aircrew posting on here share that sentiment - and the temporary heightened level of 'bonding' (?) that occurs when a crew and a groundcrew were matched up for the duration of a Fincastle or Airde Whyte was quite something - in other words you don't have to persuade anyone who is or was Nimrod aircrew that the lineys have their hearts in the right place, none of us have ever (to my knowledge) ever held lineys in anything but the deepest respect.
There's always a 'but', isn't there?
Two points - one - a LOT of the people you are dismissing as Microsoft Flight Simmers are ex-aircrew, some with an awful lot of time on type. Having spent a lot of time in ops during my 23 yrs in the RAF I only have 3500 hrs on type - I was crewed up for a time with a guy who had 20,000 hrs - you can't casually dismiss everyone who disagrees with you, these aren't all Walts by a long chalk.
Two - the Mail photo and article that FG dismissed: As I understand it the tolerance on fuel pipe connections is supposed to be 1 degree? The photo - whether of 235 or another aircraft - clearly shows a connection that a blind Ukranian plumber's guide dog would bark at. Later posts include links to official RAF reports that confirm the hand built nature of each airframe's fuel system meant that (effectively) special training was required to ensure the groundcrew could maintain the fuel system correctly - and that this trainingt was NOT actually delivered. This isn't a dig at the groundies, the tradesmen concerned are blameless - it's the training system that let THEM down. The picture, unless photoshopped, clearly shows that the fuel system of THAT aircraft was not as it should be, and it's quite easy to understand how THAT fuel connection would quite possibly spray fuel if fuel (under pressure) passed through the pipe.
Please understand that current and previous aircrew have a deep respect and liking for the groundcrew - particularly the lineys. Many of those you seem to dislike on here have got a lot of Nimrod time, and sufficient understanding of the aircraft and systems to form a reasonably valid opinion that may well be different to yours.
People like DV, who may not have any prior experience, are often pointing out that the RAF, or somebody paid by MOD to investigate some aspect of the Nimrod, have themselves reported back to the MOD/RAF with critical comments. It isn't a case of spin, it's a case of the RAF/MOD setting a standard and being caught out, so it's unfair to suggest their comments are worthless - they're simply pointing out that QQ etc don't agree with the RAF...if the report is somehow 'wrong' due to QQ etc being numpties, then why were they asked to do the review in the first place? (Don't hire someone to investigate something then dismiss their report because it doesn't say what you wanted it to!)
As for FG - sir, I have a lot of respect for those still doing the job, but please remember that there are 7 NCOs behind you* who you share responsibility for, whose only option at the moment is to fly or find themselves a job outside at very little notice... Forget the histrionics, are the fuel couplings within 1 degree as per specs?
Dave
* and 1 in front, but the flashing lights usually keep him amused....
firstly I would like to say that as EX Nimrod aircrew (with many old friends still on them) I am glad to see that the groundcrew remain, as they were in my day (not THAT long ago) comitted to providing a service that far exceeds 'civvy' attitudes to earning a crust. Actually I think you'd find that the vast majority of current and ex Nimrod aircrew posting on here share that sentiment - and the temporary heightened level of 'bonding' (?) that occurs when a crew and a groundcrew were matched up for the duration of a Fincastle or Airde Whyte was quite something - in other words you don't have to persuade anyone who is or was Nimrod aircrew that the lineys have their hearts in the right place, none of us have ever (to my knowledge) ever held lineys in anything but the deepest respect.
There's always a 'but', isn't there?
Two points - one - a LOT of the people you are dismissing as Microsoft Flight Simmers are ex-aircrew, some with an awful lot of time on type. Having spent a lot of time in ops during my 23 yrs in the RAF I only have 3500 hrs on type - I was crewed up for a time with a guy who had 20,000 hrs - you can't casually dismiss everyone who disagrees with you, these aren't all Walts by a long chalk.
Two - the Mail photo and article that FG dismissed: As I understand it the tolerance on fuel pipe connections is supposed to be 1 degree? The photo - whether of 235 or another aircraft - clearly shows a connection that a blind Ukranian plumber's guide dog would bark at. Later posts include links to official RAF reports that confirm the hand built nature of each airframe's fuel system meant that (effectively) special training was required to ensure the groundcrew could maintain the fuel system correctly - and that this trainingt was NOT actually delivered. This isn't a dig at the groundies, the tradesmen concerned are blameless - it's the training system that let THEM down. The picture, unless photoshopped, clearly shows that the fuel system of THAT aircraft was not as it should be, and it's quite easy to understand how THAT fuel connection would quite possibly spray fuel if fuel (under pressure) passed through the pipe.
Please understand that current and previous aircrew have a deep respect and liking for the groundcrew - particularly the lineys. Many of those you seem to dislike on here have got a lot of Nimrod time, and sufficient understanding of the aircraft and systems to form a reasonably valid opinion that may well be different to yours.
People like DV, who may not have any prior experience, are often pointing out that the RAF, or somebody paid by MOD to investigate some aspect of the Nimrod, have themselves reported back to the MOD/RAF with critical comments. It isn't a case of spin, it's a case of the RAF/MOD setting a standard and being caught out, so it's unfair to suggest their comments are worthless - they're simply pointing out that QQ etc don't agree with the RAF...if the report is somehow 'wrong' due to QQ etc being numpties, then why were they asked to do the review in the first place? (Don't hire someone to investigate something then dismiss their report because it doesn't say what you wanted it to!)
As for FG - sir, I have a lot of respect for those still doing the job, but please remember that there are 7 NCOs behind you* who you share responsibility for, whose only option at the moment is to fly or find themselves a job outside at very little notice... Forget the histrionics, are the fuel couplings within 1 degree as per specs?
Dave
* and 1 in front, but the flashing lights usually keep him amused....
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DV, you post #1417 was an excellent reply to EdSett's ill informed comments. As a safety engineer of over 10 years, I read EdSett's comments with deep suspicion, but unable, without the detailed knowledge of the systems and that area of the aircraft to disagree.
Your point:
is absolutely spot on, QinetiQ may not be Nimrod experts, but they do have the system safety engineering expertise to extract the right information from those who are !
Well said DV
S_H
Your point:
This has got nothing to do about understanding Nimrod, but about having specialist knowledge in system failure rates.
Well said DV
S_H
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DV:
Well, you would say that anyway, so I'll not dwell on it.
I don't doubt your word. I strongly question the categorisation of CATESTROPHIC.
A HP air duct blow-out inside any one of the engine compartments will not bring the aircraft down. The very worst it will do is damage the engine, as you have just described, which is not catastrophic.
Yes, I know. They are wrong. BAeS, IPTand QQ did not design the aircraft. BAeS and the IPT made some big mistakes in risk analysis before Sep 06, which is why the whole process has started over again.
Which means that it was an insignificant failure. None of my colleagues are aware of this 2nd duct failure. Now I know why (based on what you have just said); it was so insignificant that it didn't activate the warning which means that an Incident Report was not raised (an IR is usually raised for a Rib 2 overheat; they are never catestrophic, but are worth publicity). The slight damage must have been discovered after flight.
. The XV227 (SCP) duct was not monitored for failure in the same way as the ducts in the engine compts. As you know, that duct has been out of service since 2 Sep.
If BAeS says that the ducts are lifex it does not mean, de facto, that they present a catastrophic risk. I agree that the ducts are more vulnerable to failure than in-life ducts, but it is simply not a problem if one fails. Please remember I am referring only to ducts in the engine compartments. I am not burying my head in the sand. I accept that you are passing on info from organisations that we should trust and you place great store in them, but they have been wrong before. I believe that in the fullness of time, the CATESTROPHIC evaluation will be downgraded.
True enough. I only wish I could show you the ducts and the amount of protection around them (and I don't mean the duct heat shields; I'm talking about titanium walls and and a very solid engine)
Regards
Ed Sett
Clearly, from that statement and the points raised in your posting there is a strong indication that you are not as well informed as you make out to be.
I did not identify the hazard, nor did I set the severity. They were done by BAE Systems Chadderton Airworthiness Dept and the Nimrod IPT. The hazard in Maitenence Zone 413/443 was identified during the Zonal Hazard Analysis and the development of the Hazard log leading to the issue of the aircraft level baseline safety case in 2004. As a result hazard NM/H66 in the Nimrod Phase 2 Hazard log was raised to detail the potential for hot air leaks from LP & HP ducting on rib 2 to impinge on surrounding structure and systems (electrical wiring, CSDU oil pipes, fuel pipes and hydraulic pipes). As a result of this, the hazard was set at INCREDIBLE/CATASTROPHIC.
A HP air duct blow-out inside any one of the engine compartments will not bring the aircraft down. The very worst it will do is damage the engine, as you have just described, which is not catastrophic.
Well that has been set at "CATASTROPHIC" from day one, not by me, but BAE and the IPT.
By the way, with regards to mitigation, a temperature sensor (S7) is located at Rib 2 (17 " away from the duct failure), and was unable to detect the failure.
But there again, nothing detected the failure on XV227.
Ed, if you still believe there isn't a problem, ask yourself why has MoD finally decided to change some 37 hot air ducts in the engine bay areas, many of which were declared as being "life expired and in need of replacement" back in early 2005. Stop burying your head in the sand and look at the facts.
Not bad for someone out of his depth.
Regards
Ed Sett
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They are wrong. BAeS, IPT and QQ did not design the aircraft. BAeS and IPT made some big mistakes in risk analysis before Sept 06
The Nimrod problem is like a jig-saw. By pulling together all the pieces (evidence) we hope to get an idea of what the real picture is. The trouble is that there are people like yourself who seem afraid to view that picture. And there are those people who keep pieces of the jig saw hidden under the table, or worse still loose them.
Once again, get your head out of the sand and see the picture.
DV
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Is it hardly surprising that Nimrod aircrew post on here their concerns about the prospect of carrying out AAR duties in the future when woefully inadequate testing equipment is used to give an NFF conclusion from engineering?
Perhaps CAS should volunteer himself for some Nimrod AAR testing in the UK before proclaiming that Nimrod is as safe as it needs to be to continue AAR sorties.
I am in receipt of information suggesting tha the build standard was NOT maintained, and MoD knew about it (as a contract was let on Woodford). If the build standard is not maintained, then by definition the Safety Case cannot be valid, as there is no way of proving it reflects the up to date (or any) build standard - as required by JSP 553. In turn, the MoD cannot demonstrate compliance with airworthiness regs.
Everything is now hanging on the QC's review, no wonder MoD have their tentacles all over it.
Perhaps CAS should volunteer himself for some Nimrod AAR testing in the UK before proclaiming that Nimrod is as safe as it needs to be to continue AAR sorties.
I am in receipt of information suggesting tha the build standard was NOT maintained, and MoD knew about it (as a contract was let on Woodford). If the build standard is not maintained, then by definition the Safety Case cannot be valid, as there is no way of proving it reflects the up to date (or any) build standard - as required by JSP 553. In turn, the MoD cannot demonstrate compliance with airworthiness regs.
Everything is now hanging on the QC's review, no wonder MoD have their tentacles all over it.
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Second Duct Failure
None of my colleagues are aware of this 2nd duct failure
DV