Merged: Norfolk Island ditching
Firstly I think it's admirable that people are defending the crew, thats fine, however the fact that everyone lived was more sheer luck than good management anywhere along the flight.
The Facts - as per the report.
Firstly higher than expected headwinds = more fuel required than planned
Updated weather during the flight - weather below alt. minima = more fuel/diversion possibly required.
Surely firstly with these 2 items in mind and heading to a remote island with non precision approaches dictate a command decision that fuel would be an issue and diversion is needed?
Ignoring that lack of decision - they are then at TOD NLK - are continued to be told that WX was awful and below alt minima, yet they press on. I remember at PPL level being told to 'never back yourself into a corner'. In my opinion NLK at night, rotten WX and minimum fuel is the deepest darkest corner you could find.
They then continue to do approach after approach, then DITCH an aircraft into the ocean without formulating a plan with the very people who would rescue you. There are delays in NLK with launching boats due to no jetty. At the very least surely you would have wanted to communicate an approx direction and have communicated DME/GPS distance via radio before you actually hit. The facts show that the ground were searching in completely the wrong area, and it was just sheer luck that the airport fireman happened to on gut instint drive a different direction, and the PIC happened to have a torch, AND they were able to see it.
Lastly it appears that the PIC left the cockpit with a possibly unconscious(or at least dazed) F/O in a cabin rapidly filling with water, and upon finding a suitable exit left the aircraft leaving his crew and pax to fend for themselves. It was just very lucky for the medical crew onboard that they had experienced one of the best training programs when it comes to underwater extraction that everyone managed to get out.
Am I missing something that would dictate that we would be giving the crew kudos for all the above or was I reading a different report ?
The Facts - as per the report.
Firstly higher than expected headwinds = more fuel required than planned
Updated weather during the flight - weather below alt. minima = more fuel/diversion possibly required.
Surely firstly with these 2 items in mind and heading to a remote island with non precision approaches dictate a command decision that fuel would be an issue and diversion is needed?
Ignoring that lack of decision - they are then at TOD NLK - are continued to be told that WX was awful and below alt minima, yet they press on. I remember at PPL level being told to 'never back yourself into a corner'. In my opinion NLK at night, rotten WX and minimum fuel is the deepest darkest corner you could find.
They then continue to do approach after approach, then DITCH an aircraft into the ocean without formulating a plan with the very people who would rescue you. There are delays in NLK with launching boats due to no jetty. At the very least surely you would have wanted to communicate an approx direction and have communicated DME/GPS distance via radio before you actually hit. The facts show that the ground were searching in completely the wrong area, and it was just sheer luck that the airport fireman happened to on gut instint drive a different direction, and the PIC happened to have a torch, AND they were able to see it.
Lastly it appears that the PIC left the cockpit with a possibly unconscious(or at least dazed) F/O in a cabin rapidly filling with water, and upon finding a suitable exit left the aircraft leaving his crew and pax to fend for themselves. It was just very lucky for the medical crew onboard that they had experienced one of the best training programs when it comes to underwater extraction that everyone managed to get out.
Am I missing something that would dictate that we would be giving the crew kudos for all the above or was I reading a different report ?
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If there'd been an erroneous report of CAVOK or the like, and the crew then found to their supprise that conditions were actually below minima, then there'd be a number of people eating their words.
I see nothing in that report however to suggest any factor other than deficiencies with in-flight decision making, and possibly company or individual standards of flight planning. The personification of the PIC was the media's fault, and personal attacks on anyone in relation to an incident/accident are unnecessary.
One would imagine if the operator flies to Norfolk, then they would have standard procedures for fuel and diversions. One would assume these wouldn't include the process of: flight - missed approach - missed approach - missed approach - wet pants - wet pax.
I see nothing in that report however to suggest any factor other than deficiencies with in-flight decision making, and possibly company or individual standards of flight planning. The personification of the PIC was the media's fault, and personal attacks on anyone in relation to an incident/accident are unnecessary.
One would imagine if the operator flies to Norfolk, then they would have standard procedures for fuel and diversions. One would assume these wouldn't include the process of: flight - missed approach - missed approach - missed approach - wet pants - wet pax.
If there'd been an erroneous report of CAVOK or the like, and the crew then found to their supprise that conditions were actually below minima, then there'd be a number of people eating their words.
CAO 82.0, stipulates that it doesn't matter what the weather forecast says, YOU MUST CARRY ALTERNATE FUEL FOR FLIGHTS TO NORFOLK ISLAND!
The pilots have f**ked up right from the outset, by not carrying the alternate fuel that is stipulated in CAO 82.0. They had chances to redeem themselves enroute, but even then, they carried on.
I notice in the preliminary report, that so far, it's not too damning for the PIC. However, I think once they start expanding out to the parts of the investigation they say they will now focus on, it might come out that our "Hero" shouldn't have even taken off with the little amount of fuel he had.
morno
Couldn't agree more with you on that one CFI.
morno:
Does the provision of an alternate apply to AWK operations? If not, I think one of the debates (read: legal arguements) may centre around the interpretation as to whether this flight should have been in that catagory.
morno:
Does the provision of an alternate apply to AWK operations? If not, I think one of the debates (read: legal arguements) may centre around the interpretation as to whether this flight should have been in that catagory.
CAO 82.0 1.1 and CAO 82.0 2.1 etc are as clear as can be. An alternate is required, even when Norfolk is CAVOK. 2.3 may appear to allow CASA to 'approve' a lesser fuel policy, but the operative word there is 'adequate'. When 2.4 is then read as part of the whole deal, it is fortunate for CASA that no lives were lost or the litigants would now be finishing CASA for good (and not before time), had they approved something less.
CAO 82.0 includes Aerial Work operations.
CAO 82.0 includes Aerial Work operations.
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As an example, the Remote Island Fuel Policy in my ops manual does not require an alternate for a Remote Island, unless the weather forecast for three hours either side of the ETA are below published alt minima plus 500'/1000m
However you can not press on past your PNR for the depressurised case without the WX for one hour either side of ETA being above published alt minima plus 500'/1000m.
However you can not press on past your PNR for the depressurised case without the WX for one hour either side of ETA being above published alt minima plus 500'/1000m.
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However you can not press on past your PNR for the depressurised case without the WX for one hour either side of ETA being above published alt minima plus 500'/1000m.
Alt Minima + 500 can deteriorate to zilch in minutes there.
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There must be a fine line between AWK and Charter in this situation with Careflight chartering the aircraft from pelair and the medical crew not being classed as Crew.
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Having operated to Norfolk many times I would not be too comfortable with that policy, especially at night.
Alt Minima + 500 can deteriorate to zilch in minutes there.
Alt Minima + 500 can deteriorate to zilch in minutes there.
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I really really hope I am interpreting the wording of the report incorrectly.
In my opinion if the PIC left his unconscious co-pilot and his passengers to fend for themselves then any punishment he recieves will be nothing with having to live the rest of his life knowing that he is a you know what.
Please tell me I've got it wrong, but it looks shocking.
In my opinion if the PIC left his unconscious co-pilot and his passengers to fend for themselves then any punishment he recieves will be nothing with having to live the rest of his life knowing that he is a you know what.
Please tell me I've got it wrong, but it looks shocking.
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adsyj, don't worry yourself about it. If there's even a hint of truth in what you've inferred from the initial report, the Australian tabloid press and early evening TV, having put the guy on a such a very high pedestal themselves, will be falling over themselves to knock him off it.
Tall poppies and all that sort of stuff.
Tall poppies and all that sort of stuff.
The point now, surely, is - how to make sure it doesn't happen again. 
I wonder if the ATSB report will conclude:
Safety Deficiencies:
The safety deficiencies identified relate to the accuracy of meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island. The Bureau of Meteorology has advised that forecasts for remote Islands such as Norfolk are difficult to predict with accuracy and un-forecast conditions may occur without notice. Despite this advice the TAF issued at the commencement of the flight did not reflect this position.
Safety Recommendation:
Until the Bureau of Meteorology is confident of the accuracy of its forecasts for remote islands, a "PROB 20" line for constant conditions below the landing minima be added to every forecast to warn pilots of the Bureau of Meteorology's position that these conditions may occur without notice.
Safety Deficiencies:
It is possible that this flight was planned without regard to the changes instigated after the VH-TWR incident of 13 December 1999, which required alternate fuel for some operations to remote islands regardless of forecast. It is possible that the pilot in command was not aware of these requirements (or did not recall them at the time of pre-flight planning) as they are included in the CAOs, a different document to those usually referred to in pre-flight planning for normal operations. It is possible, that the PIC (as a PIC would for a mainland operation) simply compared the forecast conditions with the Alternate Minima listed on the Norfolk Is. approach chart.
Safety Recommendation:
The Alternate Minima section of all approach charts for all remote island destinations be amended to include a note that an alternate is required, regardless of forecast, for passenger carrying CHTR and RPT operations.
I wonder if the ATSB report will conclude:
Safety Deficiencies:
The safety deficiencies identified relate to the accuracy of meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island. The Bureau of Meteorology has advised that forecasts for remote Islands such as Norfolk are difficult to predict with accuracy and un-forecast conditions may occur without notice. Despite this advice the TAF issued at the commencement of the flight did not reflect this position.
Safety Recommendation:
Until the Bureau of Meteorology is confident of the accuracy of its forecasts for remote islands, a "PROB 20" line for constant conditions below the landing minima be added to every forecast to warn pilots of the Bureau of Meteorology's position that these conditions may occur without notice.
Safety Deficiencies:
It is possible that this flight was planned without regard to the changes instigated after the VH-TWR incident of 13 December 1999, which required alternate fuel for some operations to remote islands regardless of forecast. It is possible that the pilot in command was not aware of these requirements (or did not recall them at the time of pre-flight planning) as they are included in the CAOs, a different document to those usually referred to in pre-flight planning for normal operations. It is possible, that the PIC (as a PIC would for a mainland operation) simply compared the forecast conditions with the Alternate Minima listed on the Norfolk Is. approach chart.
Safety Recommendation:
The Alternate Minima section of all approach charts for all remote island destinations be amended to include a note that an alternate is required, regardless of forecast, for passenger carrying CHTR and RPT operations.
Last edited by Checkboard; 14th Jan 2010 at 10:45.
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mainframe
mainframe,
Your response and explanation satisfies me greatly. I am also genuinely dissapointed that you have been treated in such a manner throughout your career.
Your argument makes sense, and I appreciate the time you put into your response. I would only disagree on one point, and that is my being naive. I guess that my 'work experience' has been of a nature that has shielded me from being specifically in the Regulators spotlight, however, as a member of the aviation community I am not immune to their powers. I have received worse treatment from other people within sectors of the aviation community than I have from CASA. Does that make me lucky ? I guess it certainly seems that way. Does my being treated 'reasonably' in the past from the Regulator mean that people such as yourself have not been treated fairly ? Of course not.
Again, thank you for your open response. You have climbed a notch in my book of respect.
To everybody else, apologies for the 'dirft' and back to the thread.
Your response and explanation satisfies me greatly. I am also genuinely dissapointed that you have been treated in such a manner throughout your career.
Your argument makes sense, and I appreciate the time you put into your response. I would only disagree on one point, and that is my being naive. I guess that my 'work experience' has been of a nature that has shielded me from being specifically in the Regulators spotlight, however, as a member of the aviation community I am not immune to their powers. I have received worse treatment from other people within sectors of the aviation community than I have from CASA. Does that make me lucky ? I guess it certainly seems that way. Does my being treated 'reasonably' in the past from the Regulator mean that people such as yourself have not been treated fairly ? Of course not.
Again, thank you for your open response. You have climbed a notch in my book of respect.
To everybody else, apologies for the 'dirft' and back to the thread.
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I'm with Owen Stanley.
I read the report also and thought to myself, if Captain Hero departed the aircraft leaving his F/O out cold then best he not be standing beside me in a bar. I'll fill the room full of uppercuts.
I read the report also and thought to myself, if Captain Hero departed the aircraft leaving his F/O out cold then best he not be standing beside me in a bar. I'll fill the room full of uppercuts.
CAO 82.0.3A is the requirement and 2.3 and 2.4 are "interpretations" for 3A. Therefore this requirement would only apply to pax carrying Charter Ops.
Read 3A first and then refer to 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 for the interpretations of "minimum safe fuel" and "remote island"
Read 3A first and then refer to 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 for the interpretations of "minimum safe fuel" and "remote island"
I'm not really surprised by some of the self absorbed, inward and egotistical holier than thou drivel being posted here, but actually seeing it makes me sick to the core.
Statements such as
from adsyj
and
By Owen Stanley who by the way has a history of sweeping statements made about crew and their reactions in an emergency situation... you really make me sick. 
(We all love an expert flying instructor)
NO, you obviously DO NOT have the experience to be making final judgments, nor any judgments on what ANY of that crew did in such a horrifically traumatic event such as escaping a rapidly sinking aircraft in the middle of the ocean at night!!!!!!?
How dare you make judgement??!
HANG YOUR HEADS IN SHAME!
Regardless of what happened to result in that situation, to sit here and read page after page of cheap shot personal criticism makes me utterly utterly SICK!!
With the benefit of hindsight isn't it all so obvious what should or shouldn't of been done, but isn't this the case with nearly ALL accidents???
Are you willing to stand up and totally put down, criticize and berate the many hundreds or thousands of pilots that have died through human error?
Let's all learn from this accident, be thankful that no one was killed (and god, what a miracle no one was) and stop the personal attacks!
Statements such as
In my opinion if the PIC left his unconscious co-pilot and his passengers to fend for themselves then any punishment he receives will be nothing with having to live the rest of his life knowing that he is a you know what.
and
I haven't got the experience to be making judgments and am awaiting a final report, I wonder if ALL the details will emerge?
BUT.........The comment below sums it up for me...............
If that's what happened, hang your head in shame boy
BUT.........The comment below sums it up for me...............
If that's what happened, hang your head in shame boy
(We all love an expert flying instructor)NO, you obviously DO NOT have the experience to be making final judgments, nor any judgments on what ANY of that crew did in such a horrifically traumatic event such as escaping a rapidly sinking aircraft in the middle of the ocean at night!!!!!!?
How dare you make judgement??!
HANG YOUR HEADS IN SHAME!
Regardless of what happened to result in that situation, to sit here and read page after page of cheap shot personal criticism makes me utterly utterly SICK!!
With the benefit of hindsight isn't it all so obvious what should or shouldn't of been done, but isn't this the case with nearly ALL accidents???
Are you willing to stand up and totally put down, criticize and berate the many hundreds or thousands of pilots that have died through human error?
Let's all learn from this accident, be thankful that no one was killed (and god, what a miracle no one was) and stop the personal attacks!
Last edited by Compylot; 14th Jan 2010 at 12:00.
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I really really hope I am interpreting the wording of the report incorrectly.
In my opinion if the PIC left his unconscious co-pilot and his passengers to fend for themselves then any punishment he recieves will be nothing with having to live the rest of his life knowing that he is a you know what.
Please tell me I've got it wrong, but it looks shocking.
In my opinion if the PIC left his unconscious co-pilot and his passengers to fend for themselves then any punishment he recieves will be nothing with having to live the rest of his life knowing that he is a you know what.
Please tell me I've got it wrong, but it looks shocking.
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" Let's all learn from this accident, be thankful that no one was killed (and god, what a miracle no one was) and stop the personal attacks!"
These "lessons" have been taught for many years now. It is not a question of learning from, but rather applying the knowledge already available.
To my mind it is stretching the use of the word accident, this was the culmination of a number of errors ending in an inevitable conclusion.
These "lessons" have been taught for many years now. It is not a question of learning from, but rather applying the knowledge already available.
To my mind it is stretching the use of the word accident, this was the culmination of a number of errors ending in an inevitable conclusion.