an Autoland (in hindsight) was a better option and a correct outcome as an alternate was never planned for and also in hindsight was not the safest option.
(very dated observation here)
Whether we like it or not, the reality is that we can be called to account for our decisions after the event.
If a crew elects not to comply with one or more specific requirements and the outcome is unfortunate then two situations arise -
(a) there was another reasonable, legal, etc., option and the crew had taken all reasonable planning and inflight steps.
Becomes a very tenuous argument to sustain the original decision in the face of an aggressive barrage by skilled counsel or a Regulator hell bent on taking action against the pilot's licence.
(b) there was
no other reasonable, legal, etc., option and the crew had taken all reasonable planning and inflight steps.
Far easier to sustain the original decision in court or at whichever inquisition is relevant.
Looking back some years when forecasting was very problematic with respect to fog conditions, I can't recall any crews of my acquaintance who didn't religiously consider dew point, temperature split, cloud cover, wind expectation, high/low, etc. This was especially so heading off to those airports notorious for being fog lovers ... motoring westbound to PER or southbound to LST/HBA late at night bring back more than a few memories ..
We all got plenty of practice at PNR calculations on the way (no FMS etc. toys back then - maybe the odd hand held calculator but, mostly, it was smoke off the prayer wheels).
Every now and again, folks got caught out but experience managed to win the day (night, as the case may have been). One can even recall tales similar to the present events .. mind you, one would never have been involved in such things, oneself ...
The other consideration ... delaring an emergency at the time makes the commander's perception of the situation much clearer to all the players.