Originally Posted by
KRUSTY 34
From what I can see the Flight crew initially did exactly what they were trained to do. Flame and smoke during an interrupted start can occur but does not necessarily mean an engine fire.
Was there a Fire Warning or Tailpipe hot warning in the Flight deck? The excerpt above does not say.
There were no overtemp warnings of any kind. The website text doesn't make that clear, but the
PDF report does. And had the marshaller not panicked, the crew would have motored #1, ITT/EGT would have come down and the flight would have left on time.
Originally Posted by The ATSB
There was no indication in the flight deck that there was a fire in the left engine or an overtemperature of the tail pipe; that is, there was no master warning, no relevant indications on the caution and warning panel, no audible chimes and the fire handles were not illuminated.
Originally Posted by KRUSTY 34
Was the crew diverted from a correct course of action (continue to motor the affected engine) by confusion from ground personnel?
Seems to be the case...Again, from the PDF report:
Originally Posted by TheATSB
The captain ceased motoring the left engine and the left propeller stopped.At about this time, the flight crew noted that the left engine interstage turbine temperature (ITT) was still rising and in response the captain decided to make a second attempt at motoring. The marshaller continued to signal to the flight crew that there was a problem, which prompted the captain to check outside their window. The captain could not see any flame or fire. (Note: only the front of the engine is visible from the flight deck). The captain later reported that, given the signals from the marshaller and the rising ITT, they decided to action the engine fire emergency checklist and evacuate the aircraft
Originally Posted by 43 I
Australian airlaw gives the pilot in command powers to do whatever is nessecary in an emergency to ensure the safest outcome, that applies to any operator. If you wish to alter an Evac procedure as you see a threat the cabin crew may not then it's your perogative. In doing so you then may have to explain why afterwards, and take responsibility for any problems as a result, thats the risk.
You can play "what if's" till the cows come home, but, to use your example of the QF brake fire, a brake fire, while it can be visually quite spectacular (same as this incident, I guess) does not typically require an emergency evacuation. Nonetheless, I agree in principle with the point you make,
however giving such a direction doesn't permit you to place your crew and passengers at risk, which you do by default if you order the prohibition on using otherwise safe & serviceable exits.
As PIC, you
don't know what is going on back there, once you've made the ultimate decision to blow the slides (or jump in the case of the SAAB), that's the end of your authority. You don't get to say "Oh, we genuinely believe we're on fire and need an emergency evacuation, but only use 1 of the available exits", particularly having regard to certification requirements that say everyone should be off within 90 seconds once the command is given.
In this case, it did work out, simply due to the fact there was nothing actually wrong with the aircraft, the marshaller just shat himself when he saw the tailpipe fire, but next time...? I leave it to the reader to decide the size of the lawyers feeding frenzy if such a direction were to be given and someone was injured or killed trying to comply with it - because, remember, under Australian law, it is an offence
not to follow the direction of the PIC, when such a direction is given to ensure the safety of the aircraft, those onboard or those on the ground. Strict liability and all that...