Paul Holmes and Erebus
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While there is no doubt some blame must rest with the crew ...
They were lured into a very carefully laid trap. Very few pilots, myself included, would not have fallen for it.
Can any pilot here say that this accident would not have happened had they been the captain that day?
If somebody comes forward and says "yes - it would not have happened to me because I would have been observing that descent SOP" then I will inform you that you are deluded.
... prior to descending it's the Captains responsibility to ensure, by whatever means he/she thinks is neccessary, that they are not going to hit a hill.
This is the whole point that Mahon was making.
If, for several years, your fellow pilots make successful RNAV approaches into a place, then after a datacard update that accidentally shifted the waypoints, you attempted the approach but crashed into a hill, would that be your fault?
Ok, framer, just how do you go about making an instrument approach? You do it by placing trust in people that have designed and drawn up the procedure.
Although I was talking about confirming position prior to descending through MSA the concept is similar. Do you assume that the RNAV system is faultless and that flight planing and your crew and you yourself have made no errors? Or do you relentlessly cross check, confirm and verify things? It is a constant part of the job, we are always doing this.
Framer, the only checks they had at the time were visual
Prior to leaving 16,000ft they needed to verify their position.
If they had plotted the lat/longs onto a map it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until a radial DME check confirmed their position it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until visually past Erebus it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until overhead the station their position would have been verified.
I imagine you'l respond to this by saying that they couldn't get the DME or a radial, my response to that is that is even more reson to remain at MSA, it casts doubt as to why things aren't as expected.
When I argue this point it always sounds as though I'm saying I would have done better. I'm not. I don't know how I would have gone in the same situation. I'm using the luxury of hindsite and reports and also have the decades of learning the industry has gone through to help me. I'm lucky enough to be able to learn from the mistakes this crew made.
By saying they never made a mistake we are running the risk of missing out on some very important lessons.
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Although I was talking about confirming position prior to descending through MSA the concept is similar. Do you assume that the RNAV system is faultless and that flight planing and your crew and you yourself have made no errors? Or do you relentlessly cross check, confirm and verify things? It is a constant part of the job, we are always doing this.
I don't think that is true.
If they had plotted the lat/longs onto a map it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until a radial DME check confirmed their position it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until visually past Erebus it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until overhead the station their position would have been verified.
I imagine you'l respond to this by saying that they couldn't get the DME or a radial, my response to that is that is even more reson to remain at MSA, it casts doubt as to why things aren't as expected.
By saying they never made a mistake we are running the risk of missing out on some very important lessons.
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DozyWannabe,
" Only Chippindale's mates and those with a vested interest in ANZ - the rest of the public sided with Mahon."
That is a quite ridiculous statement. As this and other threads on the subject have shown, many people, pilots and others, share the view that there were errors made by everyone involved. and the reason this thread has been resurrected is the stupid claim by Paul Holmes that an apology to the family of Collins is due from the NZ Parliament because the crew were blameless
Following from Capt Dereck Ellis appeared in the British Airline Pilots magazine "The Log"
From John Kings publication "NZ Tragedies."
Ellis was at the time a British Airways Captain, flying Concordes, later flying 747's for Singapore Airways.
"Before reading Impact Erebus my knowledge of the event led me to gratefully and happily accept the view of the Hon P.T. Mahon as stated in the findings of the Royal Commission of Enquiry-" In my opinion, neither Capt Collins nor First Officer Cassin, nor the Flight Engineers made any error which contributed to the cause of the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence.
The effect of reading Gordon Vette's book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the Commissioner, has been in fact to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of the Air Accidents Investigation are infinitely more realistic".
There are many other publications along the same lines by very experienced aviators, but as you stated earlier you have read them all.
But it would appear you and others do not really understand what the Captains responsibilities were after requesting a VMC descent. At no time was Mt Erebus ever sighted, that alone should have rung very loud warning bells before descent below MSA.
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"that conditions existed whereby it would be possible for Erebus to be lost in whiteout - even in clear air, and "
That is a complete figment of your imagination, the whole of Ross Island was covered in cloud with a reported base, just before descent began, of 2,000ft.
"They did plot the lats/longs on a map, but did it the previous night - based on the co-ordinates they were given in their briefing. "
You completely miss the point, if there was any doubt about their position, and there was considerable doubt, as Peter Mulgrew stated just prior to impact 4 minutes I believe it was, that when he had any idea of their position he would let the pax know, this was announced from the cockpit.
The Lat and Long should have been checked before descent below 16,000ft. The readout was just above their heads.
One thing that has not been mentioned in this thread is where was First Officer Lucas during this critical phase of the flight. We have been told there was up to eight people in the cockpit during this time, may be there was no room left in there for him???
From a different thread on the same subject that may or not be true but from people who knew the man say it was the response they would expect.
" did see a hand written transcript of the voice recorder that commenced with "You are wrong, stick it up your arse." Bang door slammed( ostensibly from Lucas). thence the rest of the 30 minutes of tape recording."
" Only Chippindale's mates and those with a vested interest in ANZ - the rest of the public sided with Mahon."
That is a quite ridiculous statement. As this and other threads on the subject have shown, many people, pilots and others, share the view that there were errors made by everyone involved. and the reason this thread has been resurrected is the stupid claim by Paul Holmes that an apology to the family of Collins is due from the NZ Parliament because the crew were blameless
Following from Capt Dereck Ellis appeared in the British Airline Pilots magazine "The Log"
From John Kings publication "NZ Tragedies."
Ellis was at the time a British Airways Captain, flying Concordes, later flying 747's for Singapore Airways.
"Before reading Impact Erebus my knowledge of the event led me to gratefully and happily accept the view of the Hon P.T. Mahon as stated in the findings of the Royal Commission of Enquiry-" In my opinion, neither Capt Collins nor First Officer Cassin, nor the Flight Engineers made any error which contributed to the cause of the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence.
The effect of reading Gordon Vette's book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the Commissioner, has been in fact to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of the Air Accidents Investigation are infinitely more realistic".
There are many other publications along the same lines by very experienced aviators, but as you stated earlier you have read them all.
But it would appear you and others do not really understand what the Captains responsibilities were after requesting a VMC descent. At no time was Mt Erebus ever sighted, that alone should have rung very loud warning bells before descent below MSA.
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"that conditions existed whereby it would be possible for Erebus to be lost in whiteout - even in clear air, and "
That is a complete figment of your imagination, the whole of Ross Island was covered in cloud with a reported base, just before descent began, of 2,000ft.
"They did plot the lats/longs on a map, but did it the previous night - based on the co-ordinates they were given in their briefing. "
You completely miss the point, if there was any doubt about their position, and there was considerable doubt, as Peter Mulgrew stated just prior to impact 4 minutes I believe it was, that when he had any idea of their position he would let the pax know, this was announced from the cockpit.
The Lat and Long should have been checked before descent below 16,000ft. The readout was just above their heads.
One thing that has not been mentioned in this thread is where was First Officer Lucas during this critical phase of the flight. We have been told there was up to eight people in the cockpit during this time, may be there was no room left in there for him???
From a different thread on the same subject that may or not be true but from people who knew the man say it was the response they would expect.
" did see a hand written transcript of the voice recorder that commenced with "You are wrong, stick it up your arse." Bang door slammed( ostensibly from Lucas). thence the rest of the 30 minutes of tape recording."
Last edited by prospector; 7th Dec 2011 at 00:27.
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and the reason this thread has been resurrected is the stupid claim by Paul Holmes that an apology to the family of Collins is due from the NZ Parliament because the crew were blameless
"The effect of reading Gordon Vette's book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the Commissioner, has been in fact to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of the Air Accidents Investigation are infinitely more realistic"
Was Ellis aware that Chippindale had falsified the CVR?
There are many other publications along the same lines by very experienced aviators, but as you stated earlier you have read them all.
Not all "experienced aviators" are right - just look at Capt. Van Zanten. If this flight was briefed as one requiring all the aviation know-how that the crews had, then I'm sure the argument would stand, but it was not. As I said before, ANZ had been shaving the safety margins away year-on-year and informing neither their crews nor the NZCA that they were doing so. The flights were briefed such that a combination of AINS, visual fixes and supervision from Mac Central were enough to ensure safe passage and that is exactly what Collins and his crew did.
But it would appear you and others do not really understand what the Captains responsibilities were after requesting a VMC descent. At no time was Mt Erebus ever sighted, that alone should have rung very loud warning bells before descent below MSA.
That is a complete figment of your imagination, the whole of Ross Island was covered in cloud with a reported base, just before descent began, of 2,000ft.
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" No-one is doubting that errors were made by the crew" You said
"Originally Posted by 27/09
While there is no doubt some blame must rest with the crew...
"I doubt it wholeheartedly" You said..
"No-one's saying they never made a mistake" You said.
" and it was possible to discern landmarks below"
And they discerned them wrongly, is that not a mistake? Beaufort Is shows up quite clearly in some of the photo's, not twigging they were on the wrong side of it, is that not a mistake??
I am not implying they were negligent, and the cards were stacked against them, but they could have broken that chain of errors by confirming their position before descent below MSA, As has been written many times in this thread there were a number of ways this could have been achieved.
That is what this whole thread has been about, whether the crew were blameless as claimed by Mahon, Vette, and now Holmes.
You agree some errors, and mistakes were made by the crew but they are blameless???
That would be a nice world to live in where one is not responsible for one's mistakes or errors.
"Originally Posted by 27/09
While there is no doubt some blame must rest with the crew...
"I doubt it wholeheartedly" You said..
"No-one's saying they never made a mistake" You said.
" and it was possible to discern landmarks below"
And they discerned them wrongly, is that not a mistake? Beaufort Is shows up quite clearly in some of the photo's, not twigging they were on the wrong side of it, is that not a mistake??
I am not implying they were negligent, and the cards were stacked against them, but they could have broken that chain of errors by confirming their position before descent below MSA, As has been written many times in this thread there were a number of ways this could have been achieved.
That is what this whole thread has been about, whether the crew were blameless as claimed by Mahon, Vette, and now Holmes.
You agree some errors, and mistakes were made by the crew but they are blameless???
That would be a nice world to live in where one is not responsible for one's mistakes or errors.
Last edited by prospector; 7th Dec 2011 at 02:43.
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eg do you just assume that the glidepath is accurate or do you use your altimeter to cross check and confirm it is by referenceing to a DME when you commence the approach?
Do you assume that the RNAV system is faultless and that flight planing and your crew and you yourself have made no errors?
If they had plotted the lat/longs onto a map it would have highlighted the anomaly.
If they had remained at MSA until ...
They had been informed that the cloud base was 2,000' with visibility below the base >20km. While still north of Ross Island and in VMC, they had the opportunity to descend to below the cloud base, and they took that opportunity.
prospector,
I appreciate your thoughts and contributions to this and the earlier Erebus threads. To make your posts more readable when quoting others, could you please show the quoted section the way posters normally do.
To do that: "select" all the text that you are quoting (click at the start of the text, then drag the mouse pointer down to just past the end of the text). Then press the little button above (near the "YouTube" button) that looks like a speech bubble. Please PM me if you need further assistance. Thanks.
Dozy it looks like we'l just have to agree to disagree. Some things look white to you and appear black to me. I guess thats an indication of how many grey areas there are in this episode.
you said
then wait until you're south of the volcanoes or radar identified or can clearly see the terrain.
That doesn't cut it. Seriously.
Yes.
I agree that the mistakes are understandable. Most mistakes are. That doesn't mean that we can't defend against them.
you said
The TACAN could give them a DME, but it's position south of Ross Island meant they couldn't rely on it until south of the volcanoes.
They did plot the lats/longs on a map, but did it the previous night
And risked getting complaints from passengers that they couldn't see anything.
No-one's saying they never made a mistake - simply that the mistake was entirely understandable given the information they had, or more importantly the information they didn't have
Is that what you would have done?
I have had completely different training in completely different times from that crew, flying different equipment.
What I can say is that if I am flying an aircraft without ANP alerting and GPS input to the FMS I confirm position prior to descending below MSA. Normally this is done using a VOR and a DME, sometimes by being radar identified, and rarely by overheading a station.Maybe I do that because of lessons learnt back then and if I was there I would have done the exact same thing as they did. Unless you were a Captain back then (I wasn't)I don't think you can say what you would have done.Times have changed.
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If I may chime in hear again, homing in on general prinicples of fail-safe flying:
if you asked most commercial pilots both today and in 1979, would there be/have been a consensus that a visual descent below MSA must ALWAYS be preceded by something more "positive" than the unquestioned assumption your (actual !!) AINS flight plan, unaccompanied by any additional crosschecks or corroboration, could not possibly be fallible? The "Vette" position would appear to say no, not always. Isn't this essentially what the debate reduces to?
if you asked most commercial pilots both today and in 1979, would there be/have been a consensus that a visual descent below MSA must ALWAYS be preceded by something more "positive" than the unquestioned assumption your (actual !!) AINS flight plan, unaccompanied by any additional crosschecks or corroboration, could not possibly be fallible? The "Vette" position would appear to say no, not always. Isn't this essentially what the debate reduces to?
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Hi Dozy,
But doesn't this cut to the heart of the issue though? Doesn't this show that AINS is much more subject to error than a ground aid, which (I presume) is not being programmed and re-programmed every day, thus not as prone to slips of the finger? ( I am not a pilot, so please correct me.)
Also, how difficult would it have been for the crew to check the coordinates of the end point to McMurdo? They had what, 4 hours after take off to do this? That wouldn't have required more than a check of a few waypoints on the final leg of the inbound route. (Again, this is all with hind sight of course, and the context of some really bad luck coincidences. This is not an attempt to villify Collins.)
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
If a crew is told to expect to be placed in a given situation and that situation is changed without their knowledge, and with limited facilities to work that change out for themselves,
Also, how difficult would it have been for the crew to check the coordinates of the end point to McMurdo? They had what, 4 hours after take off to do this? That wouldn't have required more than a check of a few waypoints on the final leg of the inbound route. (Again, this is all with hind sight of course, and the context of some really bad luck coincidences. This is not an attempt to villify Collins.)
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The "Vette" position would appear to say no, not always. Isn't this essentially what the debate reduces to?
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" did see a hand written transcript of the voice recorder that commenced with "You are wrong, stick it up your arse." Bang door slammed( ostensibly from Lucas). thence the rest of the 30 minutes of tape recording."
As a result of this, even if it was on the tape and his transcription is correct (which requires a considerable pinch of salt in the first place), shorn of context it is completely useless. It could be about anything, not necessarily to do with the flight. Even if all these things are satisfied it does not gel with the otherwise good CRM ("crew loop" in those days) on the rest of the tape.
I agree that the mistakes are understandable. Most mistakes are. That doesn't mean that we can't defend against them.
Also, how difficult would it have been for the crew to check the coordinates of the end point to McMurdo? They had what, 4 hours after take off to do this?
Really? Given that the whole basis of the NZCA's argument was that the pilots left themselves ill-prepared
I'd say it demonstrates that they went to considerable lengths to have all their ducks in a row.
Defend against them yes - to do so by falsifying evidence to make the crew seem more responsible for the mistake than they were is completely out of line.
eg, verifying position before descending below MSA, and creating a culture within our airlines where we don't breach SOP's, if the SOP's are too restrictive then management can change them.
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And another one of the holes in this Swiss cheese that has not been discussed is the fact that ANZ could well have only used two senior, or management pilots for these flights. They then would have accumulated some experience in AntArctic conditions.
But, it is a known fact that ALPA put pressure on the Company to share these flights around the senior captains. This in itself sounds a fairly innocuous thing to do, but surely shows up why all the other operators going to the ice required a minimum of three trips as an observer or first officer before going down as P1
Dozywannabe,
The CVR tapes were obviously not easy to interpret. One of the reasons being that there were up to eight different voices recorded. What were all these people doing in the cockpit at this critical time??
The remark attributed to First Officer Lucas, was to those who knew him, just the way he would react if he did not agree with something, in this case the descent procedure.
Your insistance that Ron Chippendale and Capt Gemmel were involved in some sort of conspiracy is ridiculous. The one third to CAA and 2 thirds of the cost to ANZ of the enquiry, that Mahon awarded to be paid to the estates of Collins and Cassin, and some of that to cover the costs of NZALPA, and the $150,000 fine to ANZ, were thrown out by the Appeal Court, and upheld by the Privy Council because as they stated there was no evidence of , or as they stated "No clear proof " of any plan of deception.
But, it is a known fact that ALPA put pressure on the Company to share these flights around the senior captains. This in itself sounds a fairly innocuous thing to do, but surely shows up why all the other operators going to the ice required a minimum of three trips as an observer or first officer before going down as P1
Dozywannabe,
The CVR tapes were obviously not easy to interpret. One of the reasons being that there were up to eight different voices recorded. What were all these people doing in the cockpit at this critical time??
The remark attributed to First Officer Lucas, was to those who knew him, just the way he would react if he did not agree with something, in this case the descent procedure.
Your insistance that Ron Chippendale and Capt Gemmel were involved in some sort of conspiracy is ridiculous. The one third to CAA and 2 thirds of the cost to ANZ of the enquiry, that Mahon awarded to be paid to the estates of Collins and Cassin, and some of that to cover the costs of NZALPA, and the $150,000 fine to ANZ, were thrown out by the Appeal Court, and upheld by the Privy Council because as they stated there was no evidence of , or as they stated "No clear proof " of any plan of deception.
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To many things change between the night before and when you go flying.
It still doesn't change the fact that when the MSA is FL160, and there are mountains around you, you should not leave the safety of MSA until you can verify your position.
There was uncertainty as to what they were seeing
there was no explanation as to why they were having trouble with VHF comms, they were low level high speed in an unfamiliar area.
Mahon said time and time again that there was no signs of alarm on the flight deck. I suggest that he doesn't understand the subtilties of flight deck communication and things were becoming progressively less comfortable for the crew by the second. Questions like "where is Erebus now?" are asked for a reason.
verifying position before descending below MSA, and creating a culture within our airlines where we don't breach SOP's, if the SOP's are too restrictive then management can change them.
But, it is a known fact that ALPA put pressure on the Company to share these flights around the senior captains. This in itself sounds a fairly innocuous thing to do, but surely shows up why all the other operators going to the ice required a minimum of three trips as an observer or first officer before going down as P1
What were all these people doing in the cockpit at this critical time??
The remark attributed to First Officer Lucas, was to those who knew him, just the way he would react if he did not agree with something, in this case the descent procedure.
Your insistance that Ron Chippendale and Capt Gemmel were involved in some sort of conspiracy is ridiculous.
The one third to CAA and 2 thirds of the cost to ANZ of the enquiry, that Mahon awarded to be paid to the estates of Collins and Cassin, and some of that to cover the costs of NZALPA, and the $150,000 fine to ANZ, were thrown out by the Appeal Court, and upheld by the Privy Council because as they stated there was no evidence of , or as they stated "No clear proof " of any plan of deception.
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DozyWannabe,
Could you please name the family links to the Privy Council???
You obviously are so convinced of the invicinbility of Mahon and Vette you do not read and digest fact.
Your comment re communications is wrong, they never at any time lost communication, but it was all via HF, no VHF.
You were invited by a previous poster, henry crun, from memory, to give your version of how a tower, or radar controller would 'Invite" a descent to 500ft. You have not supplied an answer yet. Regardless of Company SOP's it was a CAA mandatory requirement that no flight below 6,000ft was permitted. The fact that a senior Check and Training captain carried out such a descent at the invitation of a controller, and made it public that he had done so, certainly made a rod for the back of later crews, especially when the weather was not SKC and unlimited visibility.
You have not as yet described how the transponder could possibly be working when it was physically impossible for radar to get any returns when the descent was carried out as it was, and there is no dispute on the reported track of this descent. They got a return for a min or two, no more.
Could you please name the family links to the Privy Council???
You obviously are so convinced of the invicinbility of Mahon and Vette you do not read and digest fact.
Your comment re communications is wrong, they never at any time lost communication, but it was all via HF, no VHF.
You were invited by a previous poster, henry crun, from memory, to give your version of how a tower, or radar controller would 'Invite" a descent to 500ft. You have not supplied an answer yet. Regardless of Company SOP's it was a CAA mandatory requirement that no flight below 6,000ft was permitted. The fact that a senior Check and Training captain carried out such a descent at the invitation of a controller, and made it public that he had done so, certainly made a rod for the back of later crews, especially when the weather was not SKC and unlimited visibility.
You have not as yet described how the transponder could possibly be working when it was physically impossible for radar to get any returns when the descent was carried out as it was, and there is no dispute on the reported track of this descent. They got a return for a min or two, no more.
Last edited by prospector; 7th Dec 2011 at 22:05.