Slingsby Firefly's
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We worked on 12 gph (imperial) but that was fully rich all the time. For aeros reckon on about 18 gph (rich), for cruising 8 gph (leaned). Endurance figure was 6 gph which was achievable - I managed 4 hrs 20 mins one night (!) on about 28 gals.
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I have over the past year been doing an aerobatic refresher course on a T67C. I originally did aeros in the UAS ona Bulldog.
I have just about managed to stop a precision spin on 1 1/2 turns, but would have difficulty stopping in 1 1/4.
My instructor has told me that failure to hold the control column back on the stops until full opposite rudder is applied leads to a high rotational spin. I have tried to pursuade him to demo this, so that should it occur due to my error, I would know what to expect, and how to recover. He is extremely reluctant to demo this.
Does anyone have any experience of high rotational spins and recovery technique??
I have just about managed to stop a precision spin on 1 1/2 turns, but would have difficulty stopping in 1 1/4.
My instructor has told me that failure to hold the control column back on the stops until full opposite rudder is applied leads to a high rotational spin. I have tried to pursuade him to demo this, so that should it occur due to my error, I would know what to expect, and how to recover. He is extremely reluctant to demo this.
Does anyone have any experience of high rotational spins and recovery technique??
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I can only really talk about the 260 but 1 1/4 turn spins aren't a problem, you just need to start the recovery a bit earlier - the problem is making sure the aircraft is in the vertical on recovery as there will be significant sideways movement (as you were doing about 40-50 kts on entry) so you have to bung in a lot of pro-spin rudder again as soon as the spin stops. Too soon and you may have problems!
The high rotational spin question is interesting. For a start the main problem with them is not recovering as such but rather the huge amount of height it takes if the spin is fully developed . Recovery is simply a matter of maintaining opposite rudder and pushing the stick centrally forwards until the spin stops, which it always has for me. In the event it doesn't stop, there is a case for moving the stick slowly back then forwards again - this will unmask the rudder if the elevators (which have been fully down) have been shielding it.
If however the spin is not fully developed (which a 1 or 2 turn spin isn't) then recovery is much more immediate, and indeed if you have been flick-rolling you will find that you can speed up the rotation markedly by moving the stick forwards once the rotation starts. Stopping is normal flick roll recovery but you may have to be a bit brisker.
Now the interesting bit (which I have found by experimenting) is that in e.g. a 1 1/2 turn spin, after entry, by easing the rudder off the stop, you can slow the spin down a bit, and if at almost the same time you ease the stick forwards then precision recovery can be made by using much less than full opposite rudder and only a relatively small, but brisk, further forward movement of the stick to stop precisely on heading. I have used this method in competition and got consistently good marks (although I still can't nail the 45 degree line). What I will say is that if you're going to practice, give youself lots of height. I've never yet had any problems with the Firefly spin but I'm sure it could bite if provoked
The high rotational spin question is interesting. For a start the main problem with them is not recovering as such but rather the huge amount of height it takes if the spin is fully developed . Recovery is simply a matter of maintaining opposite rudder and pushing the stick centrally forwards until the spin stops, which it always has for me. In the event it doesn't stop, there is a case for moving the stick slowly back then forwards again - this will unmask the rudder if the elevators (which have been fully down) have been shielding it.
If however the spin is not fully developed (which a 1 or 2 turn spin isn't) then recovery is much more immediate, and indeed if you have been flick-rolling you will find that you can speed up the rotation markedly by moving the stick forwards once the rotation starts. Stopping is normal flick roll recovery but you may have to be a bit brisker.
Now the interesting bit (which I have found by experimenting) is that in e.g. a 1 1/2 turn spin, after entry, by easing the rudder off the stop, you can slow the spin down a bit, and if at almost the same time you ease the stick forwards then precision recovery can be made by using much less than full opposite rudder and only a relatively small, but brisk, further forward movement of the stick to stop precisely on heading. I have used this method in competition and got consistently good marks (although I still can't nail the 45 degree line). What I will say is that if you're going to practice, give youself lots of height. I've never yet had any problems with the Firefly spin but I'm sure it could bite if provoked
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Fate of the remaining T-3s rotting away at Hondu now decided:
T-3A fleet will be destroyed
Colorado Springs Gazette September 9th
The Air Force’s fleet of 110 T-3A Firefly aircraft will be destroyed after the airplane’s short but deadly run in the service’s pilot training program during the 1990s, the Air Force said Friday.
The British-made T-3 replaced the T-41 aircraft in 1993 but was grounded in 1997 after three Air Force Academy cadets and their three instructors died in separate crashes in consecutive years.
“We critically challenged ourselves as to what was the right moral policy and economical and legal decision and were led to completely salvage these airplanes, because we no longer have a mission for this aircraft,” David Smith, news division chief with Air Education and Training Command’s public affairs office, said Friday.
The aerobatic training planes will be scrapped, with contractor, TOTALL Metal Recycling Inc., of Granite City, Ill., paid only scrap value, plus $12,000 to transport four T-3s from Edwards Air Force Base to Hondo Airport, Texas, for destruction.
TOTALL will start destroying the 106 aircraft at Hondo Monday and complete the contract by Sept. 25.
The Air Force considered selling the planes for parts or refurbishing them to Federal Aviation Administration standards for resale to the public but decided to junk them.
Smith said rehabilitation would have required replacing engines and reskinning the horizontal and vertical stabilizers because of hail damage.
“The aircraft has been sitting for nine years, so to get them to FAA certification, you’d almost have to rebuild the airplanes,” he said. “It was found to be totally cost-prohibitive.”
The Air Force bought the planes for $32 million and spent $10 million trying to fix the planes after they were grounded.
The Slingsby T-3A was used in the Enhanced Flight Screening Program. From 1993 to 1995, 113 aircraft were delivered to Hondo, Texas, and the academy.
On Feb. 22, 1995, Capt. Daniel Fischer, 28, of Jupiter, Fla., and Cadet 2nd Class Mark Dostal, 20, from Moraga, Calif., were killed when their T-3A crashed near the El Paso-Elbert County line. The plane went down during a spin maneuver. Air Force officials blamed pilot error.
On Sept. 30, 1996, Capt. Clay D. Smith, 29, of Tampa, Fla., and Cadet 1st Class Dennis P. Rando, 21, of East Bridgewater, Mass., were killed in a crash on the prairie of El Paso County. An investigation found the plane’s engine quit while the cadet was simulating a forced landing.
On June 25, 1997, Capt. Glen A. Comeaux, 31, of Yorktown, Va., and Cadet 1st Class Pace Weber, 20, of Miami, died when their plane stalled and went into a spin two miles east of the academy. The Air Force blamed the pilot for failing to recover control of the plane.
In July 1997, the service grounded the T-3A fleet and placed the aircraft in storage.
In September 1999, the plane was declared excess to the training command’s needs.
Although in 2000 the Air Force chief of staff requested a new mission be found for the T-3A, a study completed in 2002 didn’t recommend a use.
The aircraft were stored without maintenance at the academy and the Hondo Airport. In 2002-2003, the academy’s 53 aircraft were dismantled and trucked to Hondo.
In late 2002, a federal appeals court upheld a 2001 Florida jury verdict that said the T-3A is unsafe. The jury directed the plane’s British manufacturer to pay $4 million to Weber’s family. Another victim’s family settled out of court with the company.
The decision to destroy the planes was delayed by litigation involving Air Force claims against the manufacturer, Smith said.
I/C
T-3A fleet will be destroyed
Colorado Springs Gazette September 9th
The Air Force’s fleet of 110 T-3A Firefly aircraft will be destroyed after the airplane’s short but deadly run in the service’s pilot training program during the 1990s, the Air Force said Friday.
The British-made T-3 replaced the T-41 aircraft in 1993 but was grounded in 1997 after three Air Force Academy cadets and their three instructors died in separate crashes in consecutive years.
“We critically challenged ourselves as to what was the right moral policy and economical and legal decision and were led to completely salvage these airplanes, because we no longer have a mission for this aircraft,” David Smith, news division chief with Air Education and Training Command’s public affairs office, said Friday.
The aerobatic training planes will be scrapped, with contractor, TOTALL Metal Recycling Inc., of Granite City, Ill., paid only scrap value, plus $12,000 to transport four T-3s from Edwards Air Force Base to Hondo Airport, Texas, for destruction.
TOTALL will start destroying the 106 aircraft at Hondo Monday and complete the contract by Sept. 25.
The Air Force considered selling the planes for parts or refurbishing them to Federal Aviation Administration standards for resale to the public but decided to junk them.
Smith said rehabilitation would have required replacing engines and reskinning the horizontal and vertical stabilizers because of hail damage.
“The aircraft has been sitting for nine years, so to get them to FAA certification, you’d almost have to rebuild the airplanes,” he said. “It was found to be totally cost-prohibitive.”
The Air Force bought the planes for $32 million and spent $10 million trying to fix the planes after they were grounded.
The Slingsby T-3A was used in the Enhanced Flight Screening Program. From 1993 to 1995, 113 aircraft were delivered to Hondo, Texas, and the academy.
On Feb. 22, 1995, Capt. Daniel Fischer, 28, of Jupiter, Fla., and Cadet 2nd Class Mark Dostal, 20, from Moraga, Calif., were killed when their T-3A crashed near the El Paso-Elbert County line. The plane went down during a spin maneuver. Air Force officials blamed pilot error.
On Sept. 30, 1996, Capt. Clay D. Smith, 29, of Tampa, Fla., and Cadet 1st Class Dennis P. Rando, 21, of East Bridgewater, Mass., were killed in a crash on the prairie of El Paso County. An investigation found the plane’s engine quit while the cadet was simulating a forced landing.
On June 25, 1997, Capt. Glen A. Comeaux, 31, of Yorktown, Va., and Cadet 1st Class Pace Weber, 20, of Miami, died when their plane stalled and went into a spin two miles east of the academy. The Air Force blamed the pilot for failing to recover control of the plane.
In July 1997, the service grounded the T-3A fleet and placed the aircraft in storage.
In September 1999, the plane was declared excess to the training command’s needs.
Although in 2000 the Air Force chief of staff requested a new mission be found for the T-3A, a study completed in 2002 didn’t recommend a use.
The aircraft were stored without maintenance at the academy and the Hondo Airport. In 2002-2003, the academy’s 53 aircraft were dismantled and trucked to Hondo.
In late 2002, a federal appeals court upheld a 2001 Florida jury verdict that said the T-3A is unsafe. The jury directed the plane’s British manufacturer to pay $4 million to Weber’s family. Another victim’s family settled out of court with the company.
The decision to destroy the planes was delayed by litigation involving Air Force claims against the manufacturer, Smith said.
I/C
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I was glad to see this thread and read so much sensible comment regarding the T67 and it's characteristics. Sadly, there is so much rubbish spoken about this aircraft which is so often ill-informed speculation by people who really don't understand the subject very well. After all, club house stories about 'scary' aircraft tend to gather more interest than others I suppose.
I have spent many hundreds of hours instructing both beginner and advanced aeros in a T67M including spin awareness and have spun this aircraft (and many others) several hundred times in just about every conceivable mode - including several 'no drama' recoveries from some less usual situations, including inverted.
As Beagle said, not the best aeros machine by any standard but it does do what it does very well provided you prepared to accept what it is (if that makes sense). It sums up the saying 'easy to fly, hard to fly well' very well indeed.
Unlike so many light aircraft around today which have had the 'aircraft' designed out of them, such as the 172 for example, this aircraft, like the Bulldog, is unstable enough to exhibit all of the 'traditional' characteristics of the 'text book' aircraft. Such as dropping a wing and spinning in a properly stabilised autorotation. This makes it an ideal training platform for the kind of teaching I do whilst remaining a comparatively benign aircraft by all other accounts.
With any aircraft like this it will give back as good as it gets if provoked but remains friendly for long enough to give the uninitiated a little breathing space - the Bulldog was the same as are many others. With a little experimentation it will treat you to a whole number of varying spin modes and recovery responses which is just fine provided the handler is able to recognise and respond appropriately. I suspect that a number of spin related accidents in the T67 have been due to botched recoveries often as a result of 'non-familiar' entry techniques and the resultant spin mode although different to what was intended was not fully recognised for what it was.
Having said that though, I have yet to find a mode that doesn't respond eventually to the standard POH recovery technique - it just sometimes takes a little more patience and persistence as one other poster mentioned.
This willingness to spin is something that I would consider a redeeming feature in many ways. If you like flicking figures then with a little patience and practice you can pull off some very complex stuff in a T67M and 1/2 to 1 turn precision spins are easily accomplished. Believe it or not a one turn vertical upline flick is also quite straight forward with a little practice. If you want unlimited, get an Edge or Extra, if you want predictable intermediate then a T67 260M is fine. Slow roll rate and draggy ailerons come with the territory but are by no means show stoppers. Ask Alan Wade!
AL
I was at EFTS when the selection for the JEFTS contract was been considered. We flew the four types the contractors were proposing to use and the Firefly wasn't our first choice. And none of the four were as good as the Chipmunk in our opinions. Progress!
The Tincano spin is not particulary problematic. The forces are high and two hands are required to hold the control column in the pro spin position, but that was the case with the JP as well. The erect spin was slightly oscillatory, the inverted spin more stable - but the whole process was drama free. However, two Tucanos have been lost spinning. One due to inadvertant trim application and the other due to a loss of a prop blade.
Students have not been authorised to solo spin any RAF aircraft solo since the 1970s. It's not as a result of the introduction of the Tincan.
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...or perhaps it had a high-ranking officer as its champion ?
========
The T-3's {FireFly} crash record is all the more startling because from 1964 to 1994, cadets flew the trainer's predecessor, the T-41, without a single fatality. But in 1995, the Air Force Academy said goodbye to the plodding T-41 {Cessna 172} and its sturdy safety record, replacing it with the muscular T-3.
That decision is starting to look like a mistake. A TIME investigation, based on dozens of interviews as well as a review of Air Force documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, suggests that the T-3 is a plane too perilous for veteran pilots, much less beginners, to fly.
The T-3's introduction to Air Force training was a particular passion of General Merrill McPeak, the service's chief of staff in the early 1990s. McPeak, a fighter pilot who had flown with the Thunderbirds, the Air Force's precision-flying team, is now retired..
"The T-41 is your grandmother's airplane," says McPeak of the T-3's predecessor.
"Our mission is to train warrior-pilots, not dentists to fly their families to Acapulco."
The old T-41, he argued, taught students to fly only straight and level, and didn't teach cadets the building blocks of military flying, including a dizzying array of loops, rolls and spins. With the T-3, the Air Force could offer what it called an "enhanced flight-screening program," which could pinpoint "those cadets who have the basic aptitude to become Air Force pilots."
Defenders of the plane argue that's exactly what T-3 training is meant to accomplish. "We don't want to kill people at the Air Force Academy, obviously," McPeak says. "But we drove [Commerce Secretary] Ron Brown and a planeload of VIPs into the hills of Yugoslavia because of pilot error." "We don't want to kill a planeload of people because we haven't properly identified the people who can do this job."
McPeak, a former F-15 pilot, suggests the fact that all three dead T-3 instructor pilots flew bulky cargo planes before coming to the academy might have contributed to the accidents.
"Maybe if you'd had three fighter pilots in there instead of three C-141 pilots, you wouldn't have had the same result." ...
Ref
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The T67 remains an excellent basic training aircraft. The JEFTS/DEFTS contract has more than met it's objectives for over 10 years.
Reverting to "safer" types has led to increased training costs further up the pipeline whether with students not passing the likes of BFT or taking longer to convert to helicopter types. Earlier pruning (excuse the pun) on slightly more complex equipment has proved worthwhile - testing capacity and honing useful skills.
The issues concerning the T3 variant were not accurately reported in the US press which in turn added fuel to the litigation fire.
The main ones:
1. Where the aircraft were used ? Clearly out of very hot and high airfields
2. How they were operated ? Pilot error is quoted as being the main cause of the spinning accidents. Did the instructors have a standardised spin training syllabus? Entry and recovery altitudes? Parachute option? During initial aircraft evaluation, Edwards test pilots even forced the T67 into inverted spins (which was prohibited elsewhere) with no recovery problems.
3. Engine reliability - the T3's American 6 cylinder is one of the most dependable engines in light aviation. If you are carrying out a PFL then your training should include what to do if it becomes a real FL. Was engine warming in the decent carried out? Test pilots at Edwards AFB completed a thorough post accident flight test programme including closing the throttle at high altitude and gliding to the runway threshold without warming the engine in the decent. Result? The engine went to full power on the go around without any problems - this was repeated many times without any engine hiccups.
All in all a very sad tale of unnecessary waste - both of precious human life and decent aeroplanes. The former caused by poor operation and the latter by media hype and unthinking politics.
Reverting to "safer" types has led to increased training costs further up the pipeline whether with students not passing the likes of BFT or taking longer to convert to helicopter types. Earlier pruning (excuse the pun) on slightly more complex equipment has proved worthwhile - testing capacity and honing useful skills.
The issues concerning the T3 variant were not accurately reported in the US press which in turn added fuel to the litigation fire.
The main ones:
1. Where the aircraft were used ? Clearly out of very hot and high airfields
2. How they were operated ? Pilot error is quoted as being the main cause of the spinning accidents. Did the instructors have a standardised spin training syllabus? Entry and recovery altitudes? Parachute option? During initial aircraft evaluation, Edwards test pilots even forced the T67 into inverted spins (which was prohibited elsewhere) with no recovery problems.
3. Engine reliability - the T3's American 6 cylinder is one of the most dependable engines in light aviation. If you are carrying out a PFL then your training should include what to do if it becomes a real FL. Was engine warming in the decent carried out? Test pilots at Edwards AFB completed a thorough post accident flight test programme including closing the throttle at high altitude and gliding to the runway threshold without warming the engine in the decent. Result? The engine went to full power on the go around without any problems - this was repeated many times without any engine hiccups.
All in all a very sad tale of unnecessary waste - both of precious human life and decent aeroplanes. The former caused by poor operation and the latter by media hype and unthinking politics.
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USAF Firefly accidents
Hi Guys,
A couple of years ago, I obtained a pdf file off the 'web' entitled 'The York Firefly and the Wichita Mescalero and the Fiasco that followed' by a guy named Walt Shiel. I don't know who Walt Shiel is, but he seemed to have inside knowledge of what happened.
The file dealt with the whole business of the USAF's experiences with the T67. The name of the file was wichita.pdf (SECURED).
I can't remember where I got it from, but if you put the document or file title into your search engine it will probably come up with this file. It is well worth reading.
If anybody can't find this document, using the info I have given above, let me have an email address and I'll email it to you.
Broomstick.
A couple of years ago, I obtained a pdf file off the 'web' entitled 'The York Firefly and the Wichita Mescalero and the Fiasco that followed' by a guy named Walt Shiel. I don't know who Walt Shiel is, but he seemed to have inside knowledge of what happened.
The file dealt with the whole business of the USAF's experiences with the T67. The name of the file was wichita.pdf (SECURED).
I can't remember where I got it from, but if you put the document or file title into your search engine it will probably come up with this file. It is well worth reading.
If anybody can't find this document, using the info I have given above, let me have an email address and I'll email it to you.
Broomstick.
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This reopened thead perhaps should contain a reminder of facts.
On the one hand, lots of highly experienced pilots love the T67, have never found it wanting, always responding as expected.
On the other, in the civil arena in the UK, of 80 on the register, 8 have had fatal crashes, 4 of these with instructors on training flights. I understand that this 10% loss is by far the worst of certified aircraft.
Quite apart from the US experience and subsequent scrapping of them, there must be something to be addressed very seriously about them.
On the one hand, lots of highly experienced pilots love the T67, have never found it wanting, always responding as expected.
On the other, in the civil arena in the UK, of 80 on the register, 8 have had fatal crashes, 4 of these with instructors on training flights. I understand that this 10% loss is by far the worst of certified aircraft.
Quite apart from the US experience and subsequent scrapping of them, there must be something to be addressed very seriously about them.
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MikeJ
Most of the accidents involving civilian operated ex-mil Fireflys in the UK have been spin/aeros related. The spinning characteristics of the aircraft have been discussed already in this thread, and so I won't add to them other than to reinforce that the aircraft may enter a high-rotational spin if the full spin recovery is mishandled, and that it will not recovery from this high-rot mode unless the correct inputs are made. It's not a Cessna 152; if the Firefly is high-rotational it will be going all the way to the point of impact unless the correct drills are used.
It will depart quite suddenly during aeros if pulled through the heavy buffet, but will recover quickly if incipient spin recovery inputs are made promptly. A possible scenario with an inexperienced pilot could be to inadvertantly pull through the heavy buffet on the second hand of a loop with undemanded roll developing quickly into a full spin followed by a moment's confusion leading to the stick being moved forward with yaw rate present and no opposite rudder. In this scenario the aircraft will quite possibly have gone from a loop into a high-rotational spin in 5 seconds of tumbling horizon, varying 'g' and a buffeting stick. A successful outcome then requires either a calm, properly-trained head or a servicable parachute.
The Firefly is a safe and competent aeroplane (yeah, except the roll-rate, I agree). There are no issues to be addressed IMO, other than to ensure proper training and currency for those intending to turn them upside down.
Most of the accidents involving civilian operated ex-mil Fireflys in the UK have been spin/aeros related. The spinning characteristics of the aircraft have been discussed already in this thread, and so I won't add to them other than to reinforce that the aircraft may enter a high-rotational spin if the full spin recovery is mishandled, and that it will not recovery from this high-rot mode unless the correct inputs are made. It's not a Cessna 152; if the Firefly is high-rotational it will be going all the way to the point of impact unless the correct drills are used.
It will depart quite suddenly during aeros if pulled through the heavy buffet, but will recover quickly if incipient spin recovery inputs are made promptly. A possible scenario with an inexperienced pilot could be to inadvertantly pull through the heavy buffet on the second hand of a loop with undemanded roll developing quickly into a full spin followed by a moment's confusion leading to the stick being moved forward with yaw rate present and no opposite rudder. In this scenario the aircraft will quite possibly have gone from a loop into a high-rotational spin in 5 seconds of tumbling horizon, varying 'g' and a buffeting stick. A successful outcome then requires either a calm, properly-trained head or a servicable parachute.
The Firefly is a safe and competent aeroplane (yeah, except the roll-rate, I agree). There are no issues to be addressed IMO, other than to ensure proper training and currency for those intending to turn them upside down.
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Used to go vertical, at 90 kias pull the stick and step on the rudder and enjoy the ride. Airplane was great. Ever spin it with power, pro spin rudder, and stick foward? What a ride. We never had any troubles at Hondo in the T-3a. Twelve is correct, proper recovery is required to recover from a stabilized spin.
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Hammer2, ever try that while pushing the stick? YEEEEHAAAA! There was some debate as to whether that constituted an inverted spin (prohibited) but a quick call to Kirkbymoorside (the factory) confirmed that Lomcevaks were OK so off we went. What fun!
Nice to have a parachute though, and I have to wonder how the aircraft has managed to claim so many. I think most of the fatalities have concerned the lower powered A/B/C and 160hp models which maybe have a more rearward CofG than the M260/T3A. Superb aircraft though, and if I ever come into lots of dosh I shall buy one along with a Spit XIV.
Nice to have a parachute though, and I have to wonder how the aircraft has managed to claim so many. I think most of the fatalities have concerned the lower powered A/B/C and 160hp models which maybe have a more rearward CofG than the M260/T3A. Superb aircraft though, and if I ever come into lots of dosh I shall buy one along with a Spit XIV.
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We tried to do lomcevaks several times, (unsuccessful.) . We finally broke a rudder peddle, so The Air Force made us stop.
The fatalities at the academy were simply pilot error. Yes there was a spin syllabus, and it was word for word from the POH (dash 1). We had to log our spins. Over 700 hrs in the t-3, and 500 logged spins, never a problem. Mcpeak had it right when he stated " inexperienced C- 141 drivers". FOs for that matter. Not a good match for a light aircraft. They all basically spun in. Sad but true.
I almost want to say something corny like long live the t-3, but I won't.
The fatalities at the academy were simply pilot error. Yes there was a spin syllabus, and it was word for word from the POH (dash 1). We had to log our spins. Over 700 hrs in the t-3, and 500 logged spins, never a problem. Mcpeak had it right when he stated " inexperienced C- 141 drivers". FOs for that matter. Not a good match for a light aircraft. They all basically spun in. Sad but true.
I almost want to say something corny like long live the t-3, but I won't.
Last edited by hammer2; 10th Sep 2007 at 04:18.
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Mcpeak had it right when he stated " inexperienced C- 141 drivers". FOs for that matter.
in the civil arena in the UK, of 80 on the register, 8 have had fatal crashes, 4 of these with instructors on training flights. I understand that this 10% loss is by far the worst of certified aircraft.
Quite apart from the US experience and subsequent scrapping of them, there must be something to be addressed very seriously about them.
Quite apart from the US experience and subsequent scrapping of them, there must be something to be addressed very seriously about them.
In my 21 years as a US Army and Air Force pilot my most dangerous assignment came as an instructor pilot at the United States Air Force Academy flying the Slingsby T-3A Firefly. The T-3A "Plastic Coffin" was a cool little fully aerobatic plane that had a propensity for killing its pilots. It killed a good friend and flight-mate of mine, Captain Dan "Fish" Fischer in February 1995. The T-3A went on to kill three Air Force Instructor Pilots and three Cadet student pilots in less than three years of service at the Academy. A Hondo Texas T-3A was also destroyed in a landing accident during this period. When you combine this with the Slingsby T67's dismal safety record (The T-3A was derived from the T67) of eight fatal accidents and at least nine destroyed aircraft you begin to understand just how dangerous this aircraft was.
Slingsby T-3A Firefly
I flew the T-3A at the AF Academy as a flight instructor from late 1994 to August '96. I flew the Firefly's predecessor, the T-41 Mescalero (Cessna 172XP) at the Academy from August '92 to the time I transitioned into the T-3A so I can compare both training aircraft. I was the squadron flight safety officer during the first fatal T-3A accident in Feb 95 and I served on that first flight safety investigation board. I left the Academy just a few weeks before the second fatal accident occurred in October '96.
The US Air Force's T-3A was derived from Slingsby Aviation's T-67. Slingsby is an England based company which has been building small aircraft since the 1970's. The T-3A is a very different aircraft than the T67 with many major and minor differences. The Air Force called it an "off-the-shelf" acquisition but the T-3A really should have been tested more thoroughly before putting cadets in the aircraft.
The Cessna T-41 was a high powered version of the Cessna 172, similar to the 172XP. The larger engine was needed to handle the very high density altitudes of the Academy airfield. The T-41 served the Academy for over 30 years without a single fatality. There was a fatal midair collision of two T-41s in Texas but that was due completely to student pilot error. The T-41 was very safe and easy to fly and was not rated for aerobatics but as an initial trainer it is perfect. The mission of the training squadrons at the Academy and Hondo Texas was to screen out individuals who could not fly well enough to complete the Air Force's jet pilot training course. Doing this in inexpensive to fly propeller aircraft was a cost savings measure. The course also served as an introduction to powered flight for the Academy cadets so they could make a more informed decision about becoming an Air Force pilot versus a non-flying support officer affectionately called "shoe clerks" by pilots.
The T-3A Firefly was acquired by the Air Force because someone pulled a theory out of their butt. "If we make flight screening students do spins and aerobatics we'll wash out more students and save money." Brilliant! Not one freakin' student was washed out for acro or spins. They washed out for the same reason as in the T-41, the inability to land the plane well enough to solo.
We initially flew aerobatics and spins in the aircraft without wearing parachutes because the military is exempt from FAA regulations. The cost of the parachute shops and weight penalty were given as the reason the Air Force made this decision.
The T-3A was a relatively unforgiving aircraft that would snap roll with very little rudder displacement accompanied with ANY stall buffet. After the first accident I went out alone in the T-3A and try as I might I could not get the plane to enter a spin or snap roll with no rudder displacement (I placed my feet on the floor). No matter how rough I was on the ailerons and elevator the plane would stall but not snap roll or enter a spin. This lead me to believe the two later engine failure/stall/spin accidents were probably caused by the use of rudder during the initial glide & stall resulting in a snap roll spin entry.
The T-3A's spin entry was aggressive and the aircraft normally went completely inverted during entry which was disorienting for new pilots. The T-3A also spins very nose low--so low you have to look way up to see the horizon. It also spins very fast. It's nothing like the T-37, nothing at all. The T-3A spins so fast that at recovery your eyes do that cagey thing when you stop spinning.
The high density altitude of Academy spin training (between 12,000 and 7,000 feet MSL) did affect the way the aircraft spun and recovered. The thinner the air the less the flight control surfaces have to work with during a spin recovery. I believe this is the main reason all the spin accidents occurred at the Academy.
The Academy Airfield at 6572 feet MSL coupled with the very tight cowling around the big Lycoming IO540 engine (fuel Injected, horizontally Opposed 540 cubic inch) caused massive vapor lock problems. The engine would not start for a second or third sortie if the airfield temp was above 70 degrees due to fuel line vapor lock. Our maintainers found that using a bicycle pump to pressurize the fuel tank vent would get the fuel moving enough to get the plane started and this technique was used extensively for summer flying. In a pinch you could even put your lips on the fuel vent tube and blow to cure a vapor lock. The T-3's fuel pump wasn't in the fuel tank, it was inside the cowling under the engine so it would actually place the fuel between the pump and fuel tank at a lower vacuum pressure for even more vapor lock fun--that's Jaguar quality British engineering right there. We had over 100 engine stoppages during taxi at the Academy. There were 10 reported in-flight engine stoppages too and none were due to mechanical engine failure.
The parking brake brake lock system was designed in a way that allowed air to be sucked into the system when you released the parking brake (brake line pressure lock). We had hundreds of temporary full brake losses, many of them after the pre-takeoff run-up when the parking brake was released. Many of these failures resulted in runway incursions because the plane couldn't be stopped at the hold-short line. I had a full brake failure after run-up and departed the paved taxiway because I couldn't turn the aircraft with the brakes. The brake pedal would go full down with no braking action at all. If you pumped the brakes they would usually come right back. We stopped soloing students for a long time because of the brake failure issue.
While I was at T-3 transition training at Hondo sometime around October '94 a Hondo civilian instructor had a close call during a student ride. They pulled out of a planned spin at very low altitude after several unsuccessful spin recovery attempts. The instructor was really shook up. He said he tried several spin recoveries before one finally worked. They gave him more spin training and sent him back to the line. I mention the instructor is a civilian because all three of the instructor pilots killed in the T-3 were military C-141 Starlifter pilots. The C-141 is a large, four jet engine cargo plane. There was much made about the fact that no civilian instructors were involved in the fatal mishaps but the Academy had only military instructors, all the civilian instructors were at Hondo Texas (elevation 930') doing spins in nice thick air. But a civilian instructor was at the controls when a T-3 was destroyed in a landing accident at the Hondo airfield.
A couple of weeks before the first fatal accident an instructor at the Academy also suffered from a very low altitude spin recovery. The instructor made several unsuccessful spin recovery attempts before finally pulling. The instructor was white as a ghost when she came in. They gave her more spin training and sent here back to the line.
A standard T-3 practice spin entry was done at idle throttle and full rudder until spin entry. The aircraft normally went inverted during the first turn of the spin. We entered spins at 11,500-12,000 MSL with ground level between 5,300 to 7,300 feet in the training areas west of the Academy.
The spin recovery procedure for the T-3A was:
Bold items below were normally verbalized during the recovery.
Idle: Throttle to idle.
Neutral: Ailerons to neutral position--the rudders were intentionally NOT neutralized to allow the aircraft to stay in the spin so we could practice the full recovery. This procedure should have been changed to neutralize the rudders & ailerons after the first fatal accident.
Aft: Elevator (stick) full aft to the stops.
Spinning left (or right): Pilot looked up to see the horizon and determine the spin direction.
Needle left (or right): Pilot verified the turn needle agreed with his spin dirction.
Right (or left) Rudder: Anti-spin rudder was firmly and fully applied.
Pause: To allow at least one full turn with full anti-spin rudder before moving the stick.
Stick forward: Smoothly but positively move the stick forward until the spinning stopped, all the way to the forward flight stop if required. Up to a full turn could occur before the aircraft would stop spinning.
Neutral rudder: Remove the anti-spin rudder for the dive recovery.
Recover: Raise the nose to the horizon without delay but without causing a secondary stall or buffet.
A few days before the first fatal crash my Academy cadet student entered a practice spin but left the anti-spin rudder in during the recovery. He pulled too aggressively and got some stall buffet and we snap rolled in the opposite direction of the spin. It was very disorienting but I took the aircraft, started over with pro-spin rudder and executed a successful spin recovery. When I looked up at the horizon to determine the direction of the spin I wasn't 100% sure which direction I was spinning but the turn needle agreed with my guess.
During the recovery my subconscious was saying, "Hey, take your time and get this right, the bottom of the practice area and the ground is coming up fast." We recovered above the bottom of the area which was at least 3000 feet above ground level. Even so on recovery I turned to the student and exclaimed, Woo Hoo! On the climb back up to altitude I thought to myself, If I was a weak pilot or having a bad day that could have been really sporty. We never received this type of spin training where a simulated student screws up a spin recovery.
The first fatal crash occurred in February '95 during a planned spin entry at 11,700 feet MSL with an unsuccessful recovery. The crash site at 7300 feet MSL was textbook spin on impact. The instructor and cadet were both killed.
The flight safety board was illegally required to brief the AETC director of operations (second in command) before the commander was briefed and he made the safety board president, a full Colonel, rewrite the entire report's findings and recommendations. I was directly involved in this rapid rewrite before the official briefing. AETC is very set in its ways since they've been doing flight training since the Wright brothers sold the Army an airplane. The Air Force resisted every safety board recommendation.
After the first fatal accident the Air Force wanted to begin using parachutes in the T-3 but they wanted the bail out procedure flight tested first. Edwards flight test said they would not open a canopy in flight and jump out but luckily a T67 (British I believe) had a successful bailout during a spin when the student and instructor couldn't recover from a practice spin (sound familiar?). The US Air Force considered that a successful "flight test" of the parachute system and set up two parachute shops (at the Academy and at Hondo TX) and we began flying with them. The next two fatal accidents occurred with parachutes but at altitudes too low to bail out. No one ever bailed out of a T-3A.
An aircraft was destroyed in April '95 during a planned student no-flap landing at Hondo with a civilian instructor. At touchdown the student jerked the aircraft back into the air and the plane stalled. The instructor took the aircraft and applied full throttle but he couldn't prevent the crash. The only injury was the instructor's heel was injurred from the nose gear coming up through the floor of the aircraft. The mishap was classified as a Class B (non-hull loss) because it was said the aircraft could be repaired for less than $300,000 even though the Air Force chose to scrap the plane.
The second fatal accident occurred in Sept 96 during a simulated forced landing when the engine actually quit. The aircraft stalled, entered a spin and hit the ground. The instructor and cadet were both killed. We did not practice gliding stalls in the T-3 because the Air Force didn't do it in the T-37. We often practiced simulated forced landings to bad fields to avoid homes, farms and farm animals. My theory is when the engine really quit the instructor decided to maneuver to a more desirable field and when turning the aircraft used too much rudder and allowed the aircraft to get a little stall buffet--that's all that's required to snap roll the T-3 into a spin.
The third fatal mishap occurred in Jun 97 in the pattern at the Academy. The engine quit on climb out on downwind, stalled, entered a spin and hit the ground. The instructor and cadet were both killed. The official safety report said they couldn't determine if the engine was running but trust me it wasn't. They still didn't practice gliding stalls in the T-3. Again, the instructor probably used some rudder to point the nose of the aircraft toward the runway and encountered a little stall buffet for a snap roll spin entry.
A month later an engine quit when the student pulled the throttle to idle at the perch (beginning of turn to base). They made it to the runway without incident but it prompted the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) commander to ground the fleet until they could fix the aircrafts' multitude of issues. The Air Force spent millions on the fixes but no one had the balls to put cadets back in the airplane (thank god).
Two families of the cadets killed in the T-3 successfully sued Slingsby for damages (one settled out of court).
In 2006 the Air Force made the decision to scrap the planes because they had severely deteriorated in storage and would have required a crap ton of money to make them airworthy. I think the real reason the aircraft were scrapped is the Air Force leadership knew the aircraft weren't safe and they would have continued to kill pilots no matter where the aircraft ended up. Four destroyed aircraft and 6 fatalities in less than three years at the Academy. Yes, all the investigations said "pilot error" but why were so many aircraft lost to "pilot error?" The T-41 (Cessna 172XP) flew for 30 years with no fatalities there. Throw in the eight fatal Slingsby T67 accidents and it's pretty clear this airplane had serious problems.
Yes, I know that everyone that survived the T-3A spun it successfully, so did I but we shouldn't say it's a safe airplane just because we didn't freakin' die in it. With these sorry safety statistics the T67/T-3A is one of the most dangerous aircraft to ever have made it into production.
Rob Robinette
Last edited by robrob; 4th Feb 2016 at 15:22.
Thank you, Rob. That was very informative.
The fate of the 100+ T3a/T67m260s has been, for many years, the subject of a great deal of ill informed discussion, on this side of the Atlantic.
It's good to hear the observations, and opinions if someone who was on the front line, at the time..
MJ
The fate of the 100+ T3a/T67m260s has been, for many years, the subject of a great deal of ill informed discussion, on this side of the Atlantic.
It's good to hear the observations, and opinions if someone who was on the front line, at the time..
MJ
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1 1/2 turn to stop the rotation of a developped spin using the correct technique....
Cap 10 and Extra200 need 1/4 of a turn to stop, and both aircraft will stop even if stick is held back during application of opposite rudder though when experimenting this beware of secondary spin in other direction.
Both aircraft will stop spinning if controls are released and cap 10 if trimmed to 150 Km/h before spin entry will also recover by itself to straight and level in a hands free released controls situation.
Depending on density altitude and weight both aircraft loose around 3-400 ft per rotation + 5-800 ft for recovery to straight and level.
Spinning and spinning behaviors are predictable, what is often unpredictable are the unconscious inputs pilots exert on the controls with often detrimental consequences.
In all developped spins training sessions, in typical 5 to 6 turns spins, all pilots with little or no spin exposure unfailingly either freeze at the controls or exercise unconscious inputs, the most common being not keeping the controls to the stops during the maneuver which in the above a/c leads to a spiral.
A spiral can be deadly if not recognised as the recovery from a spiral applying spin stop recovery will aggravate the situation.
Oldwives tales abound about the difficulty of exiting from a spin. An A/C will either recover or will not recover. And if it will recover, provided within the mass and balance envelope, it will do so exactly as stated in the Flight Manual.
Spin training is feared among the instructors comunity, I have seen Certified instructors demonstrating the spin during the FI course recovering as soon as the wing drops after the stall.
It takes a couple of flights -It has to be done in stages- with a real aerobatic aircraft fitted with oversized tail surfaces, and a real aerobatic instructor with experience, to demistify the subject and do away with the fear.
Too many perfectly recoverable spin certified and even aerobatic aircraft have been lost with fatal consequences, because of this lack of proper training. And this is still being largely ignored.
Cap 10 and Extra200 need 1/4 of a turn to stop, and both aircraft will stop even if stick is held back during application of opposite rudder though when experimenting this beware of secondary spin in other direction.
Both aircraft will stop spinning if controls are released and cap 10 if trimmed to 150 Km/h before spin entry will also recover by itself to straight and level in a hands free released controls situation.
Depending on density altitude and weight both aircraft loose around 3-400 ft per rotation + 5-800 ft for recovery to straight and level.
Spinning and spinning behaviors are predictable, what is often unpredictable are the unconscious inputs pilots exert on the controls with often detrimental consequences.
In all developped spins training sessions, in typical 5 to 6 turns spins, all pilots with little or no spin exposure unfailingly either freeze at the controls or exercise unconscious inputs, the most common being not keeping the controls to the stops during the maneuver which in the above a/c leads to a spiral.
A spiral can be deadly if not recognised as the recovery from a spiral applying spin stop recovery will aggravate the situation.
Oldwives tales abound about the difficulty of exiting from a spin. An A/C will either recover or will not recover. And if it will recover, provided within the mass and balance envelope, it will do so exactly as stated in the Flight Manual.
Spin training is feared among the instructors comunity, I have seen Certified instructors demonstrating the spin during the FI course recovering as soon as the wing drops after the stall.
It takes a couple of flights -It has to be done in stages- with a real aerobatic aircraft fitted with oversized tail surfaces, and a real aerobatic instructor with experience, to demistify the subject and do away with the fear.
Too many perfectly recoverable spin certified and even aerobatic aircraft have been lost with fatal consequences, because of this lack of proper training. And this is still being largely ignored.
Last edited by markkal; 5th Feb 2016 at 17:58.
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Mis-information - well it's a rumour forum afterall!
Rob Rob - very sorry to hear of your loss. Flew the T67 260hp & 160hp versions in flight training role 1998-2009: Military and company operator used full envelope of the machine for much longer with no fatalities. Sent many students solo aerobatics with no issues what-so ever. Apart from roll rate, it was a very good aircraft overall. Landings were actually pretty easy because the large shock absorbers and wide undercarriage track was very forgiving. The Nose gear leg being a separate machining from the engine cage also meant there was no nose wheel shimmy issues with touch and go/rollers.
Those C141 pilots should not have perished - but to blame it all on the aeroplane is not entirely reasonable.
"There was a fatal midair collision of two T-41s in Texas but that was due completely to student pilot error. "
Neither should students get the blame for the T41 collision when there may well have been other factors such as the high wing design, limited lookout opportunities and the colour of the airframe leading to potential "see and avoid" conspicuity issues.
"There was a fatal midair collision of two T-41s in Texas but that was due completely to student pilot error. "
1. "We initially flew aerobatics and spins in the aircraft without wearing parachutes"
Just because there was a waiver does not make the risk of not recovering from a spin as low as reasonable practical (ALARP in Risk Mgt speak).
Given " squadron flight safety officer during the first fatal T-3A accident in Feb 95." what was done about it and why did a fix take so long?
2. Density Altitude:
"he Academy Airfield at 6572 feet MSL
Why were the aircraft operated at such ridiculously hot high density altitudes? Thinner air, lower stalling AoA, higher TAS for given IAS (more momentum less effective controls), etc...
"The high density altitude of Academy spin training (between 12,000 and 7,000 feet MSL) did affect the way the aircraft spun and recovered. The thinner the air the less the flight control surfaces have to work with during a spin recovery. I believe this is the main reason all the spin accidents occurred at the Academy."
3. Use of Rudder: Something awry with what was being taught? Low energy state plus rudder (out of balance) are very common factors in Cirus accidents in the circuit pattern. This is an airmanship issue not the aeroplane's fault. The WW2 Harvard trainer had "nasty" stall/ spin characteristics, yet produced 1000s of excellent pilots - provided they were taught how to handle the machine correctly.
"The third fatal mishap occurred in Jun 97 in the pattern at the Academy. The engine quit on climb out on downwind, stalled, entered a spin and hit the ground. The instructor and cadet were both killed. The official safety report said they couldn't determine if the engine was running but trust me it wasn't. They still didn't practice gliding stalls in the T-3. Again, the instructor probably used some rudder to point the nose of the aircraft toward the runway and encountered a little stall buffet for a snap roll spin entry."
Run in and break at low level with excessive rudder, pulling hard, higher stall speed...? Buffet plus demanded or un-demanded roll or yaw = incipient spin.
Ultimately it is the mishandling of a spin recovery that makes it go high rotational - this has happened to may other platforms not just the T3A. It is recoverable if the correct procedure is followed and you have enough spare height. Setting up for deliberate spins, we always used 3000 feet + height of ground for min abandon height, plus 2000 feet to sort spin out plus a good 500 feet per rotation planned to allow plenty of scope for survival.
NB: The T67M had a bigger rudder than the first T3As
4. Vapour Lock: More to do with Air Force wanting single lever operation. Chosen system was inadequate but was re-designed and a fully functional version was about to be installed when project was scrapped in USA at Hondo.
Unlike the T3A, all the T67Ms had three lever manual mixture control - no vapour lock.
5. Brakes:
"
The parking brake brake lock system was designed in a way that allowed air to be sucked into the system when you released the parking brake (brake line pressure lock). We had hundreds of temporary full brake losses, many of them after the pre-takeoff run-up when the parking brake was released. Many of these failures resulted in runway incursions because the plane couldn't be stopped at the hold-short line. I had a full brake failure after run-up and departed the paved taxiway because I couldn't turn the aircraft with the brakes. The brake pedal would go full down with no braking action at all. If you pumped the brakes they would usually come right back. We stopped soloing students for a long time because of the brake failure issue."
Again we don't rely on parking brakes whilst doing run ups - cover the brakes and be prepared to shut off the throttle as soon as a slippage occurs. Point the machine away from active runway whilst doing Cx?
6. Civi v Military?
". There was much made about the fact that no civilian instructors were involved in the fatal mishaps but the Academy had only military instructors, all the civilian instructors were at Hondo Texas (elevation 930') doing spins in nice thick air. But a civilian instructor was at the controls when a T-3 was destroyed in a landing accident at the Hondo airfield."
Makes no difference if the pilot capable and well trained and follows well thought through SOPs.
7. Terrain?
"The second fatal accident occurred in Sept 96 during a simulated forced landing when the engine actually quit. The aircraft stalled, entered a spin and hit the ground."
What sort of ground? A flat field or rocky outcrop? Again, choice of airfield for training seems to be big issue.
8. End of an era:
"Two families of the cadets killed in the T-3 successfully sued Slingsby for damages (one settled out of court)." - Very sad loss but the US media and such actions also put a nail in the coffin of a company with a long history in aviation who built some capable flying machines with associated job losses.
9. Blame the equipment?
"Throw in the eight fatal Slingsby T67 accidents and it's pretty clear this airplane had serious problems."
Perhaps it was the pilot's training, expectations and reactions to "issues" that exacerbated events. It's happened before and sadly continues today - Perfectly servicable machines can kill - AF447, Colgan 3407, etc.....
Those C141 pilots should not have perished - but to blame it all on the aeroplane is not entirely reasonable.
"There was a fatal midair collision of two T-41s in Texas but that was due completely to student pilot error. "
Neither should students get the blame for the T41 collision when there may well have been other factors such as the high wing design, limited lookout opportunities and the colour of the airframe leading to potential "see and avoid" conspicuity issues.
"There was a fatal midair collision of two T-41s in Texas but that was due completely to student pilot error. "
1. "We initially flew aerobatics and spins in the aircraft without wearing parachutes"
Just because there was a waiver does not make the risk of not recovering from a spin as low as reasonable practical (ALARP in Risk Mgt speak).
Given " squadron flight safety officer during the first fatal T-3A accident in Feb 95." what was done about it and why did a fix take so long?
2. Density Altitude:
"he Academy Airfield at 6572 feet MSL
Why were the aircraft operated at such ridiculously hot high density altitudes? Thinner air, lower stalling AoA, higher TAS for given IAS (more momentum less effective controls), etc...
"The high density altitude of Academy spin training (between 12,000 and 7,000 feet MSL) did affect the way the aircraft spun and recovered. The thinner the air the less the flight control surfaces have to work with during a spin recovery. I believe this is the main reason all the spin accidents occurred at the Academy."
3. Use of Rudder: Something awry with what was being taught? Low energy state plus rudder (out of balance) are very common factors in Cirus accidents in the circuit pattern. This is an airmanship issue not the aeroplane's fault. The WW2 Harvard trainer had "nasty" stall/ spin characteristics, yet produced 1000s of excellent pilots - provided they were taught how to handle the machine correctly.
"The third fatal mishap occurred in Jun 97 in the pattern at the Academy. The engine quit on climb out on downwind, stalled, entered a spin and hit the ground. The instructor and cadet were both killed. The official safety report said they couldn't determine if the engine was running but trust me it wasn't. They still didn't practice gliding stalls in the T-3. Again, the instructor probably used some rudder to point the nose of the aircraft toward the runway and encountered a little stall buffet for a snap roll spin entry."
Run in and break at low level with excessive rudder, pulling hard, higher stall speed...? Buffet plus demanded or un-demanded roll or yaw = incipient spin.
Ultimately it is the mishandling of a spin recovery that makes it go high rotational - this has happened to may other platforms not just the T3A. It is recoverable if the correct procedure is followed and you have enough spare height. Setting up for deliberate spins, we always used 3000 feet + height of ground for min abandon height, plus 2000 feet to sort spin out plus a good 500 feet per rotation planned to allow plenty of scope for survival.
NB: The T67M had a bigger rudder than the first T3As
4. Vapour Lock: More to do with Air Force wanting single lever operation. Chosen system was inadequate but was re-designed and a fully functional version was about to be installed when project was scrapped in USA at Hondo.
Unlike the T3A, all the T67Ms had three lever manual mixture control - no vapour lock.
5. Brakes:
"
The parking brake brake lock system was designed in a way that allowed air to be sucked into the system when you released the parking brake (brake line pressure lock). We had hundreds of temporary full brake losses, many of them after the pre-takeoff run-up when the parking brake was released. Many of these failures resulted in runway incursions because the plane couldn't be stopped at the hold-short line. I had a full brake failure after run-up and departed the paved taxiway because I couldn't turn the aircraft with the brakes. The brake pedal would go full down with no braking action at all. If you pumped the brakes they would usually come right back. We stopped soloing students for a long time because of the brake failure issue."
Again we don't rely on parking brakes whilst doing run ups - cover the brakes and be prepared to shut off the throttle as soon as a slippage occurs. Point the machine away from active runway whilst doing Cx?
6. Civi v Military?
". There was much made about the fact that no civilian instructors were involved in the fatal mishaps but the Academy had only military instructors, all the civilian instructors were at Hondo Texas (elevation 930') doing spins in nice thick air. But a civilian instructor was at the controls when a T-3 was destroyed in a landing accident at the Hondo airfield."
Makes no difference if the pilot capable and well trained and follows well thought through SOPs.
7. Terrain?
"The second fatal accident occurred in Sept 96 during a simulated forced landing when the engine actually quit. The aircraft stalled, entered a spin and hit the ground."
What sort of ground? A flat field or rocky outcrop? Again, choice of airfield for training seems to be big issue.
8. End of an era:
"Two families of the cadets killed in the T-3 successfully sued Slingsby for damages (one settled out of court)." - Very sad loss but the US media and such actions also put a nail in the coffin of a company with a long history in aviation who built some capable flying machines with associated job losses.
9. Blame the equipment?
"Throw in the eight fatal Slingsby T67 accidents and it's pretty clear this airplane had serious problems."
Perhaps it was the pilot's training, expectations and reactions to "issues" that exacerbated events. It's happened before and sadly continues today - Perfectly servicable machines can kill - AF447, Colgan 3407, etc.....