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VA Captain stands crew down after bungled approach

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VA Captain stands crew down after bungled approach

Old 9th Sep 2017, 20:20
  #41 (permalink)  
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: US via Oz, Honkers & Blighty.
Posts: 221
Originally Posted by The Bullwinkle View Post
How are you determining successful?
There has never been a Jet Hull loss by an Australian airline. (Yes, we may have come close)
How many Jet Hull losses have there been in European airlines?
I know this is simplistic but it's a fact.
Possibly BW but let's be fair here,

Australia has far less commercial traffic when compared to land mass. A far simpler airspace system, no terrain and extremely benign weather.

You can try and make it as difficult as you like to operate an aircraft in Australia but the simple fact is, it isn't. Well......it shouldn't be.
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Old 10th Sep 2017, 13:29
  #42 (permalink)  
Join Date: Feb 1999
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Canberra, Cairns, Hobart.
These have terrain threats. Hobart is procedural and as far as benign weather...... nothing like a challenging maximum crosswind landing on your last sector late at night is poor weather and vis.
Sure nothing compared to Kathmandu or Lukla.
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Old 10th Sep 2017, 16:11
  #43 (permalink)  
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: US
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1. For over a 1000' neither crew member, and especially the Captain, never looked at the flap setting after selecting them? That's a huge, and fundamental, problem. Action -> verify.

2. Does the checklist call for flaps verification? Obviously that didn't happen.

3. With level D simulators, at least in the U.S., everyone's first flight will have a full load of passengers.
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Old 11th Sep 2017, 03:12
  #44 (permalink)  
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Old 11th Sep 2017, 03:29
  #45 (permalink)  
Join Date: Jun 2011
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Originally Posted by warrior92 View Post
So whenever does a cadet stop being a cadet?
When they meet the standard, in my opinion they are a FO, if they are at a level below the DE pilot next to them that's a failing of the check and training system.
If he/she progresses through a regional, gains a command, 5000 hrs with 1000 command is that enough to loose the 'cadet stigma' when they step into a jet? or will it be carried with them through the rest of their career?
I've heard pilots with over 35 years of flying as widebody jet pilots still referred to as "bloody cadets" when someone wants to put them down.
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Old 11th Sep 2017, 08:03
  #46 (permalink)  
Join Date: Nov 2003
Location: Melbourne
Age: 56
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I've heard pilots with over 35 years of flying as widebody jet pilots still referred to as "bloody cadets" when someone wants to put them down.
This kind of thing happens in other industries as well. Ask any Army Reservist. Or any industry where there is an accelerated course where junior people get put on-par or above more senior people (e.g. Brand new Lieutenant vs. Platoon Sergeant).

IME this attitude is in part due to jealousy, but also based on the REALITY that the said Cadet (or Lt, etc.) has been placed in a position above their level of competency.

By 'Above their level of competency' I mean that while they may have the requirements on paper, practically they are often hanging on by their fingernails and require guidance and mentoring until their REAL competency matches (and then exceeds) their qualifications.

And like any other good pilot, a good cadet will become a good FO and a good Captain, and I don't think anyone here has said otherwise.

What they have said (repeatedly) is that the cadet is more likely to require more help initially than someone with more experience.

I'm generalising obviously, but that doesn't make it less true, IMHO.


when someone wants to put them down.
You write this as if the person who said "Bloody Cadets" put the other person down.

You're suggesting that someone with 35 years of widebody experience (who must now be at least 53 years old) has been 'put down' by a comment like that.


The correct response to a comment like that is "F*ck off, D*ckhead"!

I'll use myself as an example. People can try to put me down. I grew up being called a wog, as well as all other kinds of names, mainly due to being an Italian in a primary school that was basically WASP.

I get abused online as well. Anyone reading this who also remembers the EAA Vs. SAA EBA debate a couple of years back might remember all the abuse I copped on that thread. Did it put me down?


Why not?

Because I don't GAF what people's opinions of myself are. Pretty simple stuff, really. I have a thick skin, and it's difficult to survive in this industry without one.

Has a Cadet ever been abused by a CP, HOFO, or SBP? Has a Cadet ever realised that they've been pineappled by their boss, and can't do anything about it because if they complain about it they'll get sacked? Has a Cadet spent months and years on end being called a "Pukin white c*nt" by our some of our northern passengers?

Possibly not.

Does it make them a better pilot? No.

But it does help them acquire the ability to be able to take criticism, whether justified or not, without being triggered.

Something you might want to learn, perhaps.

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Old 11th Sep 2017, 16:34
  #47 (permalink)  
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: PA
Age: 55
Posts: 35
Stop banging on about a demo flapless! The report clearly states what the captain called for.

. For over a 1000' neither crew member, and especially the Captain, never looked at the flap setting after selecting them? That's a huge, and fundamental, problem. Action -> verify.
As mentioned before, they had a speed alert, and still didnt check flaps.

Being this was an ATR regional, with the accelerated program to get Captains, the Captain may have had only 2500 hrs. (the report does not mention hrs)
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Old 11th Sep 2017, 19:19
  #48 (permalink)  
Join Date: Aug 2004
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Where do you start then, to get the thousands of hours airline co-pilots you deem necessary to make a 'safe' operation?
In the UK for example, we have no big commercial GA industry, and no large number of ex Military experienced pilots to provide the number of pilots required by our airlines. The Training college is the other way.
A properly sourced and trained pilot with extensive mentoring on the line, is surely preferable to sitting in the jump seat of a 747 for years and getting no handling practice.
As a matter of interest for example, a B747 is a two man operation. No checklists include duties for a third pilot, so what does an S/O do other than act as a relief pilot on long sectors? All co pilots in my company are fully trained on joining for two crew ops. ( On many shorter routes B777/787/747/A380 operate wth just two pilots on board)

Last edited by cessnapete; 12th Sep 2017 at 01:10.
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Old 11th Sep 2017, 21:17
  #49 (permalink)  
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The report as written doesn't go into hows and whys. And saying "he should have done this" and "he should have checked that" really doesn't help. What happened was that an incorrect flap setting went unnoticed, for whatever reason. To move ahead we need to understand why this happened. Questions as to how the flight was progressing at the time, the progress of the trainee, the operation standard of the LTC, differences between manufacturer and company SOP's, the weather of the day and so on. The report just basically said "it happened". As low level incident goes, that is quite appropriate, but I wonder what the company report said? Failure to fix this means there will be a re-occurrence.

As for flying in Canberra, Cairns, Hobart - Yes the ground is a bumpy but the biggest challenges in Oz are due to the effects of hot climate and remote alternates. By weather I mean damn hot, proper CB's, real rain and winds that are unpredictable. But on a typical day, flying in Oz is pretty straight forwards. The most complicated thing to overcome is generally officialdom and "strict Australian standards".

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Old 12th Sep 2017, 01:27
  #50 (permalink)  
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Western Pacific
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Maybe if we went back to the old ways, were the aeroplane was not trusted to do what you commanded it to & the PNF was not trusted to do what you asked, there would be less problems. Don't trust anything or anybody, not even yourself.

The PNF, when selecting the flaps should have checked that, 1. they were running after being selected & 2. they reached & stayed at the position selected. In the old days there were standard calls reflecting this. The PF should have checked that the flaps reached the position he called for. The same goes for any other selection that is made on the flight deck - landing gear, anti-ice switches, etc.

Takes a few seconds of concentration & discipline, but saves a world of heartache at the times things go wrong & don't behave as expected. It takes more than just understanding the equipment & how it works, although that is very important. It takes a healthy suspicion of the equipment & a constant cross-check that the aircraft is giving you what you have asked it for. That's what we have TMA's & FMA's for.

The excellent reliability of modern aircraft is one of aviation's greatest risk factors.
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Old 12th Sep 2017, 03:00
  #51 (permalink)  
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One of the major issues in modern aviation is the lack of cockpit technology.
You shouldn't have to be cross checking everything all the time THAT is the job of technology. Unfortunately most modern airline cockpit displays comes out of the 30's just to appease the common cockpit philosophy.
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Old 12th Sep 2017, 03:14
  #52 (permalink)  
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NN, one could argue the technology was checking: the GPWS went off.
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Old 13th Sep 2017, 01:08
  #53 (permalink)  
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Location: In da Big Smoke
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My point would be that you shouldn't need that, it should be plainly obviously from the instruments what is going on. Whether that is in the design of the instruments, the location or both. In many instances in many different types this is not the case.
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Old 13th Sep 2017, 01:21
  #54 (permalink)  
Join Date: Jun 2007
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As a result of this incident and a couple of others very similar, checking/training has become more focused on the old Limitation, Operation, Indication mantra, at least at this company. It appears to be not before time.......
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Old 13th Sep 2017, 05:13
  #55 (permalink)  
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: Australia
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Just the fact that they're having to advertise for cadets shows that there's seriously something wrong with the organisation.

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Old 13th Sep 2017, 12:26
  #56 (permalink)  
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Australia
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To add a little humour into the subject of forgetting to check the flaps position after selection. In the late 1950's I was a flying instructor at RAAF Base Townsville on Lancaster Mk 4's - otherwise known as the Lincoln. I was converting my Commanding Officer to the type. His name was Wing Commander Cy Greenwood. Cy wore a bristling moustache and was a no-nonsense personality who did not suffer fools gladly.
During WW2 he was a Beaufighter pilot based at Coomalie Creek airstrip south of Darwin. During a raid on a Japanese seaplane base in Timor he was attacked by four Japanese Zero fighter floatplanes. His aircraft was shot down and Cy ditched a mile off the coast. His navigator was killed when the Japs strafed the ditched Beaufighter. Cy was repeatedly fired upon while in his life jacket but fooled the enemy pilots by ducking under water as they came at him.

He swam a mile to shore but was betrayed by local natives and caught by Japanese soldiers. He was beaten up and eventually incarcerated in the notorious Changi prison. He was repatriated after the war and remained in the RAAF becoming the CO in 1948 of the RAAF contingent flying supplies in Dakotas to the starving German population during the Berlin Airlift of Cold War fame.
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin_Blockade

In 1959 he was posted to Townsville as Commanding Officer of No. 10 (Maritime Reconnaissance Squadron) where I did his Lincoln conversion..
One day we were doing circuits and touch and go's. On final he requested full flap which I selected for him. The flap lever in the Lincoln was a vertical lever in the fuselage floor. There were several positions available. Up, Neutral and Full Down with intermediate selections in between. In each case the flap lever was set to neutral once the required setting was attained. The threshold speed for full flap was 105 knots.

At 500 feet on final he requested full flap and when the flap indicator indicted it was fully down I returned the lever to neutral. Around 100 feet the Lincoln fell out of the sky and we landed with a huge bounce. I had no idea what had gone wrong. The Wingco gave a frightful oath and firewalled all four engines for a go-around. He called for the flaps to be retracted to half as part of the go-around procedure. When I reached for the flap lever I saw that the flaps were already fully up.

Looking down at the flap lever I realised with dismay that the selector was just out of neutral and it was obvious that during selection to neutral after full flap had been attained, I had inadvertently gone past the neutral position to up. Hence the loss of lift and heavy touch-down. I apologised to the CO and assured him it was my fault for his heavy landing. He looked down at me with his moustache bristling but merely grunted. The rest of the circuits were uneventful.
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Old 14th Sep 2017, 02:19
  #57 (permalink)  
Join Date: Oct 2002
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And therein lies the difference between 'today' and 'yesteryear'. In Yesteryear, the fault analysis, root cause, remedy action and lessons learnt were done in cockpit, in real time without delay to following task. And may I say a QFI's bread and butter.

Great description BTW Centaurus.
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Old 15th Sep 2017, 21:53
  #58 (permalink)  
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: PA
Age: 55
Posts: 35
FFS, stop blaming the automation, and learn how to use it and work it to your advantage.
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