Would you please outline the procedures the crews failed to follow in the examples you quoted.
Fumes in the cabin checklist, 1 shut down APU. That's my abbreviated take on it, the ATSB report has more to say about it. The fumes started under tow into the terminal from the airintake flow coming from where the hydraulic fluid was streaming.
As for the Dash 8 apparently it should have been taken under tow after landing due to the problem requiring power against brakes.
Further to what I said above this is the ATSBs take on the A330 Evac commands;
Decision to use exits
When the captain ordered the evacuation, they did not provide any additional information to the cabin crew about the exits to be used during the evacuation. That is, the captain had not used their powers under Civil Aviation Regulation 145 to adjust the procedure for the specific situation (as detailed in some of the operator’s training as a suitable alternative in some cases), nor were they required to or needed to. Accordingly, it would be expected that all available exits would be utilised and passengers would be evacuated as quickly as possible as per the documented emergency procedure. The operator’s evacuation at the terminal procedure identified additional considerations when an evacuation occurred at a terminal, which included the use of stairs and aerobridges; however, this did not indicate that these options should be used instead of other available exits.
Whilst the ATSB did not say the Captain should have specified which exits to use it states that the Captain has the option to vary an Evac at their discretion and QF procedures allow for that. In this case the choice that FAs made not to use specific exits for fear of suspected fire.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...ir/ao-2019-073
None of what I'm saying is criticising the crew as they are the ones facing the situation on the day and making quick decisions on the spot. Just highlighting everybody is making small errors in these events and no one is perfect.