Virgin Aircraft 'Emergency' Landing
You are Monday morning quarterbacking again........
They had no way of knowing the Fog was going to lift inside 60 mins. At 61 mins the Tanks run dry and THEN THE **** REALLY DOES HIT THE FAN.......
I suggest the QF boys decision to bust the minima a little ( with full confidence in their HUD GPS LNAV ) to land ASAP was a damn good one.....
They had no way of knowing the Fog was going to lift inside 60 mins. At 61 mins the Tanks run dry and THEN THE **** REALLY DOES HIT THE FAN.......
I suggest the QF boys decision to bust the minima a little ( with full confidence in their HUD GPS LNAV ) to land ASAP was a damn good one.....
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I am trying to get my head around the wx for YMIA. My reading of the TAFs is we have the TAF issued at 1758 with TEMPO 19/24 BKN 006. The next TAF issued at 2302 but not becoming valid until 0000. Please correct me if I am wrong but I think they have both diverted to YMIA (ETA YMIA before 0000) with the forecast TEMPO BKN 006?
During pre flight the TAF---
TAF AMD YMIA 171758Z 1718/1812 24005KT 9999 SCT030 BKN060 BECMG 1718/1720 21006KT 9999 SCT006 SCT030 BECMG 1800/1802 18010KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 BECMG 1807/1809 16008KT 9999 SCT040 TEMPO 1719/1724 BKN006 RMK T 06 05 07 13 Q 1016 1018 1020 1019
The next TAF during descent into ADL--
TAF YMIA 172302Z 1800/1812 20008KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 RMK T 08 12 13 10 Q 1020 1019 1019 1020
Last TAF as they arrived MIA---
TAF AMD YMIA 172352Z 1800/1812 20007KT 3000 BR SCT003 BKN040 BECMG 1800/1801 19006KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 PROB30 1800/1802 0500 FG BKN002 RMK T 07 11 13 10 Q 1019 1019 1019 1020
THEY WERE LED UP THE GARDEN PATH.....
BKN 600' AGL is not below the minima......when they made the divert decisions there was no mention of BKN 600' or Fog and the METARS were ok...
TAF AMD YMIA 171758Z 1718/1812 24005KT 9999 SCT030 BKN060 BECMG 1718/1720 21006KT 9999 SCT006 SCT030 BECMG 1800/1802 18010KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 BECMG 1807/1809 16008KT 9999 SCT040 TEMPO 1719/1724 BKN006 RMK T 06 05 07 13 Q 1016 1018 1020 1019
The next TAF during descent into ADL--
TAF YMIA 172302Z 1800/1812 20008KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 RMK T 08 12 13 10 Q 1020 1019 1019 1020
Last TAF as they arrived MIA---
TAF AMD YMIA 172352Z 1800/1812 20007KT 3000 BR SCT003 BKN040 BECMG 1800/1801 19006KT 9999 SCT030 SCT050 PROB30 1800/1802 0500 FG BKN002 RMK T 07 11 13 10 Q 1019 1019 1019 1020
THEY WERE LED UP THE GARDEN PATH.....
BKN 600' AGL is not below the minima......when they made the divert decisions there was no mention of BKN 600' or Fog and the METARS were ok...
Last edited by nitpicker330; 18th Jul 2013 at 23:38.
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Tempo ended at 0000 so just need fuel for that plus 30mins. Both crew probably could have held for 30 and landed with FFR but that wasn't the wx they experienced so on arrival decided that it was better to conduct approach. As you probably know conducting approaches burns through the fuel much quicker than just being in a hold.
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Willadvise,
That is correct.
However the aircraft diverted to Mildura on the basis of the Metars. That is to say actual weather. Metars were not AUTO they were actual observations.
I dont know about Virgin but the Qantas had legal fuel on diversion. I think the report states 2.9 at mildura. They arrived at 2342z. Tempo ended at 2400z. So thats 18+30 = 45 mins holding fuel.
With regards to what Qantas did after the event, that is a matter for Qantas and has no bearing on the situation as it unfolded.
That is correct.
However the aircraft diverted to Mildura on the basis of the Metars. That is to say actual weather. Metars were not AUTO they were actual observations.
I dont know about Virgin but the Qantas had legal fuel on diversion. I think the report states 2.9 at mildura. They arrived at 2342z. Tempo ended at 2400z. So thats 18+30 = 45 mins holding fuel.
With regards to what Qantas did after the event, that is a matter for Qantas and has no bearing on the situation as it unfolded.
This little incident will no doubt find its way into many TEM or CRM courses over the next 100 years or so and I can imagine that the debate has only just begun.
Two different airlines, two different operating cultures, flying the same aircraft dealing with the same dire situation with thankfully an outcome resulting in no loss of life or injury.
What really jumps out of that initial report and some questions I'd like answered are;
The Qantas aircraft sails straight in after at least one aircraft has conducted a missed approach and diverted, conducts one approach with sufficient fuel on board and decides to just 'bust' minima, does so by 'only 150 feet', gets visual, sweet as, lands, refuels and continues on its merry way no worries!
The Virgin aircraft then conducts a missed approach after the Qantas aircraft had landed. I guess they were very lucky the fog cleared enough in those few minutes that they only had to 'bust' the minima by 150 feet because both before and after their landing other aircraft couldn't get in.
How much below the minima did the Qantas crew really go? Was this a classic case of getinitis and deference?
What was the Qantas crew's plan of action should they not get visual by busting minima off their first approach? This it appears, was not discussed.
Once you start making up your own minima and instrument approach conditions, on the fly, at an unfamiliar airport things start to get very sticky. A plan of action needs to be discussed, as was done by the Virgin crew.
Why wasn't the Qantas crew stood down immediately after such a serious incident?
They are the facts and they are the questions I can guarantee you will be asked by the ATSB and also the regulator during the process of investigating this incident
Two different airlines, two different operating cultures, flying the same aircraft dealing with the same dire situation with thankfully an outcome resulting in no loss of life or injury.
What really jumps out of that initial report and some questions I'd like answered are;
The Qantas aircraft sails straight in after at least one aircraft has conducted a missed approach and diverted, conducts one approach with sufficient fuel on board and decides to just 'bust' minima, does so by 'only 150 feet', gets visual, sweet as, lands, refuels and continues on its merry way no worries!
The Virgin aircraft then conducts a missed approach after the Qantas aircraft had landed. I guess they were very lucky the fog cleared enough in those few minutes that they only had to 'bust' the minima by 150 feet because both before and after their landing other aircraft couldn't get in.
How much below the minima did the Qantas crew really go? Was this a classic case of getinitis and deference?
What was the Qantas crew's plan of action should they not get visual by busting minima off their first approach? This it appears, was not discussed.
Once you start making up your own minima and instrument approach conditions, on the fly, at an unfamiliar airport things start to get very sticky. A plan of action needs to be discussed, as was done by the Virgin crew.
Why wasn't the Qantas crew stood down immediately after such a serious incident?
They are the facts and they are the questions I can guarantee you will be asked by the ATSB and also the regulator during the process of investigating this incident
Last edited by Compylot; 18th Jul 2013 at 23:48.
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Capt Fathom
I may have written that poorly.
1384 was our original aircraft and it was still there when we left on a replacement Virgin 737
From memory the Qantas aircraft passengers did not leave the aircraft. I think it departed around midday or shortly after.
We left around 3
Kris
I may have written that poorly.
1384 was our original aircraft and it was still there when we left on a replacement Virgin 737
From memory the Qantas aircraft passengers did not leave the aircraft. I think it departed around midday or shortly after.
We left around 3
Kris
Last edited by Kris Lovell; 18th Jul 2013 at 23:53.
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Compylot
The report does not detail the qantas discussions.
You have no way of knowing what the Qantas crew discussed so to make such a blanket assumption is absurd.
Nor do you have any insight into what the qantas crew might have done if they did not become visual. You may speculate but it means nothing.
You state that qantas just sails in with SUFFICIENT FUEL. Sufficient for what?
The Qantas guys can see that the fog is becoming a problem they know that aircraft have missed by flying to minima. They plan to fly 200 feet below minima on their first attempt, its in the report and they get visual.
What did you expect them to do fly around mildura on a scenic tour waiting for the fog to clear?
Clearly both busted minima on the first go. Just because we are provided with some insight into virgins decision making process does not mean that qantas didnt have a process.
Gazumpy says that the virgin crew did not yet have a fuel emergency on their first attempt yet they busted minima anyhow.
Qantas busts minima on first attempt and gets hammered by you guys.
Why cant you virgin guys just accept that 2 crew managed 2 seperate aircraft in their own way as part of a response to a difficult situation.
One landed with FFR intact and one did not. So what. They both managed the situation to a safe outcome.
The report does not detail the qantas discussions.
You have no way of knowing what the Qantas crew discussed so to make such a blanket assumption is absurd.
Nor do you have any insight into what the qantas crew might have done if they did not become visual. You may speculate but it means nothing.
You state that qantas just sails in with SUFFICIENT FUEL. Sufficient for what?
The Qantas guys can see that the fog is becoming a problem they know that aircraft have missed by flying to minima. They plan to fly 200 feet below minima on their first attempt, its in the report and they get visual.
What did you expect them to do fly around mildura on a scenic tour waiting for the fog to clear?
Clearly both busted minima on the first go. Just because we are provided with some insight into virgins decision making process does not mean that qantas didnt have a process.
Gazumpy says that the virgin crew did not yet have a fuel emergency on their first attempt yet they busted minima anyhow.
Qantas busts minima on first attempt and gets hammered by you guys.
Why cant you virgin guys just accept that 2 crew managed 2 seperate aircraft in their own way as part of a response to a difficult situation.
One landed with FFR intact and one did not. So what. They both managed the situation to a safe outcome.
Last edited by tenretni; 19th Jul 2013 at 00:18.
From my armchair, and I believe the Pilots did an excellent job considering the circumstances.
Cloud on the TAf with 600 ft even though sct should be a warning to avoid especially without an ILS.
The companies and CASA allow domestic Aircraft to operate without an alternate subject to WX requirements.
As ADL did not require an Alternate until arrival then obviously an Autoland (in hindsight) was a better option and a correct outcome as an alternate was never planned for and also in hindsight was not the safest option.
The companies and CASA are mostly to blame , the Pilots dealt with the situation very well , a minima bust was inevitable through no fault of their own, I think an ILS is better for the situation in all cases.
Also because somebody diverts somewhere it may not be the correct choice for the next guy too, different fuel states etc...(the follow like sheep scenario I am not saying this is what happened but it is worth mentioning) .
Cloud on the TAf with 600 ft even though sct should be a warning to avoid especially without an ILS.
The companies and CASA allow domestic Aircraft to operate without an alternate subject to WX requirements.
As ADL did not require an Alternate until arrival then obviously an Autoland (in hindsight) was a better option and a correct outcome as an alternate was never planned for and also in hindsight was not the safest option.
The companies and CASA are mostly to blame , the Pilots dealt with the situation very well , a minima bust was inevitable through no fault of their own, I think an ILS is better for the situation in all cases.
Also because somebody diverts somewhere it may not be the correct choice for the next guy too, different fuel states etc...(the follow like sheep scenario I am not saying this is what happened but it is worth mentioning) .
Last edited by Rabbitwear; 19th Jul 2013 at 00:37.
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How did this get turned into a QF v VA thing??
A very ordinary day at the office yet safe outcomes prevailed with very few options available.
Well done to both crews.
If this rears its head in the media again, I only hope the professionalism of both crews is highlighted, something that was lost on the initial reports.
My only disappointment, that both crews didn't down tools and head off to the nearest bar for a solid debrief
A very ordinary day at the office yet safe outcomes prevailed with very few options available.
Well done to both crews.
If this rears its head in the media again, I only hope the professionalism of both crews is highlighted, something that was lost on the initial reports.
My only disappointment, that both crews didn't down tools and head off to the nearest bar for a solid debrief
The report does not detail the qantas discussions.
The report DOES detail the discussions by the Virgin crew though.
So either the Qantas crew didn't discuss what to do should they not get visual or it wasn't included in the prelim report... It seems on the surface that the Qantas crew were committed to getting in on that first approach no matter what.
This isn't virgin vs qantas, this is an analysis of the facts. Deidentify the airlines involved and present this scenario to any airline pilot worth his salt and I can guarantee that the same questions would be raised.
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an Autoland (in hindsight) was a better option and a correct outcome as an alternate was never planned for and also in hindsight was not the safest option.
(very dated observation here)
Whether we like it or not, the reality is that we can be called to account for our decisions after the event.
If a crew elects not to comply with one or more specific requirements and the outcome is unfortunate then two situations arise -
(a) there was another reasonable, legal, etc., option and the crew had taken all reasonable planning and inflight steps.
Becomes a very tenuous argument to sustain the original decision in the face of an aggressive barrage by skilled counsel or a Regulator hell bent on taking action against the pilot's licence.
(b) there was no other reasonable, legal, etc., option and the crew had taken all reasonable planning and inflight steps.
Far easier to sustain the original decision in court or at whichever inquisition is relevant.
Looking back some years when forecasting was very problematic with respect to fog conditions, I can't recall any crews of my acquaintance who didn't religiously consider dew point, temperature split, cloud cover, wind expectation, high/low, etc. This was especially so heading off to those airports notorious for being fog lovers ... motoring westbound to PER or southbound to LST/HBA late at night bring back more than a few memories ..
We all got plenty of practice at PNR calculations on the way (no FMS etc. toys back then - maybe the odd hand held calculator but, mostly, it was smoke off the prayer wheels).
Every now and again, folks got caught out but experience managed to win the day (night, as the case may have been). One can even recall tales similar to the present events .. mind you, one would never have been involved in such things, oneself ...
The other consideration ... delaring an emergency at the time makes the commander's perception of the situation much clearer to all the players.
(very dated observation here)
Whether we like it or not, the reality is that we can be called to account for our decisions after the event.
If a crew elects not to comply with one or more specific requirements and the outcome is unfortunate then two situations arise -
(a) there was another reasonable, legal, etc., option and the crew had taken all reasonable planning and inflight steps.
Becomes a very tenuous argument to sustain the original decision in the face of an aggressive barrage by skilled counsel or a Regulator hell bent on taking action against the pilot's licence.
(b) there was no other reasonable, legal, etc., option and the crew had taken all reasonable planning and inflight steps.
Far easier to sustain the original decision in court or at whichever inquisition is relevant.
Looking back some years when forecasting was very problematic with respect to fog conditions, I can't recall any crews of my acquaintance who didn't religiously consider dew point, temperature split, cloud cover, wind expectation, high/low, etc. This was especially so heading off to those airports notorious for being fog lovers ... motoring westbound to PER or southbound to LST/HBA late at night bring back more than a few memories ..
We all got plenty of practice at PNR calculations on the way (no FMS etc. toys back then - maybe the odd hand held calculator but, mostly, it was smoke off the prayer wheels).
Every now and again, folks got caught out but experience managed to win the day (night, as the case may have been). One can even recall tales similar to the present events .. mind you, one would never have been involved in such things, oneself ...
The other consideration ... delaring an emergency at the time makes the commander's perception of the situation much clearer to all the players.
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The QF landing and previous autolands these past few weeks has begun to concern me. Unless the report is leaving out something, did qf declare a pan and fuel emergency? If not , why not. They busted minimums. Why did they bust minimums and land with 2.1, almost 1hr? My concern is not a qf vs va thing, but perhaps there is a more accepted culture at qf of autoland below minima etc that has crept in?
Reminds me of my old job where the gpws was very intermittent. Everybody just kept flying it like that because that's the way it has always been until a new pilot came in and essentially said wtf! We got so used to it thought it was ok.
Hopefully I'm wrong and more facts to come.
Reminds me of my old job where the gpws was very intermittent. Everybody just kept flying it like that because that's the way it has always been until a new pilot came in and essentially said wtf! We got so used to it thought it was ok.
Hopefully I'm wrong and more facts to come.
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You guys just dont get it do you?
Put yourselves in the QF drivers seat for a moment.
You arrive at the circuit and you know that aircraft have missed out on approaches to the minima. ... its in the report.
You know that the weather is getting worse just by observation. ...its in the report
You know that you dont have fuel to divert...its in the report.
What would you do?
Put yourselves in the QF drivers seat for a moment.
You arrive at the circuit and you know that aircraft have missed out on approaches to the minima. ... its in the report.
You know that the weather is getting worse just by observation. ...its in the report
You know that you dont have fuel to divert...its in the report.
What would you do?