Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Joined: Jul 2000
Aviation Qualifications: Spotter
Posts: 24,510
Likes: 7,255
From: Peripatetic
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news...rctic-security
Germany to Base Warships Plus Submarines and Recon Aircraft in Iceland for Arctic Security
Germany and Iceland have agreed to expand defense cooperation, allowing German naval and air assets to operate from Icelandic bases. The move enhances NATO’s ability to monitor Russian maritime activity and safeguard vital undersea infrastructure across the North Atlantic.
On 20 October 2025, Germany and Iceland moved to significantly deepen their security cooperation in the Arctic and North Atlantic, a step framed by Berlin as a direct response to rising risks to maritime infrastructure and increased Russian activity. The agreement foresees the stationing of German reconnaissance aircraft in Iceland and wider use of Icelandic ports and logistics by the Bundeswehr, opening a forward operating hub for naval units and air patrols across the GIUK gap.
This initiative matters for NATO’s early warning posture and seabed protection at a time when the Arctic’s strategic value is accelerating.
The development was reported by the German Ministry of Defence.
During his visit to Reykjavik on 19 October, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius and Icelandic Foreign Minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir signed a memorandum of understanding anchoring closer cooperation in maritime logistics, air and maritime surveillance, and the protection of critical infrastructure, including cyber defence.
Berlin intends to increase its military presence on the island, leveraging Keflavík Air Base for long-range patrols and Iceland’s modern port infrastructure to resupply frigates, submarines and auxiliaries. Iceland, a founding NATO member without standing armed forces, remains an essential waypoint and sensor node for allied surveillance across the North Atlantic and into the Arctic approaches.
A central pillar of the plan is the phased deployment of German maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft to Iceland to expand persistent anti-submarine and surface surveillance.
While the German Ministry of Defence has not yet specified the exact aircraft model to be stationed, options could include the newly delivered P-8A Poseidon, legacy P-3C Orion platforms still in limited service, or even Eurofighter Typhoons configured for reconnaissance tasks, depending on mission requirements and availability.
Germany has begun fielding the P-8A Poseidon, the multi-mission aircraft that replaces the P-3C Orion and brings longer range, higher on-station endurance and modern sensors linked to NATO networks. The first of eight German P-8As was delivered in early October 2025, with crews training alongside the U.S. Navy and operational basing planned at Nordholz.
Rotational use of Keflavík would let these aircraft, or other reconnaissance assets, monitor key sea lanes, shadow fleets and high-value undersea infrastructure more efficiently than flying solely from Germany.
At sea, the German Navy plans to employ its frigates, submarines and new maritime patrol aircraft in an integrated manner to sharpen situational awareness across the North Atlantic. Frigates equipped for air defence and anti-surface warfare can screen shipping and protect cable and pipeline corridors, while submarines contribute covert tracking and sea-denial capability.
Linked with P-8A patrols and NATO undersea surveillance systems, these assets create a layered sensor and response web over the GIUK gap, improving cueing, classification and deterrence against hostile submarines and unmarked “shadow fleet” vessels. The concept leverages Iceland’s logistics to keep ships and aircrews closer to patrol boxes, increasing sortie rates and reducing transit time.
Germany’s move rests on a long operational lineage and a rapid procurement trajectory. After decades of operating the Orion, the Marineflieger is transitioning to the Poseidon through an accelerated program: an initial order in 2021 was expanded in 2023, and the first aircraft (63+01) was handed over in October 2025 following mission-system integration and flight testing in the United States. Crews are undergoing a structured conversion syllabus in Jacksonville before the fleet beds in at Nordholz.
This sequencing, training pipeline, first deliveries, and forward employment, explains how Berlin can bring credible maritime ISR to Iceland on short notice while continuing domestic acceptance and fleet build-up.
The advantages of the German initiative are immediate. Operationally, Iceland offers a low-friction forward node that cuts hours off transit to patrol areas, translating into more time on station and denser coverage of choke points. Logistically, using Icelandic ports as points of call for frigates, submarines and supply vessels shortens resupply cycles and supports multi-ship tasking without over-extending German bases. Politically, a visible German footprint in the High North underlines allied burden-sharing and stabilizes NATO’s northern flank at a moment of heightened seabed vulnerability and contestation over dual-use shipping.
Strategically, the implications extend beyond bilateral ties.
Geopolitically, the arrangement reinforces NATO’s control of the GIUK gap, the maritime air bridge between North America and Europe, complicating any Russian attempt to push submarines into the North Atlantic undetected or to threaten transatlantic reinforcement routes.
Geostrategically, bringing German assets forward enhances the alliance’s early-warning lattice over critical cables and pipelines that underpin European economies and military command-and-control, an area made more fragile by covert “shadow fleet” activity and grey-zone tactics.
Militarily, the combination of reconnaissance aircraft, potentially P-8As, Orions or Eurofighters, with surface and subsurface units increases find-fix-finish cycles against submarines and suspicious commercial traffic, improves cueing for allied navies, and supports rapid crisis response north of the Arctic Circle, all while respecting Iceland’s choice to strengthen security without building national armed forces.
This step transforms Iceland from an episodic stopover into a routine German operating hub in the far north, tightening NATO’s surveillance net where it matters most and signaling sustained allied attention to the Arctic and North Atlantic.
As Berlin fields new aircraft and cycles frigates and submarines through Icelandic ports, the alliance gains persistence, resilience and credibility in a region where time, distance and depth have long favored the adversary.
Germany to Base Warships Plus Submarines and Recon Aircraft in Iceland for Arctic Security
Germany and Iceland have agreed to expand defense cooperation, allowing German naval and air assets to operate from Icelandic bases. The move enhances NATO’s ability to monitor Russian maritime activity and safeguard vital undersea infrastructure across the North Atlantic.
On 20 October 2025, Germany and Iceland moved to significantly deepen their security cooperation in the Arctic and North Atlantic, a step framed by Berlin as a direct response to rising risks to maritime infrastructure and increased Russian activity. The agreement foresees the stationing of German reconnaissance aircraft in Iceland and wider use of Icelandic ports and logistics by the Bundeswehr, opening a forward operating hub for naval units and air patrols across the GIUK gap.
This initiative matters for NATO’s early warning posture and seabed protection at a time when the Arctic’s strategic value is accelerating.
The development was reported by the German Ministry of Defence.
During his visit to Reykjavik on 19 October, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius and Icelandic Foreign Minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir signed a memorandum of understanding anchoring closer cooperation in maritime logistics, air and maritime surveillance, and the protection of critical infrastructure, including cyber defence.
Berlin intends to increase its military presence on the island, leveraging Keflavík Air Base for long-range patrols and Iceland’s modern port infrastructure to resupply frigates, submarines and auxiliaries. Iceland, a founding NATO member without standing armed forces, remains an essential waypoint and sensor node for allied surveillance across the North Atlantic and into the Arctic approaches.
A central pillar of the plan is the phased deployment of German maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft to Iceland to expand persistent anti-submarine and surface surveillance.
While the German Ministry of Defence has not yet specified the exact aircraft model to be stationed, options could include the newly delivered P-8A Poseidon, legacy P-3C Orion platforms still in limited service, or even Eurofighter Typhoons configured for reconnaissance tasks, depending on mission requirements and availability.
Germany has begun fielding the P-8A Poseidon, the multi-mission aircraft that replaces the P-3C Orion and brings longer range, higher on-station endurance and modern sensors linked to NATO networks. The first of eight German P-8As was delivered in early October 2025, with crews training alongside the U.S. Navy and operational basing planned at Nordholz.
Rotational use of Keflavík would let these aircraft, or other reconnaissance assets, monitor key sea lanes, shadow fleets and high-value undersea infrastructure more efficiently than flying solely from Germany.
At sea, the German Navy plans to employ its frigates, submarines and new maritime patrol aircraft in an integrated manner to sharpen situational awareness across the North Atlantic. Frigates equipped for air defence and anti-surface warfare can screen shipping and protect cable and pipeline corridors, while submarines contribute covert tracking and sea-denial capability.
Linked with P-8A patrols and NATO undersea surveillance systems, these assets create a layered sensor and response web over the GIUK gap, improving cueing, classification and deterrence against hostile submarines and unmarked “shadow fleet” vessels. The concept leverages Iceland’s logistics to keep ships and aircrews closer to patrol boxes, increasing sortie rates and reducing transit time.
Germany’s move rests on a long operational lineage and a rapid procurement trajectory. After decades of operating the Orion, the Marineflieger is transitioning to the Poseidon through an accelerated program: an initial order in 2021 was expanded in 2023, and the first aircraft (63+01) was handed over in October 2025 following mission-system integration and flight testing in the United States. Crews are undergoing a structured conversion syllabus in Jacksonville before the fleet beds in at Nordholz.
This sequencing, training pipeline, first deliveries, and forward employment, explains how Berlin can bring credible maritime ISR to Iceland on short notice while continuing domestic acceptance and fleet build-up.
The advantages of the German initiative are immediate. Operationally, Iceland offers a low-friction forward node that cuts hours off transit to patrol areas, translating into more time on station and denser coverage of choke points. Logistically, using Icelandic ports as points of call for frigates, submarines and supply vessels shortens resupply cycles and supports multi-ship tasking without over-extending German bases. Politically, a visible German footprint in the High North underlines allied burden-sharing and stabilizes NATO’s northern flank at a moment of heightened seabed vulnerability and contestation over dual-use shipping.
Strategically, the implications extend beyond bilateral ties.
Geopolitically, the arrangement reinforces NATO’s control of the GIUK gap, the maritime air bridge between North America and Europe, complicating any Russian attempt to push submarines into the North Atlantic undetected or to threaten transatlantic reinforcement routes.
Geostrategically, bringing German assets forward enhances the alliance’s early-warning lattice over critical cables and pipelines that underpin European economies and military command-and-control, an area made more fragile by covert “shadow fleet” activity and grey-zone tactics.
Militarily, the combination of reconnaissance aircraft, potentially P-8As, Orions or Eurofighters, with surface and subsurface units increases find-fix-finish cycles against submarines and suspicious commercial traffic, improves cueing for allied navies, and supports rapid crisis response north of the Arctic Circle, all while respecting Iceland’s choice to strengthen security without building national armed forces.
This step transforms Iceland from an episodic stopover into a routine German operating hub in the far north, tightening NATO’s surveillance net where it matters most and signaling sustained allied attention to the Arctic and North Atlantic.
As Berlin fields new aircraft and cycles frigates and submarines through Icelandic ports, the alliance gains persistence, resilience and credibility in a region where time, distance and depth have long favored the adversary.
Thread Starter
Joined: Feb 2002
Posts: 2,967
Likes: 100
From: Devon
Here is an article from Navy Lookout with a message that needs to be pressed home:
Royal Navy aircraft carriers: more than strike platforms
Discussion of Britain’s two aircraft carriers is primarily framed around the terms ‘Carrier Strike’ and ‘Carrier Enabled Power Projection’ (CEPP). While both are valid descriptors, they risk giving the impression that the ships exist solely to deliver ordnance against land targets. In reality, this is only one of their roles, and they are core to a much broader set of naval missions.
Instruments of sea control
It is important to understand that aircraft carriers and warships don’t just put to sea with the sole purpose of defending themselves. This would imply they were merely a self-licking ice cream or some kind of showpiece. While a carrier can be used to launch strikes deep into hostile territory, ensuring sea control around vital maritime assets is just as important. For a nation like the UK, whose prosperity depends on secure sea lanes, this is arguably the most important contribution. It may seem almost old-fashioned, but large ships must continue to safely cross the oceans, whatever advances in technology there may be.
A carrier strike group offers a layered defensive screen, extending far beyond the reach of land-based aircraft. Without such coverage, both naval forces and merchant shipping would be acutely vulnerable to hostile air and missile attack.
There is a real danger that aircraft carriers are seen only as tools for power projection, a relic of Empire or the Tony Blair era, when foreign military interventions of choice were seen as a way to protect UK interests. For better or for worse, the political and public appetite for such action is much reduced, and the growing threat from Russia and China is now the key focus of UK defence anyway. Far from making the carrier irrelevant, the change in the strategic situation makes naval power of far greater importance even than it was in the age of counter-insurgency operations.
Without control of the sea, the UK economy would virtually collapse, unable to import or export food, materials and energy. More broadly, without sea control, Europe would struggle to defend itself from Russian attack. Without sea control, the US and its allies will not be able to deter Chinese military adventures. During the Second World War, escort carriers proved decisive in closing the mid-Atlantic air gap and defeating the U-boat threat. In a modern conflict, the same logic applies: the carriers would be essential to keeping open the Atlantic lifeline to the US and the rest of the world.
If circumstances are favourable, sea control may be partially achieved by containing threats at source with missile or air strikes on land, but this is very unlikely to be a panacea. High-value assets, supply convoys, amphibious groups and reinforcement shipping must be escorted and protected at sea. Aircraft from the carrier form an outer shield against missile salvos from submarines, bombers or surface ships, buying time for destroyers and frigates to deal with threats further in. Such missions may lack the glamour of strike operations, but they are at the heart of sea control.
Anti-submarine warfare as a carrier mission
The threat from hostile submarines remains one of the greatest risks to the survival of a fleet at sea. Carriers can play a central role in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Merlin helicopters embarked with dipping sonar and Sting Ray torpedoes can patrol hundreds of miles from the task group, searching for and deterring enemy submarines. The carrier can carry the number of helicopters needed to maintain continuous coverage and can fly when a frigate’s flight deck might be unsafe in heavy weather. Carrier-launched UAVs also have great potential to decisively increase ASW mass in future.
The RN’s Invincible-class carriers were primarily ASW-focused, at least when conceived. Embarking up to 10 Sea King HAS.5 helicopters, they deployed dipping sonar and torpedoes against Soviet boats, providing convoy protection and extending the reach of NATO’s submarine barriers. British carriers were seen as highly mobile command platforms for ASW groups, integrating escorts, frigates and destroyers into ‘hunter-killer’ groups designed to hunt Soviet submarines before they reached the Atlantic shipping lanes. In this way, even as the UK’s carriers shrank in size and capability compared with their US counterparts, they retained a clear role within NATO’s layered anti-submarine defence.
The number of naval platforms on both sides is now much diminished compared with the Cold War period. However, the missile threat is more lethal and modern submarines are generally harder to detect. Modern doctrine still aims to contain Russian naval forces in the Barents Sea and High North and carriers would serve as both mobile strike bases and defensive nodes, integrated into wider NATO anti-submarine and air defence networks...
Fleet air defence
During Operation Pedestal in 1942, three RN carriers (one sunk, one damaged) endured ferocious air and submarine attacks to deliver vital supplies to Malta, effectively passing through what would now be called an area access denial bubble. Ensuring the arrival of this convoy was hugely costly but altered the balance in the Mediterranean and could not have succeeded without the air cover provided by the carriers. In a future conflict, the same logic applies; Britain’s carriers could be tasked to shepherd convoys across contested seas to reach theatres of operation. This escort role is both historically rooted and operationally indispensable.
Carriers are the only way to provide sustained air cover for convoys beyond the range of land-based fighters and the most immediate task is to defend its own group. In the Falklands conflict, Sea Harriers flying from the carriers did conduct air strikes, but by far their most important success was in preventing Argentine aircraft from inflicting decisive damage to the amphibious task force. Today, the F-35B can provide the same Combat Air Patrol (CAP) function.
In practice, the RN’s carriers give destroyers and frigates the protective cover they need to survive in a high-threat environment. Airborne early warning (primarily provided by the Crowsnest system and the F-35s’ advanced sensor fusion) ensures that threats are detected early, allowing the task group to respond in depth. Fleet defence is thus a primary warfighting role, not a secondary one.
Carriers are also central to the success of amphibious operations. The UK’s Littoral Response Groups are designed for operations on Europe’s northern and southern flanks, but their survivability depends on carrier air cover. F-35Bs can suppress enemy coastal defences, provide close air support to Royal Marines ashore, and control the sea and airspace around the amphibious force...
Also posted on the discussion about the Aircraft Carrier and Sea Control.
Royal Navy aircraft carriers: more than strike platforms
Discussion of Britain’s two aircraft carriers is primarily framed around the terms ‘Carrier Strike’ and ‘Carrier Enabled Power Projection’ (CEPP). While both are valid descriptors, they risk giving the impression that the ships exist solely to deliver ordnance against land targets. In reality, this is only one of their roles, and they are core to a much broader set of naval missions.
Instruments of sea control
It is important to understand that aircraft carriers and warships don’t just put to sea with the sole purpose of defending themselves. This would imply they were merely a self-licking ice cream or some kind of showpiece. While a carrier can be used to launch strikes deep into hostile territory, ensuring sea control around vital maritime assets is just as important. For a nation like the UK, whose prosperity depends on secure sea lanes, this is arguably the most important contribution. It may seem almost old-fashioned, but large ships must continue to safely cross the oceans, whatever advances in technology there may be.
A carrier strike group offers a layered defensive screen, extending far beyond the reach of land-based aircraft. Without such coverage, both naval forces and merchant shipping would be acutely vulnerable to hostile air and missile attack.
There is a real danger that aircraft carriers are seen only as tools for power projection, a relic of Empire or the Tony Blair era, when foreign military interventions of choice were seen as a way to protect UK interests. For better or for worse, the political and public appetite for such action is much reduced, and the growing threat from Russia and China is now the key focus of UK defence anyway. Far from making the carrier irrelevant, the change in the strategic situation makes naval power of far greater importance even than it was in the age of counter-insurgency operations.
Without control of the sea, the UK economy would virtually collapse, unable to import or export food, materials and energy. More broadly, without sea control, Europe would struggle to defend itself from Russian attack. Without sea control, the US and its allies will not be able to deter Chinese military adventures. During the Second World War, escort carriers proved decisive in closing the mid-Atlantic air gap and defeating the U-boat threat. In a modern conflict, the same logic applies: the carriers would be essential to keeping open the Atlantic lifeline to the US and the rest of the world.
If circumstances are favourable, sea control may be partially achieved by containing threats at source with missile or air strikes on land, but this is very unlikely to be a panacea. High-value assets, supply convoys, amphibious groups and reinforcement shipping must be escorted and protected at sea. Aircraft from the carrier form an outer shield against missile salvos from submarines, bombers or surface ships, buying time for destroyers and frigates to deal with threats further in. Such missions may lack the glamour of strike operations, but they are at the heart of sea control.
Anti-submarine warfare as a carrier mission
The threat from hostile submarines remains one of the greatest risks to the survival of a fleet at sea. Carriers can play a central role in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Merlin helicopters embarked with dipping sonar and Sting Ray torpedoes can patrol hundreds of miles from the task group, searching for and deterring enemy submarines. The carrier can carry the number of helicopters needed to maintain continuous coverage and can fly when a frigate’s flight deck might be unsafe in heavy weather. Carrier-launched UAVs also have great potential to decisively increase ASW mass in future.
The RN’s Invincible-class carriers were primarily ASW-focused, at least when conceived. Embarking up to 10 Sea King HAS.5 helicopters, they deployed dipping sonar and torpedoes against Soviet boats, providing convoy protection and extending the reach of NATO’s submarine barriers. British carriers were seen as highly mobile command platforms for ASW groups, integrating escorts, frigates and destroyers into ‘hunter-killer’ groups designed to hunt Soviet submarines before they reached the Atlantic shipping lanes. In this way, even as the UK’s carriers shrank in size and capability compared with their US counterparts, they retained a clear role within NATO’s layered anti-submarine defence.
The number of naval platforms on both sides is now much diminished compared with the Cold War period. However, the missile threat is more lethal and modern submarines are generally harder to detect. Modern doctrine still aims to contain Russian naval forces in the Barents Sea and High North and carriers would serve as both mobile strike bases and defensive nodes, integrated into wider NATO anti-submarine and air defence networks...
Fleet air defence
During Operation Pedestal in 1942, three RN carriers (one sunk, one damaged) endured ferocious air and submarine attacks to deliver vital supplies to Malta, effectively passing through what would now be called an area access denial bubble. Ensuring the arrival of this convoy was hugely costly but altered the balance in the Mediterranean and could not have succeeded without the air cover provided by the carriers. In a future conflict, the same logic applies; Britain’s carriers could be tasked to shepherd convoys across contested seas to reach theatres of operation. This escort role is both historically rooted and operationally indispensable.
Carriers are the only way to provide sustained air cover for convoys beyond the range of land-based fighters and the most immediate task is to defend its own group. In the Falklands conflict, Sea Harriers flying from the carriers did conduct air strikes, but by far their most important success was in preventing Argentine aircraft from inflicting decisive damage to the amphibious task force. Today, the F-35B can provide the same Combat Air Patrol (CAP) function.
In practice, the RN’s carriers give destroyers and frigates the protective cover they need to survive in a high-threat environment. Airborne early warning (primarily provided by the Crowsnest system and the F-35s’ advanced sensor fusion) ensures that threats are detected early, allowing the task group to respond in depth. Fleet defence is thus a primary warfighting role, not a secondary one.
Carriers are also central to the success of amphibious operations. The UK’s Littoral Response Groups are designed for operations on Europe’s northern and southern flanks, but their survivability depends on carrier air cover. F-35Bs can suppress enemy coastal defences, provide close air support to Royal Marines ashore, and control the sea and airspace around the amphibious force...
Also posted on the discussion about the Aircraft Carrier and Sea Control.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Joined: Jul 2000
Aviation Qualifications: Spotter
Posts: 24,510
Likes: 7,255
From: Peripatetic
Well that should make life in USN research interesting to watch in future....
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5...arch-replaced/
DOGE staffer set to replace admiral leading Navy’s research office
The senior head of a Navy office that helps organize critical research and funding for the service has been replaced by a 33-year-old former Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) employee who previously pressed for thousands of job cuts at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Rear Adm. Kurt Rothenhaus was booted as chief of naval research for Rachel Riley, a former partner at the consulting firm McKinsey & Company who joined HHS as part of the unofficial Department of Government Efficiency in January, The Bulwark first reported Thursday.
Rich Danker, HHS assistant secretary for public affairs, confirmed Riley’s move to the Navy but did not say when she left the department, telling The Hill in a statement, “We appreciate the work Rachel Riley did for HHS to improve and right size the agency across its structure, programs, and grants.”
Rothenhaus, who had been in the top post at the Office of Naval Research since June 2023 overseeing billions of dollars in grants, has been moved to an unknown position.
His replacement is highly unusual given that the office — created by Congress in 1946 to fund Navy and Marine Corps research — is typically run by a two-star admiral with extensive experience in technology, science, and engineering.
Rothenhaus is an engineering duty officer who oversaw command control computers, communications and intelligence before he took over the Naval research office. His official biography still lists him as the chief of naval research.
Riley, a Rhodes Scholarship recipient, has no apparent naval experience and has reportedly had a tumultuous several months working in the Trump administration.
She was the main push behind an attempt to lay off nearly 8,000 HHS employees at the end of September, but agency officials rejected the plan, Politico first reported last week.
She has also come under fire along with Brad Smith for their secretive handling of firings at HHS this spring; they failed to share data files with career staff responsible for carrying out layoffs, creating confusion, according to Politico.
In addition, she pushed in September for the near dismantling of the National Institutes of Health Center for Scientific Review, run by 500 employees to review grant applications at the health research agency, Politico reported.
Her LinkedIn profile lists her job experience as working for eight and a half years at McKinsey, rising to partner before starting to work for the HHS in January......
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5...arch-replaced/
DOGE staffer set to replace admiral leading Navy’s research office
The senior head of a Navy office that helps organize critical research and funding for the service has been replaced by a 33-year-old former Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) employee who previously pressed for thousands of job cuts at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Rear Adm. Kurt Rothenhaus was booted as chief of naval research for Rachel Riley, a former partner at the consulting firm McKinsey & Company who joined HHS as part of the unofficial Department of Government Efficiency in January, The Bulwark first reported Thursday.
Rich Danker, HHS assistant secretary for public affairs, confirmed Riley’s move to the Navy but did not say when she left the department, telling The Hill in a statement, “We appreciate the work Rachel Riley did for HHS to improve and right size the agency across its structure, programs, and grants.”
Rothenhaus, who had been in the top post at the Office of Naval Research since June 2023 overseeing billions of dollars in grants, has been moved to an unknown position.
His replacement is highly unusual given that the office — created by Congress in 1946 to fund Navy and Marine Corps research — is typically run by a two-star admiral with extensive experience in technology, science, and engineering.
Rothenhaus is an engineering duty officer who oversaw command control computers, communications and intelligence before he took over the Naval research office. His official biography still lists him as the chief of naval research.
Riley, a Rhodes Scholarship recipient, has no apparent naval experience and has reportedly had a tumultuous several months working in the Trump administration.
She was the main push behind an attempt to lay off nearly 8,000 HHS employees at the end of September, but agency officials rejected the plan, Politico first reported last week.
She has also come under fire along with Brad Smith for their secretive handling of firings at HHS this spring; they failed to share data files with career staff responsible for carrying out layoffs, creating confusion, according to Politico.
In addition, she pushed in September for the near dismantling of the National Institutes of Health Center for Scientific Review, run by 500 employees to review grant applications at the health research agency, Politico reported.
Her LinkedIn profile lists her job experience as working for eight and a half years at McKinsey, rising to partner before starting to work for the HHS in January......
Joined: Oct 2018
Aviation Qualifications: PPL
Posts: 12,213
Likes: 1,648
From: Ferrara
"Her LinkedIn profile lists her job experience as working for eight and a half years at McKinsey, "
Now THAT is very worrying.......................... the price of everything and the value of nothing PLUS a yes-man attitude to whoever is hires you
Now THAT is very worrying.......................... the price of everything and the value of nothing PLUS a yes-man attitude to whoever is hires you
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Joined: Jul 2000
Aviation Qualifications: Spotter
Posts: 24,510
Likes: 7,255
From: Peripatetic
https://www.navylookout.com/the-roya...-will-it-last/
The Royal Navy’s frigate gap – how deep and how long will it last?
....The MoD is reportedly facing a shortfall of more than £2 billion in the current financial year, triggering an urgent search for savings.....
With the economy stagnating and no headroom left for further borrowing, providing additional funds to the MoD will be bottom of the list of priorities for a Chancellor who refuses to address ballooning welfare costs. In the longer term, the RN faces more resourcing pressure while trying to fund major programmes that include 12 SSNs, MRSS and Type 83/FADS, which may not bode well for the future frigate fleet......
Ugly rumours
According to various sources, the deal to sell Type 26 frigates to Norway could turn from a huge industrial and strategic success into something of a trap for the RN.
There are suggestions that more ships from the middle of the production run could be sold to the Norwegians to defer capital costs. Worse still, they might not be replaced by new orders, lowering the number of RN T26s below the eight promised.
At more than £1Bn each, reducing T26 numbers while keeping the shipyards busy may be too much temptation for the Treasury. Flogging off some of the T31s (There would be no shortage of interest) as they are completed is another whisper doing the rounds......
HMS Glasgow, fitting out at Scotstoun and due to begin sea trials in 2026, and enter service the following year. HMS Cardiff, Belfast and Birmingham are progressing steadily behind her. The first Norwegian ship is required by 2030, so either HMS Belfast or Birmingham will probably be renamed as the lead Norwegian vessel.
Forecasting how the T26 programme will look beyond the delivery of HMS Glasgow and Cardiff is therefore something of an unknown and will depend on negotiations involving BAE Systems, the RN, the Treasury and the Norwegian government....
....The MoD is reportedly facing a shortfall of more than £2 billion in the current financial year, triggering an urgent search for savings.....
With the economy stagnating and no headroom left for further borrowing, providing additional funds to the MoD will be bottom of the list of priorities for a Chancellor who refuses to address ballooning welfare costs. In the longer term, the RN faces more resourcing pressure while trying to fund major programmes that include 12 SSNs, MRSS and Type 83/FADS, which may not bode well for the future frigate fleet......
Ugly rumours
According to various sources, the deal to sell Type 26 frigates to Norway could turn from a huge industrial and strategic success into something of a trap for the RN.
There are suggestions that more ships from the middle of the production run could be sold to the Norwegians to defer capital costs. Worse still, they might not be replaced by new orders, lowering the number of RN T26s below the eight promised.
At more than £1Bn each, reducing T26 numbers while keeping the shipyards busy may be too much temptation for the Treasury. Flogging off some of the T31s (There would be no shortage of interest) as they are completed is another whisper doing the rounds......
HMS Glasgow, fitting out at Scotstoun and due to begin sea trials in 2026, and enter service the following year. HMS Cardiff, Belfast and Birmingham are progressing steadily behind her. The first Norwegian ship is required by 2030, so either HMS Belfast or Birmingham will probably be renamed as the lead Norwegian vessel.
Forecasting how the T26 programme will look beyond the delivery of HMS Glasgow and Cardiff is therefore something of an unknown and will depend on negotiations involving BAE Systems, the RN, the Treasury and the Norwegian government....
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Joined: Jul 2000
Aviation Qualifications: Spotter
Posts: 24,510
Likes: 7,255
From: Peripatetic
Required deploying the entire OCU. I don't think there are any jets left at Marham apart from hangar queens....
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/20...-nato-exercise
The largest number of UK F-35B Lightning jets ever assembled on either of the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers has been deployed to the Mediterranean for a major allied exercise.
Flagship HMS Prince of Wales now carries 24 British F-35 jets as she leads the UK Carrier Strike Group in the Med after five months operating in the Indo-Pacific.
That is the highest number of the fifth-generation fighters ever seen on either of the Royal Navy’s Queen-Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.
The jets – from 809 Naval Air Squadron and 617 Squadron – are there for Italian-led drills – named Exercise Falcon Strike, which will see allied work together on a large-scale air and maritime exercise supporting NATO......
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/20...-nato-exercise
The largest number of UK F-35B Lightning jets ever assembled on either of the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers has been deployed to the Mediterranean for a major allied exercise.
Flagship HMS Prince of Wales now carries 24 British F-35 jets as she leads the UK Carrier Strike Group in the Med after five months operating in the Indo-Pacific.
That is the highest number of the fifth-generation fighters ever seen on either of the Royal Navy’s Queen-Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.
The jets – from 809 Naval Air Squadron and 617 Squadron – are there for Italian-led drills – named Exercise Falcon Strike, which will see allied work together on a large-scale air and maritime exercise supporting NATO......
Joined: Apr 2006
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From: Portsmouth
Required deploying the entire OCU. I don't think there are any jets left at Marham apart from hangar queens....
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/20...-nato-exercise
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/20...-nato-exercise
Won't do the OCU any harm to experience a really busy deck and I suspect, a really busy exercise environment.
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From: London/Oxford/New York
Required deploying the entire OCU. I don't think there are any jets left at Marham apart from hangar queens....
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/20...-nato-exercise
The largest number of UK F-35B Lightning jets ever assembled on either of the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers has been deployed to the Mediterranean for a major allied exercise.
Flagship HMS Prince of Wales now carries 24 British F-35 jets as she leads the UK Carrier Strike Group in the Med after five months operating in the Indo-Pacific.
That is the highest number of the fifth-generation fighters ever seen on either of the Royal Navy’s Queen-Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.
The jets – from 809 Naval Air Squadron and 617 Squadron – are there for Italian-led drills – named Exercise Falcon Strike, which will see allied work together on a large-scale air and maritime exercise supporting NATO......
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/20...-nato-exercise
The largest number of UK F-35B Lightning jets ever assembled on either of the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers has been deployed to the Mediterranean for a major allied exercise.
Flagship HMS Prince of Wales now carries 24 British F-35 jets as she leads the UK Carrier Strike Group in the Med after five months operating in the Indo-Pacific.
That is the highest number of the fifth-generation fighters ever seen on either of the Royal Navy’s Queen-Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.
The jets – from 809 Naval Air Squadron and 617 Squadron – are there for Italian-led drills – named Exercise Falcon Strike, which will see allied work together on a large-scale air and maritime exercise supporting NATO......
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From: Hampshire
As I mentioned in #7891 before Op Highmast OC UKLF said personnel from 207 would be part of the deployment. Maybe they are getting much closer to the aircraft availability targets. Given the (im)maturity of UKLF one would expect a high proportion of airframes to be in use by the OCU, so lending 6 to the embarked squadrons to bring them up to their nominal fleets of 12 for a short period doesn't suprise me, nor would embarking additional engineers and technicians from 207 given the shortages. I agree lending the QFIs to fly them may have more short term impact though.
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From: Surrey, UK
Which says more about the pitifully slow build up (causes, many) of the Lightning Force. It is important, because it is the first time the chockheads will have to really work the deck. There is a significant difference in spotting and operating even with just six additional.
Won't do the OCU any harm to experience a really busy deck and I suspect, a really busy exercise environment.
Won't do the OCU any harm to experience a really busy deck and I suspect, a really busy exercise environment.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Joined: Jul 2000
Aviation Qualifications: Spotter
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From: Peripatetic
The MQ-9B will fly with Saab AEW pods in Summer 2026, GA-ASI and Saab have announced.*
The Royal Navy will watch this very closely. In combination with the STOL wing kit, this would deliver the CROWSNEST successor the Navy wants.
The Royal Navy will watch this very closely. In combination with the STOL wing kit, this would deliver the CROWSNEST successor the Navy wants.
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From: Portsmouth
Thread Starter
Joined: Feb 2002
Posts: 2,967
Likes: 100
From: Devon
Here is an article from Navy Lookout with a message that needs to be pressed home:
Royal Navy aircraft carriers: more than strike platforms
Discussion of Britain’s two aircraft carriers is primarily framed around the terms ‘Carrier Strike’ and ‘Carrier Enabled Power Projection’ (CEPP). While both are valid descriptors, they risk giving the impression that the ships exist solely to deliver ordnance against land targets. In reality, this is only one of their roles, and they are core to a much broader set of naval missions.
Royal Navy aircraft carriers: more than strike platforms
Discussion of Britain’s two aircraft carriers is primarily framed around the terms ‘Carrier Strike’ and ‘Carrier Enabled Power Projection’ (CEPP). While both are valid descriptors, they risk giving the impression that the ships exist solely to deliver ordnance against land targets. In reality, this is only one of their roles, and they are core to a much broader set of naval missions.
Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales and her air wing of F-35 fighter jets have completed the first of two major Mediterranean workouts under NATO command.
The NATO pennant flew from the flagship as the largest contingent (24) of the fifth-generation jets ever assembled on a Queen Elizabeth-class carrier conducted nearly 50 sorties alongside Italian, Greek, French and US aircraft on Exercise Falcon Strike.
Most notably, it marked the moment that the UK Carrier Strike Group (CSG), centred on HMS Prince of Wales, reached Full Operating Capability – meaning all its component parts are ready to operate on front-line duties wherever required.
The declaration comes at the tail end of an eight-month global operation that took the task group into the Indo-Pacific to operate with regional allies and partners, before returning to the Med to showcase the power of NATO’s fifth-generation jets.
Over two weeks, jets carried out day and night sorties – including air interdictions, suppression of enemy defences and strike missions. The jets were also tasked with defending a ship in the strike group from attacks...
Carriers are also central to the success of amphibious operations. The UK’s Littoral Response Groups are designed for operations on Europe’s northern and southern flanks, but their survivability depends on carrier air cover. F-35Bs can suppress enemy coastal defences, provide close air support to Royal Marines ashore, and control the sea and airspace around the amphibious force...
It will also see anti-submarine drills, where personnel will practice for scenarios like ensuring freedom of navigation and securing maritime chokepoints...
Using carrier aircraft to protect task group units, anti submarine warfare, ensuring freedom of navigation/manoeuvre, securing chokepoints - all vital carrier roles, as discussed in the thread specifically about the Aircraft Carrier and Sea Control.
Joined: Oct 2018
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From: Ferrara
"it marked the moment that the UK Carrier Strike Group (CSG), centred on HMS Prince of Wales, reached Full Operating Capability"
Six years after the second vessel was commissioned - whatever did we do without them??
Six years after the second vessel was commissioned - whatever did we do without them??
Thread Starter
Joined: Feb 2002
Posts: 2,967
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From: Devon
Is the carrier group still a self licking lollipop when it it protects things such as reinforcement/resupply shipping and amphibious forces and provides freedom of manoeuvre for our (and allied) forces - the primary role of navies for centuries? This was the reason the aircraft carrier was developed during the First World War, and its main role during the Second World War, the Cold War, the Falklands War, some aspects of operations in the Mediterranean/Gulf/Adriatic - basically anywhere the seas and maritime airspace have been contested.
Here is a NATO video dated 5 March 2024:
HMS Prince of Wales can be seen from 2:15:
In the North Sea Exercise Joint Warrior has been taking place. The exercises involved 14 countries with nearly 50 vessels. This includes aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, patrol vessels, minehunters, submarines, and auxiliary ships. There were 100 fast jets, 30 helicopters, and various surveillance, patrol, and air-to-air refuelling aircraft. Their mission? Within the Steadfast Defender exercise scenario, they had to dominate the seas and the skies in the high north so that amphibious landings could be executed.
NATO task groups come together off Norway coast - Royal Navy - 14 March 24
Two potent task groups proved their strength to defend Arctic waters and shorelines from threats when they came together as part of NATO exercises.
The UK Carrier Strike Group, led by HMS Prince of Wales, was joined by a NATO Amphibious Task Group and a range of aircraft off the coast of Norway as part of Exercise Nordic Response.
The formation of more than 10 ships from eight nations gave the men and women on board the chance to practise close manoeuvres - overcoming language barriers and different ways of operating at sea.
In a show of might for NATO and it partners, the exercise allowed the vessels and their aircraft to demonstrate their ability to defend allied territory while simultaneously defending themselves from potential enemies.
Taking part were: Royal Navy ships HMS Prince of Wales, frigate HMS Portland, Royal Fleet Auxiliary tanker Tidespring and amphibious landing ship RFA Mounts Bay; Spanish frigate ESPS Almirante Juan de Borbon; German replenishment ship FGS Bonn; Norwegian frigate HNoMS Otto Sverdrup, corvette HNoMS Gnist, patrol vessels HNoMS Olav Tyrggvason and HNoMS Magnus Lagabote; Norwegian coast guard ship KV Bjornoya; Dutch support ship HNLMS Karel Doorman; Italian aircraft carrier ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi; French frigate FS Normadie; and US destroyer USS Paul Ignatius.
Giuseppe Garibaldi was acting as part of the amphibious group, supporting marines and operating support helicopters. The carrier group provided defence for her and the other amphibious forces.
Why do people assume that a carrier carrying fighters does so for self defence when they would never make such an absurd claim about land based ones? Why do they think of a fighter on CAP as if it is some sort of point defence system? The same argument applies with ASW helicopters. Defending 'the force' was always a major part of the CVF/QEC design brief:
Without going into detail, the "Residual Threat Study" for what was then CVF - worked up by what was then still DERA - very definitely had the CVF contributing exuberantly to the defence of the force against enemy air attack (trying to recall from a quarter-century ago helping out the crew in Filton's Building 20X), it did assume both the "Fictional Foreign Hostile Place With Silly Name" launching Soviet-level mass strikes of multiple regiments of Backfires or successors, and something like five Horizon / Type 45 with some sort of shared TEWA - might have been US CEC, Canadian CORALS or something else - with a huge bomber force launching literally hundreds of incoming supersonic shipkiller ASCM, and being whittled down through the Fighter Engagement Zone (ideally killing scouts, then bombers, and only missiles if those failed); the Missile Engagement Zone where the various escorts re-enacted the "Start Of The War" from Red Storm Rising; and the study ending with "okay, this is what leaked through, maintain HIGH% probability of continuing to remain able to conduct air operations" as the requirement to meet for the carrier..
From here.
You might also consider what the late Professor Eric Grove said:
Professor Grove mentions carriers a lot, in terms of protecting shipping and amphibious forces. At 22:35 he mentions the F/A-18 Super Hornet or F-35 Lightning proving air defence, and then discusses the teaming of the F-35B and the Aegis system via data link to provide a level of air defence (with AMRAAM) that is approaching the capability provided by the old F-14 Tomcat/Phoenix combination.
At 50:15 he suggests that the thing hostile submarine captains dread most of all is the helicopter with dipping sonar - and that an airborne radar flooding an area will keep the hostile submarines down. He then describes witnessing an ASW exercise in which a number of NATO submarines transmitted Soviet levels of noise, and every one was covered by either an ASW helicopter or an MPA.
Here is a NATO video dated 5 March 2024:
HMS Prince of Wales can be seen from 2:15:
In the North Sea Exercise Joint Warrior has been taking place. The exercises involved 14 countries with nearly 50 vessels. This includes aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, patrol vessels, minehunters, submarines, and auxiliary ships. There were 100 fast jets, 30 helicopters, and various surveillance, patrol, and air-to-air refuelling aircraft. Their mission? Within the Steadfast Defender exercise scenario, they had to dominate the seas and the skies in the high north so that amphibious landings could be executed.
NATO task groups come together off Norway coast - Royal Navy - 14 March 24
Two potent task groups proved their strength to defend Arctic waters and shorelines from threats when they came together as part of NATO exercises.
The UK Carrier Strike Group, led by HMS Prince of Wales, was joined by a NATO Amphibious Task Group and a range of aircraft off the coast of Norway as part of Exercise Nordic Response.
The formation of more than 10 ships from eight nations gave the men and women on board the chance to practise close manoeuvres - overcoming language barriers and different ways of operating at sea.
In a show of might for NATO and it partners, the exercise allowed the vessels and their aircraft to demonstrate their ability to defend allied territory while simultaneously defending themselves from potential enemies.
Taking part were: Royal Navy ships HMS Prince of Wales, frigate HMS Portland, Royal Fleet Auxiliary tanker Tidespring and amphibious landing ship RFA Mounts Bay; Spanish frigate ESPS Almirante Juan de Borbon; German replenishment ship FGS Bonn; Norwegian frigate HNoMS Otto Sverdrup, corvette HNoMS Gnist, patrol vessels HNoMS Olav Tyrggvason and HNoMS Magnus Lagabote; Norwegian coast guard ship KV Bjornoya; Dutch support ship HNLMS Karel Doorman; Italian aircraft carrier ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi; French frigate FS Normadie; and US destroyer USS Paul Ignatius.
Giuseppe Garibaldi was acting as part of the amphibious group, supporting marines and operating support helicopters. The carrier group provided defence for her and the other amphibious forces.
Why do people assume that a carrier carrying fighters does so for self defence when they would never make such an absurd claim about land based ones? Why do they think of a fighter on CAP as if it is some sort of point defence system? The same argument applies with ASW helicopters. Defending 'the force' was always a major part of the CVF/QEC design brief:
Without going into detail, the "Residual Threat Study" for what was then CVF - worked up by what was then still DERA - very definitely had the CVF contributing exuberantly to the defence of the force against enemy air attack (trying to recall from a quarter-century ago helping out the crew in Filton's Building 20X), it did assume both the "Fictional Foreign Hostile Place With Silly Name" launching Soviet-level mass strikes of multiple regiments of Backfires or successors, and something like five Horizon / Type 45 with some sort of shared TEWA - might have been US CEC, Canadian CORALS or something else - with a huge bomber force launching literally hundreds of incoming supersonic shipkiller ASCM, and being whittled down through the Fighter Engagement Zone (ideally killing scouts, then bombers, and only missiles if those failed); the Missile Engagement Zone where the various escorts re-enacted the "Start Of The War" from Red Storm Rising; and the study ending with "okay, this is what leaked through, maintain HIGH% probability of continuing to remain able to conduct air operations" as the requirement to meet for the carrier..
From here.
You might also consider what the late Professor Eric Grove said:
Professor Grove mentions carriers a lot, in terms of protecting shipping and amphibious forces. At 22:35 he mentions the F/A-18 Super Hornet or F-35 Lightning proving air defence, and then discusses the teaming of the F-35B and the Aegis system via data link to provide a level of air defence (with AMRAAM) that is approaching the capability provided by the old F-14 Tomcat/Phoenix combination.
At 50:15 he suggests that the thing hostile submarine captains dread most of all is the helicopter with dipping sonar - and that an airborne radar flooding an area will keep the hostile submarines down. He then describes witnessing an ASW exercise in which a number of NATO submarines transmitted Soviet levels of noise, and every one was covered by either an ASW helicopter or an MPA.