Channel 9 Under Investigation MAX Promo
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Unfortunately the crew never got to carry out an existing Non Normal procedure.
The following morning on 29 October 2019, the aircraft was operated from Jakarta with intended destination of Depati Amir Airport, Pangkal Pinang. According to the DFDR and the CVR, the flight had same problems as previous flight from Denpasar to Jakarta.
The flight crew started the IAS DISAGREE Non-Normal Checklist (NNC), but did not identify the runaway stabilizer. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to numerous ATC communications contributed to the flight crew difficulties to control the aircraft.
The following morning on 29 October 2019, the aircraft was operated from Jakarta with intended destination of Depati Amir Airport, Pangkal Pinang. According to the DFDR and the CVR, the flight had same problems as previous flight from Denpasar to Jakarta.
The flight crew started the IAS DISAGREE Non-Normal Checklist (NNC), but did not identify the runaway stabilizer. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to numerous ATC communications contributed to the flight crew difficulties to control the aircraft.
The following morning on 29 October 2019, the aircraft was operated from Jakarta with intended destination of Depati Amir Airport, Pangkal Pinang. According to the DFDR and the CVR, the flight had same problems as previous flight from Denpasar to Jakarta.
The flight crew started the IAS DISAGREE Non-Normal Checklist (NNC), but did not identify the runaway stabilizer. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to numerous ATC communications contributed to the flight crew difficulties to control the aircraft.
The flight crew started the IAS DISAGREE Non-Normal Checklist (NNC), but did not identify the runaway stabilizer. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations, and distractions related to numerous ATC communications contributed to the flight crew difficulties to control the aircraft.
I don’t mean to be blunt but after years of flying, both accidents could have been avoided in my humble opinion and pilot error was a major contributing factor in both accidents.
contributed to the flight crew difficulties to control the aircraft.[
I think you will find in both of those reports there were contributing factors highlighted in training, currency, crm and sop compliance. I have never said pilots can’t be responsible for an accident, what I am saying is a pilot will never be SOLELY responsible. Even the German who flew the plane into a mountain shouldn’t have been there as he was known to have suicidal thoughts and ironically the fortified cockpit door introduced to enhance safety was also a contributing factor. There is not a better example of systemic design and certification failures leading to an accident than the MAX issues. To blame it SOLELY at feet of the pilots is to excuse gross negligence on the part of Boeing and the FAA.
Maybe I've misunderstood your intent because you've changed your wording slightly from "sole cause" to "solely responsible". The inclusion of contributing factors is used to identify others who may bear some responsibility. Again, I have not offered commentary on the Boeing MCAS case.
Even the German who flew the plane into a mountain shouldn’t have been there as he was known to have suicidal thoughts and ironically the fortified cockpit door introduced to enhance safety was also a contributing factor.
Last edited by Chronic Snoozer; 9th Apr 2021 at 03:24. Reason: Corrected link
The cockpit door is not a cause.
It seems strange that some are still defending Boeing and 737 MAX when Boeing and its lawyers have admitted criminal culpability and paid an (initial) fine of nearly $3 billion.
If you have not already done so, read Deferred Prosecution Agreement at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-re...51336/download and particularly Statement of Facts at Attachment A.
Inter alia Boeing admits at para. 46
“46. Because of Boeing’s intentional withholding of information from the FAA AEG (Aircraft Evaluation Group), the final version of the 737 MAX FSB (Standardization Board) Report lacked information about MCAS, and relevant portions of this 737 MAX FSB Report were materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete. In turn, airplane manuals and pilot-training materials for U.S.-based airlines lacked information about MCAS, and relevant portions of these manuals and materials were similarly materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete as a result.”
There’s much more along similar lines. All of which Boeing admits and agrees; for purposes of future criminal and civil litigation.
If you have not already done so, read Deferred Prosecution Agreement at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-re...51336/download and particularly Statement of Facts at Attachment A.
Inter alia Boeing admits at para. 46
“46. Because of Boeing’s intentional withholding of information from the FAA AEG (Aircraft Evaluation Group), the final version of the 737 MAX FSB (Standardization Board) Report lacked information about MCAS, and relevant portions of this 737 MAX FSB Report were materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete. In turn, airplane manuals and pilot-training materials for U.S.-based airlines lacked information about MCAS, and relevant portions of these manuals and materials were similarly materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete as a result.”
There’s much more along similar lines. All of which Boeing admits and agrees; for purposes of future criminal and civil litigation.
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So you have changed your mind then from this :
Because what you have just posted makes the point that Ollie was making. engineering should have sorted the problem out if it was recurring, repetitive MCAS activations, distractions from ATC. All of which by your own statement
So not pilot error but a systemic error starting with the incompetent manufacturer to produce a safe aircraft.
Because what you have just posted makes the point that Ollie was making. engineering should have sorted the problem out if it was recurring, repetitive MCAS activations, distractions from ATC. All of which by your own statement
So not pilot error but a systemic error starting with the incompetent manufacturer to produce a safe aircraft.
If you where running a simulator session and the operating crew where given a Stall Warning followed by a Runaway Stabiliser, the crew then failed to recognise the Runaway Stabiliser would you fail them?
But it wasnt a runaway stabiliser, It was a system that Boeing had not identified to operators and minimised its impact on operations to the regulator. If a sim session included multiple alerts, the check captain playing the part of an intrusive ATC and involved a system that the crew were not aware of then no, the crew would not be failed, as the session would involve a scenario above and beyond what a line crew would reasonably be expected to cope with.
In case you skipped this post have a read then explain what part of manfacturer negligence and moral bankruptcy you don't understand:
In case you skipped this post have a read then explain what part of manfacturer negligence and moral bankruptcy you don't understand:
It seems strange that some are still defending Boeing and 737 MAX when Boeing and its lawyers have admitted criminal culpability and paid an (initial) fine of nearly $3 billion.
If you have not already done so, read Deferred Prosecution Agreement at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-re...51336/download and particularly Statement of Facts at Attachment A.
Inter alia Boeing admits at para. 46
“46. Because of Boeing’s intentional withholding of information from the FAA AEG (Aircraft Evaluation Group), the final version of the 737 MAX FSB (Standardization Board) Report lacked information about MCAS, and relevant portions of this 737 MAX FSB Report were materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete. In turn, airplane manuals and pilot-training materials for U.S.-based airlines lacked information about MCAS, and relevant portions of these manuals and materials were similarly materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete as a result.”
There’s much more along similar lines. All of which Boeing admits and agrees; for purposes of future criminal and civil litigation.
If you have not already done so, read Deferred Prosecution Agreement at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-re...51336/download and particularly Statement of Facts at Attachment A.
Inter alia Boeing admits at para. 46
“46. Because of Boeing’s intentional withholding of information from the FAA AEG (Aircraft Evaluation Group), the final version of the 737 MAX FSB (Standardization Board) Report lacked information about MCAS, and relevant portions of this 737 MAX FSB Report were materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete. In turn, airplane manuals and pilot-training materials for U.S.-based airlines lacked information about MCAS, and relevant portions of these manuals and materials were similarly materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete as a result.”
There’s much more along similar lines. All of which Boeing admits and agrees; for purposes of future criminal and civil litigation.
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[QUOTE=Lookleft;11024883]But it wasnt a runaway stabiliser, It was a system that Boeing had not identified to operators and minimised its impact on operations to the regulator. If a sim session included multiple alerts, the check captain playing the part of an intrusive ATC and involved a system that the crew were not aware of then no, the crew would not be failed, as the session would involve a scenario above and beyond what a line crew would reasonably be expected to cope with.
In case you skipped this post have a read then explain what part of manfacturer negligence and moral bankruptcy you don't understand:[/QUOTE
Do you think if the crew in the Lion Air accident had known about MCAS it would have made a difference to the outcome. I very much doubt it.
The F/O couldn’t find the Unreliable Airspeed Non Normal in the QRH, mean while the aircraft has the stabiliser trim wheel spinning and the aircraft getting out of trim and the crew never noticed it, come on.
Unfortunately in this was accident going somewhere to happen.
I have said my piece I’m off to put another 737Max back into operation.
In case you skipped this post have a read then explain what part of manfacturer negligence and moral bankruptcy you don't understand:[/QUOTE
Do you think if the crew in the Lion Air accident had known about MCAS it would have made a difference to the outcome. I very much doubt it.
The F/O couldn’t find the Unreliable Airspeed Non Normal in the QRH, mean while the aircraft has the stabiliser trim wheel spinning and the aircraft getting out of trim and the crew never noticed it, come on.
Unfortunately in this was accident going somewhere to happen.
I have said my piece I’m off to put another 737Max back into operation.
No opinion still stands, the crew did not Recognise a Runaway Stabiliser.
If you where running a simulator session and the operating crew where given a Stall Warning followed by a Runaway Stabiliser, the crew then failed to recognise the Runaway Stabiliser would you fail them?
If you where running a simulator session and the operating crew where given a Stall Warning followed by a Runaway Stabiliser, the crew then failed to recognise the Runaway Stabiliser would you fail them?
It was not a Runaway Stabilizer - it was functioning exactly as it was designed to function.
Exactly as MCAS was designed to function = Exactly! nothing other than it was designed to do nothing else.
So why interfere with the STS when it is doing exactly as it was designed.
Again - IT WAS NOT a RUNAWAY TRIM in any way shape or form it was a perfect response to MCAS 100%.
I hope all pilots do not override every auto system on all occasions as the auto systems are far safer (normally) than a pilot - but they do need to work 100% as designed to be safe.
If the PIC had been able to reenter the flight deck then the Germanwings accident would not have happened.
It was not a Runaway Stabilizer - it was functioning exactly as it was designed to function.
ozaub
It seems strange that some are still defending Boeing and 737 MAX when Boeing and its lawyers have admitted criminal culpability and paid an (initial) fine of nearly $3 billion.
It seems strange that some are still defending Boeing and 737 MAX when Boeing and its lawyers have admitted criminal culpability and paid an (initial) fine of nearly $3 billion.
just finished watching a replay of this sensational rubbish. great pity one of the "aviation experts" couldn't avoid being hypocritical when he said something like "if people in the know are saying things are wrong, then management should listen". around the 28 minute mark, comments were made by a former executive chairman who wouldn't listen to advice from the floor before he got the sack from a small pacific airline.
Last edited by down3gr33ns; 11th Apr 2021 at 22:52. Reason: syntax and position.
Speed Trim System (STS) trimming forward for a few seconds during cleanup = normal
STS trimming forward for 5 seconds = you have my attention!
STS trimming down for 10 seconds during climb = WTF, this isn’t normal do something NOW.
(hold the controls, manual flight and re-trim)
STS trimming down 10 seconds for a second time = RUNAWAY STABILIZER no if’s or but’s.....
(STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches should have been an instinctive ‘go to’, stay in manual flight and land)
Standards and Training at these two airlines should be under the spotlight!
STS trimming forward for 5 seconds = you have my attention!
STS trimming down for 10 seconds during climb = WTF, this isn’t normal do something NOW.
(hold the controls, manual flight and re-trim)
STS trimming down 10 seconds for a second time = RUNAWAY STABILIZER no if’s or but’s.....
(STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches should have been an instinctive ‘go to’, stay in manual flight and land)
Standards and Training at these two airlines should be under the spotlight!
Last edited by hoss; 13th Apr 2021 at 21:38.
The other thing a lot of people are discounting is the stickshaker that activated for the entire time they were airborne. Whilst it’s easy to look back now and say “they should’ve ignored it because it was obviously erroneous” they couldn’t really detect that at the time. Multiple problems evolving and it becomes a matter of investigation and prioritisation. Their thought may have been to use the Stab Trim Cutout switches to stop the random Stab movement, but increase speed in case the stickshaker warning was legitimate, and a speed increase might resolve it? We’ll never know for sure. It was a terrible situation they were put into and I’m not sure all Western pilots would’ve coped better in an identical scenario.
If you have a new aircraft with untried features don't unleash it on 2nd world flight crews.