Mcpeak had it right when he stated " inexperienced C- 141 drivers". FOs for that matter.
McPeak was an idiot and did untold damage to the entire Air Force. NONE of the C-141 drivers that died in the T-3A were FOs. They all were prior 141 Aircraft Commanders or above.
in the civil arena in the UK, of 80 on the register, 8 have had fatal crashes, 4 of these with instructors on training flights. I understand that this 10% loss is by far the worst of certified aircraft.
Quite apart from the US experience and subsequent scrapping of them, there must be something to be addressed very seriously about them.
^This.
In my 21 years as a US Army and Air Force pilot my most dangerous assignment came as an instructor pilot at the United States Air Force Academy flying the Slingsby T-3A Firefly. The T-3A "Plastic Coffin" was a cool little fully aerobatic plane that had a propensity for killing its pilots. It killed a good friend and flight-mate of mine, Captain Dan "Fish" Fischer in February 1995. The T-3A went on to kill three Air Force Instructor Pilots and three Cadet student pilots in less than three years of service at the Academy. A Hondo Texas T-3A was also destroyed in a landing accident during this period. When you combine this with the Slingsby T67's dismal safety record (The T-3A was derived from the T67) of eight fatal accidents and at least nine destroyed aircraft you begin to understand just how dangerous this aircraft was.
Slingsby T-3A Firefly
I flew the T-3A at the AF Academy as a flight instructor from late 1994 to August '96. I flew the Firefly's predecessor, the T-41 Mescalero (Cessna 172XP) at the Academy from August '92 to the time I transitioned into the T-3A so I can compare both training aircraft. I was the squadron flight safety officer during the first fatal T-3A accident in Feb 95 and I served on that first flight safety investigation board. I left the Academy just a few weeks before the second fatal accident occurred in October '96.
The US Air Force's T-3A was derived from Slingsby Aviation's T-67. Slingsby is an England based company which has been building small aircraft since the 1970's. The T-3A is a very different aircraft than the T67 with many major and minor differences. The Air Force called it an "off-the-shelf" acquisition but the T-3A really should have been tested more thoroughly before putting cadets in the aircraft.
The Cessna T-41 was a high powered version of the Cessna 172, similar to the 172XP. The larger engine was needed to handle the very high density altitudes of the Academy airfield. The T-41 served the Academy for over 30 years without a single fatality. There was a fatal midair collision of two T-41s in Texas but that was due completely to student pilot error. The T-41 was very safe and easy to fly and was not rated for aerobatics but as an initial trainer it is perfect. The mission of the training squadrons at the Academy and Hondo Texas was to screen out individuals who could not fly well enough to complete the Air Force's jet pilot training course. Doing this in inexpensive to fly propeller aircraft was a cost savings measure. The course also served as an introduction to powered flight for the Academy cadets so they could make a more informed decision about becoming an Air Force pilot versus a non-flying support officer affectionately called "shoe clerks" by pilots.
The T-3A Firefly was acquired by the Air Force because someone pulled a theory out of their butt. "If we make flight screening students do spins and aerobatics we'll wash out more students and save money." Brilliant! Not one freakin' student was washed out for acro or spins. They washed out for the same reason as in the T-41, the inability to land the plane well enough to solo.
We initially flew aerobatics and spins in the aircraft without wearing parachutes because the military is exempt from FAA regulations. The cost of the parachute shops and weight penalty were given as the reason the Air Force made this decision.
The T-3A was a relatively unforgiving aircraft that would snap roll with very little rudder displacement accompanied with ANY stall buffet. After the first accident I went out alone in the T-3A and try as I might I could not get the plane to enter a spin or snap roll with no rudder displacement (I placed my feet on the floor). No matter how rough I was on the ailerons and elevator the plane would stall but not snap roll or enter a spin. This lead me to believe the two later engine failure/stall/spin accidents were probably caused by the use of rudder during the initial glide & stall resulting in a snap roll spin entry.
The T-3A's spin entry was aggressive and the aircraft normally went completely inverted during entry which was disorienting for new pilots. The T-3A also spins very nose low--so low you have to look way up to see the horizon. It also spins very fast. It's nothing like the T-37, nothing at all. The T-3A spins so fast that at recovery your eyes do that cagey thing when you stop spinning.
The high density altitude of Academy spin training (between 12,000 and 7,000 feet MSL) did affect the way the aircraft spun and recovered. The thinner the air the less the flight control surfaces have to work with during a spin recovery. I believe this is the main reason all the spin accidents occurred at the Academy.
The Academy Airfield at 6572 feet MSL coupled with the very tight cowling around the big Lycoming IO540 engine (fuel Injected, horizontally Opposed 540 cubic inch) caused massive vapor lock problems. The engine would not start for a second or third sortie if the airfield temp was above 70 degrees due to fuel line vapor lock. Our maintainers found that using a bicycle pump to pressurize the fuel tank vent would get the fuel moving enough to get the plane started and this technique was used extensively for summer flying. In a pinch you could even put your lips on the fuel vent tube and blow to cure a vapor lock. The T-3's fuel pump wasn't in the fuel tank, it was inside the cowling under the engine so it would actually place the fuel between the pump and fuel tank at a lower vacuum pressure for even more vapor lock fun--that's Jaguar quality British engineering right there. We had over 100 engine stoppages during taxi at the Academy. There were 10 reported in-flight engine stoppages too and none were due to mechanical engine failure.
The parking brake brake lock system was designed in a way that allowed air to be sucked into the system when you released the parking brake (brake line pressure lock). We had hundreds of temporary full brake losses, many of them after the pre-takeoff run-up when the parking brake was released. Many of these failures resulted in runway incursions because the plane couldn't be stopped at the hold-short line. I had a full brake failure after run-up and departed the paved taxiway because I couldn't turn the aircraft with the brakes. The brake pedal would go full down with no braking action at all. If you pumped the brakes they would usually come right back. We stopped soloing students for a long time because of the brake failure issue.
While I was at T-3 transition training at Hondo sometime around October '94 a Hondo civilian instructor had a close call during a student ride. They pulled out of a planned spin at very low altitude after several unsuccessful spin recovery attempts. The instructor was really shook up. He said he tried several spin recoveries before one finally worked. They gave him more spin training and sent him back to the line. I mention the instructor is a civilian because all three of the instructor pilots killed in the T-3 were military C-141 Starlifter pilots. The C-141 is a large, four jet engine cargo plane. There was much made about the fact that no civilian instructors were involved in the fatal mishaps but the Academy had only military instructors, all the civilian instructors were at Hondo Texas (elevation 930') doing spins in nice thick air. But a civilian instructor was at the controls when a T-3 was destroyed in a landing accident at the Hondo airfield.
A couple of weeks before the first fatal accident an instructor at the Academy also suffered from a very low altitude spin recovery. The instructor made several unsuccessful spin recovery attempts before finally pulling. The instructor was white as a ghost when she came in. They gave her more spin training and sent here back to the line.
A standard T-3 practice spin entry was done at idle throttle and full rudder until spin entry. The aircraft normally went inverted during the first turn of the spin. We entered spins at 11,500-12,000 MSL with ground level between 5,300 to 7,300 feet in the training areas west of the Academy.
The spin recovery procedure for the T-3A was:
Bold items below were normally verbalized during the recovery.
Idle: Throttle to idle.
Neutral: Ailerons to neutral position--the rudders were intentionally NOT neutralized to allow the aircraft to stay in the spin so we could practice the full recovery.
This procedure should have been changed to neutralize the rudders & ailerons after the first fatal accident.
Aft: Elevator (stick) full aft to the stops.
Spinning left (or right): Pilot looked up to see the horizon and determine the spin direction.
Needle left (or right): Pilot verified the turn needle agreed with his spin dirction.
Right (or left)
Rudder: Anti-spin rudder was firmly and fully applied.
Pause: To allow at least one full turn with full anti-spin rudder before moving the stick.
Stick forward: Smoothly but positively move the stick forward until the spinning stopped, all the way to the forward flight stop if required. Up to a full turn could occur before the aircraft would stop spinning.
Neutral rudder: Remove the anti-spin rudder for the dive recovery.
Recover: Raise the nose to the horizon without delay but without causing a secondary stall or buffet.
A few days before the first fatal crash my Academy cadet student entered a practice spin but left the anti-spin rudder in during the recovery. He pulled too aggressively and got some stall buffet and we snap rolled in the opposite direction of the spin. It was very disorienting but I took the aircraft, started over with pro-spin rudder and executed a successful spin recovery. When I looked up at the horizon to determine the direction of the spin I wasn't 100% sure which direction I was spinning but the turn needle agreed with my guess.
During the recovery my subconscious was saying, "Hey, take your time and get this right, the bottom of the practice area and the ground is coming up fast." We recovered above the bottom of the area which was at least 3000 feet above ground level. Even so on recovery I turned to the student and exclaimed, Woo Hoo! On the climb back up to altitude I thought to myself, If I was a weak pilot or having a bad day that could have been really sporty. We never received this type of spin training where a simulated student screws up a spin recovery.
The first fatal crash occurred in February '95 during a planned spin entry at 11,700 feet MSL with an unsuccessful recovery. The crash site at 7300 feet MSL was textbook spin on impact. The instructor and cadet were both killed.
The flight safety board was illegally required to brief the AETC director of operations (second in command) before the commander was briefed and he made the safety board president, a full Colonel, rewrite the entire report's findings and recommendations. I was directly involved in this rapid rewrite before the official briefing. AETC is very set in its ways since they've been doing flight training since the Wright brothers sold the Army an airplane. The Air Force resisted every safety board recommendation.
After the first fatal accident the Air Force wanted to begin using parachutes in the T-3 but they wanted the bail out procedure flight tested first. Edwards flight test said they would not open a canopy in flight and jump out but luckily a T67 (British I believe) had a successful bailout during a spin when the student and instructor couldn't recover from a practice spin (sound familiar?). The US Air Force considered that a successful "flight test" of the parachute system and set up two parachute shops (at the Academy and at Hondo TX) and we began flying with them. The next two fatal accidents occurred with parachutes but at altitudes too low to bail out. No one ever bailed out of a T-3A.
An aircraft was destroyed in April '95 during a planned student no-flap landing at Hondo with a civilian instructor. At touchdown the student jerked the aircraft back into the air and the plane stalled. The instructor took the aircraft and applied full throttle but he couldn't prevent the crash. The only injury was the instructor's heel was injurred from the nose gear coming up through the floor of the aircraft. The mishap was classified as a Class B (non-hull loss) because it was said the aircraft could be repaired for less than $300,000 even though the Air Force chose to scrap the plane.
The second fatal accident occurred in Sept 96 during a simulated forced landing when the engine actually quit. The aircraft stalled, entered a spin and hit the ground. The instructor and cadet were both killed. We did not practice gliding stalls in the T-3 because the Air Force didn't do it in the T-37. We often practiced simulated forced landings to bad fields to avoid homes, farms and farm animals. My theory is when the engine really quit the instructor decided to maneuver to a more desirable field and when turning the aircraft used too much rudder and allowed the aircraft to get a little stall buffet--that's all that's required to snap roll the T-3 into a spin.
The third fatal mishap occurred in Jun 97 in the pattern at the Academy. The engine quit on climb out on downwind, stalled, entered a spin and hit the ground. The instructor and cadet were both killed. The official safety report said they couldn't determine if the engine was running but trust me it wasn't. They still didn't practice gliding stalls in the T-3. Again, the instructor probably used some rudder to point the nose of the aircraft toward the runway and encountered a little stall buffet for a snap roll spin entry.
A month later an engine quit when the student pulled the throttle to idle at the perch (beginning of turn to base). They made it to the runway without incident but it prompted the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) commander to ground the fleet until they could fix the aircrafts' multitude of issues. The Air Force spent millions on the fixes but no one had the balls to put cadets back in the airplane (thank god).
Two families of the cadets killed in the T-3 successfully sued Slingsby for damages (one settled out of court).
In 2006 the Air Force made the decision to scrap the planes because they had severely deteriorated in storage and would have required a crap ton of money to make them airworthy. I think the real reason the aircraft were scrapped is the Air Force leadership knew the aircraft weren't safe and they would have continued to kill pilots no matter where the aircraft ended up. Four destroyed aircraft and 6 fatalities in less than three years at the Academy. Yes, all the investigations said "pilot error" but why were so many aircraft lost to "pilot error?" The T-41 (Cessna 172XP) flew for 30 years with no fatalities there. Throw in the eight fatal Slingsby T67 accidents and it's pretty clear this airplane had serious problems.
Yes, I know that everyone that survived the T-3A spun it successfully, so did I but we shouldn't say it's a safe airplane just because we didn't freakin' die in it. With these sorry safety statistics the T67/T-3A is one of the most dangerous aircraft to ever have made it into production.
Rob Robinette