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Rex emergency evacuation Melbourne

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Rex emergency evacuation Melbourne

Old 7th Apr 2022, 21:37
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Originally Posted by PoppaJo View Post
Getting a tad off topic but a few issues in Rex land at the moment.

They raised airfares. Now priced above Virgin and on par with Qantas. I don’t think that is a wise move for a number of reasons. I recall Sharpie being very vocal about pricing his business like Jetstar, with Qantas service. Now they are trying to do the latter with pricing also.

Secondly OOL is seriously underperforming, to the point that they might as well exit the market. Serious issues at hand if your only pulling 5-20 bodies per flight, and Virgin is filling a whopping 14 flights a day consistently. Virgin are currently the biggest player out of the Gold Coast to Melbourne and Sydney.
Slightly off topic…but is this correct?

If Rex are now pricing themselves above Virgin, then they are going to really struggle.

I also thought OOL was one of their better markets loads wise. That should also ring major warning bells moving into school holidays.

I’ve been amazed at the number of 73s that do seem to be parked around airports - especially when they only have 6 frames, as well as the time between turn arounds. There was a 73 that was on a 2 hour turn in MEL the other day at 8:30 in the morning.

Looks like more of their pilots are leaving to go back to Virgin. And now that QF are hiring again, they will start to lose SAAB crew too

And for something more relevant, given perhaps the maintenance issues this week on the prop fleet - how are the ATRs looking as a fleet replacement?
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Old 7th Apr 2022, 22:29
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Originally Posted by Colonel_Klink View Post
Slightly off topic…but is this correct?

If Rex are now pricing themselves above Virgin, then they are going to really struggle.

I also thought OOL was one of their better markets loads wise. That should also ring major warning bells moving into school holidays.

I’ve been amazed at the number of 73s that do seem to be parked around airports - especially when they only have 6 frames, as well as the time between turn arounds. There was a 73 that was on a 2 hour turn in MEL the other day at 8:30 in the morning.

Looks like more of their pilots are leaving to go back to Virgin. And now that QF are hiring again, they will start to lose SAAB crew too

And for something more relevant, given perhaps the maintenance issues this week on the prop fleet - how are the ATRs looking as a fleet replacement?
Having operated ATR, I’d pick Q400 everytime. Not as expensive to lease, buy or maintain and much quicker, so more sectors per day.
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Old 8th Apr 2022, 00:17
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Originally Posted by Colonel_Klink View Post
Slightly off topic…but is this correct?

If Rex are now pricing themselves above Virgin, then they are going to really struggle.

I also thought OOL was one of their better markets loads wise. That should also ring major warning bells moving into school holidays.

I’ve been amazed at the number of 73s that do seem to be parked around airports - especially when they only have 6 frames, as well as the time between turn arounds. There was a 73 that was on a 2 hour turn in MEL the other day at 8:30 in the morning.

Looks like more of their pilots are leaving to go back to Virgin. And now that QF are hiring again, they will start to lose SAAB crew too

And for something more relevant, given perhaps the maintenance issues this week on the prop fleet - how are the ATRs looking as a fleet replacement?
there wont be any money left for the ATRs
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Old 16th Apr 2022, 03:53
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Originally Posted by Jenna Talia View Post
Excess fuel feed before light-off during engine start can cause a flame throw with smoke or just smoke without the flames from the exhaust at the rear of the engine. Normally a non event.
I wonder if the event was accompanied by an Engine Fire and/or Tailpipe hot warning?

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Old 15th Nov 2022, 05:18
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4 Minutes to Evacuate a SAAB?!?

How the hell does it take 4 minutes to evacuate a commuter turboprop, on the ground, in almost-perfect conditions? Correct me if I'm wrong (often am according to the KRviatrix...) but once the skipper orders an evacuation it is not up to them to direct which exits to use - and in this case, given the crew presumed an actual engine fire (firing the bottles, EMER EVAC, etc...), and commanded an evacuation and as a result of the "Use R1 only" command it took 4 minutes to evacuate 25POB!?!?
The ATSB has released an interim report from its ongoing investigation into an incident where passengers were evacuated from a Saab 340 after flame and smoke were briefly observed from the rear of the aircraft’s left engine during an interrupted engine start.The aircraft, operated by Regional Express, was being prepared for departure on the morning of 5 April 2022 for a flight from Melbourne to King Island, with two pilots, a flight attendant and 23 passengers on board.

“Drawing upon a preliminary review of CCTV footage, on-board recordings and interviews with the crew, the report details the incident’s sequence of events during the engine start-up sequence,” said ATSB Director Transport Safety Dr Mike Walker.

After the right engine was started, and as the crew began to start the left engine, a ground staff member disconnected the ground power unit from the aircraft prior to receiving the signal from the flight crew to do so, the report details. This interrupted the start-up sequence.

The captain then initiated the interrupted engine start procedure for the left engine, which included motoring (using its starter to rotate the engine with fuel and ignition switched off) to remove any residual fuel from inside the engine.

As the left engine propeller began to rotate, flame and smoke were visible coming from the rear of the left engine for about 3 seconds.

A marshaller, positioned at the front of the aircraft, noticed the flames and began to signal to the flight crew to stop the engine start using the appropriate hand signal. However, the marshaller could not recall the hand signal for fire and instead communicated to the flight crew by mouthing the words ‘smoke’ and ‘flame’ and gesturing to the left engine.

The captain ceased motoring the left engine. At about this time, the flight crew noted that the left engine interstage turbine temperature (ITT) was still rising and in response the captain decided to make a second attempt at motoring. At this time, the marshaller continued to signal to the flight crew that there was a problem.

The report then details the actions of the flight crew, including actioning the engine fire emergency checklist and commanding an evacuation.

Two passengers received minor injuries in the evacuation, which took about 4 minutes.

The report details safety action taken by the operator as a result of the incident, including the development of a new hand signal to indicate an interrupted engine start, and providing ground staff with a training package about dispatch procedures and hand signals.
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Old 15th Nov 2022, 07:15
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How the hell does it take 4 minutes to evacuate a commuter turboprop, on the ground, in almost-perfect conditions?
KRviator.

I suspect due to the distance from the R1 door sill to the ground, each passenger had to sit down on the sill and lower themselves to the ground. I doubt there was a jumping castle in position to catch them.
If there was fire licking at their heels, I'm sure they would have jumped faster!
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Old 15th Nov 2022, 07:22
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Monkey See Monkey Do,
Not the first time ground staff had pulled the GND PWR during a start, happened to me twice.
Second hand training was always the norm for GND OPS.

4 Minitues!!! Extra long time for a evac.
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Old 15th Nov 2022, 08:24
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Originally Posted by Capt Fathom View Post
KRviator.

I suspect due to the distance from the R1 door sill to the ground, each passenger had to sit down on the sill and lower themselves to the ground. I doubt there was a jumping castle in position to catch them.
If there was fire licking at their heels, I'm sure they would have jumped faster!
That's exactly what I'm thinking, Capt but....My question is once the Evac command is given, it's not up to the skipper to decide which exits to use or how to abandon the aircraft. Or is it in Rex?

If there's fire/smoke/obstruction the CC are trained to not open that exit and direct people to another usable one. In this case, the skipper directed R1 only and as a result, 25POB took longer to get out of a SAAB 340 in perfect conditions than 170 people did to evacuate a well-and-truly burning 777 following an engine letting go and the crew leaving the [good] engine running for 45 seconds after commanding the evacuation rendering some slides unusabe!

As regards the incident itself though, ISTR we had a similar issue with one of the Army KingAirs at Brissy many years ago whereby a cloud of unburnt fuel spat out the back and ignited with someone promptly calling RFFS...
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Old 15th Nov 2022, 08:39
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From what I can see the Flight crew initially did exactly what they were trained to do. Flame and smoke during an interrupted start can occur but does not necessarily mean an engine fire.

Was there a Fire Warning or Tailpipe hot warning in the Flight deck? The excerpt above does not say.

Was the crew diverted from a correct course of action (continue to motor the affected engine) by confusion from ground personnel?

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Old 15th Nov 2022, 10:35
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Originally Posted by KRviator View Post
That's exactly what I'm thinking, Capt but....My question is once the Evac command is given, it's not up to the skipper to decide which exits to use or how to abandon the aircraft. Or is it in Rex?

If there's fire/smoke/obstruction the CC are trained to not open that exit and direct people to another usable one. In this case, the skipper directed R1 only and as a result, 25POB took longer to get out of a SAAB 340 in perfect conditions than 170 people did to evacuate a well-and-truly burning 777 following an engine letting go and the crew leaving the [good] engine running for 45 seconds after commanding the evacuation rendering some slides unusabe!

As regards the incident itself though, ISTR we had a similar issue with one of the Army KingAirs at Brissy many years ago whereby a cloud of unburnt fuel spat out the back and ignited with someone promptly calling RFFS...
Australian airlaw gives the pilot in command powers to do whatever is nessecary in an emergency to ensure the safest outcome, that applies to any operator. If you wish to alter an Evac procedure as you see a threat the cabin crew may not then it's your perogative. In doing so you then may have to explain why afterwards, and take responsibility for any problems as a result, thats the risk. The cabin crew are also trained to only evacuate through usable exits, but what if theres a huge fuel spill under the left wing near hot brakes from a reject not visible from the overwing exits.

The QLink brake fire was also called an evacuation, with an actual brake fire ocurring yet it was clear passengers were just disembarking with carryon through the L1 with not much urgency. Not saying it should be a mad rush with all exits in use, but a pretty similar situation.

Last edited by 43Inches; 15th Nov 2022 at 10:49.
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Old 15th Nov 2022, 22:10
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Originally Posted by KRUSTY 34 View Post
From what I can see the Flight crew initially did exactly what they were trained to do. Flame and smoke during an interrupted start can occur but does not necessarily mean an engine fire.

Was there a Fire Warning or Tailpipe hot warning in the Flight deck? The excerpt above does not say.
There were no overtemp warnings of any kind. The website text doesn't make that clear, but the PDF report does. And had the marshaller not panicked, the crew would have motored #1, ITT/EGT would have come down and the flight would have left on time.
Originally Posted by The ATSB
There was no indication in the flight deck that there was a fire in the left engine or an overtemperature of the tail pipe; that is, there was no master warning, no relevant indications on the caution and warning panel, no audible chimes and the fire handles were not illuminated.
Originally Posted by KRUSTY 34
Was the crew diverted from a correct course of action (continue to motor the affected engine) by confusion from ground personnel?
Seems to be the case...Again, from the PDF report:
Originally Posted by TheATSB
The captain ceased motoring the left engine and the left propeller stopped.At about this time, the flight crew noted that the left engine interstage turbine temperature (ITT) was still rising and in response the captain decided to make a second attempt at motoring. The marshaller continued to signal to the flight crew that there was a problem, which prompted the captain to check outside their window. The captain could not see any flame or fire. (Note: only the front of the engine is visible from the flight deck). The captain later reported that, given the signals from the marshaller and the rising ITT, they decided to action the engine fire emergency checklist and evacuate the aircraft
Originally Posted by 43 I
Australian airlaw gives the pilot in command powers to do whatever is nessecary in an emergency to ensure the safest outcome, that applies to any operator. If you wish to alter an Evac procedure as you see a threat the cabin crew may not then it's your perogative. In doing so you then may have to explain why afterwards, and take responsibility for any problems as a result, thats the risk.
You can play "what if's" till the cows come home, but, to use your example of the QF brake fire, a brake fire, while it can be visually quite spectacular (same as this incident, I guess) does not typically require an emergency evacuation. Nonetheless, I agree in principle with the point you make, however giving such a direction doesn't permit you to place your crew and passengers at risk, which you do by default if you order the prohibition on using otherwise safe & serviceable exits.

As PIC, you don't know what is going on back there, once you've made the ultimate decision to blow the slides (or jump in the case of the SAAB), that's the end of your authority. You don't get to say "Oh, we genuinely believe we're on fire and need an emergency evacuation, but only use 1 of the available exits", particularly having regard to certification requirements that say everyone should be off within 90 seconds once the command is given.

In this case, it did work out, simply due to the fact there was nothing actually wrong with the aircraft, the marshaller just shat himself when he saw the tailpipe fire, but next time...? I leave it to the reader to decide the size of the lawyers feeding frenzy if such a direction were to be given and someone was injured or killed trying to comply with it - because, remember, under Australian law, it is an offence not to follow the direction of the PIC, when such a direction is given to ensure the safety of the aircraft, those onboard or those on the ground. Strict liability and all that...
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Old 15th Nov 2022, 22:39
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As PIC, you don't know what is going on back there, once you've made the ultimate decision to blow the slides (or jump in the case of the SAAB), that's the end of your authority. You don't get to say "Oh, we genuinely believe we're on fire and need an emergency evacuation, but only use 1 of the available exits", particularly having regard to certification requirements that say everyone should be off within 90 seconds once the command is given.
Actually the PIC has radio comms with ATC, possibly ground staff and fire marshals at the primary airports. So the PIC will have inputs from all angles as to whats going on outside if done properly. And yes the QF brake fire combined with whatever else could have been going on could have become much worse very quickly under the right circumstance, after all the fire is located under the engines and wings, would not take much for it to spread very quickly with an ignition source that takes possibly hours to cool down. I noticed the QF aircraft did have the R1 exit open, but all passengers were exiting through L1 with bags, so a confusing picture to say the least.

If the QF situation had occurred at an outport without nearby fire service there may have been a lot more damage. There was a significant amount of flame coming from the tyres before the FO sprayed it, the BCF only had a few squirts left with the right wheels smoldering as well.

If the situation is confusing I say get all the info you can before moving, however if unsure I don't think the SAAB did anything wrong once they wanted to empty the aircraft as the FA could quite easily have ordered other exits used as well should the situation deteriorate. Very different to the QF 330 on the stand where pax were actually exposed to hazardous fumes.

Evacuations are fluid and you should be able to adjust to the situation with what little control you have.

You can play "what if's" till the cows come home, but, to use your example of the QF brake fire, a brake fire, while it can be visually quite spectacular (same as this incident, I guess) does not typically require an emergency evacuation. Nonetheless, I agree in principle with the point you make, however giving such a direction doesn't permit you to place your crew and passengers at risk, which you do by default if you order the prohibition on using otherwise safe & serviceable exits.
Evacuations are exactly playing with "what ifs" as you are expecting things might get to the stage somebody is hurt, after all you evacuated for a safety based "what if". Almost every evacuation is going to be slightly different so there's no procedure that covers all outcomes. We have standard Evac procedures for the worst case scenario where you need to get everybody off ASAP, but that may not be the case in 90% of Evacs. The Bangkok golf adventure proved the standard procedures were flawed to rely on the Captain at all for Evac notice and procedures changed and so they will keep changing as we find new holes in the cheese.

One thing with both the QF incidents I mention is that both crews were not following the procedure for the relevant operation, if they did an Evac would not have been warranted. The 330 should have not been using the APU and the Dash 8 is yet to come out but sounds like it should not have taxied to the terminal under power. We all make mistakes, this situation just sounds like another one.


At what point would you evacuate? When it breaks in through the window or use forrward exits while it's chewing the tail?

Last edited by 43Inches; 15th Nov 2022 at 23:08.
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Old 15th Nov 2022, 23:09
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Originally Posted by 43Inches View Post

One thing with both the QF incidents I mention is that both crews were not following the procedure for the relevant operation, if they did an Evac would not have been warranted.
Would you please outline the procedures the crews failed to follow in the examples you quoted.


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Old 15th Nov 2022, 23:12
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Would you please outline the procedures the crews failed to follow in the examples you quoted.
Fumes in the cabin checklist, 1 shut down APU. That's my abbreviated take on it, the ATSB report has more to say about it. The fumes started under tow into the terminal from the airintake flow coming from where the hydraulic fluid was streaming.

As for the Dash 8 apparently it should have been taken under tow after landing due to the problem requiring power against brakes.

Further to what I said above this is the ATSBs take on the A330 Evac commands;

Decision to use exits

When the captain ordered the evacuation, they did not provide any additional information to the cabin crew about the exits to be used during the evacuation. That is, the captain had not used their powers under Civil Aviation Regulation 145 to adjust the procedure for the specific situation (as detailed in some of the operator’s training as a suitable alternative in some cases), nor were they required to or needed to. Accordingly, it would be expected that all available exits would be utilised and passengers would be evacuated as quickly as possible as per the documented emergency procedure. The operator’s evacuation at the terminal procedure identified additional considerations when an evacuation occurred at a terminal, which included the use of stairs and aerobridges; however, this did not indicate that these options should be used instead of other available exits.
Whilst the ATSB did not say the Captain should have specified which exits to use it states that the Captain has the option to vary an Evac at their discretion and QF procedures allow for that. In this case the choice that FAs made not to use specific exits for fear of suspected fire.

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...ir/ao-2019-073

None of what I'm saying is criticising the crew as they are the ones facing the situation on the day and making quick decisions on the spot. Just highlighting everybody is making small errors in these events and no one is perfect.

Last edited by 43Inches; 15th Nov 2022 at 23:33.
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Old 16th Nov 2022, 00:42
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4 minutes would have been because the average Rex customer is over the age of 60 heading to a capital city for medical treatment.
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Old 17th Nov 2022, 00:46
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Neither of which seem to have made it to the ATSB reports page (as of posting). I wonder why
Had an engine failure at V1 when the turbine decided to spit everything out the back end, you won't find a report on the ATSB site, was a first for the aircraft type in Australia.
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