G-ARPI - The Trident Tragedy: 40 years ago today
The T3 was a gas-guzzler too. As I recall the fuel flow in the cruise was around 4 tonnes per hour - the 737 carried almost the same payload (albeit at a more pedestrian pace) using 2/3 of the fuel & 2 pilots. When wing cracks were discovered on the fleet, the engineers bolted bits of meccano under the wings to hold them together (I was in the crew that took 'ZG to Hatfield for this mod). To transfer lift loads inboard they also rigged the flaps when retracted slightly down and the ailerons slightly upwards, which worsened the already poor specific fuel consumption. But - as has been posted before - it was a delightful machine to fly. If you were high and or fast on descent profile - no problem - airbrakes (not speedbrake!) and reverse on the pod engines (up to 10,000 RPM IIRC) gave you astonishing earthward plunges. And reverse idle during the flare was handy for reducing LDR. Boost unreliability was a problem. I recall a lobbing into GVA for refuelling on an ATH-LHR and offloading pax in OSL to meet boostless TO perf requirements off a slushy runway.
Some of the Capts were brilliant, including the excellent John Moss, who steered me through line training. Others not so: when I remarked to one of these (initials RM) that I was enjoying myself doing some manual poling his response was: 'You're not here to enjoy yourself', delivered with a scowl.
Some of the Capts were brilliant, including the excellent John Moss, who steered me through line training. Others not so: when I remarked to one of these (initials RM) that I was enjoying myself doing some manual poling his response was: 'You're not here to enjoy yourself', delivered with a scowl.
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As I know nothing really about aircraft except as a passenger,could somebody tell me what "droop" is please? I do remember the accident at Staines,and it's interesting to hear about ex RAF pilots being arrogant when flying for BEA/BA.Being ex RAF,a supplier 1960-68, I found aircrew most genial,it was the non-aircrew officers that were a pain in the ar*e. This was most noticeable in Changi,the Shack,Hastings,Argosy,Britannia and Comet aircrew were very easy going,the non-aircrew officers were even bigger chuffs than in the UK,talked to you like sh*t.
Chris
Chris
As I know nothing really about aircraft except as a passenger, could somebody tell me what "droop" is please?
Good description of droop leading edges (aka cuffs) here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leading_edge_cuff
On later marks of the Trident the DLEs were replaced with conventional slats.
Manx the important problem of the droop is that on a T1 at max landing weight the stall speed increased by 30 knots whilst take off flap of 10 degrees made an additional difference of 8 knots.
Add to that supposedly the stall speed increase was virtually instantaneous with droop retraction on the T1 whereas it is gradual with flap retraction.
The other marks of Trident had slotted droop which worked in a different way.
The relevance to the accident is that BEA had a unique noise abatement proceedure which saw the flap being selected up after take off leaving only one possible selection to change the stall speed by 30knots plus.
Add to that supposedly the stall speed increase was virtually instantaneous with droop retraction on the T1 whereas it is gradual with flap retraction.
The other marks of Trident had slotted droop which worked in a different way.
The relevance to the accident is that BEA had a unique noise abatement proceedure which saw the flap being selected up after take off leaving only one possible selection to change the stall speed by 30knots plus.
Leg and leg role reversal?
Chris Scott asked (post #141) : "So what happened on the copilot's leg in half-decent weather? Was there not a complete role-reversal?" but he only got a partial answer.
This answer is based on my background in BA. S/O and F/O 9 years Trident, then Capt Merchantman 2 years, Trident 8 years, B757 5 years, A320 3 years, B747-400 8 years. So my experience as an F/O is confined to 3-pilot Trident ops 1965-74 and not other BEA types. In my experience, as per my practice and from observation and discussion with my contemporaries, is that flying was pretty much leg-and-leg at the Captain's discretion, and provided there were no other considerations that restricted the F/O sectors (weather, ADDs, F/O experience, training etc).
That usually meant exchange of all PF/PNF duties, i.e. the F/O undertook all "P1" tasks and the Captain the "P2" duties. As an F/O I also found some Captains were happy to allow me to continue to landing after flying an instrument approach in good weather. A lot of these guys were outstanding teachers of airmanship and problem-solving, although they never got paid a penny as official trainers. The system allowed us to build experience in the RHS of the most advanced aircraft extraordinarily rapidly particularly bearing in mind we often started at age 20 with 220 hours total time. I have quite a few pages in my logbook from my time as a Second Officer in the late 60s with 3 or more signatures for a T/O and landing, out of 12 sectors.
Yes there were also a small number of "difficult personalities", as in all walks of life, but I can't recall anyone who frightened me by wilful disregard of procedures, although some "interpretation" certainly occurred from time to time.
With a 3-pilot Trident crew, on those "half-decent" days with 4 sectors, generally each F/O did 2 legs RHS as P2 and 2 as panel operator P3. The Captain then got 2 landings and each F/O got 1. On 3 sector days the F/O seat rotation meant that we got 1 landing each. Typically the 2 F/Os tossed a coin to see who'd 2 legs RHS and thus get both an approach AND a landing. As Captain I then did 1 T/O and landing out of 3, but got 2 approaches.
On 2 crew a/c same leg-and-leg role reversal was generally applied, although on the 744 it was harder due to the limited number of landings available on trips with a heavy crew, and lack of recent handling practice was recognised as a real issue.
On shorthaul operations I also found most Captains' attitude was that fine weather was an opportunity to practice if you wanted to. If you have higher safety "reserves" thanks to VMC, you can do without autopilots, flight directors and autothrust. You can concentrate on hand flying on basics down to DH quite safely as the other pilot will take it away to land whenever he needs to, having been visual for many miles. The general low level of recency on ultra-long haul ops combined with generic recommendations in many airlines to use all available automation makes this harder to do today but I believe still has merit.
Over to you Chris.
This answer is based on my background in BA. S/O and F/O 9 years Trident, then Capt Merchantman 2 years, Trident 8 years, B757 5 years, A320 3 years, B747-400 8 years. So my experience as an F/O is confined to 3-pilot Trident ops 1965-74 and not other BEA types. In my experience, as per my practice and from observation and discussion with my contemporaries, is that flying was pretty much leg-and-leg at the Captain's discretion, and provided there were no other considerations that restricted the F/O sectors (weather, ADDs, F/O experience, training etc).
That usually meant exchange of all PF/PNF duties, i.e. the F/O undertook all "P1" tasks and the Captain the "P2" duties. As an F/O I also found some Captains were happy to allow me to continue to landing after flying an instrument approach in good weather. A lot of these guys were outstanding teachers of airmanship and problem-solving, although they never got paid a penny as official trainers. The system allowed us to build experience in the RHS of the most advanced aircraft extraordinarily rapidly particularly bearing in mind we often started at age 20 with 220 hours total time. I have quite a few pages in my logbook from my time as a Second Officer in the late 60s with 3 or more signatures for a T/O and landing, out of 12 sectors.
Yes there were also a small number of "difficult personalities", as in all walks of life, but I can't recall anyone who frightened me by wilful disregard of procedures, although some "interpretation" certainly occurred from time to time.
With a 3-pilot Trident crew, on those "half-decent" days with 4 sectors, generally each F/O did 2 legs RHS as P2 and 2 as panel operator P3. The Captain then got 2 landings and each F/O got 1. On 3 sector days the F/O seat rotation meant that we got 1 landing each. Typically the 2 F/Os tossed a coin to see who'd 2 legs RHS and thus get both an approach AND a landing. As Captain I then did 1 T/O and landing out of 3, but got 2 approaches.
On 2 crew a/c same leg-and-leg role reversal was generally applied, although on the 744 it was harder due to the limited number of landings available on trips with a heavy crew, and lack of recent handling practice was recognised as a real issue.
On shorthaul operations I also found most Captains' attitude was that fine weather was an opportunity to practice if you wanted to. If you have higher safety "reserves" thanks to VMC, you can do without autopilots, flight directors and autothrust. You can concentrate on hand flying on basics down to DH quite safely as the other pilot will take it away to land whenever he needs to, having been visual for many miles. The general low level of recency on ultra-long haul ops combined with generic recommendations in many airlines to use all available automation makes this harder to do today but I believe still has merit.
Over to you Chris.
Interesting Steve.
We used IMC to practice full manual flying as in many countries in VMC IFR and VFR traffic are mixed especially in Switzerland and the States. The exception being if we managed to get a visual where our eyes were out of the cockpit anyway.
We used IMC to practice full manual flying as in many countries in VMC IFR and VFR traffic are mixed especially in Switzerland and the States. The exception being if we managed to get a visual where our eyes were out of the cockpit anyway.
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Sunday 18 June 1972
My dad was quite literally first on the scene - as we were approximately 100 yards in front of the Trident when it landed in the field.
We were returning from a family Sunday walk back along the towpath from Staines Moor. It was a wet and cloudy day. My mother would have been pushing our double buggy back along the public footpath (which is still there) with my brother and I - the type of pushchair with coloured beads to amuse toddlers.
We had momentarily stopped whilst my mum scanned through some of the piles of rubble from part of the nearby linoleum factory that they were pulling down at the time. She was looking for any bits that might prove interesting for her art college she was attending at Twickenham, when this terrible incident unfolded.
My mother's initial intake of the phenomenon is quite bizarre; upon hearing the dull, muffled-like thud (this is the noise the Trident made when impacting with the wet ground), and not quite understanding what she was witnessing, started looking around the scene for TV crew/cameras.
Not being quite 4 years old, I have a 'JPEG snap' memory of my father squeezing through a gap in the fence, turning back towards us, probably shouting at my mum to take us home. I also think I recall my mother screaming at him not to go near the scene - but that might be a memory my mother told me about, at a later date...
My dad (whom I have pressed for information/details of what he saw, over the years) knew fairly quickly that there was nothing he could do. One lasting but lucid memory he has is of a businessman chap lying curled up with the wind gently blowing through his hair; he just looked like he was asleep - a briefcase lay close by him, flung open with coloured
slides scattered about.
Later that evening, two policemen turned up at our house to speak to my father. They wanted to know if he'd picked up a pistol. Apparently, there were also two plain-clothed 'sherriffs' travelling aboard BEA 548, but that they had only recovered one of these hand guns - my dad recalled that they were not interested in any other aspects of the crash.
I was 1 year old when we first moved to Staines and spent the best part of 30 years growing up/living there. As a kid, I used to play over Staines Moor, swim and canoe in the River Colne, always with the knowledge/fascination of this terrible accident never far from my consciousness. It seems that I'll be forever haunted by it.
We were returning from a family Sunday walk back along the towpath from Staines Moor. It was a wet and cloudy day. My mother would have been pushing our double buggy back along the public footpath (which is still there) with my brother and I - the type of pushchair with coloured beads to amuse toddlers.
We had momentarily stopped whilst my mum scanned through some of the piles of rubble from part of the nearby linoleum factory that they were pulling down at the time. She was looking for any bits that might prove interesting for her art college she was attending at Twickenham, when this terrible incident unfolded.
My mother's initial intake of the phenomenon is quite bizarre; upon hearing the dull, muffled-like thud (this is the noise the Trident made when impacting with the wet ground), and not quite understanding what she was witnessing, started looking around the scene for TV crew/cameras.
Not being quite 4 years old, I have a 'JPEG snap' memory of my father squeezing through a gap in the fence, turning back towards us, probably shouting at my mum to take us home. I also think I recall my mother screaming at him not to go near the scene - but that might be a memory my mother told me about, at a later date...
My dad (whom I have pressed for information/details of what he saw, over the years) knew fairly quickly that there was nothing he could do. One lasting but lucid memory he has is of a businessman chap lying curled up with the wind gently blowing through his hair; he just looked like he was asleep - a briefcase lay close by him, flung open with coloured
slides scattered about.
Later that evening, two policemen turned up at our house to speak to my father. They wanted to know if he'd picked up a pistol. Apparently, there were also two plain-clothed 'sherriffs' travelling aboard BEA 548, but that they had only recovered one of these hand guns - my dad recalled that they were not interested in any other aspects of the crash.
I was 1 year old when we first moved to Staines and spent the best part of 30 years growing up/living there. As a kid, I used to play over Staines Moor, swim and canoe in the River Colne, always with the knowledge/fascination of this terrible accident never far from my consciousness. It seems that I'll be forever haunted by it.
Last edited by Trickster01; 9th Feb 2014 at 23:00.
You are not alone. I think many people are haunted by this tragedy. I knew Simon Ticehurst's parents and they certainly were, as must be very many other relatives and friends.
It was a strange Sunday. I was driving home from Cambridge to Epsom. On the car radio news came a report of an aircraft crash at Newmarket Race Course. An hour later the lead item of news was the Papa India report and no mention of Newmarket. I remember thinking 'some-one in the BBC news dept has got their wires crossed.' It turned out that both reports were correct but obviously PI overshadowed the Twin Com prang (engine failure just after getting airborne).
In another sad coincidence, I discovered I knew chaps involved in both crashes. In 'PI one of the Vanguard S/Os was a chap who had been on my CPL/IR course at Oxford. The pilot of the Twin Com was Graham Cameron, CFI at the Dorset Gliding Club (Compton Abbas) in 1969 (where I did a season of glider towing). He was killed in the Newmarket crash but his passengers survived.
In another sad coincidence, I discovered I knew chaps involved in both crashes. In 'PI one of the Vanguard S/Os was a chap who had been on my CPL/IR course at Oxford. The pilot of the Twin Com was Graham Cameron, CFI at the Dorset Gliding Club (Compton Abbas) in 1969 (where I did a season of glider towing). He was killed in the Newmarket crash but his passengers survived.
Discorde:
Graham Cameron's passenger that day was jockey Joe Mercer. I once flew from Compton Abbas to Thruxton and back with Graham at the controls of a DH Rapide. I didn't realise these accidents happened on the same day.
Graham Cameron's passenger that day was jockey Joe Mercer. I once flew from Compton Abbas to Thruxton and back with Graham at the controls of a DH Rapide. I didn't realise these accidents happened on the same day.
More than just an ATCO
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I remember LATCC passing a number of time revisions for KOK. It must have been about an hour later that the estimate was cancelled.
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Stall Warning Horn and Stick Shaker
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGeC0TbZfUs
This demonstration shows just how overwhelming the stall warning horn was on the Trident.
This demonstration shows just how overwhelming the stall warning horn was on the Trident.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGeC0TbZfUs
This demonstration shows just how overwhelming the stall warning horn was on the Trident.
This demonstration shows just how overwhelming the stall warning horn was on the Trident.
I see that the thread after I last looked has become a bit of a bun fight, as ever the views of multiple people can differ so much depending on exactly what they saw and experienced. Both sides can be correct.
No question in my mind that the public enquiry appears to have distorted the facts somewhat, a pity as usually AAIB are fully believable and if they don't know something they say so.
