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B777 rejected take off. Confusion on flight deck.

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B777 rejected take off. Confusion on flight deck.

Old 24th Jun 2018, 10:41
  #21 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
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It is obvious there was "procrastination" in the cockpit
Bloggs,
I just timed myself setting an imaginary park brake, making an imaginary PA, asking my FO to identify and then running memory items, then having a very brief imaginary chat with ATC before asking for the Evac checklist. I stopped the iPad timer when the Evac command came. It was 12 seconds slower than what the BA crew did.
I would recommend anyone reading this to do the same in the calm quiet environment of their lounge room, without additional cargo fire alerts, startle effect etc.
For me it was an eye opener because I know from experience that I would have been graded nicely in the sim yet 12 seconds is a long time to be sitting in 25a looking at ( and probably feeling) a large fire three feet away.
Regardless of how contributors to this thread view the BA crews actions I suggest you run this little exercise and see if it changes/ tempers/ reaffirms your current assessment.
I am certainly throwing no stones in their direction.
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Old 24th Jun 2018, 11:34
  #22 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2002
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Originally Posted by Capt Fathom View Post


That’s my point. A Sim exercise. You know it’s coming and you’ve gone through it the night before, verbatim.

Pull up to a stop and halfway through the drills the instructor says ‘Yep that’s great, let’s move on to the next lesson’.

Nothing like a real fire to ramp it up to the next level.
Exactly, the sim is the sim... It's not real, there is no fear (except maybe loss of licence), the instructor is telling you what you can see.

I hope people who throw stones from the comfy 1 G armchair get it perfect every time.
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Old 24th Jun 2018, 13:35
  #23 (permalink)  
 
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Framer, I just did it as Captain Armchair. I was comfortably inside the 2min 6 seconds it took for the Captain to call for the evacuation checklist. Look, please don't get me wrong. I'm not saying I'll get it right, and would expect to get hammered on Prune when I don't, but the fact is, that whole sequence was pretty ordinary, as pointed out by Centaurus. I can't see how anybody could say otherwise.

Throw in almost zero help from ATC, the crew doing an inflight engine fire drill on the ground (FO using the MFD timer for the 30"??; I'm not familiar with the 777 but wouldn't you just use the (if fitted) stopwatch?) and precious seconds go wasted.

Originally Posted by Fathom
Pull up to a stop and halfway through the drills the instructor says ‘Yep that’s great, let’s move on to the next lesson’.
Maybe in your outfit; not mine.
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Old 24th Jun 2018, 13:50
  #24 (permalink)  
 
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Good stuff Blogs, glad you did that.
Lots of different ways of looking at it I guess. I measured from when the aircraft came to a stop until the Evacuation command was given, BA did it in 1 min 16 sec. I took longer in my armchair with some pre-planning. ( I understand that a mistake was made re the running engine).
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Old 25th Jun 2018, 00:24
  #25 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2012
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It was a bit untidy BUT it worked at the end of the day.

The MFD timer is neither here or there, it comes up as part of the checklist, so no biggie, though in this instance the 30 seconds is irrelevant.

Bear in mind though that from the 777 flight deck you cannot see the wing at all, let alone the engines, you cannot hear the engines, except maybe at takeoff thrust, the wind is probably blowing the smoke away from you and you are relying on external cues, so from that perspective prob not much different to your 717 Bloggs.

In real terms the difference between a false fire indication and a real fire is, I suspect as I have never had one, difficult to determine, because of the things I listed above, so chuck everyone out down the slides and injure someone and it is a false indication and someone will have a go at you, don't throw them down the slides immediately without confirmation that it is a real fire and someone will have a go at you - so in reality you are between the devil and the deep blue sea.
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Old 25th Jun 2018, 05:09
  #26 (permalink)  
 
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Sorry Snakecharma but no-one is suggesting there were any issues with the decision to evacuate.

There was no question there was a fire - the relief pilot confirmed that to the Captain almost immediately via visual inspection from the cabin - and that the decision to evacuate was correct. No-one is criticising that decision The devil and the deep blue sea were in the same place. There was no middle ground. They were in the poo, no doubt about it.

The issues from this evac relate primarily to the Captain’s decision to run the evac checklist from memory and subsequent failure to shutdown the operating #2 engine. Exits 2L, 3L, 2R and, after 5 pax evac’d, 1L were rendered unusable by fire. The Captain’s decision to run the checklist from memory and failure to shutdown the #2 engine rendered 3R and 4R unusable as a result of jet blast. Therefore, of the 8 exits, 4 were unusable due fire, 2 were effectively rendered unusable by the Captain and only 2 were available for evac, being 1R and 4L, at extreme ends and sides of the aircraft.

They were somewhat fortunate the aircraft was only half full as they only had 1/4 of the exits available, broadly in line with certification requirements of half the exits for a full pax load.

I would respectfully suggest you need to read the report carefully, rather than make vague statements about demons and oceans.

As I said earlier, there are clear learnings in this accident. I look at recent sims I’ve done, and this report, and take those learnings gladly on board. I’m not sure I could have done better but I hope I can take something from this and maybe learn from it if, heaven forbid, I’m confronted with something similar while in the LHS one day.

Last edited by DirectAnywhere; 25th Jun 2018 at 05:25.
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Old 25th Jun 2018, 07:04
  #27 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2012
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Direct - the joys of (me) jumping into the middle of a thread you are correct the captains’ decision to ‘sort of’ do the checklist was not a brilliant one, I was commenting (albeit obliquely) more generally on the various thoughts about how the checklist procedures were intended to be done in a 2 crew environment and how having extra people on the flight deck both helps and hinders the workflow on the flight deck and a few other things.

I can understand (I don’t and didn’t say I agree with) why things played out as they did - he couldn’t see anything of any note from the flight deck, as Capn Bloggs suggested there wasn’t a huge amount of support/info from ATC, so he sent the relief pilot into the cabin to have a look.

This interrupted the normal (sim like) flow of events in the flight deck, he shut down the engine with the fire, and then they half did the rest of the checklists. As I said untidy.

i would hope I would do things differently, but until it happens to me (touch wood it won’t) I can’t really comment, but I can understand how things planned out as they did.


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Old 25th Jun 2018, 08:42
  #28 (permalink)  
 
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At our yearly CRM session, the following video was talked about regarding pointing and calling. I believe its a good methodology to employ in briefings/self briefings etc for RTO's to help minimise the possibility of missing steps of memory items.

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Old 26th Jun 2018, 05:43
  #29 (permalink)  
 
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What's the point of that?
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Old 26th Jun 2018, 06:45
  #30 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2002
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I've seen pilots point at an engine oil pressure gauge (for which I had quietly pulled the C/B) and say "Ts and Ps normal".
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Old 26th Jun 2018, 07:29
  #31 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
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I’ve seen a pilot point at a woman in the front seat of a convertible Mercedes and say “ sh1t, that’s my wife!”
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Old 26th Jun 2018, 11:12
  #32 (permalink)  
 
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Good CRM example of a V1 cut from VA

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Old 26th Jun 2018, 12:21
  #33 (permalink)  
 
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2:26 parked until pilots out. Plus probably another 60 to get the pax off. A good example of the ridiculousness of the 30" wait.

Stopwatch!
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Old 26th Jun 2018, 14:43
  #34 (permalink)  
 
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In that video it takes exactly two minutes from when the aircraft comes to a stop until the evacuation command is given.
Forty four seconds longer than the BA crew. The BA f/o reduced the 30 Second wait to 15 seconds.
It sure is a fine line between rushing and cocking it up v’s taking longer than necessary. The one thing that is obvious is that the fire crews arriving on scene quickly made things much safer so the timing of the call for services is critical.
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Old 27th Jun 2018, 04:49
  #35 (permalink)  
 
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Sorry but that video is totally unrealistic to how the situation would develop in real life, that crew clearly is rehearsed and knows exactly what is coming. Having conducted several investigations into engine failures and RTO’s you can’t underestimate just how much of a factor the ‘startle effect’ is. The best instructor I ever had in the sim once told me that you should be deliberately slow in the Sim as when it happens in real life you will go twice as fast with the adrenaline, from all the crew I have interviewed that does seem to be the case. I have seen some amazing lapses, mistakes made in the heat of the moment when under pressure from an unexpected situation, best thing you can do is ‘review’ over and over which is what the BA crew did, things were done wrong but thankfully it was mopped up by each other to a good outcome.
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Old 27th Jun 2018, 05:31
  #36 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Ollie Onion View Post
Sorry but that video is totally unrealistic to how the situation would develop in real life, that crew clearly is rehearsed and knows exactly what is coming. Having conducted several investigations into engine failures and RTO’s you can’t underestimate just how much of a factor the ‘startle effect’ is. The best instructor I ever had in the sim once told me that you should be deliberately slow in the Sim as when it happens in real life you will go twice as fast with the adrenaline, from all the crew I have interviewed that does seem to be the case. I have seen some amazing lapses, mistakes made in the heat of the moment when under pressure from an unexpected situation, best thing you can do is ‘review’ over and over which is what the BA crew did, things were done wrong but thankfully it was mopped up by each other to a good outcome.
Totally agree Ollie, lots of Monday morning quarter backing going on, with a significant whiff of arrogance attached as well.
First of all, yes it could have been done better, but errors were trapped or mitigated and most importantly EVERYONE lived to tell the tail.
Having been through a highspeed (144kts according to the QAR) RTO back in my 757 days I can tell you it isn’t as black and white as the report will relate nor is the sim a particularly realistic representation.
This reminds me of the witch hunt and whispering campaign that went on after the 777 at LHR as well as when the crew BA9
did such a fantastic job...but were initially vilified.
The key thing here is to add knowledge, to be critical if necessary but most importantly be better prepared to deal with a problem as it arises.
For me this report merely reinforces my experience of the RTO I went through and the ensuing intital confusion and relative chaos.
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