Vistajet Future
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Berlin 28th March
Good morning,
just got the invitation to attend the interview and sim in Berlin on the 28th of March… Anyone else? And could someone give us some info about the sim and the interviews…thank you very much !!!
just got the invitation to attend the interview and sim in Berlin on the 28th of March… Anyone else? And could someone give us some info about the sim and the interviews…thank you very much !!!
Join Date: Jul 2011
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The article from the URL above:
Vista Global Financial Update (Uncorroborated)
I am a passionate believer in corroborating my numbers and published statements. For this article I haven't received secondary confirmation, so I am inviting Vista Global to contact me and provide verifiable evidence that contradicts the numbers I recently received about their full-year 2022 financial performance.
My source suggested that 2022 losses increased by 175% (YOY) to $139 million. In addition, the Vista Global group has current liabilities that exceeded their current assets by more than $1.4 billion, at the end of Q4 2022. Debt increased, dramatically, during 2022, leaving Vista Global with a debt to equity ratio that exceeded 23, a dramatic increase from less than eight, at the end of 2021.
Assuming these numbers are correct, from a hitherto reliable source, they point to Vista Global quickly transitioning from being a market leading branded charter and aircraft management company to becoming worryingly illiquid (euphemism), IMO. According to banking contacts, who are vastly more knowledgable than me about such matters, Vista Global may be at risk of breaching banking covenants that are tied to billions of dollars in asset-backed debt.
I’ve already written about the possibility that up to three large fleet operators face the threat of insolvency. Obviously, the used aircraft market would struggle (gross understatement) to absorb as many as 59 wholly-owned Challenger 300/350’s, 34 Global 5000/6000’s and 16 nearly new Global 7500’s.
Without appropriate pre-planning, any unexpected disruption of flight operations (another euphemism) could have a devastating impact on used aircraft values, industry-wide, aside from placing hundreds of unrelated asset-backed loans at risk.
My hopes are, firstly, that these numbers are wrong and that Vista Global have the necessary resources to remain solvent until their business becomes profitable, or secures additional resources, particularly given the tens of thousands of flights their customers have already contracted and paid for! Secondly, I hope that Bombardier, and the banks that have been financing Vista Global, are paying close attention and have back-stop plans prepared, in case of any unfortunate developments (yet another euphemism).
A collapse of Vista Global would be calamitous…for the entire industry, IMHO. I watched as Avantair unravelled, leaving their 55 Piaggio Avanti's parked-up across the US, many of which were impounded by local suppliers, who hadn't been paid. Avantair's share owners were left with almost nothing, by the end of bankruptcy proceedings.
I have been tracking vulnerable operators because of my unfortunate experiences (my final euphemism) with too many Avantair share owners! Hopefully, I'll receive comforting, and independently verifiable, statements from Vista Global that will allow me to publish a full retraction!
Vista Global Financial Update (Uncorroborated)
I am a passionate believer in corroborating my numbers and published statements. For this article I haven't received secondary confirmation, so I am inviting Vista Global to contact me and provide verifiable evidence that contradicts the numbers I recently received about their full-year 2022 financial performance.
My source suggested that 2022 losses increased by 175% (YOY) to $139 million. In addition, the Vista Global group has current liabilities that exceeded their current assets by more than $1.4 billion, at the end of Q4 2022. Debt increased, dramatically, during 2022, leaving Vista Global with a debt to equity ratio that exceeded 23, a dramatic increase from less than eight, at the end of 2021.
Assuming these numbers are correct, from a hitherto reliable source, they point to Vista Global quickly transitioning from being a market leading branded charter and aircraft management company to becoming worryingly illiquid (euphemism), IMO. According to banking contacts, who are vastly more knowledgable than me about such matters, Vista Global may be at risk of breaching banking covenants that are tied to billions of dollars in asset-backed debt.
I’ve already written about the possibility that up to three large fleet operators face the threat of insolvency. Obviously, the used aircraft market would struggle (gross understatement) to absorb as many as 59 wholly-owned Challenger 300/350’s, 34 Global 5000/6000’s and 16 nearly new Global 7500’s.
Without appropriate pre-planning, any unexpected disruption of flight operations (another euphemism) could have a devastating impact on used aircraft values, industry-wide, aside from placing hundreds of unrelated asset-backed loans at risk.
My hopes are, firstly, that these numbers are wrong and that Vista Global have the necessary resources to remain solvent until their business becomes profitable, or secures additional resources, particularly given the tens of thousands of flights their customers have already contracted and paid for! Secondly, I hope that Bombardier, and the banks that have been financing Vista Global, are paying close attention and have back-stop plans prepared, in case of any unfortunate developments (yet another euphemism).
A collapse of Vista Global would be calamitous…for the entire industry, IMHO. I watched as Avantair unravelled, leaving their 55 Piaggio Avanti's parked-up across the US, many of which were impounded by local suppliers, who hadn't been paid. Avantair's share owners were left with almost nothing, by the end of bankruptcy proceedings.
I have been tracking vulnerable operators because of my unfortunate experiences (my final euphemism) with too many Avantair share owners! Hopefully, I'll receive comforting, and independently verifiable, statements from Vista Global that will allow me to publish a full retraction!
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The article from the URL above:
Vista Global Financial Update (Uncorroborated)
I am a passionate believer in corroborating my numbers and published statements. For this article I haven't received secondary confirmation, so I am inviting Vista Global to contact me and provide verifiable evidence that contradicts the numbers I recently received about their full-year 2022 financial performance...........
Vista Global Financial Update (Uncorroborated)
I am a passionate believer in corroborating my numbers and published statements. For this article I haven't received secondary confirmation, so I am inviting Vista Global to contact me and provide verifiable evidence that contradicts the numbers I recently received about their full-year 2022 financial performance...........
Sounds like a typical growth company which doesn't becomes profitable. At one point every company has to start making money. The future will tell.
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and there it is..front page of the Financial Times
Private jet disrupter: the debt-fuelled ascent of Thomas Flohr’s VistaJet https://www.ft.com/content/57e19c7c-...b-efc6c361873e
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianfo...h=5f15cd5e31f0
To summarize the well-written and researched FT article, VistaJet lost $436 million over the last four years, and doubled its debt load last year to $4.4 billion. Their auditors Ernst & Young (EY) question the company’s very ability to continue as a going concern.
Private jet disrupter: the debt-fuelled ascent of Thomas Flohr’s VistaJet https://www.ft.com/content/57e19c7c-...b-efc6c361873e
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianfo...h=5f15cd5e31f0
To summarize the well-written and researched FT article, VistaJet lost $436 million over the last four years, and doubled its debt load last year to $4.4 billion. Their auditors Ernst & Young (EY) question the company’s very ability to continue as a going concern.
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VistaJet CEO defends company’s financials as auditor raises liquidity, debt concerns
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/19/vist...-concerns.html
So EBITDA is a sufficient measure of profitability?
While EBITA presupposes that there are enough investors who also finance the ongoing losses
(if you calculate full costs) and do not get cold feet at some point in time.
Companies that have not yet been profitable have been quickly gone in the past when demand falls,
which will begin politically in the medium term, or rather has already begun, while executive ops
is largely superfluous.
So EBITDA is a sufficient measure of profitability?
While EBITA presupposes that there are enough investors who also finance the ongoing losses
(if you calculate full costs) and do not get cold feet at some point in time.
Companies that have not yet been profitable have been quickly gone in the past when demand falls,
which will begin politically in the medium term, or rather has already begun, while executive ops
is largely superfluous.
“Look, none of this is new. All documents and data was always available to our equity and debt holders,” Flohr said.Auditing firm EY warn in a report on the company’s 2022 accounts that “a material uncertainty exists that may cast significant doubt on the group’s ability to continue as a going concern,” the article said.
Flohr denied that these points meant any risk to the company, which is headquartered in Malta and flies to 1,900 airports in 96% of the world’s countries, according to its website. He stressed that VistaJet is profitable on an EBITDA basis, which is the company’s main focus.
“We as a company, both shareholders and bondholders, [are] only focused on EBITDA, the cash creation of the company,” Flohr said. “The adjusted EBITDA was over $800 million in 2022. We never focused below the EBITDA line.”
Flohr said that he may consider using mark-to-market accounting this year rather than what he describes as “a very, very conservative 13 years to zero” depreciation policy, which he says would then mean the company is turning a profit. He stressed that the company has a clear EBITDA growth path.
“Going forward, this infrastructure really allows us to grow the company from approximately $800 million EBITDA to $1.5 billion EBITDA,” he said.
The FT report also notes that VistaJet had $831 million worth of prepaid flights on its books at the end of 2022, but only $134 million left in actual cash.
Flohr emphasized that this did not warrant concern, explaining that the company only needs roughly 22% of clients’ up-front payments to fly the jets they book.
“It’s not a problem at all. It’s a snapshot of December 31. Think about when clients pay us money up front — we need only about 20 to 22% of that number to serve our clients for the direct operating expenses of those flights,” he said.
He stressed that those deposits are non-refundable and is not money that clients can withdraw. “We have a subscription business model. The key of this number is to serve these hours. It costs us about 22% of those numbers to actually fly them.”
“When you look at absolute debt, you always need to make it relative to the EBITDA that is infrastructure produces, and actually our EBITDA has grown more in relative terms than our debt and hence, the company is extremely comfortable,” he said. “So are the shareholders and so are the bondholders with the capital structure that the company has in place.”
Flohr denied that these points meant any risk to the company, which is headquartered in Malta and flies to 1,900 airports in 96% of the world’s countries, according to its website. He stressed that VistaJet is profitable on an EBITDA basis, which is the company’s main focus.
“We as a company, both shareholders and bondholders, [are] only focused on EBITDA, the cash creation of the company,” Flohr said. “The adjusted EBITDA was over $800 million in 2022. We never focused below the EBITDA line.”
Flohr said that he may consider using mark-to-market accounting this year rather than what he describes as “a very, very conservative 13 years to zero” depreciation policy, which he says would then mean the company is turning a profit. He stressed that the company has a clear EBITDA growth path.
“Going forward, this infrastructure really allows us to grow the company from approximately $800 million EBITDA to $1.5 billion EBITDA,” he said.
The FT report also notes that VistaJet had $831 million worth of prepaid flights on its books at the end of 2022, but only $134 million left in actual cash.
Flohr emphasized that this did not warrant concern, explaining that the company only needs roughly 22% of clients’ up-front payments to fly the jets they book.
“It’s not a problem at all. It’s a snapshot of December 31. Think about when clients pay us money up front — we need only about 20 to 22% of that number to serve our clients for the direct operating expenses of those flights,” he said.
He stressed that those deposits are non-refundable and is not money that clients can withdraw. “We have a subscription business model. The key of this number is to serve these hours. It costs us about 22% of those numbers to actually fly them.”
“When you look at absolute debt, you always need to make it relative to the EBITDA that is infrastructure produces, and actually our EBITDA has grown more in relative terms than our debt and hence, the company is extremely comfortable,” he said. “So are the shareholders and so are the bondholders with the capital structure that the company has in place.”
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bad balance & liquidity
Even if there is still a lot of leverage in the aggressive depreciation left, why was this not choosen in the first place?
Now the depreciation period must be massively increased in order to turn the balance somehow a positive direction.
If liquidity is low, the hours paid must still be flown off for the customers, at least the variable costs should be available,
or are required as liquidity?
And the interest on the fixed-cost bond has to be earned in addition to the already very high prices,
while liquidity can then only be increased with the sale of (well depreciated) aircraft? in Shalah!
Now the depreciation period must be massively increased in order to turn the balance somehow a positive direction.
If liquidity is low, the hours paid must still be flown off for the customers, at least the variable costs should be available,
or are required as liquidity?
And the interest on the fixed-cost bond has to be earned in addition to the already very high prices,
while liquidity can then only be increased with the sale of (well depreciated) aircraft? in Shalah!
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Even if there is still a lot of leverage in the aggressive depreciation left, why was this not choosen in the first place?
Now the depreciation period must be massively increased in order to turn the balance somehow a positive direction.
If liquidity is low, the hours paid must still be flown off for the customers, at least the variable costs should be available,
or are required as liquidity?
And the interest on the fixed-cost bond has to be earned in addition to the already very high prices,
while liquidity can then only be increased with the sale of (well depreciated) aircraft? in Shalah!
Now the depreciation period must be massively increased in order to turn the balance somehow a positive direction.
If liquidity is low, the hours paid must still be flown off for the customers, at least the variable costs should be available,
or are required as liquidity?
And the interest on the fixed-cost bond has to be earned in addition to the already very high prices,
while liquidity can then only be increased with the sale of (well depreciated) aircraft? in Shalah!
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Correct, and the change now to a "less aggressive depreciation" was announced by the CEO 20-25 years iso 13
to turn the negative balance of $1.4 billion somehow a positive direction, and calm the situation, as despite a record year no profit
but losses increased by 175% (YOY) to $139 million, while the EBITA argument requires investors continue to finance these ongoing losses.
Meanwhile further investments were made like: https://www.dufour.aero/ , VTOL- and eVTOL-Technologie).
To sum up:
+ relative Iow liquidity vs the requirement to fly the hours (paid off by the customers), at least the variable costs need to be available, no?
+ high interest on the fixed-cost $500 Mil. bond and 9,5% Yield, which will be the growing challenge, with an already quite costly (not profitable) product.
= some changes will be required, (and this is probably not the complete picture). to be continued, lets hope for the best in the interest of the souls involved!
to turn the negative balance of $1.4 billion somehow a positive direction, and calm the situation, as despite a record year no profit
but losses increased by 175% (YOY) to $139 million, while the EBITA argument requires investors continue to finance these ongoing losses.
Meanwhile further investments were made like: https://www.dufour.aero/ , VTOL- and eVTOL-Technologie).
To sum up:
+ relative Iow liquidity vs the requirement to fly the hours (paid off by the customers), at least the variable costs need to be available, no?
+ high interest on the fixed-cost $500 Mil. bond and 9,5% Yield, which will be the growing challenge, with an already quite costly (not profitable) product.
= some changes will be required, (and this is probably not the complete picture). to be continued, lets hope for the best in the interest of the souls involved!
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VistaJet - Air Hamburg clash
Another article, this time on Wirtschaftswoche.. seems the previous AH owners aren't happy at all.
https://www.wiwo.de/my/finanzen/geld.../29191572.html
This can escalate quickly..
https://www.wiwo.de/my/finanzen/geld.../29191572.html
This can escalate quickly..
Another article, this time on Wirtschaftswoche.. seems the previous AH owners aren't happy at all.
https://www.wiwo.de/my/finanzen/geld.../29191572.html
This can escalate quickly..
https://www.wiwo.de/my/finanzen/geld.../29191572.html
This can escalate quickly..