Mt Erebus Disaster 40th Anniversary
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Er...Thanks but no, thanks.
Australia, the lucky country.
I'll take Jacinda over the complete pack of ******** that have run this place over the last 15 years.
I doubt she has any idea of the complexity of the accident chain ( she most certainly is not an expert legal boffin!).
It often seems obvious that they have sought advice from experts, only partially understood it, then applied their authority, or in the case of Holmes just written their opinion like it was fact. Jacinda is no different.
It would be remarkable if only one party carried responsibility and the other parties were completely ‘innocent’. Almost unthinkable that such a terrible outcome wasn’t the result of a chain of errors made by several parties. Yet that’s what we bang on about.
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Tailwheel, any chance of restoring the link on post #160? Or is there too much Kaptin M in there? ;-)
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The link works fine for me. Here it is again:
Erebus 25 years on
I didn't check for Kaptin M but I did notice a few names that, with a sigh of relief, I note have long since moved on.
TW
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The link works fine for me. Here it is again:
Erebus 25 years on
I didn't check for Kaptin M but I did notice a few names that, with a sigh of relief, I note have long since moved on.
TW
Last edited by The name is Porter; 2nd Dec 2019 at 04:42.
Man Bilong Balus long PNG
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I'll take Jacinda over the complete pack of ******** that have run this place over the last 15 years.
Waheka; Once again, thanks, but No Thanks!!
Porter; Am willing to discuss the issue over a bottle of a *good Barossa Shiraz anytime!
* Memo to self: There is no such thing as a bad Barossa Shiraz!
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Paragraph377 says repeatedly that: “The evidence shows Vette to be a company man, towing the company line.”
Capt A G Vette acted as a technical representative for NZALPA and the Royal Commission of Enquiry, to selflessly and tirelessly establish the true causes of this accident, to the ultimate detriment of his career, in opposition to his employer who was engaging in an orchestrated litany of lies. He is a true hero of the piloting profession.
lest we forget!
Capt A G Vette acted as a technical representative for NZALPA and the Royal Commission of Enquiry, to selflessly and tirelessly establish the true causes of this accident, to the ultimate detriment of his career, in opposition to his employer who was engaging in an orchestrated litany of lies. He is a true hero of the piloting profession.
lest we forget!
Just to get the facts straight.=left
The route MSA was FL160, For descent below this there were four conditions that had to be met, none were. the minimum descent for any reason was 6,000ft, this was a mandatory requirement laid down by CAA before these flights could commence.
The route MSA was FL160, For descent below this there were four conditions that had to be met, none were. the minimum descent for any reason was 6,000ft, this was a mandatory requirement laid down by CAA before these flights could commence.
Aircraft were known to fly up the sound at 2,000/1,500, having descended to that altitude via an enroute descent. The excuse is given that they were in severe clear VMC, the argument then becomes what defines VMC. There is no evidence that Captain Collins was in anything other than VMC up to the point of impact, to say otherwise is not to understand whiteout. It should be noted too that McMurdo folk observed an aircraft on one occasion operating in and out of cloud at some 2,000 while the aircraft reported they were in VMC. I recall on climb out in Antarctica as a pax and being in severe clear VMC all the way to entering the overcast at 20,000, yet it was like being in a milk bottle, absolutely nothing distinguishable in the visual field, except rare shadows on the surface cast by invisible isolated small puff ball clouds below. The manner in which the airline operated was an accident looking for a time and place to happen, and happen it did, unfortunately to Captain Collins, crew and passengers.
“The evidence shows Vette to be a company man, towing the company line.”
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You bet it was appealed. What do you think ignited the Mahon Inquiry and the incredible investigative work done by Captain Gordon Vette and NZAlpa? If not for that, yes, Chippendale's report may have remained the official finding and what a travesty of justice that would have been.
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Aircraft were known to fly up the sound at 2,000/1,500, having descended to that altitude via an enroute descent. The excuse is given that they were in severe clear VMC, the argument then becomes what defines VMC. There is no evidence that Captain Collins was in anything other than VMC up to the point of impact, to say otherwise is not to understand whiteout.
Yet down he went.
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If the flight was VMC at FL160, and the photo's taken show they were, why was it not noticed that Beaufort Island was on the stbd side, and if they were on the track they thought they were on it should have been on the port side. Beaufort Island is plainly visible in some of the pax photos.
The Altitudes that were mandatory requirements. I do believe the original reason for going below 6,000ft was by invitation of the controller at McMurdo. Does this invitation overide CAA mandatory requirement??
Most know that the rules and regulations are bent at times to suit the occasion, but if they are disregarded one has to be very certain that they are fireproof, and if it turns to custard then there will be repercussions.
There are reports that the flight was advised by ground staff at McMurdo that the weather conditions were no good, in fact hopeless for sightseeing around the base and it was recommended that the flight proceed to the Dry Valleys which were reported clear. This procedure had been carried out on a previous flight due weather. The pax had been briefed that this was always a possibility. The person who did this advising from the ground at McMurdo was never called to give evidence at the Mahon enquiry.
Most know there was enough fault from all concerned, the Company, CAA for letting Air New Zealand be virtually self monitor the Antarctic operation, and by the crew. The cause for all this discussion would be Mahons findings that the crew were "In my opinion neither Captain Collins nor first officer Cassin nor the flight engineers made any error which contributed to the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence"
Obviously many very experienced aviators do not agree with this statement and never will. The fact that our prime minister, who has as much aeronautical experience as Justice Mahon, None, agrees with his finding does nothing to change any knowledgable persons view.
The Altitudes that were mandatory requirements. I do believe the original reason for going below 6,000ft was by invitation of the controller at McMurdo. Does this invitation overide CAA mandatory requirement??
Most know that the rules and regulations are bent at times to suit the occasion, but if they are disregarded one has to be very certain that they are fireproof, and if it turns to custard then there will be repercussions.
There are reports that the flight was advised by ground staff at McMurdo that the weather conditions were no good, in fact hopeless for sightseeing around the base and it was recommended that the flight proceed to the Dry Valleys which were reported clear. This procedure had been carried out on a previous flight due weather. The pax had been briefed that this was always a possibility. The person who did this advising from the ground at McMurdo was never called to give evidence at the Mahon enquiry.
Most know there was enough fault from all concerned, the Company, CAA for letting Air New Zealand be virtually self monitor the Antarctic operation, and by the crew. The cause for all this discussion would be Mahons findings that the crew were "In my opinion neither Captain Collins nor first officer Cassin nor the flight engineers made any error which contributed to the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence"
Obviously many very experienced aviators do not agree with this statement and never will. The fact that our prime minister, who has as much aeronautical experience as Justice Mahon, None, agrees with his finding does nothing to change any knowledgable persons view.
Disagree. Firstly - no other pilot descended below 2000'
He claims that a flight captained by Gordon Vette flew at 1300 feet.
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/a...ectid=10609805
PH6
They could have been at A060 below a BKN070 layer with vis 50km+ and likely speared in just the same on the same track. The only difference would be the wreckage ~3nm further south. Quibbling over the descent to 1500 is immaterial. I'm certainly not condoning his actions, but it's not really relevant to the systemic issues at play.
We'll never know exactly what they saw. But we can't paint a pretty accurate picture from the photos out the side windows. As you likely recall, I've been there and seen similar conditions first hand- and posted the photos to a previous thread before photo bucket killed the internet. Whiteout might be a theory, but it's a bloody good one, and noone has come up with any plausible alternative.
Descent below LSALT should never have been related to VMC in those flight orders, It should have been related to what we now define as SKC or SCT at most - and 30km+ vis.
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addendum 1... whilst looking for the map list in the Chippendale report for my post below, I found the following quote which is relevant to this one:
addendum 2:
PH6 stated
Chippendale Report says
If Collins (who was not VMC at 2000' - what other reason was there to descend further) had climbed out at 2000' rather than descending further to 1500', the accident might have been averted.
Thirdly - if by "whiteout" you mean the whole "false horizon" hypothesis - that too is just a theory.
Descent below LSALT should never have been related to VMC in those flight orders, It should have been related to what we now define as SKC or SCT at most - and 30km+ vis.
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addendum 1... whilst looking for the map list in the Chippendale report for my post below, I found the following quote which is relevant to this one:
"2.17 Whiteout conditions can exist within the normal VMC minima and even in the conditions defined by Air New Zealand as the minima for VMC descents to 6000 feet."
PH6 stated
Disagree. Firstly - no other pilot descended below 2000'
1.17.40 On 22 November 1979 CAD advised Air New Zealand Limited that reports had been received from US Authorities in Antarctica that civil aircraft had been observed at lower than normal altitudes over some glaciers and at 1000 above ground level.
Last edited by compressor stall; 2nd Dec 2019 at 10:55.
why was it not noticed that Beaufort Island was on the stbd side, and if they were on the track they thought they were on it should have been on the port side. Beaufort Island is plainly visible in some of the pax photos.
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In Gordon Vette publication "Impact Erebus" on page 42 there is a chart that is shown as "Antarctic strip chart showing McMurdo route:Annex 1.
"In the Antarctic envelope handed to the crew at their pre- despatch briefing shortly before take off, was an Antarctic strip chart which depicted two routes between New Zealand and McMurdo. both routes ran through the Byrd reporting point in the middle of McMurdo Sound"
Even on the scale reduced enough to fit on to the book page Beaufort Island is clearly shown as to be passed on the port side if they were on the track they believed they were on.
Would this flight have been conducted the way it was if there had of been a C AA airline inspector onboard? I have heard one was scheduled to do the trip but had to cancel due to family reasons. Not confirmed only heard through grapevine many years ago.
"In the Antarctic envelope handed to the crew at their pre- despatch briefing shortly before take off, was an Antarctic strip chart which depicted two routes between New Zealand and McMurdo. both routes ran through the Byrd reporting point in the middle of McMurdo Sound"
Even on the scale reduced enough to fit on to the book page Beaufort Island is clearly shown as to be passed on the port side if they were on the track they believed they were on.
Would this flight have been conducted the way it was if there had of been a C AA airline inspector onboard? I have heard one was scheduled to do the trip but had to cancel due to family reasons. Not confirmed only heard through grapevine many years ago.
Have a look at the Antarctic Strip Chart Appendix I in the Chippendale report.
If this is the same one to which you refer, there is a label for Beaufort Island, but the actual location (outline) of the island is not actually depicted on the chart.
I've never looked at chart aspect in detail so if they were given something better (like the USGS maps @ 1:250:000 of Ross Island and Franklin Island first published in 1962) please let me know.
If this is the same one to which you refer, there is a label for Beaufort Island, but the actual location (outline) of the island is not actually depicted on the chart.
I've never looked at chart aspect in detail so if they were given something better (like the USGS maps @ 1:250:000 of Ross Island and Franklin Island first published in 1962) please let me know.